Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs)

Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs)

ML031150237
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	06/22/1988
Revision:	0
From:	Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-041, NUDOCS 8806170033
Download: ML031150237 (8)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 22, 1988NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-41: PHYSICAL PROTECTION WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIEDTHROUGH REGULATORY EFFECTIVFNESS REVIEWS(RERs)

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potentialproblems resulting from weaknesses that may exist in their physical securitysystems and programs. The NRC identified physical security weaknesses duringsafeguards regulatory effectiveness reviews (RERs) at a number of plant sites.It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do notconstitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required.Description of Weaknesses:During recent RERs, which assess a licensee's capability to cope with the F!PC'sdesign-basis threats, the staff identified problems at a number of sites. Thesefindings involved such areas as intrusion detection systems, vital area barriers,alarm assessment and response, access portal search equipment, and weapons derployment and mix.Some examples of findings identified at various sites that have generic appli-cability are given below.1. Support posts, junction boxes, and fencing located in close proximity toperimeter intrusion detection systems have been demonstrated to be poten-tial penetration aids for successfully defeating detection. Some intru-sion detection systems also could be circumvented in certain instances bycrawling. In addition, RER team members have found weaknesses in intru-sion detection coverage on the roofs, ledges, and walls of structures thatmake up a portion of the protected area barrier at some sites.2. Several sites have had difficulty distinguishing between nuisance or falsealarms and alarms activated by a simulated intruder.8 36703 IN 88-41June 22, 1988 . Some vital area barriers were found where ventilation openings and ducting,walls, and hatches provided little resistance to undetected penetration byhand tools available within the protected area.4. Performance problems with X-ray equipment were experienced at a few sitesduring RERs. Coordination of X-ray and explosive detection techniques alsowas a weakness at some sites.5. Weaknesses were found in the storage locations and in the accessibility ofresponse weapons and equipment.6. Detection systems sometimes were not functionally tested following soft-ware changes to the security computer system.7. Problems were identified with regard to the backup power supply for pro-tected area security lighting.8. Tactical training exercises have been infrequent or did not cover the rangeof potential safeguards contingencies consistent with NRC's design-basisthreat.Discussion:To be fully effective, physical protection must be supported by a managementcommitment to excellence; performance testing of equipment, procedures, andpersonnel functions; and good maintenance. The approaches that some licenseeshave employed for dealing with the above-mentioned weaknesses are given below.However, these are not the only acceptable solutions; alternative solutions mayexist that are better suited to the conditions of a particular site.Intrusion Detection:Reducing the height or changing the configuration of intrusion detection systemsupport posts and relocating Junction boxes and fencing are means of eliminatingthese objects from serving as penetration aids. Stacking microwave heads, ad-ding E-field wire or shortening detection zones have been effective againstjumping or crawling. Reconfiguring, replacing, or repairing existing intrusiondetection systems or adding additional intrusion detection devices have, in someinstances, improved the capability to detect attempted penetration over, around,or through protected area barrier structures.Alarm Assessment:Alarm assessment has been improved in several cases by the addition and/orenhancement of closed-circuit television cameras; timely and thorough on sceneverification by a security patrol; the addition of a second fence to delay arunning adversary; and/or increasing the alarm callup monitor speed.Vital Area Barriers:At a number of sites, material such as welded deck grating has been used to pro-vide a substantial barrier. In some cases, intrusion detection systems have beeninstalled to detect any attempted penetration of vital area barriers. Adequacy IN 88-41June 22, 1988 of barriers is affected by factors-such as time required to penetrate in relationto detection and response capability, the amount of normal foot traffic throughthe area, and the extent of concealment available to adversaries.Entry Searches:Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand-carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitiveequipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.Response Weapons and Equipment:Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location to faci-litate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easy inter-diction of the response force. Ammunition placed in the weapons that are lockedin storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can also facilitaterapid deployment.Computer Software Changes:In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, somelicensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has notbeen adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.Security Lighting:Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source ofbackup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also havebeen used.Tactical Training:Some licensees are increasing the frequency and thoroughness of tactical trainingdrills for their security forces. Security training officers have been givenspecialized education and training in tactics.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211

Attachment:

List of Recentlv Issued NRC Information Notices AttachmentIN 88-41June 22, 1988Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to88-4088-3988-3888-3788-3688-3588-34Examiners' Handbook forDeveloping OperatorLicensing ExaminationsLaSalle Unit 2 Loss ofRecirculation Pumps WithPower Oscillation EventFailure of UndervoltageTrip Attachment on GeneralElectric Circuit BreakersFlow Blockage of CoolingWater to Safety SystemComponentsPossible Sudden Loss of RCSInventory During Low CoolantLevel Operation6/22/886/15/886/15/886/14/886/8/88All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for BWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.Inadequate Licensee Performed 6/3/88Vendor AuditsNuclear Material Controland Accountability ofNon-Fuel Special NuclearMaterial at Power Reactors5/31/8887-61,Supplement 1Failure of WestinghouseW-2-Type Circuit BreakerCell Switches5/31/88All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.88-33Recent Problems Involvingthe Model Spec 2-TRadiographic ExposureDevice5/27/88All Agreement Statesand NRC licenseesauthorized to manu-facture, distributeor operate raeio-graphic exposuredevices and sourcechangers.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit IN 88-41June 22, 1988 of barriers is affected by factors such as time required to penetrate in relationto detection and response capability, the amount of normal foot traffic throughthe area, and the extent of concealment available to adversaries.Entry Searches:Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand-carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitiveequipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.Response Weapons and Equipment:Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location to faci-litate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easy inter-diction of the response force. Ammunition placed in the weapons that are lockedin storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can also facilitaterapid deployment.Computer Software Changes:In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, somelicensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has notbeen adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.Security Lighting:Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source ofbackup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also havebeen used.Tactical Training:Some licensees are increasing thedrills for their security forces.specialized education and trainingfrequency and thoroughness of tactical trainingSecurity training officers have been givenin tactics.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES _06//,7/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRRNPKadambi MWarren RDube05/19/88 05/19/88 05/19/88*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger06/15/88*C/RSGB:DRIS:NRRRErickson05/19/88*PPMB:ARMTechEd05/27/88*AD/DRIS:NRRBGrimes05/26/88 IN 88-xxJune xx, 1988 in relation to detection and response capability, the amount of normal foottraffic through the area, and the extent of concealment available toadversaries.Entry Searches:Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand-carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitiveequipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.Response Weapons and Equipment:Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location tofacilitate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easyinterdiction of the response force. Ammunition placed In the weapons that arelocked in storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can alsofacilitate rapid deployment.Computer Software Changes:In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, somelicensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has notbeen adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.Security Lighting:Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source ofbackup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also havebeen used.Tactical Training:Some licensees are increasing the frequency and thoroughness of tacticaltraining drills for their security forces. Security training officers havebeen given specialized education and training in tactics.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Informat N tices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D/DOEA:NRR C/OGC :D A:NRRCERossi CHBerlinger06/ /88 06//3788OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *C/RSGB:DRIS:NRRNPKadambi ,P f MWarren RDube RErickson05/19/88 L/4% 05/l9/88 05/19/88 05/19/88*PPMB:ARMTechEd05/27/88*AD/DRIS:NRRBGrimes05/26/88

-4-IN 88xNo specific action or written response is required by this informationnotice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact theRegional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or thisoffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational EventsAssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211*See Previsous Concurrence aORC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :AD tyR :OGCB:NRR :OGCB:NRR~~~~~~~~-----s--------____ __ --- _ -- --- ---- --- --- -- ---- --__--__________-___-_____NAME :MWarren* :RDube* :RErickson* : eS :NPKadambi* :CHBerlinger______ _:________- ----------------:--------- :'-- -------------:-------------DATE :05/19/88 :05/19/88 :05/19/88 :5,'884df: 05/19/88 : / /88OFC :DOEA:NRR : rNAME :CERossi :v :::DATE ./ /88 *

-4-No specific action or written response is required by this informationnotice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact theRegional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or thisoffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational EventsAssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211ORC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB R :AD:DRIS:NRR :OGCBZ ::OGCB:NRR__---------- ----- --.............NAME :MWarren :RDube ? :REr n :BGrimes :NPKadambi :CHBerlinger___ ____--- ---:___________ -- ----- ------------ -- ---------DATE : 8 5/l/88 5/i /88 : / /88 / /88OFC :DOEA:NRR : :NAME :CERossi :DATE : / /88 : : : :