Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets

Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets

ML031150639
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	02/12/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-005, NUDOCS 8802110328
Download: ML031150639 (5)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 12, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE ND. 88-05: FIRE-IN ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL CABINETS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permitsifor nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

'

This Information notice is being provided to Inform addressees of three oc- currences of electrical fires in annunciator control panels suoplied by

Electro Devices, Inc. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained

in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Recently, electrical fires have occurred in remote cabinets containing multiple

circuit cards for the control of visual and audible annunciator functions in the

main control rooms at three nuclear power plants. The annunciator systems for

the three plants were provided by Electro Devices, Inc. of St. Louis, Missouri.

On January 28, 1988, while Beaver Valley 2 was in cold shutdown, all control

room annunciator alarms were lost. A small fire was detected in a remote an- nunciator'control cabinet, and it was immediately extinguished by the two

operators who had been dispatched to investigate. Plant parameters were avail- able throughout the event from other control room instruments and the safety

parameter display system. Because of the sustained loss of the annunciators, the'licensee declared an alert in accordance with the plant emergency plan.

Damaged solid state cards were removed, annunciator capability was restored, and the alert was terminated. The root cause of the fire is under investigation.

On February 1, 1988, while Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 was operating at 100% power, an

alert was declared because all control room annunciator alarms were lost. The

complete loss of the annunciator system resulted from a fire in a remote control

cabinet that provides audible and visual alarm functions for the main control

room. The operators were alerted to the fire by the actuation of the automatic

fire protection system. The visual indication function of all control room

annunciator panels was out of service for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the audible function

was not restored for two days. The root cause of the fire is under investiga- tion; however the licensee intends to review the adequacy of circuit protection

8802110328

IN 88-05 February 12, 1988 (sub-fusing of branch circuits within the annunciator

this contributed to the occurrence of the fire. The system) to determine if

power throughout the event. unit remained at 100%

On February 8, 1988, while Rancho Seco was in cold

annunciator alarms were lost because of a fire in ashutdown, all control- room'

provides audible and visual control functions to the remote control cabinet that

annunciator system. The

fire is believed to have originated from a failed subcomponent

circuit card. The root cause of 'the fire is under on a solid state

investigation.

Although the NRC's investigation of these events is

following similarities among the events are noteworthy:n`ot yet complete, the

-

The annunciator systems were provided by the same

manufacturer.

Common to each event was the licensee's lack of

specific

procedures to address complete loss of the annunciator emergency

system.

None of the licensees have provisions for monitoring

in the control cabinets. ambient temperatures

'-In the events at Calvert Cliffs and Rancho Seco, the fire teams experienced

nausea and dizziness, apparently as a result of inadequate

area in which the fire occurred. Licensees thus may oxygen in the

_ their procedures for fighting small fires in confined wish to review

areas to

a-cquacyofersonnef protection and th7eho'd t& spcfy thedetermine

'thied'

breathing apparatus. use of

No specific action or written response is required

If you have any questions about'this matter,.please by this information notice.

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator contact the technical

office. of the appropriate regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

V. D. Thomas, NRR

(301) 492-0786 X

E. N. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

-- V

Attachment

IN 88-05 February 12, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Intormatlon Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-04,i Inadequate Qualification 2/5/88 All holders of OLs

and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear

Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-03 Cracks in Shroud Support 2/2/88 --All holders of OLs

Access Hole Cover Welds or CPs for BWRs.

88-02 Lost or Stolen Gauges 2/2/88 All NRC licensees

authorized to possess

gauges under a

specific or general

license.

88-01 Safety Injection Pipe 1/27/88 All holders of OLs

Failure or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

_

-- 86-81, Broken External Closure 1/11/88. - All -holders of OLs

Supp. 1 Springs on Atwood & Morrill or CPs for nuclear

Main Steam Isolation Valves power reactors.

87-67 Lessons Learned from 12/31/87 All holders of OLs

Regional Inspections of or CPs for nuclear

Licensee Actions in Response power reactors.

to IE Bulletin 80-11

87-66 Inappropriate Application 12/31/87 All holders of OLs

of Commercial-Grade or CPs for nuclear

Components power reactors.

87-28, Air Systems Problems at 12/28/87 All holders of OLs

Supp. 1 U.S. Light Water Reactors or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

87-65 Plant Operation Beyond 12/23/87 All holders of OLs

Analyzed Conditions or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL - Operating License

CP - Construction Permit

IN 88-05 February 12, 1988 (sub-fusing of branch circuits within the annunciator system) to determine if

this contributed to the occurrence of the fire. The unit remained at 100%

power throughout the event.

On February 8, 1988, while Rancho Seco was in cold shutdown, all control room

annunciator alarms were lost because of a fire in a remote control cabinet that

provides audible and visual control functions to the annunciator system. The

fire is believed to have originated from a failed subcomponent on a solid state

circuit card. The root cause of the fire is under investigation.

Although the NRC's investigation of these events is not yet complete, the

following similarities among the events are noteworthy:

. The annunciator systems were provided by the same manufacturer.

Common to each event was the licensee's lack of specific emergency

procedures to address complete loss of the annunciator system.

None of the licensees have provisions for monitoring ambient temperatures

in the control cabinets.

In the events at Calvert Cliffs and Rancho Seco, the fire teams experienced

nausea and dizziness, apparently as a result of inadequate oxygen in the

area in which the fire occurred. Licensees thus may wish to review

their procedures for fighting small fires in confined areas to determine

the adequacy of personnel protection and the need to specify the use of

breathing apparatus.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

V. D. Thomas, NRR

(301) 492-0786 E. N. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE

• EAB:DOEA *DEST *DEST *PPMB:Tech Ed Ca j~ DOEA v K

ENFields VDThomas SNewberry Ann Thomas W Lnning VERosi

2/11/88 2/11/88 2/11/88 2/11/88 2/112 /88 2//1.288

IN 88-05 February 11, 1988 for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the audible function was not restored for two days. The root

cause of the fire is under investigation; however the licensee intends to review

the adequacy of circuit protection (sub-fusing of branch circuits within the

annunciator system) to determine if this contributed to the occurrence of the

fire.

On February 8, 1988, when Rancho Seco was in cold shutdown, its control room

experienced a loss of all annunciator alarms because of a fire in a remote

control cabinet that provides audible and visual control functions to the

annunciator system. The fire is believed to have originated from a failed

subcomponent on a solid state circuit card. The root cause of this fire is

under investigation.

Although the NRC's investigation of these events is not yet complete, the

following similarities among the events are noteworthy:

The annunciator systems were provided by the same manufacturer.

Common to each event was the licensee's lack of specific emergency

procedures to address complete loss of the annunciator system.

None of the licensees have provisions for monitoring ambient temperatures

in the control cabinets.

In the events at Calvert Cliffs and Rancho Seco, the fire teams experienced

nausea and dizziness, apparently as a result of inadequate oxygen in the

area in which the fire occurred. Licensees thus may wish to review

their procedures for fighting small fires in confined areas to determine

the adequacy of personnel protection and the need to specify the use of

breathing apparatus.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

V. D. Thomas, NRR

(301) 492-0786 E. N. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB:DOEA X T PlD( C:EAB:DOEA PPMB:Tech Ed

EWFields VDThomas WDLanning Ann Thomas 'CERossi

2/// /88 / 2/11 /88 2/ /88 2/11/88 2/1/ /88 DEST

SNewberry

2/11/88