IR 05000482/1989027
| ML19332C628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332C623 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-89-27, GL-89-13, NUDOCS 8911280361 | |
| Download: ML19332C628 (16) | |
Text
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- t . 7m . . yj ,- y _r f ,; ' - , , , . Y - ' ll I G7 \\;g - ' y 'jF "3: _ ,' ' ' ~ .p c, . , ~~: APPENDIX'B a - W " s - , + 3- $d[[L c^ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
'.;i ' ' REGION IV ,; '*' l- - >; < -- , - .<
' ' L ] , - , 3* w NRC) Ins'pection Repo't:~ 150-482/89-27. ' Operating License: NPF-42-
r ' ?.. ., - - w ., t ?% Docket:?L501482' ' ' ' % m ' Licensee:s Wolf; Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -(WCN00)N c ' ' - s 'P.O. Box ~411 i Burlington, Kansas' 66839 - .) ' - 'T Facility Name:. . l ' ' m .. . ' Wolf Creek Generating Station.(WCGS) 3; ' ? M Inspection At:" WCGSL Coffey' County, Burlingt6n,-Kansas ' l y
Inspection Conducted:,10ctober 1-31, 1989
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~#^ f & ' Inspectors': : B. L'., Bartlett, Senior Resident; Inspector Project Section D,' Division'of Reactor Projects gQ - - . , .M. E;.Skow, Resident' Inspector;. .. ' Project Section D, Di. vision of Reactor Projects.
. - " .. . . a - _ 'D.:V.H Picketts Project Manager, Project Directorate IV, .
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Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V.,and Special~ .
Projects,NRR ' /Mbo/S7 ! Approved:~ .E..J.
Holler, Chief, Project Section.D Date " , , . Division of Reactor Projects ,i u q ^
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' Inspecti$n'Summaryx ' i l
- Inspect 16n! Conducted October 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-482/89-27)
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- Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status,.
L operational safety ' verification, engineered safety-features' walkdown ' monthly -
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- surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and followup of-Q W.
- written reports of.nonroutire. event..
, Q;$ ' " ~ h .Results:[Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified. 'The .. W violation * involved the failure to properly perform an essential service . L l water 7(ESW)fsurveillance requirement (paragraph 5).
A violation was noted ' y for which 'a citation will' not be issued, regarding the proper marking of: a ~
b safety-related work request (paragraph 6). An~ unresolved item and an open item:concernino the heat loads to the ultimate heat sink (UHS) were identified (paragraph 4);' During this inspection, the inspectors performed an indepth q review of:the ESW system. While no issues were found which would bring into a l.: , 4' 8911280361 891120 PDR ADOCK 05000482 jj ' O PDC , " > v
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Nitems?of concern weresidentified.! These items ranged from the violation and ' ^ ' ~ " '
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- DETAILS'
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Persons Contacted '{ g, , , - Principal Licensee Personnel-
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- J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Operations t
'.*R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality Assurance (QA),
- F. 'T.l Rhodes, Vice Presidtat. Engineering and Technical Services 2,
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- G. D.;Boyer, Plant Manager
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- . H. K. Chernoff,: Supervisor, Licensing
. R. B. Flannigan, Manager, buclear Safety Engineering (NSE)
i ' 1*R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications ~3; (*W.iM.!Lindsay, Manager,QA i e , ' i*0. L. Maynard, Manager Regulatory Services n-
- D. G.- Moseby, Supervisor, Operations
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- W; B.-Norton, Manager,: Technical Support I
< *C. E. Parry, Manager, QA, WCGS - ,
- S.;Wideman, Licensing Specialist III
- M. G;-Williams, Manager, Plant Support t
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- N Hoadley. -Manager, NPE Systems
.The inspectors also contseted,other members of the licensee's staff during the l inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Denotes those. personnel in attendance at the' exit meeting held on 3 '
' .0ctober 31, 1989.
' ' ~2.
-Plant Status i ,The plant operated in Mode 1 -(100 percent reactor thermal power) during
' the inspection period with one power reduction to 30 percent on
i 10ctober 17,.1989, to replace.a transducer -in the electrohydraulic control
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. system for the main turbine.-' There 'were no reactor or turbine trips.
<, 3.,. Operational' safety Verification (71707) " The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory -.i , requirements.
It also was to ensure that.the licensee's management' ~ control system was: effectively discharging its responsibilities for i; continued safe operation. The methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the . -facility, interviews 'and discussions with licensee personnel, independent? =l
verification of' safety system status and limiting' conditions for-operation, corrective actions, and review of facility records.
Areas reviewed daring this inspection included, but were not limited to, control room activities, routine surveillances, engineered safety feature " operability, radiation protection controls, fire protection, security,
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4- .., , Je^ l < plant cleanliness, instrumentation and alarna, deficiency reports, and i ' - a corrective actions.
Routine surveillence and operating activity witnessed and/or reviewed by >
-_ the inspector is listed below: - , On October 24. 1989, the licensee was performing stroke tests on the main , feedwater isolation valves (MFiVs).
Valve AE-FY40, the 1. cop "B" MFIV, ' faibd to operate. The failure was similar to a failure on September 22,. i 1989, which was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/89-24. Because i of the September failure and similar problems in the past, the licensee l was testing both actuation trains of the MFIVs monthly instead of the
- - required quarterly staggered tests.
In September, the licensee replaced
' the red train "M" 4-way slide velve which was suspected of having stuck.
r This time, the licensee replaced the red train "N" 4-way slide valve.
'! When the licensee disassembled the "M" valve, no noticeable degradation. ' was found. When the licensee disassembled the "N" valve, scoring was , found on the cylinders. The licensee has increased the frequency of testing the MFIVs and will decrease the frequency over tine if the testing is satisfactory. The purpose of the increased testing is to determine if ., a permanent testing schedule more frequent than the quarterly staggered test should be implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
, 4.. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Walkdown (71710) l The ESF system walked down during this inspection period was the ESW l system. The primary documents used by the inspectors during the walkdown
are listed in Attachment 1.
The inspectors also used other support ' documents and procedures as rvquired by the inspectors during the system walkdown. The scope of the inspection and selected inspector observations are discussed below.
During this inspection of the ESW system, the inspectors also L " ! included portions of other systems which interfaced with ESW.
For example, room cooler and heat exchanger piping, which typically l' carries other system designations, wds included in the walkdown if
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ESW flowed to the piping. A tour of the UHS was included to look for
areas of shore erosion that could have contributed to silt buildup.
, Silt buildup was discussed previously in NRC Inspection ' Report 50-482/89-21, paragraph 5.- A containment entry was made to ! verify ESW valve positions in the containment building.
Surveillance and maintenance activities discussed in other portions of this report { were chosen to focus on the ESW system. Trend analysis was performed o L on surveillance test data for ESW flow through the containment air coolers. The inspectors also reviewed the cathodic protection system for the underground portion of the ESW piping.
The walkdown confimed that the ESW system was generally lined up in
" accordance with plant drawings and procedures. Some valves were , - e throttled that were shown as full open on system drawings. Valves ' . > _- Y a . . .
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appeared correctly installed. The inspector did not observe packing ! leakage, bent stems, or missing handwheels on any of the valves '; inspected. A few labels were missing. Valves were locked when t required. Housekeeping was satisfactory and no prohibited ignition l ' sources or flannable materials were observed in the vicinity of the i ' ESW system.
Electrical breakers and switches appeared properly i aligned. The minor drawing and label discrepancies were discussed With the licensee. No obvious sources of erosion were observed . l around the lake shore near the UHS.
' The cathodic protection system for the underground ESW piping has
apparently suffered f rom neglect and incorrect installation in the past.- Many of the problems stem from cathodic protection electric
cables that were buried with fill dirt with a large amount of crushed
sharp ' ged gravel. Over time, the crushed gravel appears to have .l-damaged the electric cable insulation. This allowed corrosive action '! to take place on the conductor which caused periodic circuit l failures.. The degradation of the-cathodic protection appears to be a ' ' long term concern.
For short-term degradation, on the order of weeks - , or months, significant corrosion of the ESW piping is not expected. , ' The licensee has increased efforts to return the cathodic protection- - . to its intended effectiveness. The licensee also indicated plans to ! add additional cathodic protection to the existing system.
! During the review of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), the
inspectors discovered assumptions inconsistent with current procedures.- USAR Section 9.2.5.2.2.1 " Heat Loads following a LOCA."
, states, in part " Heat rejected to the VHS following a LOCA is based en the following assumptions: a. Two ESW trains in o>eration f or the ! - initial 8 hours.
b. One ESW train in operation for tie remainder of
the 30 days." These asrumptions do not match the licensee's current ' emergency operating procedures, which have no provisions to shut down one train of ESW if both trains properly actuate. This is an open
iteia pending' the licensee's verification that the UHS and ESW satisfy i the worst case scenario discussed in paragraph 4.a below (482/8927-04).
- As followup to the above finding, the inspectors reviewed the
licensee's calculations for the heat load rejected to the UHS by the
ESW system. The intpectors made the following observations: a.
Calculation EF-19, Revision 0, giver the average heat load and the integrated heat load from the ESW system to the UHS for . different conditions. To be conservative, the condition used in ' the final sizing of the UHS should be the one which rejects the most energy to the UHS (e.g)., no single failure, all ESF equipment performs properly The. licensee's calculation for this condition gives an average heat load of 8.04X10(7) BTU per " hour and a total integrated heat load (over 30 days) of 5.786X10(10) BTU. The values generated using the licensee's assumption of isolating one ESW train 8 hours after the , .. . . . . .f ,.._,......,.._m -
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. ! -6-i ! . i ' , . . . l initiation'of an assumed accident result in an average heat load
of 5.91X10(6) BTU per hour and a total integrated heat load of l 4.255X10(10) BTU. The licensee's values-for heat load on the VHS varied considerably, depending on the conditions assumed. The licensee designed the VHS-for a 2-unit.: simultaneous accident / safe shutdown; themfom, the UHS was substantially ! overdesigned. Notwithstanding this, the sizing calculations ' should mflect conservative assumptions.1 Pending the licensee's.
Lverification that the UHS and ESW satisfy'the worst case ! scenario, this will remain an unnsolved item (482/8927-03).
_ b.
Calculation EF-24, Revision 1. gives the heat rise expected.
- ' under postulated accident conditions, for the ESW system.
In
this calculation, the licensee used a conversion factor to i change from gallons per minute to' pounds per hour. However, the ' conversion factor was not derived'in the calculation. The ' inspectors were ' unable.to verify the conversion factor, using a ! variety 'of assumed temperatures and pressures.' The conversion
factor derived by the,inspactors. differed only slightly from the i licensee's. The inspectors' calculation of heat rise was t 170.5'F.cand the licensee's value was 170.2'F.
In the
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inspectors' opinion, using a conversion factor in a calculation l without e statement of source is a poor engineering practice.
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, In response to recent escalated! enforcement at other facilities, the I
inspectors reviewed licensee records and interviewed personnel in - i order to detemine the extent of testing ~for heat exchanger , efficiencies. At the current time, the licensee performs only the , routine testing that is called for in the TS. The licensee is
! cerrently on schedulesto initiate testing'in accordance with Generic Letter 89-13. " Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related . Equipment." Testing of the heat transfer capabilities of . - safety-related heat exchangers is required in order to ensure their i continued operability /functionability.
Failure to perfom this 4 t testing could result in the failure to detect degraded heat r exchangers and determine when the heat exchangers will no longer meet ' , the assumed design characteristics.
l USAR Table 9.2-21 states that WCGS complies with Regulatory-
Guide 1.27 Revision 2. " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power '
,. i Plants." Regulatory Position C.1 states, in part. " Procedures for l ensuring a continued capability after 30 days should be available."
~ At'the present time, WCGS does not have any procedures in place to meet this recommendation. The licensee should review its commitment ! regarding this matter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Montbly Surveillance Observation -(61726) ' The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems and components was.being conducted in accordance with TS. Methods used ~to' perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and review of records.
Items inspected in this area' included, but were not limited to, verification that: . Testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an
approved test procedure.
The surveillance procedure was in confonnance with TS requ.'rements.
, The operating system and test instrumentation was within its Nrrent
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calibration cycle.
Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained prior '* to initiating the test.
Limiting conditions for operation were met and the system was
, properly returned to service, ! The test data were accurate and complete and the test results met TS
requirements.
, Surve111ances witnessed and/or reviewed by the inspectors are listed below: , STS IC-475A, Revision 5. " Channel Calibration Containment Purge
System Radiation Monitor GT RE22 " perfonned October 11, 1989 l STS EF-925 Revision 0, " Containment Coolers Flow Verification " !
performed on July 9 August 10. September 9, and December 10, 1987; j , January 10. February 9. March 9 April 9 May 8. June 9. July 9.
, August 9 September 9. and December 15, 1988; and January 14 February 13. March 15, April 15, May 15, June 2. June 20, July 20, August 17, and October 16, 1989 - STS EF-925A, Revision 0, " Containment Coolers Flow Rate -(Upon Safety
' Injection) Verification Train ' A',' performed on March 15 and June 2,
1989 STS EF-925B, Revision 0, " Containment Coolers Flow Rate (U)on Safety ~*: Injection) Verification Train 'B'," performed March 14, 1939 STN IC-259, Revisions 0, 1, and 2, ' Calibration of ESW 'A' and 'B' Flow to the Pcwer Block," perfonned on September 24,1986, April 8 and November 3, 1988, and May 22, 1989 - - .
9m - . - - -- - , ! -l . j < u - , -8-e k ! i ' STN 10-248 Revision 0, " Calibration of ESW Pumps ' A' and '8'
Discharge Pressure Indicators EF PI-0011 and -0012." performed on ! September 11, 1986, and March 24, 1988 . i
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~ STN 10-212, Revision 0, "ESW to Power Block Temperature ! ' [' Senw rs EF TE-61 and -62," performed on July 23, 1986, and February 22, 1988 l STN IC-224. Revision 0, " Channel Calibration Containment Cooler
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Dischar9e Temperature Instrumentation loop," performed June 6,1989-STN 1C-465. Revisions 0 and 1 " Channel Calibration ESW Pump Room
, Temperature Control Loop GP TE01," performed on August 16, 1985, h February 18, 1987, and June 9, 1989 ~ j STN 10-466, Revisions O and 1. " Channel Calibration ESW Pump Room
Temperature Control Loop GD TEll," performed on August 6,1985, and l November 19, 1988 j i STN IC-260. Revisions 0 and 1. " Calibration of ESW Pumps ' A' and 'B' { '
.Prelube Storage Tank Levels Loops," performed on September 11 1986,
j and April 14, 1988 STS 10-917. Revision 2. " Analog Channel Operational Test Essential
Service Water to Air Compressor," performed on January 15,
February 8, March 7. April 7. May 7, and June 7,1988 . STS IC 918, Revision 1. " Channel Calibration Essential Service Water
to Air Compressor Isolation," parformed on March 29, 1988, and i September 14, 1989 ) STS 1C-925. Revisions 2 and 6, "Coitainment Coolers Flow Rate !-
Verification," perfonned on April 4, =1985, and June 8,1987 STS 10-927, Revisions 1 and 2, "Surveillence Test Essential Service I
Water Pump and Automatic Valve Actuation," performed on March 7,
, L 1985, October 13, 1986, October 7,1987, and April 12, 1989 l' Selected inspector observations are discussed below: H During the review of STS EF-925, the inspector identified a concern
- that the licensee was not performing the surveillance test in i accordance with TS. TS 4.6.2.3.a.2 requires verifying a cooling . water flow rate of greater.than or equal to 2200 gpm to each cooler J group at least once per 31 days.
Since June 20, 1989, the licensee's ~j procedure has called for the use of the normal service water pumps
i through the normally open bypass valves (EF HV-47 and -48).
l Since June 20,1989. the licensee's STS EF-925 requires that the ,
' surveillance be perfonned in a manner the inspector believes
- appropriate (i.e., nonnal service water pumps operating and a normal
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-9 ! i valvelineup), Previously, the licensee used the ESW umps (which
put out a higher flow rate and discnarge pressure) or from at least i July 9, 1987, to June 20,1989) the licensee's procedure called for . nonna11y closed valves (EF HV-49 and -50) to be opersed during the ' test. This valve lineup is designed to incrtase flow through the r coolers under accident conditions. TS Basis B.3/4.6.2.3 states the operability of the contairment cooling system ensures that the
containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during - normal operation. By modifying the valve lineup or using the ESW '
' pumps, the licensee had been defeating the purpose of the ! , , surveillance, which is to verify that there had been no degradation j , of system performance under nonnel conditions. The use of an
. abnormal system lineup to complete the STS constituted a failure to
' - ' meet the surveillance requirement and is an apparent j violation (482/8927-01).
, Because containment air temperatures were maintained within TS limits ' and the coolers.were tested for adequate flow during accident . conditions, the' failure to meet TS Surveillance 4.6.2.3.a.2 was not a ' cause for significant safety concern.
> 6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
. ! The purpose of inspections in this area was to ascertain that maintenance i . ' activitiesonsafety-related(SR)systemsandcomponentswereconductedin accordance with approved procedures and TS. Methods used in this ' inspection included direct observation, personnel interviews, and records
review.
Items verified in this inspection included: ! Activities aid not violate limiting' conditions for operation and
redundant components were operable.
, . Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained before
initiating work.
Radiological ' controls were properly implemented.
, Fire prevention controls were implemented.
- Required alignments and surveillances to verify postmaintenance
, operability were performed.
p Replacement parts and materials used were properly certified.
' ' ' Craf tsnen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and i
additional technical expertise was made available when needed.
- Quality control (QC) hold points and/or checklists were used and QC ' (; personnel observed designated work activities.
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Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to date.
Portions of selected meintenance activities regarding the work l requests (WRs) listed below were observed. The WRs and related documents ' , were reviewed by the inspectors: l ! L No.
Activity . WR 90028-89 Pressurizer level controller oscillation caused backup- ! Group "B" to cycle and trip breaker l .WR 04533-89 . Main generator load megawatt transducer drifts high . i L . Semiannual lubrication of ESW self-cleaning Strainer ' WR 50194-89 Motor DFEF02B > WR 50193-89.
Quarterly preventive maintenance on ESW Pump "A" WR 52158-89 Check oil on'"A" centrifugal charging pump l ! WR 52234-89 Quarterly maintenance on ESW Pump "A" ' , WR 52235-89 Semiannual maintenance on ESW Pump "A" WR 52402-88 18-month maintenance of DFEF02B i ^ WR 50855-89 Semiannual lubrication of DFEF02A WR 51954-89 Semiannual lubrication of DFEF028 l WR 51634-88 Semiannual lubrication of DFEF02B , a WR 50681-28 Semiannual lubrication of.DFEF02A
i WR 50271-88~ Semiannual lubrication of DFEF02B
WR 50273-88 Semiannual maintenance of ESW Traveling Water Screen FEF04B , WR 04343-89 Perform ultrasonic testing of Pipe EF138HBC-30 ' , Selected inspector. observations.are discussed below: i a.
WR 90028-89 required that technicians disconnect and replace a plug connection due to a broken jackscrew. The broken jackscrew allowed . some connectors in the plug to become intermittent affecting the reference temperature value. The control room operators took several ~ ' control features out of automatic while repairs were made. During I the time that systems were in manual, the operators kept close comunications with the repair technicians, remaining especially alert for those repair activities that could have potentially caused signal spikes and transients. There were no transients or unexpected l ~ . lj ' i
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'Ql $ e . . , ,- l i-11-l ! , , , . p . , ' responses by the plant to the repair activities and control systems
were returned to noma 1.
b.
A watt transducer was replaced during perfomance of WR 04533-89.
The watt meter on the turbine control panel in the control room had- , begun to drift high. The licensee stated that the effect of the i high reading was not specifically a problem because a computer
display of the parameter was processed separately. The licensee's~ ! concern was that the transducer could drift or fail low. A low ! signal would indicate a false power to load imbalance and this would
- cause a turbine trip and reactor trip.
prior to perfoming the work,
the licensee reduced reactor power to approximately 30 percent. Had > the work been perfomed at full power, the potential existed that a load imbalance signal spike could have been created by the maintenance
activities and this would have shut the combined intercept valves, - tripped the turbine and, in turn, the reactor. The operators
performed smooth power changes and closely monitored the control .! panels for potential transients caused by the maintenance activities, j Replacement of the transducer was perfonied with care. Technicians i i conducted tests of the new transducer as it was installed to. verify s ' operability. Afterwards, the technicians placed the old transducer on a test bench to simulate insta11ed' conditions. The transducer failed to zero after 3 hours.
l c.
The inspector observed that Ventilation Dam >ers GD TZ-001A, -B, and [ -C to ESW pump room Supply Fan CGD01A ("B" )ay) had been out of
service since July 14, 1988.. The. licensee infomed the. inspector
that the NH96 electrohydraulic actuators for the dampers were , l inoperable and repairs were on hold pending receipt of parts from the i vendor. The parts are currently expected in mid-December. The
, dampers have been blocked open while waiting for the parts..During the summer, this allows the supply fan to supply cooling, and during
the winter, the four room heaters maintain the proper temperature.
i d.
During this inspection period, the inspector compared the licensee's preventive maintenance program on the ESW traveling water screens to the vendor's recommendations (M-020-0K015-W11. " Instruction Manual for , Traveling Water Screens"). The licensee's program appears to meet t , ! all the vendor recommendations. Although-the vendor's recommendations were stated in tems of operating hours (e.g., change fluid coupling oil every 4,000 operating hours) and WCGS's schedule L is based on calendar years (e.g., change fluid coupling oil during 2-year maintenance), the licensee's preventative maintenances are l ' perfomed within the vendor's recommendation.
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During the review of WR 04343-89, the inspector identified that this L SRWRhadbeenmarkedasnonnuclearsafety-related(NNSR), NNSR WRs , I do not normally receive the same level of review as SR WRs. However, upon checking, the inspector detemined that although the initiator of the WR made a mistake in marking it, he had known that it was ER ' and had sent it through the correct review process. This failure to ! [' . . - - - . - . .
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1 l comply with administrative requirements is a violation-(482/8927-02).
i It will not be cited because the violation, which is of minor safety I concern, was corrected by the licensee and met the criteria specified ' in Section V.A of the General Statement of Policy and procedure for i > . NRC Enforcement Actions were satisfied. No written response to this
L violation is required. This noncited violation is closed.
. i No other violations or deviations were identified.
l ' x7.
Onsite Followup of Written Reports Nonroutine Events (92700) ! -
During this inspection seriod, the inspectors perfonned followup on a Wolf ! < Creek special report su)mitted in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.3.
The i < special report was reviewed to ensure that: .l ~ ' l
Corrvctive action stated in the report has been properly conpleted or work is in progress.
' ' Response to the event was adequate.
.
' Response to the~ event met license conditions, commitments, or other
applicable regulatory requirenents.
! ' The information contained in the report satisfied applicable reporting requirements.
- Generic, issues were identified.
. ' The inspectors reviewed Special Report 482/89-002, dated October 18, 1989, concerning a failure of Emergency Diesel Generator "B" due to a plugged c jacket water surge line. The licensee had taken the diesel generator out , of service for maintenance. Work had been performed on the fuel system and the jacket water expansion tank.
Special Report 89-002 states that , ' the engine was run unloaded to vent the fuel lines. During the run, water was found leaking from the water jacket pump shaft seal. ~ Troubleshooting i as a result of multiple seal failures found that the surge line from the t expansion tank was plugged. The licensee concluded in the report that i this was an invalid failure of _ the diesel generator in accordance with ' , Regulatory Guide 1.108.-Revision 1.
The inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusion, but found that additional infonnation was necessary , - to reach that conclusion. The-licensee was encouraged to ensure that . necessary supporting infonnation is included in reports to the NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Unresolved Item p Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance, or ' L deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is ' discussed in paragraph 4.
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9.
Exit Meeting (30703) j; ! ' The inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) on
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October 31, 1989. The inspectors sumarized the scope and findings of the l [ inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of, the
j*f informatiosiprovided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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{ ' , , . - > . , , , > ' ' .; ATTACHMENT 1 l i ^ 10881-089-K029-02, " Instruction Marual for ESW Pumps" L M-020-0K015-W11,'" Instruction Manual for Traveling Water Screens" ! , !-
4 +
M-K2GD01(Q), Revision 5. " Piping ~and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) Essential Service Pump House HVAC"
M-K1GD01(Q). Revision E, " System Flow Diagram Essential Service Water Pump ' House HVAC" - S 'M-K2KT01, Revision 1 "P&lD ESW Chlorination System" f 'E-91, Revision N, " Cathodic Protection Plan" ( M-1, Revision D, " Site Development" l M-2, Revision E. " Properly Development" M-51. Revision H. " Outdoor Piping Key Plan and General Notes" , ~ M-52 Revision K " Outdoor Piping Interface Locations" ' 'C-K202(Q),' Revision 8, "ESW System Yard Pipelines & Elect Duct Banks" l C-K201(Q),' Revision 6 "ESW System Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks" .
' J-12EF01A(Q). Revision 0, " Control Logic Diagram ESW System" - i
J-02EF01B(B), Revision 0,"ControlLogicDiagramESWSystem" .l h.
through J-02EF05
' M-KG081,. Revision 4, "ESW System Pumphouse Ecuipment Locations" + M-KG080,; Revision 4, "ESW System Pumphouse Equipment Locations" ! , E-K1001(Q), Revision 2, " Single Line Diagram ESW System" i E-11001'(Q),: Revision 0, " Main' Single Line Diagram" . M-12AL01(Q), Revision 0, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary .. Feedwater System"
M-12EC01(Q), Revision-1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Coaling , and Cleanup System" - M-12EF01(Q), P,evision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service . ater System" ' W ' . ,
c - - - . _ . -. . - . -
c.
, < - . ' ' , ,' , [ ! . -2-l r !' M-12EF02(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service <- Water System"
k N-K2EF01(Q), Revision 14, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service ! - Water System" . M-12EG01(Q), Revision 2. " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling , Water System" ' ! , M-12EG02(Q), Revision 2, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling i Water System" } M-K2GD01(Q), Revision 5 " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service - Water Pump House HVAC" i g ! n M-12GF01(Q), Revision 1, * Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Miscellaneous Buildings HVAC"
s M-12GG02(Q), Revision 1. " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Building HVAC" , , M-12GK01(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC" j , I M-12GK03(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building
HVAC" + ' , - M-12GLOI(Q). Revision 0, " Piping'and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Building ' HVAC" ' M-12GLO2(Q), Revision 3, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Building HVAC" i M-12GLO3(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Building HVAC" M-12GN01(Q), Revision 1,"PipingandInstrumentationDiagramContainment
- _ Cooling System" M-12KA01(Q), Revision 3. " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Compressed Air System"
M-12KA01(Q), Revision 3 " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Compressed Air System" l M-02KJ01(Q), Revision 5. " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator ' A' Cooling Water System" M-02KJ04(Q), Revision 5 " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel .
- Generator 'B' Cooling Water System" l
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' Mil 2KJ03(Q) Revision 0, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel , . Generator 'A' Lube Oil System
M-12KJ06(Q), Revision 0, " Piping and Instrumentat. ion Diagram Standby Diesel ! , :s
Generator 'B' Lube Oil System"
. . CKL EF-120. " Essential Service Water Valve, Brealier, and Switch Lineup" l . , t7 t ? g.' i r
, .3 i i t ( .- s t t b + tI : ';.
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