IR 05000482/1989024
| ML19327A876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327A873 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-89-24, NUDOCS 8910180336 | |
| Download: ML19327A876 (12) | |
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APPENDIX i
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM41SSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-482/89-24 Operating -License: NPF-42 I
Docket:
50-482'
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Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
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.P.O. Box 411
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'Burlington, Kansas 66839 j
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Facility Name: Wolf Cnek Generating Station (WCG3)
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Inspection At!. WCGS, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas
i Inspection Conducted:' September 1-30,1989 j
Inspectors:
B. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector Pmject Section D. Division of Reactor Projects
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M. E. Skow, Resident Inspector Project Section D Division of Reactor Projects j
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- Approved:
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E. J. eloller, chief, Project sect 1on D Date
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- Division of Reactor Pro.iects
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(p Inspection Summary;
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f Inspection Conducted September 1-30, 1989 (Report 50-482/89-24)
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. Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status,
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operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly
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maintenance observation, onsite followup of events at operating power reactors,
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cold weather preparations, followup of previously identified NRC items, and myiew of licensee event reports.
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified. On September 19 1989, l'
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the licensee entered Tschnical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 because of problems i
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with a centrifugal charging. pump miniflow valve. ~ The licensee's response to
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L the TS 3.0.3 entry appeared correct but the identification of the recirculation i
valve operability issue was not timely. An unresolved item was identified e
t regarding this matter pending resolution of the effects of the centrifugal
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charging puup. recirculation line flow degredation on system operability
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L (paragraph 6). An open item was identified regarding the licensee's intentions t
to detemine how leaving Dampers GL D36 and GL D37 open affects auxiliary i
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building emergency exhaust operability (paragraph 3.a).
Licensee actions L
8910160336 891012 i
PDR ADOCK 05000482 L*
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regarding maintenance difficulties encountered during repair of a main
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feedwater isolation valve that required entry into a 6-hour limiting condition for operation appeared appropr16te to the circumstances (paragraph 4).
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r DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Personnel
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- B. Withers-President and CEO
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- J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Operations
- R. M. Grant. Vice President, Quality Assurance (QA)
F. T. Rhodes, Vice President. Engineering and Technical Services
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- G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager
- R. S. Benedict, Manager. Quality Control
- H. K. Chernoff, Supervisor, Licensing
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- S. Conner, Supervisor Management Systeras, Wichita
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- D. Erhe, Security Operations Supervisor
- R.. B. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering (NSE)
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- C. W. Fowler, Manager, Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
- B. Goshorn, Planning Engineer, Kansas Electric Power Cooperatives
- R. C. Hagan, Manager, Nuclear Services
- R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications
- W. M. Lindsay, Manager, QA
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- M. C. Lutre, Security Administration Coordinator
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- 0. L. Maynard, Manager, Regulatory Services B.- McKinney, Manager, Operations
- D. G. Moseby, Supervisor, Operations l
- W. B. Norton, Manager, Technical Support
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- *D. Peavler, QA Specialist III
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- J. M. Pippin. Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)
- G. Rathbun,' Manager, NPE Wichita
- C. Sprout, Section Manager, NPE, WCGS
- K. Steinbrook, NPE
- S. Wideman, Licensing Specialist III
'*M. G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support
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The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
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- Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on l
September 29, 1989.
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Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1 (100 percent reactor tnenal power) during the inspection period. There were no reactor or turbine trips.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the facility was being
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operated safely and in confonnance with license and regulatory
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t requirements.
It also was to ensure that the licensee's managenent
control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for
continued safe operation. The methods used to perfom this inspection
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area included direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the l
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facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent
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verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, corrective actions, and review of facility records.
Areas reviewed during this inspection included, but were not limited to, i
control room activities, routine surveillances, engineered safety feature
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operability, radiation protection controls, fire protection, security.
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. plant cleanliness, instrumentation and alarms, deficiency reports, and corrective actions.
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Routine surveillance and oserating activities witnessed and/or: reviewed by the inspectors are listed yelow:
a.
On September 11, 1989, the licensee reported that on August 28, 1989,
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Dampers GL D36 and GL D37 had been removed from service and tagged in
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t the open position for annual preventinn maintenance. The dampers should have been removed from service in the closed position. The
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licensee discovered the error during restoration of the equipment
sfter completion of the maintenance. These dampers are in a line i
that draws air from the tunnel between the radwaste bulloing and the
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' auxiliary building. They close on a safety injection signal (SIS).
If an SIS had occurred while the dampers were out of service in the open position, the auxiliary building emergency exhaust system may not have been able to maintain a negative 1/4-inch water gauge relative pressure in the euxiliary building,,If the emergency exhaust system was unable to attain the required negative pressure, then the system would have been inoperable and in violation of
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The TS action statement provides for restoration within 7 days when one emergency exhaust system is inoperable.
In this case, both systems may have been out of service and, if so, would have required entry into TS 3.0.3.
TS 3.0.3 requires that the plant be shut down within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Based on discussions with personnel involved in
. tagging the dampers, the dampers were apparently tagged open for less
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than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
I-The licensee does not know if the emeri,ency exhaust would have been inoperable. That is, whether the exhaust system could maintain the
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auxiliary building at t negative pressure of greater than 1/4-inch water gauge relative pressure with Dampers GL D36 and GL 037 open.
The licensee has decided to test the emergency exhaust system to det.rmine if the open dampers would prevent the system from attaining the required negative pressure. The licensee committed that the test will be perfomed during the next refueling outage.
To prevent recurrence of similar events, the licensee developed specific
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f training regarding the tagging of ventilatien dampers for inclusion in licensed operator onshift and requalification training. This is
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en open item for tracking purposes (482/8924-01).
b.
During the last refueling outage, the licensee replaced the reactor control cluster assemblies (RCCAs). This was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/88-37. -Since startup from that outage in January 1989, the licensee has operated with the RCCAs at a fully withdrawn position of 230 steps. The licensee has determined that
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changing the fully withdrawn position is necessary to pernit uniform
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wear on the RCCA cladding. On September 15, 1989, the licensee moved
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the RCCAs to a new fully withdrawn position of 229 steps. The licensee stated that, approximately monthly, the RCCAs' fully withdrawn position will be changed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation -(61726)
The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems and components was being conducted in
accortlance with TS. Methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and review of records, t
Iwms inspected in this area included, but were not limited to, verification that:
Testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an
approved test procedure.
The surveillance procedure was in conformance with TS requirements.
- The operating system and test instrumentation was within its current
calibration cycle.
- Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtaine:i prior
to-initiating the test.
Limiting conditions for operation were met and the system was
properly returned to service.
The test data were accurate and complete and the test results met TS
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requirements.
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Surve111ances witnessed and/or reviewed by the insoectors are listed below:
STS AC-001, Revision 5. " Main Turbine Valve Cycling Test," performed
September 6,1989
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STS KJ-005A, kevision 13, " Manual / Auto Start, Synchronization and Load-
ing of Emergency Diesel Cenerator NE01," perfomed September 6,1989
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STS IC-211A. Revision 9 " Actuation Logic Test Train 'A' Solid State
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Protection System," performed September 15, 1989
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Selected inspector observations are discussed below:
a.
While performing STS IC-617A. " Slave Relay Test K617 Train ' A' Safety
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Injection," the licensee questioned ramifications of lifting leads on the K617 SIS contact. This contact is part of the circuitry that trips the safety-related Class 1E 4160 volt bus supply breaker on degraded voltage or loss of power to the bus.
If the circuitry
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L senses degraded voltage, the contacts on K617 would close on an SIS
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and trip the bus supply breaker. With the leads lifted, there is a 3-second delay before the supply breaker is tripped. = The emergency diesel generator would then start and close on the isolated bus.
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an SIS occurred during the period that a degraded voltage condition i
existed during the 3-second delay, emergency core cooling system pumps could try to start on degraded voltage. When the timer completed its delay, the bus supply breaker would trip and the loss i
of coolant accident (LOCA) sequencer would restart the pumps on the diesel generator powered bus. That, however, is dependent on the
motors not being damaged by trying to start on low voltage and not tripping their overcurrent protection devices, i
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Licensee analysis found that pump motors would not be damaged but
.that the essential' service water (ESW) pump rotor may tri) on
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overcurrent while starting on a low voltage bus. The loc (out would
have to be raset locally before the motor could be restarted. This could take several minutes since the pumps are located at the lake,
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outside of the power bicek. The licensoe revised Procedure STS IC-617A a
to not lift the leads on the K617 relay. The licensee also reviewed all-previous performances of STS IC-617A and -B to April 4,1985, and found that the lifted leads ano potential inraerability of the ESW
pump did not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the period allc.ved by TS 3.7.4 e
On September 22,.1989, the licensee was performing stroke tests on u.
the main feedwater isolation valves (MFIV). Valve AE-FV40, the Loop "B" MFIV, failed to operate. A 4-way slide valve in the
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actuating mechanism was found to have failed. AE-FV40 has two trains of actuation; one train remained operable. The licensee entered TS 4.0.5, which required the plant to repair the valve within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or shut down. While the licensee was replacing the 4-way slide valve, air pressure from the other train air reservoir bled off rendering both actuation trains inoperable.
The MFIV fails shut on loss of electric power but fails "as is" on loss of air. The licensee entered TS 3.3.2.5 Action Statement 27 which required the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The licensee completed replacing the 4-way slide valve, stroke tested AE-FV40, and exited TS 3.3.2.5 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. During replacement of the 4-way slide valve, a nonenvironmentally qualified 0-ring was used. Subsequent licensee safety analysis could not find sufficient documentation to
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support use of the 0-ring and the licensee replaced it with a qualified 0-ring.
No violations or deviations here identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The purpose of inspections in this area was to ascertain that maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and TS. Methods used in this
. inspection included direct observation, personnel interview, and records
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review.
Items verified in this inspection included:
Activities did.not violate limiting conditions for operation and redundant components were operable.
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Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained before initiating work.
Radiological controls were properly implemented.
- Fire prevention controls were implemented.
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Required alignments and surveillances to verify postmaintenance
operability were performed.
Replacement parts ar'd materials used were properly certified.
- Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and
additional technical expertise was made available when needed.
Quality control (QC) hold points and/or checklists were used and
QC personnel observed designated work activities.
Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to date.
- Portions of selected maintenance activities regarding the work L
requests (WRs) listed below were observed. The WRs and related documents were reviewed by the inspectors:
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Activity l
WR 02867-89 Fuel oil lines rubbing against injection pumps on KJ01 L
WR 02348-89 Inspect Jacket Water Expansion Tank TKJ01B
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WR 02868-89 KJ018 fuel oil leak on return header blind flange A
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p WR 03875-89 Install drainlines on KJ air compressor relief valves WR 51666-89 1-year maintenance on Fuel Oil Supply Filter FKJ07B Selected inspector observations are discussed below:
The maintenance. activities that were observed, appeared to be performed
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satisfactorily and in accordance with procedure.
In one esse, maintenance personnel found a procedure error and resolved it before continuing with f.he procedure.
In another case, a torque wrenc:1 appeared to fail.
The inspector followed up and found that the torgue wrench was returned to the.
metrology lab for evaluation. Another torque w+ench was checked out and used for the job. The inspector found that the licensee could readily determine where and when the torque 'vrench had previously been used, in this case, the torque wrench had not been used since it was last calibrated.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
The purpose of this inspection activity was to provide onsite inspection
- of events at operating power reactors. Specific inspection act!vities included:
Observing plant status
Evaluating the significance of the events, perfomance of safety systems, and actions taken by the licensee Confiming that the licensee had made proper notification of the
events and of any new developments or significant changes in plant conditions Evaluating the need for further or continued NRC _ response to the
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events The following items were considered during the followup:
_ Details regarding the cause of the event
Event chronology
Functioning of safety systems as required by plant conditions
Radiological consequences and personnel exposure
Proposed licensee actions to correct the cause of the event
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.j Corrective actions taken or planned prior to resumption of facility
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operations A selected event requiring a licensee event report (LER) that occurred i
during this report period is listed in the table below*
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Date.
Event Plant Status Cause
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9/19/89 Entry into TS 3.0.3 Mode 1 Equipment Failure j
(100% Power)
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i The inspector will review this LER for the event and will report any
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. findings in a subsequent inspection report.
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Selected inspector observations regarding the above event are discussed below:
r At 5:55 p.m., on September 19, 1989, the licensee entered TS 3.0.3..The reason for the entry was that the "B" diesel generator was out of service
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for routine maintenance when the "A" centrifugal charging pump was declared inoperable. On September 15,1989, the licensee performed Procedure STS IC-603A which tested the niinimum flow line for the "A"
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centrifugal charging pump. A valve in that line was required to shut when
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charging flow had sufficiently increased to permit maximum flow during a
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small break LOCA. However, after the valve shut, it reopened. The test
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sersonnel originally considered the problem to be a procedural problem
'>ecause this was the first performance of the procedure following a major i
revision. After the licensee detennined that an actual equipment failure
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had been found and that it affected the ability of the centrifugal charging pump to perfonn its safety function, the pump was declared inoperable. After entry into TS 3.0.3, the licensee identified and replaced a failed relay, completed STS IC-603A satisfactorily, and exited
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TS 3.0.3 at 7:40 p.m. that same evening, j
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The licensee expected to have the relay repaired promptly and did not start an actual power reduction during the TS 3.0.3 entry.
Licenste experience has shown that a controlled shutdown can be perfonned in approximately 31/2 hours.
Because the shutdown was not actually initiated, a Notice of Unusual Event was not declared. Licensee actions to initiate the TS 3.0.3 required shutdown within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, included
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notification of system operations, and the readying of procedures for the controlled shutdown of the plant. The NRC was also notified.
The licensee is currently perfonning an evaluation of the safety significance of the loss of injection flow with the miniflow open, including a detenaination of the operability of the system with miniflow
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valve malfunctioning.
Pending the results of this evaluation, this will remainanunresolveditem(482/8924-02). The licensee's response to the TS 3.0.3 entry appeared correct. However, the untimely identification of
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the recirculation valve operability issue was unacceptable although it was I-an isolated occurrence. Licensee management recognized the importance of
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timely identification and stated intentions to improve the operator and
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d technicians sensitivity to this issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7, Cold Wrather Preparations (21714)
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The objective of this inspection was to determine whether the licensee has
maintained effective implementation of the program of protective measures for extreme cold weather.
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Procedure STN GP-001, Revision 2; " Plant Winterization," was i
partially performed on September 13, 1989. The procedure
) laced heating in service for the demineralized water storage tan <,
condensate storage tank, reactor makeup water storage' tank, and the
refueling water storage tank.
In addition, heat tracing of outside
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piping running to those tanks was also placed in service.
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Ti;, licensee performed the portions of STN GP-001 described above even though freezing weather was not imediately expected. The
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procedure also establishes-space heating to several rooms and stand alone structures and verifies proper operation of the, heating.
Howevec, temperatures in most of the rooms remained sufficiently warm such that thermostats could not be adjusted high enough to cause the space heating to actuate,
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Another portion of the procedure not performed was the isolation and draining of chilled water coils from power block supply air units.
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At the time the procedure was perfomed, warm weather was forecast to return before cold winter weather sets in, and the need for continued room cooling was.still anticipated.
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STN GP-001 did not include the temporary fire main piping which is
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located outside of the circulating water screenhouse.
The licensee stated that the replacement of the fire main; piping was expected to be complete by mid-October 1989. This is prior to the normal onset of freezing weather. The licensee recognized the need to provide freeze protection to the temporary fire raain piping should it become
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necessary.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Followop on Previously Identified NRC Items (92701)
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(Closed)UnresolvedItem(482/8807-22):
PMR 1722 Motor-Operator Testing - This item concerned Engineering Evaluation
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Request (EER) 86-EM-03 that described a problem of multiple drawings and inadequate cross referencing between plant and vendor drawings.
At the time the item was opened, the EER had not been evaluated or dispositioned. The EER has since been evaluated and dispositioned.
The licensee had expanded the use of an interim series of drawings to
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i consolidate the multiple drawings. These drawings provide a unique
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- internal wiring diagram for the safety-related Westinghouse valves
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during the modification process. The interim drawings will become the basis for the permanent drawings after modifications are complete. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(482/8807-35)(par.3.2.2.3):
PMR 2084 CCW Pipe Wall Thinning - This plant modification request involved application of a weld overlay on a component cooling water line. On l
February 1,1989, NRC issued WCGS a Notice of Violation and Proposed
ImpositionofCivilPenalty(EA88-282). The violation addressed the major safety issue raised by Unresolved Item 482/8807-33.
NRC
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Inspection Report 50-482/88-200 addressed the remaining issues in
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this unresolved item. As identified in the above reports, the
licensee did fail to follow procedures during the perfonnance of
PMR 2084; however, this failure has already been cited, followed up on; and closed as part of the enforcement action EA 88-282. This unresolved item is closed.
c.
.In i;RC Inspection Report 50-482/89-23. two items were inadvertently
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given the same item number. To clarify and correct the numbering
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error, the unresolved item in. paragraph 8.a of the referenced report should be 482/8923-02.
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Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER)
(92700)
During this inspection period, the inspectors performed followup on two
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Wolf Creek LERs. The Leks were reviewed to ensure:
Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or
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work is in progress.
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Response to the event was adequate.
- Response to the event i.ut license conditions, conunitments, or other
applicable regulatory requirenents.
The information contained in the report satisfied applicable
reporting requirenents.
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Generic issues were identified.
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The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed:
'89-016. " Inattention to Detail Leads to Error in Schedule Causing
Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement."
The licensee attributed the event to the personnel error of failing
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- to ensure the surveillance test was properly scheduled. The report
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also listed as a contributing factor, a computer program limitation that made scheduling this particular surveillance test more difficult. The licensee revised the computer program to hard date P
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the 62-day surveillance tests. The licensee demonstrated the
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scheduling program for the NRC inspectcr. This item was discussed in
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NRC Inspection Report 50-482/89-23 and identified as a noncited i
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violation (482/6923-01). This LER is closed.
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l 89-018, " Failure to Recognize the Need to Take Action to Place
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Dempers in Safeguards Position May Have Resulted in Inoperability of i
o b-Both Emergency Exhaust Systems." This item was discussed in paragraph 3.a.
The licensee's comitment to test the emergency exhaust system with the dampers open during the next refueling outage
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b is in addition to the corrective action discussed in the LER. This LER is closed.
10. Unresolved Items l
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Unresolved items are matters about which more infonnation is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance, or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.
11. Exit Meeting (30703)
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he inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) on September 29, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the s
.infomation provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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