IR 05000482/1989016
| ML20247L352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247L329 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-89-16, NUDOCS 8908010222 | |
| Download: ML20247L352 (13) | |
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- APPENDIX.
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY c.0MMISSION
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REGION IV
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.NRC Inspection' Report: 50-482/89-16 Operating License: NPF-42
Docket: :50-482 j
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
'P.O. Box 411:
Burlington, Kansas-66839-Facility.Name: ' Wolf Creek Generating. Station (WCGS)
x Inspection' At: = WCGS, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas
- Inspection Conducted: June 1-30. 1989
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, Inspectors:
B. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects M. E. Skow, Resident Inspector, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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' Approved:
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E. Jk Holler, Chief,. Project 5ection D '
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Division of~ Reactor Projects
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N Inspection Summary
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50-482/89-16)
Inspection ~ Conducted June 1-30, 1989 (Report Areas Inspected-Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status, followup on a previously identified NRC item, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, engineered safety features walkdown. review of licensee event reports, and onsite followup of events'at operating power reactors.
Resultsi The licensee was observed to perform complicated and time-restricted eddy current inspection and maintenance on the four safety-related air conditioning chilled water unit heat exchangers in a professional manner. When problems were encountered replacing tubes in the heat exchangers, a coordinated effort was immediately initiated to correct the situation (paragraph 4.c). The engineered ' safety features (ESF) system walkdown performed this month did not identify any major discrepancies. However, numerous comments were turned over to the licensee including:
o Fire dampers and relief valves are not labeled and there appears to be no overall plan on the part of the licensee to label them.
8908010222 890726 PDR ADOCK 05000482 Q
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f or Multiple errors are still being identified on plant drawings (see NRC-lInspectionReports 50-482/89-10, -89-05, and -87-03).
While it' appears that' the' licensee expends considerable resources (time, money, and manpower) maintaining the. engineering design basis, numerous
.. minor items.are still missed (paragraph 7).
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DETAILS
'1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel B. Withers, President and CEO
- F. T. Rhodes, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
- R. M.. Grant, Vice President, Quality Assurance (QA)
- J. A. Bailey, Vice Prcsident, Operations G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager
- R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications
- 0. L. Maynard, Manager of Regulatory Services
- B. McKinney, Manager, Operations
- M. G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support
- K, Peterson, Supervisor, Licensing G. Pendergrass, Licensing
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- W. B. Norton, Manager,. Technical Support
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- C. W. Fowler, Manager, Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
- P...B. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- R. S. Benedict, Manager, Quality Control
- W.-M. Lindsay, Supervisor, QA
- J. A.'Zell, Training Manager
- J.-Pippin, Manager', Nuclear Plant' Engineering (NPE)
- S. Wideman, Licensing Specialist III
- H. L. Stubby, Supervisor, Technical Training
- T.' F. ' Deddens,. Jr., Outage Manager
- J. H.Ziesenis, Supervisor, Chemistry
- D. G. Moseby, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- C. L. Palmer, Supervisor, Chemistry
- J. Weeks, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- C. Sprout, Section Manager, NPE
- N. Hoadley, Manager, NPE Systems
- R. L. Logsdon, Manager, Chemistry NRC Attendees
- T. F. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section
- H. F. Bundy, Reactor Inspector
- J. R. Boardman, Reactor Inspector The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on June 30, 1989.
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Plant Status
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- During the inspection period, the licensee operated at 100 percent power.
There were no reactor trips or turbine trips.
.3.
Followup on a Previously Identified NRC Item (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8727-06):
Causes of Low As-Found Setpoints on PZR Code Safeties - This item concerned the method of testing pressurizer code safety valve operability. The licensee noted that one of the valves had an as-found setpoint that was below normal operating pressure. The. licensee performed an evaluation of the test method and found that the valve setpoints were sensitive to valve body temperature and method of heating the valve. The licensee has issued Revision 2 to STS MT-005, which incorporated the procedural changes necessary to test the valves under conditions more closely matching actual operating conditions. This unresolved item is closed.
4.
.0perational Safety Verification (71707)
The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory requirements.
It also was to ensure that the licensee's management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation. The methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, corrective actions, and review of facility records.
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Areas reviewed during this inspection included, but were not limited to, control room activities, routine surveillance, ESF operability, radiation protection controls, fire protection, security, plant cleanliness, instrumentation and alarms, deficiency reports, and corrective actions.
Routine. surveillance and operating activities witnessed and/or reviewed by
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the inspectors are listed below:
a.
On May 10, 1989, a 10 CFR Part 21 report was issued by another
licensee concerning safety-related room cooler vents and drains. The room coolers contain 1/2-inch diameter carbon steel vent and drain i
lines. These lines were welded or brazed to copper-nickel supply and return headers.
Inspection revealed galvanic corrosion of the carbon
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steel vent and drain line stubs which penetrate through the I
copper-nickel headers into the flow stream. The same style of room coolers with similar drains are utilized at WCGS. There are a total of 16 room coolers potentially affected.
WCNOC issued Plant Modification Request (PMR) 02893 to replace the carboa steel lines with stainless steel and to monitor the room j
coolers for leakage until the PMR is implemented.
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On June 1,1989 Limitorque Corporation issued a 10 CFR Part 21 report applicable'to WCGS. 'The Part 21 report was issued.because of.
NRC Vendor Branch Inspection Report '88-01 and concerned supplying WCGS with the wrong terminal blocks. WCNOC issued Industry Technical Information Program (ITIP) No. 01025 to evaluate the Part 21 report.
WCNOC determined that four unqualified terminal blocks had been received under Purchase Order 027000-000-13350. All:four terminal
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blocks were-located in the warehouse. A " hold" was placed on the terminal blocks and quality control has written Nonconformance Report N-078 to' document receipt of the unqualified terminal blocks.
The licensee stated that these terminal blocks were received in 1985 -
under the old receipt inspection program which inspected purchase order number and price. The current receipt inspection program has the inspection requirements generated on site and would inspect more than just the purchase order number and the price.
c.
On June 1,1989, the licensee sent Letter WM 89-0163 to NRC stating their intentions to perform inspections and maintenance on the Class IE electrical equipment air conditioning units (GK)..The licensee stated:
"In early May 1989, eddy current inspections were performed on the central chilled water (GB system) heat exchangers and unacceptable indications were discovered on the heat exchanger tube walls. As a result, 55 of the 480 tubes were replaced.
Later examination of the defective tubing revealed corrosion in the form of pitting. During startup of WCGS, the central chilled water heat'exchangers and SGK05A and B were mechanically cleaned and soaked by a chlorine solution. Because of the similar niicrobiologically induced corrosion -(MIC) treatments, operating water chemistry, materials of composition, and the recent findings on the GB system; WCN0C feels that it is prudent to perform eddy current inspections of SGK05A and B now instead of waiting until the next refueling outage."
In addition to inspecting the SGK05A and -B units, the licensee inspected the SGK04A and -B units (control room chillers).
During the inspection period, the licensee performed the eddy current inspections. SGK04A had one heat exchanger tube plugged and SGK04B had 88 tubes replaced (out of a total of 110). SGK05A had 61 tubes replaced and 2 t'ubes plugged (out of a total of 89) and SGK058 had a total of 42 tubes replaced. All heat exchangers were found to have sone pitting on the tube sheets and were repaired. The licensee's root cause evaluation is continuing. Samples of the pitted heat exchanger tubes were sent to offsite laboratories for analysis but the results have not yet been returned.
In response to an inspector's question, the licensee stated that an evaluation for operability concerns regarding the silt blockage found in the units will be performed.
It should be noted; however, that the chillers are-the normal source of cooling to the control room and no temperature
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-6-problems-had been encountered. Pending the licensee's root cause analysis of the tube pitting, determination of how long the condition may have existed along with long-term corrective action, and analysis
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of the silt buildup, this will remain an unresolved item (482/8916-01).
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tio violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems and components was being conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS). Methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and'
review of records.
Items included in this inspection included, but were not limited to, verification that:
o Testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure.
o The surveillance procedure was in conformance with TS requirements, o
The operating system and test instrumentation was within its current calibration cycle, o
Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained prior to initiating the test.
o Limiting conditions for operation were met and the system was properly returned to service.
o The test data were accurate and complete and the test results met TS requirements.
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Surveillance witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed below:
o STS PE-013, Revision 6, " Personnel Air Lock Seal Test," performed June 13, 1989 o
STS10-201, Revision 7, " Analog Channel Operational Test 7300 Process Instrumentation Protection Set I (Red)," performed June 20, 1989 STS BB-004, Revision 5, "RCS Water Inventory Balance," performed o
June 27, 1989 o
MPE E051Q-01, Revision 4, " Semi-annual Cleaning and Testing of Internal Components In Battery Chargers," performed June 27, 1989 No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The purpose of-inspections in this area was to ascertain that maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and TS. Methods used in this inspection included direct observation, personnel interview, and records review.
Items verified in this inspection included:
o Activities did not violate limiting conditions for operation and redundant components were operable, o
Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained before initiating work.
o Radiological controls were properly implemented.
o Fire prevention controls were implemented.
o Required alignments and surveillance to verify postmaintenance operability were performed.
o Replacement parts and materials used were properly certified.
o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and additional technical expertise was made available when needed, o'
Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used and quality
. control personnel observed designated work activities.
o Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to date.
Portions of selected maintenance activities on the work requests (WRs)
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listed below were observed. The WRs and related documents were reviewed
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by the inspectors:
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Activity WR 51427-89 Battery Charger PK23 - 6-month battery charger checkout I
WR 02804-89 Battery Chargers PK23 and PK24 - Implement Revision 2 of PMR 01362 install new low drift CFA cards WR 02336-89 Condenser air removal Filter FGE01 WR 02320-89 Class IE Air conditioner SKG05A - Tube replacement No violations or deviations were identified.
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Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by walking down selected accessible portions of the system. The inspectors verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required position, power was available, and valves were locked where required. The inspectors also inspected system components for damage or other conditions that could degrade system performance.
The ESF system walked down during this inspection period was the " Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (GK)." The primary documents utilized by the inspectors during the walkdown are listed in Attachment 1.
a.
Reviews of Drawings and Procedures As a result of drawings and procedures reviews, the inspectors identified the following discrepancies:
o Valves GK V-782, -783, -784, -786, and -787 to the secondary alarm station (SAS) room coolers were not on Valve Checklist (CKL) GK-121 Revision 7. " Control Building HVAC Checklist."
The licensee stated that CKL GK-121 would be revised to include these valves.
It should be noted that all valves were in their SAS cooler is actually the central alarm' station (prints as the required positions. The cooler referenced on the CAS) cooler.
o Nonseismic pipes supplying freon to the CAS room cooler are located in the control room.
The licensee pointed out to the inspector that Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 6.4.1 Stated that leakage of this f reon into the control room had previously been evaluated and was not a personnel hazard, ESF Switchgear Room Unit Heater EGKOSA was in Switchgear Room II o
(B train) and Heater EGK05B was in Switchgear Room I (A train).
The licensee stated that the heaters were mislabeled on the piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). A corrective work request was initiated to correct the mislabeling.
During the review of CKL GK-131, Revision 9, " Control Building o
HVAC Electrical Checklist " it was noted that the terminology for verifying breaker positions was different than other CKLs.
Some CKLs use " closed" or " opened" and some use "on" or "off."
The licensee committed to the inspector to correct the terminology difference during 2-year procedure reviews and
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updates.
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System Walkdown During walkdowns of the GK system in the control building and auxiliary building the following discrepancies were observed:
o Fire dampers (damptrs located inside ductwork at locations where the ductwork penetrated fire walls wnich are designed to stop the spread of fire in the ductwork) did not nave any identification tags.
The licensee stated that, because all fire barrier penetrations
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had identification tags and because the dampers were r.at routinely manipulated, the existing identification tags were sufficient. Ductwork penetration numbers on the 2016-foot clevation in the control building were noted by the inspector to be missing, however. The licensee stated that the missing
numbers would be posted.
o A list containing valves and dampers with missing identification tags was given to the licensee. The licensee initiated engraving requests and will replace the missing tags with two exceptions; Tornado 3ackdraft Damper D-315 and Relief Valve GK V-772. Operations indicated ' hat labeling of equipment that is not used during operation of the plant is unnecessary. The inspector's concern is that uniabeled equiptw may impede maintenance and corrective action act1via n. This matter will remain open pending this inspector's review of the licensee's equipment labeling practices (482/8916-02).
o Several minor items such as an open conduit and a missing diffuser cover were identified to the licensee. Corrective Work Request (CWR) 03051-89 and 03052-89 were written to correct the discrepancies.
o Dampers D-159 and D-039 are shcwn on the P&ID in the reverse order that they are installed in the ductwork as are Dampet's D-152, D-33, D-158, D-125, D-ul, and D-182.
CWR 03062-89 issued by the licensee will correct the discrepancy by revising the P&ID.
The P&lD and USAR Figure 9.5.1-2 both show a 3-hour fire barrier o
between the outside air inlets to the "A" and "B" train contrc1 room pressurization units; however, portions of the "8" inlet duct are in the "A" room.
The licensee stated that, even though a single postulated fire in the "A" control room pressurization units area (Room 3416)
could incapacitate both trains, these units were not required for safe shutdown because the control room would remain'
habitable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without outside air makeup.
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-10-o Differential pressure transmitter (PDT) isolation valve tags
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were reversed to PDT-21, -22, -24, -32, -33, and -35.
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licensee corrected the tags.
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The P&ID showed an incorrect arrangement for the instrument
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tubing to the instruments listed immediately above, j
CWR 03062-89 was issued to correct this discrepancy.
With the exception of the itrms noted above, the GK system was found to be well maintained and operated. Operators were knowledgeable and conscientious.
For example, when the inspector remarked to a nonlicensed operator (NLO) that valves on the six PDTs were mislabeled, the NLO corrected them before the inspector could inform licensee management of the situation. Labeling of plant equipment was less than fully satisfactory, however.
Personnel not as familiar with equipment as those in the Operations Department depend en equipment labeling for proper identification. Maintenance, for examp'a, performs work on fire dampers by fire damper number not by penetration numbers.
tio violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(92700)
During this inspection period, the inspectors performed followup on WCGS LERs. The LERs were rew'ewed to ensure:
c Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or work is in progress, o
Response to the event was adequate.
o Response to the event met license conditions, commitments, or einer applicable regulatory requirements.
o The information contained in the report satisfied applicable rer.orting requirements.
o Generic issues were identified.
The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed:
88-C27, " Manufacturing and/or Installation Process Deficiencies Cause o
Pcwer Failure of Postaccident Excore Neutron Monitoring System to Meet Postaccident Qualifications." The licensee replaced the cable assemblies and detectors with fully qualified equipment.
In addition, the licensee performed an audit of the vendor and reviewed circuits which have vendor-to-vendor interfaces. This LER is closed.
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'LER 89-006, " Inattention to Detail Leads to Failure to Perform Cloud Point' Analysis of. Fuel Oil Causing. Technical Specification Violation," Corrective action was verified complete.
It included:
o Change to Procedure STS CH-015, '? Emergency Die'sel New Fuel," to include cloud poir:t in the vendor lab analysis.
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Change to Procedure ADM 04-029 (Revision 7), " Control of Li Chemical Supplies," to include.a chemistry supervisor review of.
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new or renewed blanket purchase orders, o
The purchase order for the diesel fuel vendor lab analysis was revised to include a cloud point analysis.
During review of the LER, the inspector observed that prior to April 16.1984, when the vendor supplied cloud point data, there was no formal review of the cloud point at the time the information was received. The safety significance now of what the cloud point was for the period prior to April 16, 1984, is minimal. This LER.is closed.
9.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
The purpose of. this inspection activity was to provide onsite inspection l
of events at operating power reactors.
Specific inspection activities included:
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Observing plant status.
o Evaluating the significance of the events, performance of safety systems, and actions taken by the licensee.
o Confirming that the licensee had made proper notification of the events and of any new developments or significant changes in plant conditions.
o Evaluating'the need for further or continued NRC response to'the events.
The following items were considered during the followup:
o Details regarding the cause of the event.
o Event chronology.
Functioning of safety systems as required by plant renditions.
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. Radiological consequences and personnel exposure.
o Proposed licensee actions to correct the cause of the event.
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Corrective actions taken or. planned prior to resumption of facility operations.
The events that occurred during this report period are listed in the table below:.
Date Event Plant Status Cause 6/23/89 TS 3.0.3 Mode 1 Both trains of Entry (100 percent)
safety-related HVAC
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cooling were inoperable
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On June 23, 1389., the licensee.was performing maintenance on one train of safety relate,1 chillers (see paragraph 4.c) when the other train was determined to be inoperable. A loose electrical connection was preventing the compressor from properly loading, The connection was replaced and the chiller promptly returned to service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery.
6/26/89 CRVIS*
Mode 1 GK RE-04 power failure (100 percent)
- CRVIS - Control room ventilation isolation system actuatior.
The inspectors will review the LERs for these events and will report any finding 3 in a subsequent NRC inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable item, items of noncompliance, or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.c.
11.
Exit Meeting (30703),
The inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) on June 30, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify, as proprietary, any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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Attachment 1
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' Procedures
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CKL GK-121, Revision 7, " Control Building HVAC Valve Checklist" CKL GK-131, Revision 9. " Control Building HVAC Electrical Checklist" STS GK-001A, Revision 7, " Control Room Emergency Vent. System Train 'A'
Operability Test" STS GK-001B, Revision 7 " Control Room Emergency Vent System Train 'B'
Operability' Test" MCM M622.1Q-01, Revision 2. " Control Room and Class IE A/C Units Charging, Evacuating and Leak Test" PMR 02827 Revision I thruugh 5, " Incorporation of Carrier Manual"
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MCM M00C-03, Revision 2, " Heat Exchangers Corrective Maintenance" Drawings M-1H3411(Q), Revision 0, " Heating, Ventilating, and Air Condition Control Building Elevation 2016'-0", Area 1" M-12GK01(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC" M-12GK02(Q), Revision 1. " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC" l1-12GK03(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC" M-12GK04(Q), Revision 1, " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC" 10466-M-621-0008-W12, " General Arrangement Control Room Filtration Unit FGK01A and B" 10466-M-621-0002-W10, " General Arrangement Control Room Pressurization Unit FGK02A and B" M-13GK02, Revision 2, "Snall Piping Isometric Room Coolers and Compressors-Vents and Drains-Aux Building" M-13GK02, Revision 2, "Small Piping Isometric Filter Adsorber Drains Aux.,
Control, Reactor, Fuel and Radw. Bldgs" M-1G051, Revision 0, " Equipment Locations Control & Diesel Gens. Bldgs. onu Comm. Corridor Plan El. 2000'-0" and El. 2016'-0""
M-622.1-00095-W01, " Integral Finned, Tube 'N' Stcmp Nuclear"
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