IR 05000482/1987020
| ML20235M364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1987 |
| From: | Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunter D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M308 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-87-20, NUDOCS 8710060163 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20235M364 (12) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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' REGION IV
.t NRC Inspection Report:
50-482/87-20 License:
NPF-42 l
Docket:
50-482-Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation'(WCNOC)..
P.-0. Box 411
.Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: -Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)
Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted:
August 1-31, 1987 Inspectors:
bduh, 9 C l 8'7 w
J..E.
C~ummins, Senio'
Resident Inspector, Date Operations 00h An YLt 24 B. L. Bartlett, Redident Reactor Inspector, Date7 Operations Approved:
O 4!Ef!/7 D. R. Hunter, Chief, Reactor Project Date Section B, Reactor Projects Branch f
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted August 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-482/87-20)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, 10 CFR Part 21 report followup, physical security verification, radiological protection, engineered safety features system walkdown, allegations followup, and followup on regional requests for information.
Results:
Within the 10 areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3, paragraph 3).
One open item is identified in paragraph 11 and one unresolved item is identified in j
paragraph 5.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- B. D. Withers, President I
- R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality
- J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
- F. T. Rhodes, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager
- 0. L. Maynard, Manager of Licensing l
- C. M. Estes, Superintendent of Operations
- M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance
- M. G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative Services
- W. J. Rudolph, QA Manager-WCGS
- A. A. Freitag, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS
- M. Nichols, Plant Support Superintendent
- K. Peterson, Supervisor of Licensing G. Pendergrass, Licensing
- W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems
- C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist
- J. A. Zell, Training Manager
- J. Houghton, Operations Coordinator-0perations The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on September 4, 1987.
2.
Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1 during the inspection period.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility records.
The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and interview of personnel verified that physical security, radiation protection, and fire protection activities were controlled.
By observing accessible components for correct valve position and electrical breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of selected portions of safety-related systems.
The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety
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components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could prevent them from performing their designed functions.
Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:
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On August 18, 1987, during a routine plant tour, the NRC inspector observed licensee security personnel responding to a possible loss of security in the fuel building. During maintenance to replace a section of-fire protection piping, a hole through the side of the fuel building had
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been left after a section of piping had been removed. The personnel
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performing the work failed to realize that the opening left with the pipe removed could be a security problem and a fuel building pressurization
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problem. The NRC inspector reviewed the circumstances and it was concluded that the hole created neither a security problem nor a TS problem; however, it did point out the need to consider the functions of walls and other boundaries during the preparation of work packages, particularly when the boundaries are being breached during the work activity.
I A3 proximately one hour after the above observation, the NRC inspector o) served that Penetration OP152W1317 (auxiliary building to control room)
had been recently worked on; however, with the help of the shift supervisor (SS) it was determined that it did not violate the control room pressure boundary. Discussions with the SS the next day revealed that l
work packages were again found to inadequately address the functions of I
walls when they were breached. The SS had all penetration work stopped until he felt that the wall penetrations were properly addressed.
Later
that day penetration work was allowed to continue.
l Licensee personnel informed the NRC inspector that even if Penetration OP152S1317 had been completely breached that it would not matter since that part of the auxiliary building wall was not part of the control room pressure boundary. The pressure boundary was actually the l
wall of the electrical cable chase which was inside the control room.
On August 20, 1987, during a routine plant tour of the control room, the NRC inspector observed Door 36171 propped open. Door 36171 is the access i
door to the southeast electrical chase and as noted above is a part of the control room pressure boundary. The NRC inspector notified the SS who immediately implemented appropriate administrative controls.
Interviews with the personnel who had propped the door open to perform penetration work revealed that the door had been open off and on all morning and l
afternoon but for less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> at any one time. The review by the NRC inspector determined that the licensee inspection activities in the
area of the door were limited to the previous 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
With the control room pressure boundary violated, the ability of either train of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to.25 inches j
of water was violated. With both trains of the control room emergency l
ventilation system inoperable, the licensee should have entered TS 3.0.3.
l This failure of the licensee to recognize entry into TS 3.0.3 is an j
apparent violation (482/8720-01).
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Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures.
The NRC inspectors considered the following elements while inspecting surveillance activities:
o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved procedure.
o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirements.
o Required test instrumenhtion was calibrated, o
Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were satisfied.
o Test data was accurate and complete.
Where appropriate, the NRC inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data to verify their accuracy.
o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable administrative procedures.
o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the test results met the required limits.
I Surveillance witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed below:
o STS PE-013, Revision 5, " Personnel Air Lock Seal Test," performed on August 26, 1987 o
STS RE-012, Revision 1, "QPTR Determination," performed on August 26, 1987 o
STS SE-002, Revision 0, " Manual Calculation of Reactor Thermal Power," performed on August 26, 1987 o
STS EJ-1008, Revision 1, "RHR System Inservice Pump 'B' Test,"
performed on August 26, 1987 o
STS EG-100A, Revision 2, " Component Cooling Water Pumps A/C Inservice Pump Test," performed on July 10, 1987 o
STS EG-100B, Revision 2, " Component Cooling Water Pumps B/D Inservice Pump Test," performed on July 10, 1987 No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards.
The following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:
o LCOs were met and, where applicable, redundant components were
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operable, o
Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, o
Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were used.
o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, 0perations)
was made available when appropriate, o
Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified, o
Required radiological controls were implemented, o
Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate.
o Required alignments and surveillance to verify post maintenance operability were performed.
o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work activities.
Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work requests (WR) listed below were observed and related documentation reviewed by the NRC inspector:
No.
Activity WR 02972-87 Piping Line EF-134-HBC-16, UT thickness examination WR 02892-87 Foam penetration closures, auxiliary building WR 02888-87 Foam penetration closures, auxiliary building-inspect and rework as required Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:
On August 21, 1987, the licensee determined by ultrasonic testing (UT)
that Section EF-134-HBC-16 of essential service water (ESW) Train "B"
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piping had less than the allowable minimum wall thickness of.328 inches.
.The lowest thicknesses measured were.125 inches.
This section of piping was located directly downstream of throttled butterfly Valve' EF V090.
The licensee has determined that piping downstream of throttled butterfly valves was subject to a possible high erosion rate.
The licensee performed the UT on the pipe in accordance with a recently implemented preventive maintenance erosion / corrosion monitoring program.
On August 21, 1987, when this piping wall was identified to be less than minimum, in accordance with licensee Procedure ADM 08-212, Revision 0,
" Erosion / Corrosion Monitoring Program," Work Request (WR) 02972-87 was written to get an engineering evaluation of the minimum wall condition and to provide instructions for any necessary repairs.
On August 24, 1987, the engineering evaluation determined that the pipe would not meet seismic and ASME Code compliance requirements.
Based on this evaluation, the licensee declared the ESW Train "B" inoperable and entered TS 3.7.4, which allowed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to either make the component operable or to shut down the plant.
The section of pipe was repaired within the 72-hour action of TS 3.7.4 by overlay welding on.its outer surface which increased the wall thickness to greater than the required minimum.
During the refueling outage from October-December 1986, this same section of piping had been repaired to correct a through wall leak.
Activities related to the repairs to ESW piping that was less than the required minimum wall thickness due to erosion were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/87-15, paragraph 5.
Unresolved Item 482/8715-04 was written pending NRC review of whether or not the licensee should declare a component inoperable immediately upon determination that it fails to meet ASME Code requirements.
In this instance ESW Pipe Section EF-134-HBC-16 was determined to be below minimum wall thickness by the licensee at 3:41 p.m. (CDT) on August 21, 1987, as documented in the shift supervisor's log.
However, the NRC inspector determined from discussions with licensee personnel that the engineering evaluation was not performed until Monday, August 24, 1987.
The engineering evaluation determined that the section of pipe would not have withstood upset conditions (seismic event) as required and ESW Train "B" was declared inoperable.
Pending completion of the NRC review of the question of the operability of a component that fails to meet ASME Code requirements, this will remain an unresolved item (482/8720-02) and will be reviewed as a part of Unresolved Item 482/8715-04.
As a part of this event, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
granted temporary relief so that the licensee did not have to perform the radiographic test of the repair weld as required by the ASME Code.
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performance of the test would have required a plant shutdown.
The relief I
was based on the satisfactory ic.agnetic particle examination of each weld I
layer and an ultrasonic test of the completed repair which verified that l
the pipe wall thickness was greater than the minimum required.
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6.
10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup a.
The NRC inspector, by review of documents and discussions with licensee personnel, verified that the'10 CFR Part 21 reports discussed below had been reviewed and appropriately acted on by the licensee.
(Closed) P21-1987-87-19:
Design Defect in Limitorque Valve Operators Manufactured Prior to 1975 The licensee determined that the limitorque operators at Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) were manufactured after 1975 and that they have a machined notch in the belleville spring assembly to prevent the hydraulic locking problem reported in the 10 CFR Part 21 report.
This information was documented in WCGS Industry Technical Information Review and Evaluation (ITIP) No. 00360.
(Closed) P21-1987-87-06:
Stationary Sleeve on MSIV Thrust Bearing Eg ending Past Rotating Face This 10 CFR Part 21 report reported a defect in reverse seating check valves manufactured by Atwood and Morrill Company, Inc. and used as main steam isolation valves (MSIV).
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hydraulically activated, bidirectional, double disc gate valves manufactured by a different vendor, therefore, this 10 CFR Part 21 is not applicable to WCGS.
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The NRC resident inspector provided a copy of the 10 CFR Part 21
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report listed below to the licensee for review and action, if required.
P21-1987-87-65: Wolfe & Swickard-Inner Bearing Race Missing on OG Air Start Motors 7.
Physical Security Verification The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physical security plan (PSP)
is being complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and
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security personnel.
l The NRC inspectors by observation of randomly selected activities verified that search equipment is operable, that the protected area barriers and vital area barriers are well maintained, that access control procedures are followed and that appropriate compensatory measures are followed when equipment is inoperable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Protection By performing the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that radiologically related activities were controlled in accordance with the
. licensee's procedures and regulatory requirements:
o-Reviewed documents such as active radiation work permits and the health physics shift turnover log.
o Observed personnel activities in the radiologically controlled area (RCA) such as:
Use of the required dosimetry equipment, q
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" Frisking out" of the RCA, and
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Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where
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required.
o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated areas.
o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics supervisors.
Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:
On August 28, 1984, the licensee received from Science Applications International (SAI) a boron analyzer which had a fission chamber in it that contained approximately 2 grams of Uranium 235 (U235).
This analyzer was part of the post-accident sampling system.
At the time the analyzer was shipped and received the fission chamber did not get classified as special nuclear material (SNM) and therefore the transaction was not documented in accordance with the instructions in NUREG/BR-0006, Revision 2, " Instructions for Completing Nuclear Material Transaction Reports." NUREG/BR-0006 requires that the shipper, in this case SAI, initiate a DOE /NRC Form 741 and send it to the receiver, in this case the licensee, with the SNM.
The receiver then fills out the appropriate section of the DOE /NRC Form 741 and distributes it per the instructions in NUREG/BR-0006.
Recently, licensee personnel questioned whether or not the fission chamber should have been treated as SNM and in subsequent discussions with SAI, it was decided that it should have been.
SAI on August 19, 1987, sent the licensee a DOE /NRC Form 741 for the fission chamber which the licensee filled out and distributed in accordance with NUREG/BR-0006.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by walking down l
selected accessible portions of the systems.
The NRC inspector verified j
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l valves and electrical circuit breakers were in'the required position, power was available, and valves were locked where required.
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inspectors also inspected system components for damage or other conditions that could degrade system performance.
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The ESF system walked down during this inspection period and the documents utilized by the NRC inspectors during the walkdown are listed below:
i System Documents Component Cooling Water (EG)
Drawing M-12EG01(Q), Revision 2,
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" Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System" Drawing M-12EG02(Q), Revision 1,
" Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System" Drawing M-02EG03(Q), Revision 17,
" Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System"
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Checklist (CKL) EG-120, Revision 8,
" Component Cooling Water System Valve, Switch, and Breaker Lineup" SYS EG-120, Revision 5, " Component Cooling Water System Startup" SYS EG-203, Revision 5, " Chemical Addition to Component Cooling Water System" SYS EG-201, Revision 4,." Transferring Supply of CCW Service Loop and CCW Train Shutdown" STS EG-001, Revision 4, " Component Cooling Water Valve Check" STS EG-100A, Revision 2, " Component Cooling Water Pumps A/C Inservice Pump Test" STS EG-1008, Revision 2, " Component Cooling Water Pumps B/D Inservice Pump Test"
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Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:
o Three 4-inch drains with flanges on each train of CCW were not included in CKL EG-120.
o Drain Valves EG-V381, 382, and 384 were not in CKL EG-120.
o Flow Indicator EG F1-64 was not reading zero when that portion of the system was isolated.
The observations noted above were given to the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Allegation Followup (Closed) Allegation (4-87-A-065): An alleger stated that when the plant was under construction, stainless steel welds were quenched with water.
Findings: The NRC inspector interviewed licensee engineers and determined that in May 1983, Quality Surveillance Report SR-437M was initiated to document craft personnel applying a saturated cloth to a stainless field weld. Although this was standard recommended practice and did not violate code and/or procedural criteria, it was not being done in accordance with an approved procedure. The licensee issued guidance for the welders to use in quenching; however, the licensee subsequently decided to discontinue quenching.
Conclusion:
The allegation that Wolf C:eek construction quenched welds was substantiated; however, quenching the stainless steel welds had no impact on safety.
11.
Followup on Regional Requests for Information During this inspection period, Region IV management informed the NRC inspectors of a containment temperature problem at another nuclear power plant.
It appeared that for a number of years the ambient air temperature inside containment had been excessively high and the licensee at that facility failed to adequately address the causes of the high temperatures, their affect on equipment qualification (EQ)e and on the accident analysis.
WCGS TS 3.6.1.5 requires that the primary containment temperature be determined by averaging the temperatures of the four containment coolers U
inletsandthatitnotbegreaterthanf20F. During this inspection period, the average temperature was 101 F.
When questioned further by the NRC ;nspector, licensee personnel stated that the temperatures of individual compartments inside containment could not be determined; however, Plant Modification Request (PMR) 1975 had been written to place
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some temporary' temperature probes insideLcontainment to monitor'various
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locations during the next cycle.
This item will remain open pending NRCs.
review of the next cycle temperature data (482/8720-03).
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Open Items i
Open items are. matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
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on the part of the NRC or licensee or.both.- One open item disclosed Lduring the inspection'is discussed in paragraph 11.
13.
linresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.
14. -Exit Meeting The NRC' inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss'the scope and findingstof-this inspection on' September 4, 1987.
The NRC inspectors also attended-entrance / exit meetings of.the NRC region-based inspectors identified below:
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Inspection Lead Area-Inspection Period-Inspector Inspected Report No.
8/3-7/87 R. Stewart Temporary 87-18 Instruction Followup.
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