IR 05000400/1989003
| ML18005A830 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1989 |
| From: | Bradford W, Dance H, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A829 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-03, 50-400-89-3, NUDOCS 8904030426 | |
| Download: ML18005A830 (11) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AEGION II 101 MARIETTAST., N.V/.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-400/89-03 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris Inspection Conducted:
January 21 - February 20, 1989 Inspectors:
M.
H. Bradford License Nos.:
NPF-63, ate Signed M. C.
Sha Date Signed
.
C.
nce, Section C ief Division of Reactor Projects D te S'gne SUMMARY Scope:
Results:
This routine safety inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, surveillance observations, main-tenance observations, licensee event reports, and follow-up of events at operating power reactors.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Two automatic reactor trips occurred during this period and are discussed in paragraph 6.
8904030426 890317 PDR ADOCK 05000400
PNU
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Batts, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance D. Braund, Supervisor, Security
- J. Collins, Manager, Operations
- G. Forehand, Director, gA/QC C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager T. Lentz, Operations Support Supervisor
- T. Norton, Manager, Maintenance C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring H. Smith, Supervisor, Radwaste Operations
- D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance
,
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Technical Support A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project E. Willet, Manager, Outages and Modifications W. Wilson, Performance Engineering L. Woods, Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted'uring this inspection included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engine'ering personnel, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in paragraph 8.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that:
systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocu-mented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and general housekeeping and control of fire hazards were satisfactory.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation
and interviews with plant personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the control room operators'ogs, tagout logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards and panels.
During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions, and manipulated plant controls properly.
The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
They observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffing met the TS requirements.
Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas.
The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas reviewed included:
operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, ALARA implementation, Radiation Work Permits for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of, work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.
No discrepancies were noted.
II Several inspector hours were spent on back shift inspections and observa-tions.
Various other aspects of plant operation were observed and evaluated.
The operators appeared to be alert, knowledgeable, and competent in their duties.
The licensee has developed a high degree of professionalism in the control room staff.
Plant housekeeping continues to be excellent.
The licensee has an ongoing program to repaint floors in the radiation controlled areas of the plant.
The health physics group has continued to work on contaminated areas following the outage and has aggressively reduced the amount of con-taminated area.
The inspectors have continued to perform a
system walkdown of the CCW system in order to meet resident action item 88-01, Drawing System Verification.
The inspection of the CCW system also included a review of surveillance testing, operating procedures, emergency procedures, valve lineups, inservice testing, and maintenance activities.
The system review will be completed arid documented in a future inspection report.
At this point, no findings/violations have been identified.
On February 1,
1989, the inspector attended a plant training lecture on Plant Emergency Training at the licensee's training facility.
The class attendees consisted on licensed reactor operators, licensed senior reactor operators, and members of plant management.
The instructor presented the
course in a clear and precise manner, utilizing appropriate procedures and study guides.
The instructor was well prepared to teach the subject, and class participation was very good.
The, eight-hour lecture was followed by scheduled simulator exercises.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (71709)
The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with applicable require-ments.
These observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedure to ensure that administrative controls were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test, and verifying that the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant approved procedures.
.Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service.
Portions of the following test activities were observed or reviewed by the inspectors:
OST 1216 EST 212 EST 211 OST 1028 OST 1807 OST 1103 OST 1316 CCW System Operability (1A and IB Pumps)
Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Auxiliary Relief Valve Testing Containment Isolation Valve Operability Containment Spray System ESF Response Time Testing CCW ISI Valve Testing CCW System Operability ( 1C Pump)
Ho violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with TS.
Items considered during the review included verification that LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; approved procedures were used; completed work was performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were also reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which could affect system perfor-mance.
Portions of the following activities were observed or reviewed:
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)
Main feed pump shaft repair Replacement of timing relay on potable water pressure tank, which also supplies lubricating and sealing water to the circulating water pumps bearings Replacement of explosion diaphragms on main turbine Various 480 Vac breaker inspections and cleaning Cleaning and inspecting various instrument control panels No violations.or deviations were identified.
The licensee received a
CFR Part 21 Report A'148, dated, December 20, 1988, from IMO Delaval Incorporated concerning a potential defect in a
component of the standby diesel generator.
The problem concerns cracks in the delivery valve holder.
This is a component part of the fuel injection pump.
The suspect delivery valve holders are identified by a mark 7/77.
Prior to Shearon Harris nuclear plant receiving an operating license, the licensee noted lower than normal cylinder head temperatures on one cylinder during diesel generator operation.
The injection pump was disassembled and the delivery valve holder was found to be cracked in almost the same pattern as the 7/77 assembly.
This component was marked 6/77.
The licensee contacted IMO Delaval Inc.
and has sent the affected component to the diesel manufacturer for analysis.
The licensee has
'pare delivery valve holders in stock.
These are presently being inspected.
The licensee plans to examine installed delivery valve holders during the next unit outage of sufficient length.
Meanwhile the engine cylinder head temperatures will be monitored for lower than normal operating temperature..
This item will remain open pending the inspection of both the spare and installed delivery valve holders.
IFI 89-03-02:
Follow-up on Diesel Generator Injection Valve Holder Inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements, and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate.
The licensee's action was reviewed to verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated as required by the TS; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety settings, and LCOs were not exceeded.
The inspector examined the incident reports, logs and records, and interviewed selected person'nel.
The following LERs are considered closed:
LER 88-07 LER 88-08 LER 88-09 Plant Trip Due to a Loss of Feedwater The licensee's corrective action was to replace the failed REN type fuse with a NON type fuse.
The fuses in the other main feedwater. regulating valves were also replaced.
The licensee placed a hold on all REN type fuses in stock.
All installed REN type fuses will be replaced as, they are identified and as plant conditions permit.
Inadvertent Actuation of Engineered Safety Features During Testing of 1B-SB Emergency Sequencer.
The licensee performed an evaluation of the ESW pump overcurrent relay for possible generic failure mode.
This evaluation is dated April 18, 1988, and concludes that there is no generic problem.
This is a Westinghouse Com-5 type relay.
PCR-2867 was issued to accomplish certain design changes to the load sequencer.
ETP-033 was revised and successfully performed on May 7, 1988.
Technical Specification Violation While Testing the Solid State Protection System LER 88-10 The licensee revised certain operating procedures which require consideration of operability of the components in
, the other train when performing testing of the solid state protection system.
'These procedures were completed on May 5, 1988.
MST-I0001, Train A Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test, and MST-I10320, Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test, were revised and approved on July 29, 1988.
Training on this event was completed on May 5, 1988.
Containment Leak Detection Radiation Monitor was Declared Inoperable and the Containment Purge Valves were not Closed as Required Due to Personnel Error The licensee revised the sampling procedure to require Plant Operations close the containment purge valves when declaring the monitor inoperable.
This was completed on June 30, 1988.
All active licensed operators and STA qualified operations personnel received training on this event.
Training was completed on June 16,. 1988.
All personnel involved in this event were counseled on May 25, 1988.
LER 88-11 Unanalyzed Condition Pertaining to Inadvertent Actuation of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System
LER 88-12 LER 88-13 LER 88-35 LER 88-14 The licensee initiated corrective action to disable the LTOPs by removing the card in PIC Cab 08, slot 244 and the card in PIC Cab 05, Slot 248.
The cards were removed and controlled under AP-024, Temporary Bypass, Jumper, and Wire Removal Control Log.
This action was completed and verified on May 13, 1988.
The permanent corrective action will be accomplished under PCR 3241 which is recommended by Westinghouse Corporation.
This PCR will be done during a
plant outage.
The completion of PCR 3241 is designated as IFI 89-03-01 and will be closed when the PCR is completed.
Both Emergency Service Water Systems Inoperable Due to Isolation Valve Failure and Design Deficiency The licensee's corrective action consisted of a modifica-tion to the emergency service water seal system under PCR 2878 and WR/JO 88-A(AJ1.
The work was completed on September 12, 1988.
Post maintenance testing consisted in hydrostatic testing which was completed satisfactorily.
Emergency Diesel Generator Start Due to Undervoltage on 1A-SA Emergency Bus Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation Due to the lA-SA Emergency Bus Tripping Caused by Failed Relays The LERs listed above are closed based on corrective action taken on December 20, 1988.
This corrective action is described in Inspection Report No. 50-400/88-40.
Subcooling Margin Monitor Using Unverified.Computer Inputs for Calculations Due to Procedural Deficiency.
LER 88-15 Procedures MST C0001, Core Subcooling Margin Monitor Computation Check, NST-I0080, Loop Calibration of Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0402)
-
Loop C
Protection Section I, and NST-I0081, Channel Calibration of Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0403),
were revised on Nay 31, 21, and 24, 1989, respectively.
Modifi-cation Procedure (MOD)-208, Software/Database Changes for Process Computers, was reviewed and found to be adequate.
Technical Specification Noncompliance:
Failure to Obtain Vent Stack Sample While Radiation Monitor Inoperable This incident is classified as personnel error.
A meeting was held on June 15, 1988, to discuss the importance of the event and to stress the need for communicatio LER 88-16 Technical Specification Violation Due to RCS Leakage Detection System Inoperable Technical Specification Interpretation Number 88-005 for Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 was written and approved on September 30, 1988.
The licensee repaired the leaking valves from the refueling water storage tank under WR/JOs 88-AARQ1 and 88-AARQ4.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Follow-up on Plant Events (92702)
On February 6,
1989, at 12:08 a.m.,
the plant tripped from lOOX power following a shaft shear on the
"A" NFP.
The plant experienced a turbine runback to 65K power.
The operators took manual feedwater control and attempted to maintain SG level.
Approximately one minute into the transient, the reactor tripped automatically due to low steam generator level.
The MFP shaft was found to be sheared at the coupling keyway between the pump and coupling.
The damaged shaft was sent to the company's laboratory (Energy and Environmental Center)
and it appeared that the cause of failure was long-term cyclic fatigue.
The shaft had
- been in service for approximately two years and had been sent to the manufacturer one year ago for pump machining and balancing.
The shaft failure caused internal damage to the pump motor, as well as damage to components in the vicinity due to missiles.
Following a satisfactory inspection of the
"B" MFP shaft, the licensee elected to restart the plant and operate around 50K power while affecting repairs to the "A" NFP.
Repairs to the "A" NFP (which included replacement of the pump, pump shaft, coupling, and motor rotor)
and other components damaged by the shaft failure were completed on February 14, and the plant was returned to full power operation.
On February 7,
1989, at 10:59 a.m, the plant experienced an automatic reactor trip following a loss of all three circulating water (CW) pumps.
The plant was operating at 47~ reactor power and was in the process of recovering from the reactor trip on February 6, 1989, which was caused by the "A" MFP shaft failure.
The loss of all three CW pumps resulted in a loss of flow to the main condenser.
This in turn caused a loss of vacuum which led to a turbine trip/reactor trip.
The operators began reducing turbine load following the CW pump loss and planned on tripping the reactor prior to receiving a
low vacuum turbine trip.
Various discre-pancies caused some confusion in analyzing the casualty and possibly delayed operator action.
Two of the circulating water pumps had been experiencing low seal water flow alarms.
Backup potable water supply to the pump seals and bearing cooling had been established.
The backup was supplied in order to clear the main control board alarms as part of the black board alarm progra Work request 89-AA2U1 was initiated on January 14, 1989, to address this problem, but had not been worked.
The seal water system became air bound and air was injected into the CW pump seal and bearing cooling system.
The air caused a low flow condition which resulted in the "A" and "8" pump trips.
The
"C" CW pump tripped following the
"A" and
"8" pump trips; apparently due to a low discharge head condition which resulted in the inability to supply its own cooling and seal requirements.
CW pump seal water problems had been documented during the plant start-up program.
In September 1986, PCR-0365 was initiated to correct this problem.
To date PCR-365 has not been completed.
Mith more timely action by engineering, this event could have been avoided.
Following the event, all four low vacuum trip switches were found to be out of calibration and actuated prior to the actual trip setpoint.
The NC8 vacuum readings were known to be inaccurate because the instrument tubing serving the vacuum gage transmitters was sloped and trapped moisture, The lines required draining every few hours to ensure reasonable readings and this task was often neglected.
PCR-1474 was initiated on April 24, 1987, and PCR-1975 was initiated on July 20, 1987, to address the known indication problems.
Neither PCR had been accom-plished.
With more timely action by engineering, this event could have been avoided.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the reporting period and on February 22, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspection findings listed below were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
Item Number Descri tion/Reference Para ra h
400/89-03-01 400/89-03-02 Acronyms and Initialisms IFI - Follow-up on PCR-3241 Implementation to Resolve LTOP Concerns (paragraph 5)
IFI -
Follow-up on Diesel Generator Injection Valve Holder Inspections (paragraph 4)
AFM AH ALARA-AP CCW C'1'CCS-EIR Auxiliary Feedwater Air Handling As Low as Reasonably Achievable Administrative Procedure Component Cooling Mater Circulating Water Emergency Core Cooling System Equipment Inoperable Records
EPT ESF EST ESW ETP FSAR-IFI ISI KV LCO LER LOCA-LTOP MCB MFP MS HSIY HST NRC OP OST PCR PIC.Cab PMTR-PNSC-QA QC RAB RCDT-RCS/RC-RHR RWP SF SG S!S STA TS Vac WR/JO-Engineering 'Periodic Test Procedure Emergency Safeguards Features Engineering Surveillance Test Emergency Service Water Engineering Test Procedure Final Safety Analysis Report Inspector Follow-up Item Inservice Testing Kilo Volt Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Loss of Coolant Accident Low Temperature Operations Protection Main Control Board Main Feed Pump Hain Steam Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance Surveillance Test Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Procedure Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request
- Primary Instrument Control Cabinet Post Maintenance Test Requirements Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Quality Assurance Quality Control Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal System Radiation Work Permit Spent Fuel System Steam Generator Safety Injection Signal Shift Technical Advisor, Technical Specification Volt A.C.
Work Request/Job Order