IR 05000400/1989022
| ML18005B127 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1989 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005B126 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-22, IEIN-87-054, IEIN-87-54, NUDOCS 8911030101 | |
| Download: ML18005B127 (14) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 OcT %9 1%o Report No.:
50-400/89-22 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted:
Septe er 13-15, 1989 Inspector:
W.
Yi. Sartor, r.
License No.:
NPF-63 e
'gned Accompanying Personnel:
R.
Hogan (NRC, NRR, PEPB)
. Guilfoil (Battelle)
Approved by.
H.
.
an sn, ref Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards le I ate sgne SUMNARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency exercise.
Selected staffing and response of the emergency organizations in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Cen.er, and Emergency Operations Facility were observed.
The inspection also included.a review of the exercise objectives and scenario, as well as observation of the licensee's critique to management.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were riot identified.
Based upon the scenario used, and the response observed, the licensee's performance was satisfactory to determine that they could implement their Emergency Plan and procedures to adequately provide for the health and safety of the public and plant personnel.
No exercise weaknesses were identified, however, inspector followup will observe the Site Emergency Coordinator and his staff in their ability to coordinate prompt damage control during the next annual exercise.
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/~r. REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
~R. Black, Jr., Manager Emergency Preparedness
- D. Brund, Supervisor, Security
~J. Collins, Manager, Operations
- J. Floyd, Radiation Control Foreman
- G. Forehand, Manager, guality Assurance/guality Control
- A. Garrou, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- C. Gibson, Director, Plans and Programs
- J. Hammond, Nanager, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- W. Hindman, Jr., Manager, Control and Administration
- C. Hinnant, Harris Plant General Manager
- R. Indelicato, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- N. Jackson, Maintenance Supervisor
- B. McFeate>'s, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- T. Morton, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- D. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- N. Thompson, Jr., Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel
- N. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
HRC Resident Inspector
- N. Shannon
- Attended,exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and local emergency plans and organizations as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IY.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the'cheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on September 13, 1989.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(lj,
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there was adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, due to the scenario conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite, emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and corporate assistance.
The on duty Shift Foreman assumed. the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Harris Plant General Manager.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a
standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(4),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
Although the Emergency Action Level Flowpath was cumbersome and time
'emanding to proceed through it, it was used to properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency.classes as the simulated emergency progressed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response.organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
The notifications to the State and local response organizations were completed according to procedure with minor exceptions.
The notification of the General Emergency to the NRC was made 51 minutes after the declaration and 39 minutes after the State and counties were notified.
The requirement to report emergency classifications to the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies was emphasized at the exit interview.
The activation of the prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was simulated for this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I T Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency
- response organization and offsite authorities appeared to be adequate.
No communications related problems were identified by the NRC inspection team during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as, required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Carolina Power and Light News provided information to the media and the public on September 6,
1989, in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on the purpose of the exercise and planned offsite activities.
The first news release for the exercise was provided 48 minutes after the Alert declaration.
The Harris Joint Information Center (JIC) in Raleigh was established and staffed by representatives from the utility, the State of North Carolina, and Chattam, Lee, Harnett, and Make Counties.
The JIC functioned effectively in providing information about the plant to the public and media.
An inspector noted that the utility and State of North Carolina coordinated effectively in the coordination of news releases.
It was also noted that the utility's status posting of the emergency declaration as Site Emergency in lieu of Site Area Emergency could be confusing.
The utility's news release correctly used the term Site Area Emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of key emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
No equipment deficiencies were noted by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identifie Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.-I..
The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiologcal hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the accident assessment program appeared to function effectively with one exception.
The exception was the failure of the SEC and the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff to coordinate the closing of the
"B" side containment vacuum, relief valve/CB-6.
Specifically, although the Operational Support Center (OSC)
was aware of a valve rumbering problem at 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />, the information was not passed on to the TSC Accident Assessment Team.
At 0032 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, a controller intervened to properly identify the valve in the TSC.
The valve was then closed at 0119 hours0.00138 days <br />0.0331 hours <br />1.967593e-4 weeks <br />4.52795e-5 months <br /> to terminate the release.
The need for the SEC and staff to be more involved in interactive problem solving between the OSC and TSC Accident Assessment Team to facilitate timely repairs was identified for corrective action as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-400/89-22-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent. with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel,
.were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARs)
for offsite populations within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The licensee's PARs were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and other criteria and notifications were made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15 minute criteria.
Onsite protective actions of nonessential personnel was not demonstrated during this exercise as accountability of onsite personnel was simulated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
Player critiques were observed in the TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
immediately following exercise termination.
A formal critique of the emergency exercise was held on September 15, 1989, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and NRC personnel attending.
The licensee's critique was adequate and discussed
'weaknesses identified as a result of the exercise.
Licensee actions on these weaknesses will be reviewed during a
subsequent inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate
.correspondence.
14.
Exit Interview The snspectson scope and findings were summarized on September 15, 1989, with those persons indicated in.Paragraph
above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Dissenting comm'ents were not received from the licensee.
Item Number 50-400/89-22-01 Descri tion and Reference IFI - Failure of SEC and TSC staff to coordinate timely repair (Paragraph 10).
Attachment:
SHNPP 'Scope and Objectives and Scenario Summary and Time Line
CAROLINA POWER
& LIGHT COMPANY PLAN FOR SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE - Se tember
1989 I.
MISSION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE To activate and evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan,'associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate "Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulation
CFR 50.47(b).
This exercise wil) fulfillthe bienniel exercise requirements for the local county government.
The State will activate its response center and media center to support the county efforts.sufficiently.
The exercise scope and objectives and scenario requirements were negotiated by a task force of state, county, and CP&L emergency management personnel.
The joint development of the scenario was to meet the intent of NRC IN No. 87-54.
II.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.
~Sco e
A simulated accident at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) which could escalare to a general emergency and will involve planned response and recovery actions to include:
emergency classit'ication; notification of off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions to correct the emergency conditions; and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the accident.
B.
O~bectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room Staff to perform accident assessment and implement those appropriate mitigating actions necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of response personnel to analyze current plant conditions, identify and project trends/potential consequences, and formulate near term mitigating actions.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and classify the emergency in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
4.
Demonstrate the adequancy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing CP&L emergency response personnel.
(4112HRGa/ebc)
5.
Demonstrate the timeliness and adequacy of the information provided 'in the initial notifications to state and county agencies.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up notifications to the state and county agencies'.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate off-site protective action recommendations.
8.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center in providing additional manpower support and coordination.
9.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and communication/notification activities..
10.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Facility in providing off-site dose assessment, environmental monitoring, protective action recommendations, and evaLuation/coordination of off"site activities.
Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency kits and equipment in emergency response facilities.
12.
Demonstrate that emergency exposure control procedures have been established and are utilized in the protection of emergency workers.
13.
Demonstrate the capability to monitor personnel and equipment for contamination.
14.
Demonstrate that the radiological, meteorological, and process data transmittal to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility is adequate.
N ~
15.
Demonstrate the capability.to coordinate the preparation, review, and release of information for the news media.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate'ews releases with. the, state and county personnel.
17.
Demonstrate the proper procedures and use of protective measures for entering a Radiologically Controlled Area under abnormal radiological conditions.
18.
Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Actual participation of the NRC Operations Center may be simulated.
19.
Demonstrate the capability to respond to an emergency commencing at a time between 6:00 p.m.
and midnight.
(4112HRGa/ebc )
SCENARIO SUMMARY AND TIME LINE TIME 1830 Drill commences.
The initial data set is presented in the Control Room.
1848 The Turbine Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) control system fails in automatic mode causing a partial load rejection.
The pressure transient results in the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) momentarily cycling and in the "C" Steam Generator Safety Valve opening and sticking partly open.
The steam generator safety valve open with less than 1180 psig in the steam generator results in a breach of Containment, and an Alert should be declared.
1858 A controlled shut down of the reactor is initiated at 10 MW/min.
1912 The Site Emergency Coordinator should call for activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC).
1927 Notifications of the Alert condition should be made to the state and county warning points within 15 minutes of declaring the emergency.
2012 Notification of the Alert condition should be made to the NRC within one (1) hour of declaring the emergency.
2013 At 100MW, both input'reakers to the "A" Start-Up Transformer (SUT)
trip open and can not be reclosed.
A fault (open) in the "B" phase bushing caused phase current imbalances which tripped the input breakers.
This problem will appear to be rapidly repairable (replace the bushing).
After replacing the bushing, the input breakers still will not remain closed (a result of undetected internal transformer problems resulting from 'the initial bushing failure and current imbalance).
The transformer will need to be replaced with the spare.
2015 The TSC and OSC should have been activated by now.
2018 The "C" Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inadvertently shuts, the
"C" Steam Generator PORV goes full open, and the "C" Steam Generator Safety Valve cycles.
2020 Safety Injection occurs based upon steam generator pressure (rate induced, as a result of the safety valve cycling).
Reactor and Turbine trips occur.
With the start-up transformer on the "A" side inoperable, a loss of the "A" and "D" auxiliary buses occur The loss of auxiliary bus "D" will cause the computer room ventilation fan discharge dampers to shut.
One of the three
'cenario branches 'will be taken from this point depending on the actions taken by the drill participants.
Path one (1) will be followed unless controllers are notified otherwise by the lead controller.
PATH 1:
PATH 2:
With no action taken to limit the temperature in the computer room, the ERFIS computer will crash after 25 minutes.
If the back-up computer (CPU B) is de-energized and the doors to the computer room are propped open (simulated),
the ERFIS computer will remain operable for 40 minutes.
PATH 3:
Xf the discharge damper for the computer room
'
ventilation fan is disconnected snd Jacked open, the ERFIS computer will remain operable throughout the scena'rio.
PATH 4:
Restoration of power or jacking the damper open will restore ERFIS capabilities after it has failed (PATH 1 or PATH 2).
The lead exercise controller will control the restoration of ERFIS.
The lead
, exercise controller will notify the lead controllers at PATH 4 entry and ERFIS data can be resumed at the data interval approximately 15 minutes after PATH 4 is entered (controlled by contingency messages).
2021 The steam generator safety valve shuts/reseats after the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occurs.
. The containment barrier is no longer breached.
2022 A fire begins in '"B" Essential Services Chilled Water (ESCW)
Chiller.
The fire is small and does not require off site assistance.
The fire damages the power feed to the chiller compressor.
With the "A" train chiller previously out of service, no essential services chilled water is available to safety related systems.
The Site Emergency Coordinator should declare a Site Emergency based on a fire causing the loss of a safety related function.
The Site Emergency Coordinator should request activation of the Emergency Operations Facility.
2045 If the operators reach the point in the procedures where they attempt to reclose the reactor trip breakers, the breakers will not close.
A fault in the Solid State Protection System'(SSPS)
is preventing the breakers from closing.
2200 The Emergency Operations Facility should be activated by no An 800 gpm LOCA occurs with is a breach in the Reactor Coolant System.
The fuel fission product barrier is considered breached based on a red status on the Core Cooling critical safety function.
Containment pressure is rising and the containment sprays initiate.
Safety Injection must be manually initiated since the reactor trip breakers have not been recycled.
2222 Radiation monitors inside containment alarm.
The emergency action level for the containment high range monitors is exceeded.
2222 Upon receipt of a Safety Injection Signal the "B" side containment vacuum relief valve 1CB-6 drifts off of its shut seat.
The area radiation monitor in the area alarms indicating that the containment atmosphere is leaking into the 286 elevation RAB North area.
This indicates a breach of the containment barrier.
Since the ventilation in this area recirculates without exhaust, no uncontrolled release occurs.
A General Emergency should be declared based upon a loss of all three fission product barriers.
The protective action recommendations made to the state and counties should be to evacuate all subzones within five miles and all subzones 10 miles downwind, and to shelter all=remaining subzones.
2249 The Refueling Water Storage Tank level reaches 23.4 and the safety injection system should be realigned to recirculate from the containment sumps.
0030 The exercise is terminated (approximate).
All required notifications should be made.
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