IR 05000400/1989005
| ML18005A801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1989 |
| From: | Bassett C, Potter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A800 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-05, 50-400-89-5, IEIN-88-032, IEIN-88-062, IEIN-88-063, IEIN-88-079, IEIN-88-101, IEIN-88-32, IEIN-88-62, IEIN-88-63, IEIN-88-79, NUDOCS 8903140054 | |
| Download: ML18005A801 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-400/89-05 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400, Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted F b uar 6-10, 1989 License No.:
NPF-63, Inspect r:
C.
asset D
S gne Approved by:
0.
P otter, Chief Facilities Radiation Protection Section Emergency.Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards gne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's radiation protection program consisted
"of a review in the areas of:
organization and management controls; training and qualifications; external and internal exposure control; control of radioactive material and contamination, surveys, and monitoring; the solid radioactive waste program; and transportation of radioactive material.
The inspection also included a review of licensee actions concerning previous enforcement and inspector followup items and Information Notices.
Results:
The licensee has made changes in the health physics organization in order to improve the radiation protection program.
Management support of the radiation protection program is evident and appears to be adequate.
The licensee's radiation protection program appears to be functioning as necessary to protect the health and safety of the occupational radiation workers.
During the inspection, no weaknesses were noted in the areas of procedural compliance, compliance with Technical Specification requirements, or regulatory compliance.
PgI.I%I,40054
. 90 'Ol F'DR ADOCK 05IM04C>0
PDQ
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees N. Boone, Radiation Nonitoring System Foreman, Radiation Control
- J. Brown, Senior Specialist, guality Assurance
- J. Collins, Manager, Operations D. Elkins, Radioactive Waste Foreman, Radiation Control
- J. Floyd, Operations Foreman, Radiation Control
"J.
Hammond, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety D. Hawley, Senior Specialist, Radioactive Waste Operations
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager
- J. Kiser, Supervisor, Radiation Control
- B. Morgan, Senior Specialist, ALARA, Radiation Control J. O'Halloran, Dosimetry Foreman, Radiation Control
- R. Pederson, guality Assurance, Corporate
- A. Poland, Project Specialist, Radiation Control F. Reck, Support Foreman, Radiation Control
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- F. Strehle, Project Specialist, guality Assurance D. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- N. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Bradford, Senior Resident Inspector N. Shannon, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transportation - Organization and Management Controls (83750)
a ~
Organization The licensee is required by Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 to establish specific onsite and offsite organizations for unit operation and corporate management.
The responsibility, authority, and other management controls necessary for establishing and maintaining a health physics (HP)
program for the facility are
further outlined in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
TS 6.5.2 specifies the composition of the Plant Nuclear Safety Coomittee (PNSC)
and delineates its functions, responsibilities, and authority.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's site organization, as well as the responsibilities, authority, and control given to management as they relate to the site radiation protection program.
Anticipated changes in plant management were reviewed to verify that they would not adversely affect the ability of the licensee to continue implementing the critical elements of the program.
The inspector discussed the support received for the radiation protection program from other managers with the Environmental and Radiation Control (E&RC) Manager and determined that it was adequate.
Staffing TS 6.2 also specifies the minimum staffing requirements for the facility.
FSAR Chapters 12 and 13 also outline further details on staffing levels at the site.
The inspector reviewed the Radiological Control (Rad Con) or HP organization with the ERRC Manager.
The subjects of attrition rate, use of contractor HP personnel, promotions, staff qualifications, and actual versus authorized staffing levels were also reviewed and discussed.
The ESRC Manager indicated that some changes had been made in the Rad Con organization and that a
more extensive reorganization was being considered.
The previous Rad Con operations supervisor had been transferred to the Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HEEC)
as a project specialist.
The individual brought in to fill the operations supervisor position was the former ALARA project specialist from the licensee's Brunswick facility.
Also, the previous ALARA senior specialist had been transferred to another position on the Rad Con staff and the person brought in to fill the ALARA senior specialist position was a former member of the Rad Con staff.
Through interviews and records review, the inspector determined that these two individuals'xperience level and qualifications were adequate for their new job assignments, as discussed further in Paragraph 3.a.
below.
At the time of the inspection, 23 of the 27 authorized senior or ANSI qualified technician positions were filled.
The licensee indicated that the vacancies existed in the ALARA, Radiation Monitoring System (RMS), Operations and Dosimetry sections.
It was also noted that the licensee had 12 junior technicians in training status.
The licensee indicated that the junior technicians were about to complete the required training program and that they would be qualified by early March.
In addition to the permanent personnel, the licensee was using the assistance of 12 contractor personnel to augument the Rad Con staff
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during routine operations.
Licensee representatives indicated that, once the 12 trainees had completed the training program, they planned to reassess the personnel needs in the Rad Con group and explore the possibility of decreasing the number of contractor technicians used during routine operations.
Management Controls The inspector reviewed the licensee's Radiation Safety Violation (RSV) reports which were used to identify and document safety and radiological incidents.
It was noted that most of the RSVs involved personnel failure to follow good radiological work practices or failure to comply with instructions.
However, the inspector verified that adequate corrective actions had been initiated, as required.
These actions included counselling, verbal and written reprimands and time off without pay.
The inspector also noted that the number of RSVs being written had decreased markedly following the end of the outage.
The inspector discussed this with the E&RC Manager and indicated that, although the work load had decreased, the program for self-identification of problems should be continually emphasized.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transportation - Training and gualifications (83750)
Radiation Control Staff Training TS 6.4 requires that each member of the Rad Con staff meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI 3.1-1979 with several exceptions listed in the FSAR.
b.
The inspector reviewed the records of selected Rad Con personnel, including the new Rad Con operations supervisor and the new ALARA senior specialist, and noted that their qualifications and experience level appeared to be commensurate with their job assignments and responsibilities, and that they met the requirements outlined.
Contractor Rad Con Technician Training and gualification During outages, the licensee augments the Rad Con staff with contractors to assist in job coverage.
Prior to allowing the contractors to work at the site, the licensee requires that they submit resumes detailing previous work locations and experience.
The licensee performs a review of the resumes submitted and contacts the contr actors'ormer employers to verify that the work experience cited in the resumes is accurate.
Following initial screening, the contractors must satisfactorily pass General Employee Training (GET),
respiratory protection training, and a respirator fit test.
The contractors are then interviewed by the foreman for whom they will be working and are asked specific questions concerning their experience
and what they would do in a certain set of circumstances.
Only candidates for the position of contractor foreman or supervisor are given.formal oral boards, however.
After the interview and prior to being assigned job coverage, the contractor Rad Con technicians are also required to satisfactorily demonstrate their knowledge and skills by performing the same tasks, and completing the same qualification cards required of the licensee technicians.
The checkout of a contractor technician, in selected tasks, is monitored by a licensee employee previously qualified on that task.
Upon successful completion of the tasks, the monitor signs off the contractor technician's qualification card.
After the on-the-job training and demonstrations are completed, the contractors are assigned radiological job coverage responsibilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping and Transportation - External Exposure Control and Dosimetry (83750)
a
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Personnel Dosimetry The licensee is required by
CFR 20.101 and 20.102 to maintain workers'oses below specified levels.
CFR 20.202 requires each licensee to supply appropriate personnel monitoring devices to specific individuals and require the use of such equipment.
The licensee's external exposure control and personnel dosimetry programs were reviewed by the inspector.
This included a review of facilities, equipment, and personnel records used to control exposures and determine dose and a review of the licensee's current National Voluntar'y Licensee Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The facilites and equipment appeared to be adequate and the personnel records were being maintained as required.
NVLAP accreditation had been received after an actual demonstration of compliance with ANSI-N13. 11-1983 through testing using the Panasonic thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD)
model UD802 for ANSI-N13.11 categories I - VIII.
The NVLAP accreditation had been issued to the HEEC as the primary processing facility with each power plant site being accredited as a sub-facility.
b.
Records Exposure records of plant and contractor personnel for 1988 and year-to-date were selectively reviewed.
No exposures greater than the limits specified in
CFR 20. 101 or the station's quarterly administrative control level were noted.
A review of the station daily dose report (NRC Form 5 equivalent),
dated February 9, 1989, indicated that, of the approximately 1,050 personnel badged at the
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facility, an individual dose of 210 millirem (mrem)
was the maximum received for the current quarter.
Skin Dose The licensee had completed one skin dose calculation based on an event in which a person found a discrete radioactive particle (hot particle)
on his shorts following removal of his protective clothing (PCs).
The particle, reading approximately'4,000 counts per minute (cpm),
was determined to be a 0.063 micro curie (uCi) particle of Cobalt-60.
Through interviews with the individual and a review of the radiation work permit (RWP) used, the licensee determined that the maximum time the particle could have been on the person's shorts was 1.53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br />.
Using the VARSKIN methodolo'gy and assuming no attenuation due to the cloth of the shorts, the skin dose was calculated to be 398 mrem.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's methodology and calculations and determined that the dose assigned was conservative.
d.
Radiologically Controlled Areas
CFR 20.203 specifies posting and control requirements for radiation areas, high radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas radioactive material areas, and radioactive material.
e.
During plant tours, the inspector observed the licensee's posting and control of-radiation, high radiation, airborne radioactivity and radioactive material areas.
The inspector also verified that various locked high radiation areas in the reactor auxiliary building (RAB),
the reactor containment building (RCB),
and the radwaste building (RWB) were being maintained locked as required.
At Power Containment Entry The inspector reviewed the radiological controls provided by the licensee for containment entries made at power.
The controls were specified in the procedure HPP-046,
"Containment Power and Initial Post Shutdown Entries," Revision 4, dated December 21, 1988.
Through discussions with licensee representatives, it was noted that 6.671 person-rem as measured by self-reading pocket dosimeters (SRPDs)
had been expended on at power containment entries during 1988.
As of February 9, 1989, 0.711 person-rem had been expended in 1989.
The licensee indicated that the exposure expended during 1988 was too high in comparison to the total accumulated site dose and that the increasing exposure trend in 1989 had prompted them to reevaluate the current entry policy. It was determined that entries were being made on too frequent a basis.
A new policy was drafted and, upon approval, will become Plant General Order 050.
The policy will limit entries to once every two weeks except for emergencies.
The policy will require greater coordination of work activities and
will limit the type of work that can be performed and restrict work to specified locations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transportation - Internal Exposure Control and Assessment (83750)
a ~
C.
Engineering Controls
CFR 20.103(b)(1)
requires that the licensee use process or other engineering controls to the extent practicable to 1 imit concentrations of radioactive materials in the air to levels below those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in
CFR 20.203(d)(1)(ii).
During tours of the RAB and the RWB, the inspector observed the use of various engineering controls employed to limit the concentrations of radioactive material in air.
The licensee used enclosures or tents constructed around equipment or areas which were suspected of being or which actually were highly contaminated and provided high effeciency particualte air (HEPA) filtered ventilation systems for the enclosures.
The licensee also used ducting to draw air away from'orkers and into the filtered ventilation system.
Machining or grinding was also performed in tents or by using ducting to control and limit airborne radioactivity.
Respiratory Protection Program
CFR 20. 103(b)
requires that, when it is impracticable to apply process or engineering controls to limit average concentrations of radioactive material in air below 25 percent (X)
of the concentrations specified in Appendix B, Table 1,
Column 1, other precautionary measures should be used to maintain the intake of radioactive material by any individual within seven consecutive days as far below 40 Maximum Permissible Concentration-hours (MPC-hrs)
as is reasonably achievable.
Through records review and discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector evaluated the respiratory protection program including training, medical qualifications, fit testing, and MPC-hr assignment.
The records and discussions indicated that only those personnel who have been trained and qualified to wear a respiratory protective device were issued respirators.
No MPC-hr assignments had been required since the last inspection.
Air Sampling and Bioassays
CFR 20.103 establishes the limits for exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive materials in air in restricted areas.
Section 20. 103 also requires that suitable measurements of
concentrations of radioactive material in air be performed to detect and evaluate the airborne radioactivity in restricted areas and that appropriate bioassays be performed to detect and assess individual intakes of radioactivity.
The inspector reviewed the results of selected air samples taken during the last inspection.
The air sample log indicated that the airborne concentration had seldom been above 25'A of the MPC of radionuclides specified in
CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1.
The licensee also indicated that no problems had been encountered, to date, concerning airborne radioactivity including radioiodine.
It was noted that the air samples had been evaluated for alpha, beta and gamma activity and analyzed to determine the specific isotopes present.
The results of selected whole body counts (WBCs) were also reviewed.
No instances were noted in which personnel received greater than the limits specified in
CFR 20.103.
Through records review and discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that there had been no intakes of radioactive material since the last inspection and no confirmed internal exposures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transportation - Control of Radioactive Material and Contamination, Surveys and Monitoring (83750)
a ~
b.
Personnel and Material Release Surveys While touring the RAB, the RCB, and the RWB, the inspector observed workers exiting contaminated areas and exiting the radiation control area (RCA)
to determine whether or not adequate personal contamination surveys were being performed.
The movement of material from contaminated areas and from the RCA was also observed to determine if adequate direct and smearable contamination surveys were being performed.
All personnel and material surveys observed appeared to be adequate.
Personnel Contamination Reports The inspector reviewed all the personnel contamination reports completed since the last inspection.
It was noted that, of those involving skin contamination, most were determined to have been caused by improper personnel actions or from what was suspected to be hot particle contamination from laundered PCs.
In discussing this with licensee representatives, they indicated that, as a
means of stopping the hot particle contamination problem, following work in very highly contaminated areas such as the seal table room, the outer set of PCs would be discarded and not sent out to be washed.
The licensee also indicated that the Personnel Contamination Record forms, used to complete an investigation of the cause of the
contamination problem, were being changed to require the contaminated person to respond to an RSV if it was determined that the person was at fault for tlie event.
C.
Radiation Detection and Survey Instrumentation The inspector reviewed the licensee's use of portable radiation detection instruments for routine radiation protection activities.
During plant tours, the inspector verified that all instruments observed in use had been calibrated within the prescribed time period and also observed that the selection and use of instruments was appropriate for the radiation protection activity in progress.
Following a tour of the RAB, the inspector noted that the the large detectors in the whole body contamination monitors were being maintained adequately by the licensee.
No punctures or holes were noted in the detector mylar windows and no tape had been used to repair the windows.
Through discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that, when a detector window was damaged, the entire detector was replaced.
Following the detector replacement, however, the licensee did not perform any type of efficiency check or response check to verify proper response.
Licensee representatives indicated that, due to the monitors'esign with self-diagnostic and self-monitoring capabilities, the efficiency check was not needed.
Also, the detectors are either purchased from the vendor or repaired using an established set of criteria such as the mylar thickness.
These controls help limit the variation introducted in detector response.
The inspector reviewed the technical manual and the procedures used to operate the whole body monitors.
The manual and procedures stipulated only a weekly response check for the monitors.
The inspection discussed the response checks with the E&RC Manager.
He i ndicated that his staff would review the necessity of a daily response check and a response check following detector replacement.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transportation - Solid Radioactive Waste (83750)
a
~
Procedures The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures for handling solid radioactive waste:
DM-OP-022, "Process Control Program for the CNSI Demineralization System," Revision B/1, dated January 17, 1989.
DM-OP-044-45215,
"Operating Procedure for CNSI Modular Fluidized Transfer Demineralization System at Shearon Harris," Revision 0, dated January 17, 198 SD-OP-003-455,
"Process Control Program for CNSI Cement Solidification Unit at Shearon Harris," Revision 0, dated November 15, 1988.
SD-OP-039,
"Operating Procedure for the Mobile Cement Solidification Unit No. 121," Revision H, dated November 7, 1988.
Topical Report CNSI-2 (4313-01354-01) for Chem-Nuclear Systems Inc.
Mobi 1 e Cement Sol idificati on System, acceptance dated April ll, 1983.
b.
Waste Classification
CFR 20.311(d)( 1) requires that licensees prepare all waste such that the waste is classified in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
The licensee is currently sampling four waste streams including evaporator bottoms, radwaste resins, filter sludge and dry active waste (DAW) on an annual basis.
Samples are sent to a vendor for analysis and the results are returned to the corporate office for development of the appropriate scaling factors.
The scaling factors are entered into the data base of the vendor-supplied computer program (WASTETRAK) and the proper waste classification is then determined.
Licensee representatives at the HEEC are in the process of accumulating and analyzing data in order to develop a
means of predicting shifts in the scaling factors.
This is being done in an effort to avoid the high costs of sample analysis and to avoid unnecessary sampling and exposure as well.
The method being developed is based on a simplification of the ISOSCALE computer program and deals with scaling factors for isotopes which originate in reactor fuel, i.e.
fission products and transuranics.
The simplified method being implemented uses a combination of a database and spreadsheet and predicts shifts in scaling factors based on the ratios of iodine isotopes in reactor coolant.
b.
Waste Stability
CFR 20.311(d)(l) requires that any generating licensee prepare all wastes so that the waste meets the waste characteristics requirements in 10 CFR 61.56.
Through discussions with licensee representatives and records review, the inspector determined that waste shipments were being prepared in conformance with the licensee's Process Control Program (PCP).
The licensee was using steel liners to meet the stability requirements for both dewatered and solidified wastes.
No problems had been
C.
d.
encountered to date with either the dewatering or the solidification processes.
Manifests
CFR 20.311(b)
requires that each shipment of radioactive waste to a
licensed land disposal facility be accompanied by a shipment manifest and specifies required entries on the manifests.
'he inspector reviewed selected records of radioactive waste shipments completed during 1988, and verified that the manifests had, been properly completed.
The inspector also verified. that copies of manifests were maintained on file until a receipt verification was received from the disposal site.
The documents were then filed.
Temporary Demineralization System The inspector observed the operation of a
temporary system, a
demineralization (demin)
skid set-up, in the RWB.
The system was installed as an alternate means of processing liquid radioactive waste.
The licensee had been using a reverse osmosis system followed by, evaporation of the concentrate to process the liquid waste.
The licensee was of the opinion that the temporary demin system would be more cost effective and produce less radwaste than the permanently installed system; After operating the system on a trial basis for one year, the licensee would make the determination of whether or not to purchase the system.
The inspector reviewed the procedures used to operate the system and the safety analysis that had been performed.
The licensee had determined that no unreviewed safety question existed as a result of the installation of the system.
The inspector verified that the appropriate FSAR changes had been submitted as part'f a Plant Change Request, PCR-3547 and approved by the PNSC on January 18, 1989.
No violations or deviation were identified.
8.
Occupational Exposure, Shipping, and Transporation - Transporation (83750)
a
~
b.
Approved Procedures The inspector reviewed selected licensee procedures and instructions pertaining to the shipment of radioactive materials.
The documents reviewed had been approved as required and appeared to be adequate to assure compliance with the applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.
Shipping Records
CFR 71.5(a)
requires that each licensee who transports licensed material outside of the confines of its plant or other place of use,
or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the DOT in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189.
In addition to the shipments referenced in Paragraph 7, the inspector reviewed the documentation of selected radioactive material shipments transported in 1988.
These shipments included such items as test coupons and tools, solidified evaporator concentrates, dewatered filter media, and DAM.
Records reviewed included shipping manifests, package and vehicle radiation and contamination surveys, waste classification, and records indicating what package marking and labeling and what vehicle placarding was used.
The shipping documents were prepared consistent with 49 CFR requirements and were being maintained as required.
The survey results were found to be within the limits for the mode of transport used.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Facility Statistics a
~
Annual Personnel Dose b.
In 1987, the station's cumulative personnel dose was 33.5 person-rem, while in 1988, that total increased to 169 person-rem.
The increase was the result of exposure received during the station's first refueling outage.
As of february 7, 1989, the licensee had expended approximately 6.3 person-rem as measured by SRPD.
Personnel Contaminations During 1987, the licensee experienced 48 skin and 39 clothing contaminations compared to a total of 99 skin and 159 clothing contaminations for 1988.
This upward trend in personnel contaminations was again attributable to the refueling outage in 1988.
To date, the licensee has experienced a total of two clothing contaminations and zero skin contaminations.
co Area Contamination Control At the end of 1987, the licensee maintained approximately 3,370 square feet (ft~) within the RCA, excluding the RCB.
This represented about 1'4 of the total area within the RCA.
As of December 31, 1988, approximately 7,600 ft~ were being controlled as contaminated representing about 2X of the total RCA area.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Action of Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/88-28-04:
Review the Adequacy of the Set-up and Operational Performance of the Personnel Contamination Monitors.
Through interviews with licensee representatives and a review of the licensee test data and report documenting the results, the inspector determined that the operational tests of the personnel contamination monitors had been performed and were adequate.
The report indicated that, when using a
Cs-137 source to calibrate the monitors, the efficiency was reduced to approximately 5'A when considering the average beta energy noted at the plant.
This, however, was compensated for by the large size of the detector which would lead to a conservative measurement of the contamination present by a factor of approximately 3.
b.
(Closed)
VIO 50-400/88-28-02:
Failure to Properly Survey Items Being Released From a Contaminated Area at the Containment Control Point.
co d.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated November 17, 1988, and verified that the corrective actions specified therein had been taken.
During the inspection, no instances of personnel contamination monitoring or material frisking problems were noted.
(Closed)
VIO 50-400/88-28-05:
Failure to Adhere to Procedure Requiring a Response Check of Dositecs Prior to Being Issued.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated November 17, 1988, and verified that the corrective actions had been completed.
Dositecs responses are checked daily by the Rad Con instrumentation technicians and the verification of completion is documented on a
daily sign-off sheet.
(Closed)
VIO 50-400/88-28-06:
Failure to Approve the Implementing Procedures on the Process Control Program.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated November 17, 1988, and verified that all the corrective action items mentioned had been completed.
The licensee developed a
new procedure, ONN-008
"Process Control Program Implementation Procedure Review and Approval," Revision 0, to ensure that the procedures used in the processing and handling of radioactive waste, whether licensee generated or vendor-supplied, are approved as required.
ll.
Followup on Information Notices (92717)
The inspector determined that the following Information Notices (IN) had been received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability, distributed to the appropriate personnel and that action, as appropriate, had been taken or was schedule IN 88-32:
Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material IN 88-62:
Recent Findings Concerning Implementation of guality Assurance Programs by Suppliers of Transport Packages IN 88-63:
High Radiation Hazards From Irradiated Incore Detectors and Cables IN 88-79:
IN 88-101:
Misuse of Flashing Lights for High Radiation Area Control Shipment of Contaminated Equipment Between Nuclear Power Stations 12.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 10, 1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph
above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
Licensee management was informed that the items discussed in Paragraph 10 were considered closed.
Acronyms and Initialisms ALARA ANSI CFR CNSI cpm dpm DAW Demin DOT E&RC FSAR ft~
GET HEEC HEPA HP IFI IN MPC MPC-hr mrem NRC NVLAP As Low As Reasonably Achievable American National Standards Institute Code of Federal Regulations Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc.
Counts per minute Disintegrations,per minute Dry Active Waste Demineralization Department of Transportation Environmental and Radiation Control Final Safety Analysis Report square feet General Employee Training Harris Energy and Environmental Center High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter)
Health Physics Inspector Followup Item Information Notice Maximum Permissible Concentration Maximum Permissible Concentration-hour Millirem Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Voluntary Licensee Accreditation Program
PCs PCP PNSC RAB Rad Con RCA RCB RNS RSV RWB RWP SRPD TLD TS uCi WBC Protective Clothing Process Control Program Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Reactor Auxiliary Building Radiation Control Radiation Control Area Reactor Containment Building Radiation Nonitoring System Radiation Safety Violation Radwaste Building Radiation Work Permit Self-reading Pocket Dosimeter Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Technical Specification Micro curies Whole Body Count