IR 05000400/1989009
| ML18005A956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1989 |
| From: | Bradford W, Dance H, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A955 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-09, 50-400-89-9, NUDOCS 8906280142 | |
| Download: ML18005A956 (10) | |
Text
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~*j,44" UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/89-09 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris Inspection Conducted:
April 25 - May 23, 1989 Inspectors:
ra or License No.:
NPF-63 Date igned
.
C.
Shan on Approved b
. Dance, Section Chse Division of Reactor Projects D te Signed 4rg g
ate Soigne SUMMARY Scope:
F This routine safety inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification; surveillance observations, maintenance observations,
CFR Part 21, and action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
Licensee identified items which may have generic industry affects are discussed in paragraph 2.
These items deal with procurement of molded case. circuit breakers, failure of Brown Boveri circuit breakers to open on demand, and spiking of primary system temperature sensors.
- Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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RFPORT DETAILS
., Persons Contacted W. Batts, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance D. Braund, Supervisor, Security J. Collins, Manager, Operations G. Forehand, Director, QA/QC C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager L. Lentz, Operations Support Supervisor T. Morton, Manager, Maintenance C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring H. Smith, Supervisor, Radwaste Operation
- D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance B.
Van Metre, Manager, Technical Support E. Willett, Manager, Outages and Modifications Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
Note:
Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in paragraph 8.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted routine plan't tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that:
systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment, and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and general housekeeping and control of
, fire hazards were satisfactory.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the control room operato'r's logs, tagout logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards and panels.
During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing pl'ant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.
The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
They observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffing met Technical Specification requirement Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had proper authorization to be in the respective areas.
The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were. kept locked and alarmed.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas reviewed included:
operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, ALARA implementation, Radiation Work Permits for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.
No discrepancies were noted.
a.
Molded Case Circuit Breakers In response to NRC Bulletin No. 88-10, Nonconforming Molded-case Circuit Breakers, the licensee performed a
procurement quality assurance inspection of suppliers of safety related molded case circuit breakers.
On Apri,l 21, 1989, the licensee discovered that
circuit breakers could. be traced to the California companies that had been accused of selling refurbished equipment.
Ten of the breakers were installed on safety-related equipment.
The suspect breakers were replaced as soon as replacement breakers were taken from the on site warehouse or received from the procurement process.
The final breaker was replaced on May 19, 1989.
The suspect breakers in the warehouse were inspected by the inspectors.
Because of markings, wear and deformation on the breaker parts, the inspectors concluded that the breakers were not new/original breakers.
An inspection of a breaker that could be traced to a major manufacturer also exhibited signs of previous use.
All of the suspect breakers were quarantined by the licensee.
The supplier surveillance is continuing.
b.
Brown Boveri LK16 Switchgear The licensee experienced problems with non-safety related Brown Boveri 480 Vac switchgear breakers, model LK16.
The breakers were failing to open on demand and required the load center to be de-energized in order to disconnect the load from the source.
It was noted that only breakers used for cyclic loads were experiencing the failure to open.
The manufacturer's technical representative was brought on site and inspected four breakers that would not open.
The inspectors witnessed the troubleshooting of the breakers and noted that after buffing of the arching contacts, the breakers operated
satisfactorily.
The LK16 breakers have knife switch contacts instead of the more conventional face riding contacts; The LK16 breakers also have tension springs to maintain the electrical contact.
It was
'ound by the manufacturer that the tension springs had been improperly set during manufacturing and were clamping the main and arcing contacts and thus prevented opening.
Various safety related 480 Vac breakers were inspected, tested, and found to have the correct adjustments.
There were no safety related LK16 breaker fai lures at the Harris site.
The manufacturer is modifying the non-safety breaker opening mechanism by adding a
new torsion spring.
It was noted by the inspectors that the opening mechanism design appeared to be marginal because of the low pivot point angle of the opening spring.
It was also noted that the manufacturer had previously modified the LK-16 breaker by adding a
second opening spring due to breaker opening problems.
Plant Runback During TS Surveillance During the performance of MST-I-0269, LO-LO TAVE P-12 interlock (T-0422) Protection Set II Operational Test, on May 18, 1989, the inspector witnessed a turbine runback.
It was determined that the runback was caused by a spike on the Loop III OT-delta T channel while Loop II was in test for MST-I-0269.
Loop III OT-delta T has experienced spurious spiking since the last outage and the licensee has been reducing power by
megawatts prior to performing surveillances on the other channels.
The inspectors discussed the spiking problem with the primary instrumentation system engineer in order to determine licensee corrective actions for this problem.
The licensee has a chart recorder on the affected channel and it could be seen that a
small temperature change could cause a spike on the OT-delta T channel due to the lead/lag compensating circuits.
The temperature oscillations were thought to be caused by incomplete mixing of the reactor coolant at the temperature sensing point.
The symptoms appeared to be related to the last core load, when older assemblies were placed on the periphery of the core, which resulted in less power output and thus cooler water out of the older assemblies and hotter water out of the new assemblies which in turn resulted in larger temperature gradients.
The larger temperature differences and incomplete mixing at the sensing point appear to be causing the increased channel spiking.
The licensee has taken actions to limit spurious trips/runbacks by additional power reductions prior to performance of any associated surveillance.
A suggestion was made by an operator to reduce TAVE, to the low end of the operating band during the performance of related testing.
This is presently under consideration by the plan.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (71709)
The inspectors reviewed surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with applicable requirements.
The review included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedure to ensure that administrative controls were in force, ensuring that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test, and verifying that the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant approved procedures.
Other observations included verification that test instrumentation was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service.
Portions of the following test activities were observed or reviewed by the inspectors:
OST-1010 OST-1411 OST-1111 OST-1024 OST-1216 MST-I-0269 NST-I-0045 MST-I-0141 MST-1-0378 FMP-101 Containment Cooling System Operability Test, Monthly Intervals, Modes 1, 2, 3,
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1X-SAB quarterly Surveillance Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1X-SAB Operability Test Monthly Interval - Nodes 1, 2,
Onsite Power Distribution Verification Component Cooling Water System Operability LO-LO-TAVE P-12 Interlock Protection SET II Operational Test Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range, N42 Delta T-TAVE (T-0422)
Protection SET II Operational Test Plant Vent Stack Accident Monitor RE-21A-V-3509-1SA Operational Test Incore Thermocouple and Flux Mapping No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards and were in conformance with TS.
Items considered during the review included verification that LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; approved procedures were used; completed work was performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented, Work requests were also reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to
sa fety-re 1 a ted equi pment maintenance which coul d affeet system performance.
Portions of the following activities were observed or reviewed:
Brown Boveri 480 Vac Safety Related Air Circuit Breaker Preventative.
Naintenance Inspection.
.
Inspection of Brown Boveri 480 Vac Non-safety related air circuit breakers, Nodel LK-16, with manufacturer representative present.
Replacement of 10 molded-case circuit breakers in accordance with NRC Bulletin 88-10.
Troubleshooting and repair of S-3 vital 120 Vac inverter--transformer replacement.
Control Room annunciator power supply inverter failure and repair.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
CFR Part 21 Reports (Closed)
CFR Part 21 Item P2186-02, Diesel Generator potential defect with lube oil sump pump foot valve liner disintegration.
This could cause a restriction which could prevent flow of oil to the on-engine lube oil pump.
The licensee inspected and repaired the lube oil sump foot valves under WR/JO 86-AFHX1 for emergency diesel generator lA-SA and WR/JO 86-AFSN1 for emergency diesel generator 1B-SB.
6.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(Closed)
Violation, 88-06-01, failure to require Emergency Operating Procedures to be consistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The licensee response of April 29, 1988 was considered acceptable.
The events which caused this procedure deficiency occurred prior to licensing the plant.
The inspectors verified that a
CFR 50.59 safety analysis was completed on all Plant Change Request (PCR);
PCR's were reviewed to determine impact on plant procedures; changes were made to the DSAR after procedures were revised; and FSAR changes prior to 1986 were reviewed to verify conformity to procedures.
The corrective actions stated in the licensee response have been implemented.
(Closed)
Violation, 88-11-01, failure to control system configuration during a test of the Solid State Protection System.
The licensee response of July 20, 1988, detailed the corrective actions.
These corrective actions were reviewed and verified by the inspectors, and are considered acceptable.
The actions consisted of the following:
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Procedure was revised and approved on Nay 10, 1988 and Reactor Protection Procedure was revised and approved on April 26, 1988.
The revisions reference operability of equipment on the other trai MST-I-0001, Train A Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay 'Test - Rev. 4, and NST-I-0320, Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test - Rev.
5, have been revised to remind operators that opposite train equipment must be evaluated prior to testing.
Appropriate training was completed on May 23, 1988.
7.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings, including items addressed in the Results section, were summarized during management interviews throughout the reporting period and on Nay 23, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
8.
Acronyms and Initialisms ALARA FNP FSAR LCO MST OST OT PCR QA/QC TS Vac WR/JO As Low As Reasonably Achievable Fuel Management Procedure Final Safety Analysis Report Limiting Condition for Operation Maintenance Surveillance Test Operations Surveillance Test Over Temperature Plant Change Request Quality Assurance/Quality Control Technical Specifications Volt Alternating Current Work Request/Job Order
C