IR 05000400/1988026
| ML18005A600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A599 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-26, NUDOCS 8809260259 | |
| Download: ML18005A600 (24) | |
Text
1P,S REGS Wp
+
+ ***+
UNITE D STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATL ANT A, G E OR G IA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/88-26 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
NPF-63 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted:
August 8-12, 1988 Inspectors:
J..
Col ey
= J I
'
G.
a 1 str om Approved by.-. "-.
J. J.
ake, Section Chief te ials and Processes Section ng neering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Date Signed Date Signe
'7
/z. ps Date igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of NRC Bulletin 87-01; evaluation of Steam Generator A&B leakage at the primary head drains; inservice inspection - review of. program, review of procedures, and observation of work activities.
Results:
CP&L management was very responsive to NRC initiatives and involved in assuring quality.
However, the need foI additional attention to technical details by other CP&L responsible personnel is demonstrated by new Inspector Followup Items 50-400/88-26-02,
"UT Scanning Techniques" and 50-400/88-26-03, Kerotest Valves Installed Backwards on Leakoff Lines for RC-107 and RC-103.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
SSO POP AQL(c~~ 8i IO9 g q
OSOOO400 PDC:
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"G. Forehand, Director, guality Assurance/equality Control
- M. Hamby, Project Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager
"V. McKay, Principle Engineer W. Ponder, Reactor Coolant System Engineer
- M. Puq,~,
r iuject Specialist, Inservice Inspection (ISI)
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiological Control
- W. Slover, Project Engineer, Technical Support
- D. Tibbitts, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
"R.
Van Metre, Manager, Technical Support
'M. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- R. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Plant Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations
"J. Hewitt, Project Manager, Nuclear Energy Services B.
Down, Level III Examiner, Nuclear Energy Services S.
Larson, Project Engineer, Nuclear Energy Services NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Bradford, Senior Resident Inspector
"M. Shannon, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Inservice Inspection (ISI)
The inspectors reviewed procedures, interviewed licensee/cortracto~
personnel and reviewed records to determine whether the licensee's,program pertaining to ISI is complete and in conformance with regulatory require-ments and the licensee's commitments, as indicated below.
The licensee submitted their inservice inspection program/plan (including relief requests)
to the Commission by letter dated January 26, 1988.
The applicable Code for Inservice Inspection is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME BRPV)
Code Section XI 1983 edition, Summer 1983 addenda (83S83).
The plant which commenced commercial operation on May 2, 1987, is in the first 40 month period of the first ten year ISI interval.
The first ten (10) year interval covers the period from May 2, 1987 through May 1, 1997.
The inspection period dates are as indicated below:
First Inspection Period May 2, 1987 to Sept.
2, 1990 Second Inspection*Period Sept.
3, 1990 to Jan.
2, 1994 Third Inspection Period Jan.
3, 1994 to May 1, 1997 As permitted by ASME Section XI, the inspection periods above as well as the inspection interval may be decreased or extended (but not cumula-tively) by as much as one (1) year to enable an inspection to coincide with a plant outage.
Review of Program (73051)
(1)
Program Approval The inspectors interviewed personnel and reviewed documents indicated below to determine whether requirements were met in the following areas:
ISI program, including examinations and tests, in conformance with relevant ASME Code Section XI editions and addenda, and Code cases proposed for use as part of the plan; services of an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) have been procured and the ISI plan has been reviewed by the ANII in accordance with Article IMA-2120 of the ASME Code; and the ISI plan has been reviewed.by the licensee's site nuclear safety review committee,'or equivalent licensee review and approval has been documented.
The insp'ector s substantiated that the licensee has procured the services of an ANII and has submitted the ISI program/plan to the Commission.
Cognizant licensee personnel informed the inspectors that the formal NRC Safety Evaluation Report had not been received but they were informally advised that requested reliefs would be granted for components within the program.
The inspectors noted that the first inspection period would end.
after the next refuel outage and NRC approved relief requests would be mandatory by that time.
The inspectors further noted that present CP&L corporate philosophy as stated in July 31, 1987 internal correspondence from S.
R.
Zimmerman (File NED-B-711) requires NRC approval of requested reliefs before implementation of the alternate testing involved.
Cognizant licensee personnel responded that they considered any alternate testing conducted during this outage to be "at risk" until formal NRC approval of requested reliefs was obtaine (2)
Program Organization The inspectors reviewed the ISI program organization'o verify that the following items were included:
Identification of all licensee commitments and regulatory requirements pertinent to ISI testing and monitoring.
Means of prepari ng plans and schedules and filing them with enforcement and regulatory authorities having jurisdiction at the facility.
Sufficient organizational staff, both in number and training, to ensure that acceptable ISI work is performed.
Site administrative procedures are in place to define the authority and responsibility of the persons or organiza-tions involved with the final evaluation and acceptance of ISI results for the licensee.
I (3)
Qual ity Assurance Program The inspectors reviewed the licensee and ISI contractor's QA programs to verify the following:
procedures for the mainte-nance of required ISI records; QA review includes assurance that plans and procedures have been reviewed by appropriate personnel and meet regulatory requirements; procedures are established for the corrective action of conditions adverse to quality as detected during examination, including provisions to preclude repetition of such adverse conditions; audits or surveillance of ISI activities are conducted by qualified QA personnel to verify compliance with the ISI program; and procedures are established to effectively oversee contractor activities concerned with ISI/PSI.
(4)
Repair Program The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative and maintenance procedures indicated below to verify that. the requirements of Article IWA-4000 of the ASME Code, and, NRC supplementary requirements, are included or referenced.
(5)
Replacement Program The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative and maintenance procedures indicated below to verify that require-ments of Article IWA-7000 of the ASME Code, and NRC supple-mentary requirements, are included or reference (6)
Records The inspectors reviewed procedures and records indicated below to determine whether provisions for the maintenance and reten-tion of records, including inspection,'xamination, test reports, repair and replacement, gA, and NDE records have been established in the ISI program.
(7)
gualification of Personnel The inspectors reviewed procedures indicated below to determine whether the ISI program specifies personnel qualification requirements consistent with ASME Code; plant Technical Speci-fications (TS),
and other applicable documents.
(8)
Reporting Requirement" The inspectors reviewed procedures indicated below to determine whether the licensee's ISI program includes the ASME Code and plant TS requirements for submittal of written reports of ISI results, repairs,
'and replacements.
(9)
Relief Requests The inspectors reviewed procedures indicated below to determine whether the licensee's program contains guidance regarding the identification and processing of requests for relief from ASME Code requirements.
( 10) The following documents were reviewed for the above examina-tions:
Identification Serial:
NLS-88-026 Title SHNPP Inservice Inspection Program Plan - First Interval CP8L-RMP-002, Rev.
001 CP&L-ISI-100, Rev.
Document Distribution and Control Control of Inservice Inspection Activities CPEL-ISI-102, Rev.
Inservice Inspection Drawing Preparation and Control CPS L-ISI-103, Rev.
Receiving Inspection Procedure for Inservice Inspection Calibration Standards and Controlled Materials
Identification (cont'd)
Title CP&L-IS1-104,. Rev.
CP&L-ISI-107, Rev.
CP&L-ISI-302, Rev.
CP&L-AP-006, Rev.
CP&L-MMM-013, Rev.
CP&L-PLP-605, Rev.
Control of Inservice Inspection Calibration Standards SHNPP Erosion/Corrosion Program PRISIM:
Passwords Procedure Review and Approval Maintenance History Records ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Repair and Replacement Program CP&L-NDEP-10, Rev.
Training gualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel b.
Review of Procedures (73052)
(1)
Program Requirements The inspectors reviewed the licensee's commitments in the SAR, Technical Specification (TS),
and approved ISI program to ascertain whether ISI procedures adequately cover all areas specified in the licensee's commitments for ISI and PSI require-ments.
(2)
Procedure Approval The inspectors reviewed the below listed procedures to determine whether the ISI procedures have been approved by authorized licensee personnel and by the Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspection (ANII) where applicable Documents Examined Identification Title CP&L-NDEP-10, Rev.
Training, (jualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel CP&L-NDEP-50, Rev.
gualification of Nondestructive Examination Procedures
Identification (cont'd)
NES-83A0288, Rev.
Title Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds In Ferritic Materials Greater Than Two Inches on Thickness NES-83A0282, Rev.
NES-83A0284',
Rev.
Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of Piping Systems Magnetic Particle Examination-Wet and Dry Methods NES-83A0281, Rev.
Liquid Penetrant Examination
"
(Color Contrast, Solvent Method)
NES-83A0291, Rev.
Visual Examination Procedure for Nuclear Power Systems and Related Components (3)
Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
(a)
Procedure Review The inspectors reviewed the procedures indicated in paragraph (b) below to determine whether requirements are specified and agree with licensee's commitments inclu'ding specified or referenced acceptance levels; qualifications of NDE personnel are specified in accordance with the licensee's approved ISI program; methods of recording, evaluating, and dispositioning findings are established and reporting requirements are in compliance with applicable Code requirements; and procedures delineate the scope of work and division of responsibilities between the licensee and the contractor.
(b)
Technical Content 1)
Visual Examination The inspectors reviewed the below listed visual examination procedure to determine whether it contained information or reference to a
general inspection procedure or supplementary instructions sufficient to assure that all parameters are specified and controlled within the limits permitted by the applicable Code and other additional specification requi rements; all essential examination variables are defined and whether these variables are controlled within the limits specified by the applicable Code and
other additional specification/contract requirements.
Specific areas examined were:
method; application; how visual examination is to be performed; type of surface condition; method or tool for surface prepara-tion, direct or remote viewing; special illumination, instruments,-
or equipment; sequence of performing examination; data to be tabulated; acceptance criteria are specified consistent with the applicable Code and report form or general statement to be completed.
Procedure Examined NES-830291, Rev.
Liquid Penetrant Examination The inspectors reviewed the below listed liquid penetrant examination procedure to determine whether it contained information or reference to a
general inspection procedure or supplementary instructions sufficient to assure that all parameters are specified and controlled within the limits permitted by the applicable Code and other additional specification requirements; all essential examination variables are defined and whether these variables are controlled within the limits specified by the applicable Code and other specification/contract requirements.
Specific areas examined were:
specified test method is consistent with applicable Code requirements; brand names and specific types (number or letter designation if available of penetrant, penetrant remover, emulsifier and developer are specified; penetrant materials used for nickel base alloys are required by procedure to be analyzed for sulfur using the method prescribed by the applicable Code; penetrant materials are required by procedure to be analyzed for total halogens using the method prescribed in the applicable Code; method for acceptable pre-examination of surface preparation are specified and consistent with the applicable Code, area to be cleaned is consistent with applicable requirements, cleanliness acceptance requirements are consistent with applicable Code requirements; procedure established a
minimum drying time following surface cleaning; method of penetrant application and penetration (dwell) time are specified and that the penetration time is consistent with the penetrant manufacturer's recommendation; examination surface is specified and is consistent with the
applicable Code; methods for removal of solvent removable penetrant are 'specified; method and time of surface drying prior to developing is specified; type of developer to be used, method of developer applica-tion and the time interval between penetrant removal and developed application specified; examination technique is specified and the permitted time interval during which the "final interpretation" is preformed within the range of 7-30 minutes after developer application; minimum light intensity at the inspection site is prescribed; technique for evaluation of indications is specified, acceptance standards are included and these are consistent with applicable Code and specific contract requirement; reporting require-ments are specified; and procedure requires requali-fication when changes are encountered.
Procedure Examined HES-83A0281, Rev.
3)
Magnetic Particle Examination The inspectors reviewed the below listed magnetic particle examination procedure to determine whether it contained information or references to a general inspection procedure or supplementary instructions sufficient to assure that all parameters are specified and controlled within the limits permitted by the applicable Code and other additional specification requirements; each essential examination variable is defined and whether these variables are controlled within the limits specified by the applicable Code and other specification/contract requirements.
Specific areas examined were:
method - continuous; surface preparation; particle contrast; surface temperature; light intensity; coverage; prod spacing; magnetizing current yoke pole spacing; and acceptance criteria are specified consistent with the applicable ASME Code Section and specific contract requi rements.
Procedure Examined NES-830284, Rev.
4)
Ultrasonic Examination The inspectors examined the below listed ultrasonic examination procedures to determine whether they contain information or references to a
general
inspection procedure or supplementary instructions sufficient to assure that all parameters are specified and controlled within the limits permitted by the applicable Code and 'other additional specification requirements; all essential examination variables are defined and whether these variables are controlled within the limits specified by the applicable Code and other specification/contract requirements.
Specific areas examined were:
type of apparatus used; extent of coverage of weldment; calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method for demon-strating penetration; limits for evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indica-tions; and, acceptance limits.
Procedures Examined NES-830288, Rev.
NES-83A0282, Rev.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)
The inspectors observed weld examination activities associated with the liquid penetrant, magnetic particles and manual ultrasonic methods of testing" components.
The inspectors witnessed the following pipe weld examinations:
Meld Identification Method of Examination
~Sstem 1FW25-2A-SW5 1FW25-2A-SW4 1FW25-2A-SW3 1FW25-2A-SW2 1FW25-2A-SW1 1FW-SW-E3 1FW-SW-C3 1FW-SW-C7 1RC-SW-C9 1RC-SW-C13 1RC-FW-324 1RC-SW-C9 1RC-SW-C13 1RC-FW-324 1MS-FW-293 1MS-FW-293A 1MS-FW-2938 Magnetic Particles Magneti c Par'ti c 1 e s Magnetic Particles Magnetic Particles Magnetic Particles Magnetic Particles Magnetic Particles Magnetic Particles Liquid Penetrant Liquid Penetrant Liquid Penetrant Manual Ultrasonics Manual Ultrasonics Manual Ultrasonics Manual Ultrasoniics Manual Ultrasonics Manual Ultrasonics Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam
The inspectors observed the above methods of examination to determine whether the following requirements were met:
Approval procedures were available, being followed and specified nondestructive examination equipment was being used.
Examination personnel were knowledgeable of examination method and operation of test equipment.
Examination personnel with proper level of qualification and certification were performing the various examination activi-ties, including equipment calibration, examination, interpreta-tion/evaluation/acceptance of test results.
Examination results, evaluation of results and any corrective actions are being recorded as specified in the ISI program and the examination procedures'uring the 45 degree angle beam ultrasonic examination of main steam weld no.
1MS-FM-293 (Steam Generator A, Nozzle to Pipe)
the inspectors noted the following questionable scanning and ultrasonic reflector interpretation techniques.
Meld No.
1MS-FM-293 was ground smooth making the center of the weld impossible to visually identify from the outside diameter of the pipe.
The weld center line could have been determined with the 0 degree longitudinal wave examination that preceded the angle beam examination.
However, the location of the weld center line was not marked during that examination.
Therefore, precise measurements could not be taken.
Angle beam scanning of weld 1MS-FW-293 revealed ultrasonic reflectors originating at or near the inside diameter of the pipe.
The examiner took no measurements to determine if these reflectors were in the same plane as reflectors which had been recorded in preservice records that were on the job site.
Neither did the examiner interrogate these reflectors to determine if a
ultrasonic signature could be obtained to classify by signal envelope the source of the reflector.
While the examiner was testing the weld the inspectors cautioned that he was scanning in a zig zag pattern
,that was allowing incomplete coverage of the weld.
The examiner acknowledged the discrepancy and re-scanned the area of concern.
The examiner's helper, which in this case was another level II ultrasonic examiner, left the area after the magnetic particle examination which preceded the ultrasonic examinations and did not return until the angle beam examination was nearly
completed.
Therefore, the examiner performing the examination had no assistance to record information, compare the preservice data or to help take measurements.
When the inspectors questioned the examiner concerning the source of the ultrasonic reflectors, the examiner stated that the reflectors were from root geometry because they arose at or near the ID of the pipe, appeared to fall in the same plane and were repeated at I/2 skip and at 14 skip.
The inspectors were concerned however because a crack signal will occur at or near the ID of the pipe and the signature of the signal observed was a single spike which is not the characteristic signal shape from a root condition.
In addition, a crack will also follow the plane of the heat affected zone which starts at the root and extends for approximately I/2 inch in the axial direction of the pipe.
Therefore, precise measurements needed to be taken to compare the current examination data with the data recorded on preservice to ensure that any indication involved is not a
new indication.
Initial discussions with licensee personnel indicated an apparent lack of sensitivity to the potential gravity of the issues involved.
However, the licensee agreed to corrective actions as follows:
reexamination of the weld, conduct additional training to insure that examiners discriminate ultrasonic reflectors carefully and use the preservice data coordinates in their interpretations/evaluations and have CPSL's corporate NDE group monitor examiner performance.
Since the licensee has just started the ultrasonic examinations for the first outage, the above actions appeared adequate.
However, the inspector s will verify the effectiveness of the corrective action during a subsequent inspection.
This concern will be tracked with Inspector Followup Item 400/88-26-02, UT Scanning Techniques.
Within the areas examined, violations and deviations were not identified.
3.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
Housekeeping (54834B), Material Identific'ation and Control (42902B),
and Material Control (42940B)
The inspectors conducted a general inspection of Unit I containment to observe activities such as housekeeping, material identification and control, material control, and storage.
During the above examination the inspectors noted evidence of extensive boric acid leakage below pressurizer spray discharge valve RC-103.
Leakage from RC-103 and its sister valve RC-107 is
considered controlled due to the installation of a leakoff collection system (stem collector shield, drain line, and attendant isolation valves).
The leakoff collection system had been considered operable.
However leakage had occurred past the stem collector shield of valve RC-103 sufficient to deposit a considerable amount of boric acid crystals on electrical equipment (junction boxes and penetrations)
located below the valve.
Additional investigation by the inspectors identified that the isolation valves included a Kerotest Y type globe valve downstream of the collector shield and a swing check valve downstream of the Kerotest valve.
The Kerotest valve had been installed in opposition to the normal direction of leakoff flow.
-The inspectors noted that the design of the Kerotest valve was such that sufficient reverse flow would cause the valve to automatically close and "in effect" cause the collector shield to become part of the RCS pressure boundary.
Cognizant licensee personnel informed the inspectors that installa-tion of Kerotest valves in the reverse direction had been identif'ied during construction for many installations and the resulting nonconformance report (NCR) dispositioned use-as-is since the valve can accommodate flow from either direction.
The inspectors requested a
copy of the NCRs involved together with supportive engineering justification proving that reverse flow seen by valves left "as-is" was not sufficient to cause automatic closure of the valves involved.
Initial discussions with licensee personnel indicated an apparent
'ack of sensitivity to the potential gravity of the issues involved.
At the end of the inspection cognizant licensee personnel indicated that they were confident that proof existed to justify the "as-is" disposition but that insufficient time remained to provide the information during this inspection.
Further that leakage from valve RC-103 had been previously identified (Trouble Ticket No. 88-AL-Y-Hl)
and would require an analysis of root cause of the leakage involved.
The inspectors informed cognizant licensee personnel that NRC concern on this matter would be addressed in a subsequent inspection and would be identified as Inspector Followup Item 400/88-26-03, Kerotest Yalves Installed Backwords On Leakoff Lines for RC-107 and RC-103.
Boric Acid Leakage From Primary Head Drains On Steam Generators ASB Suspected boric acid leakage from the A and B steam generators was identified to the inspectors by cognizant licensee personnel during the first day of this inspection.
Boric acid crystals had been observed at the center of the primary side bottom head and collected on the primary side drain line.
The leakage source was not yet identified and the inspectors indicated their desire to perform an independent verification of the leakage source after all insulation had been remove The inspectors conducted an independent examination of the primary side bottom heads of the A and B steam generators and noted that the boric acid crystals were uniformly deposited around the drain line at the interface between the P3 bottom head material and the inconel penetration.
Westinghouse personnel informed the inspectors that the cylindrica 1 inconel penetration had been machined to provide for an approximate I/2" ID drain line and a cryogenic fit between itself and the P3 head material.
A partial penetration groove weld attaches the inside end o
the penetration to the stainless cladding inside the head.
The inspectors observed that the indicated leakage path was from inside the head and into the cavity between the inconel penetration and the P3 head material fop both steam generators.
Wesiiighcuse and cognizant licensee personnel agreed and stated that ih~ >. v~~sed repair was a seal weld around the penetration on the outside of the head.
The repair will be completed in accordance with requirements of ASNE Section XI with temper-Bead technique to allow welding without subsequent post-weld heat treatment.
Welding procedure and performance qualifications will be performed before completing the production welds.
The inspectors informed cognizant licensee personnel that need for further NRC evaluation of this matter in a subsequent inspection will be identified as Inspector Followup, Item 400/88-26-01, Repair of Primary Side Head Drain for Steam Generators
'A and B.
Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified.
4.
Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
The inspectors examined licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
Results are as follows:
a
~
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 400/87-39-01, Full Flow Testing, of Check Valves This item concerned full flow testing of check valves.
Valve No. 1-SC-34, a 3-inch check valve, was required by ISI-203 to be full flow tested.
This testing was to be accomplished with OST-1215,
"Emergency Service Mater System Operability quarterly Interval Nodes 1-2-3-4."
OST-1215, Rev.
1, paragraph 1.1.
stated
"to verify the operability of 1B-SB ESW Screen Wash Pump and that its associated discharge check valve ( I-SC-34)
passes flow in the forward di rec-tion."
The procedure provides no full flow acceptance criteria for the pump and therefore, no full flow acceptance criteria for I-SC-34.
The above is the result of the fact that the screen wash pump flow is dependent on system demand.
Therefore question arose as to whether
valve 1-SC-34 i's exercised to the position required to fulfill its safety function as required by IWV-3522.
IWV-3522 has been inter-preted by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) letter from D.
G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing to C.
E. Norelius, Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, Region III, dated January 3,
1983, which indicated that NRR has found four methods acceptable to test check valves in which the full stroke motion of the disk cannot be directly observed or where there is no position-indicating device are as follows:
a.
By demonstrating that the valve can pass the full flow which has been taken credit for in FSAR analyses.
b.
By showing that, for the measured flow, the pressure loss through the valve is such that the valve could only be fully open.
c.
By using a mechanical exerciser which can be observed to move through a full stroke.
d.
By partial disassembly of the valve and manually moving the disc through a full stroke.
A similar condition existed for valve 1-SC-24.
The inspectors reviewed ISI-203, Rev.
5,
"ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Program Plan" in regard to this matter.
Approved alternate testing for valves 1-SC-24 and 1-SC-34 requires disassembling as required by Section 5.5.3.
Section 5.5.3 states that:
Check Valve Disassembl Valve disassembly is utilized as an alternative for check valves where it has been determined that testing is impractical.
A sampling plan is used for groups of check valves which are identical (i.e.,
same manufacturer, type, size, etc.)
in construction and for which the system operating environment is the same.
The sampling plan selects one valve from each group for disassembly during each'efueling outage.
If the selected valves passes inspection a
second valve is selected for disassembly at the next refueling, etc., until the group has been completed or until such time that sufficient inspections have been performed to justify an alternate sampling plan.
For those cases where disassembly indicates that there are no valve problems, a
new relief request may be prepared to perform less frequent inspections.
Failure of the selected valve to pass inspection will initiate additional valve disassembly as specified by the appropriate relief reques The visual inspection of disassembled valves includes verifica-tion that the valve is capable of full stroke operation.
All valves specified for disassembly are of the bolted bonnet design.
For valves with hinge pins in the valve body, full stroke operability will be verified by manually exerci si ng the valve through a complete cycle.
For valves with hinge pins in the removable bonnet such that the valve internals are removed from the valve body during disassembly direct verification of full stroke operability by manually exercising is not possible
.
For these valves, full stroke operability will be verification of full stroke travel of valve internals for evidence of wear, binding, etc.
and by stringent valve reassembly procedures."
The inspectors also reviewed CP&L Work Request No.
WR/JO 87-BLCR1 for disassemble of valve I-SC-24 during this refuel outage.
This matter is considered closed.
b.
(Open)
NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants.
Ouring the inspector surveillance of nondestructive testing performed at Harris this outage the inspector observed the licensee activities relating to Bulletin 87-01.
Areas verified by the inspectors were:
Review of program; the licensee is using the Electric Power Research Institute Erosion Corrosion Matrix (CHEC Program)
Review of Procedure; ISI-107 SHNPP Erosion/Corrosion Program Observation of Work Activities
,
readings were verified on a
30 inch reducer to 20 inch reducer to a
12 inch straight pipe in the condensate system Mapping, recording, data input, evaluation of completed data was verified.
The licensee has a very conservative program in place.
One-Hundred Thirty-Seven components wi 1 1 be examined this outage in order to obtain a substantial base line of components.
The licensee response to NRC Bulletin 87-01 and a further review of data/evaluations will be conducted in a subsequent inspection.
Within the areas examined, violations and deviations were not identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 12, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information
is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
(Open)'- Inspector Followup Item 50-400/88-26-01, Repair of Primary Side Head Drain for Steam Generators AKB (Open) Inspector Followup Item 50-400/88-26-02, UT Scanning Techniques (Open)
Inspector Followup Item 50-400/88-26-03, Kerotest Valves Installed Backwards in Leak Off Lines for RC-107 and RC-103