IR 05000400/1988018
| ML18022A675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Girard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18022A674 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-18, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8808010186 | |
| Download: ML18022A675 (8) | |
Text
Report No.:
50-400/88-18 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P.
0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No 50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducte
June.,21-22, 1988 (
Inepec ore
)rar
/
Accompanying Person 61:
L-.
L. Robinson Approved by: '"
e,
>e Materials and Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety License No.:
NPF-63, a e.
>gne a
e
>gne Scope:
SUMMARY This special, unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of NRC Bulletin 88-05.
The inspection included interviews with responsible licensee personnel, observation of involved materials and review of test records'he inspection was conducted to aide in an NRC investigation related to this bulletin, Results:
In the area inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee appeared to have a well-planned and controlled program for addressing the concerns described in the bul'letin.
The technical aspects were adequately addressed.
Management had recognized the importance and was clearly involved in assuring proper resolution of the matter.
,p,wQQQ fQj$6 $807 ia PDI AOOCK 05000400 POC I~1
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Alexander, Metallurgical Specialist, Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HEEC)
~J.
Harness, Plant General Manager
- C. Hinnant, Manager of Maintenance E. Johnson, Principal Specialist, Document Services
"R. Jordon, Specialist, HEEC
~J.
McKay, Site Engineering Supervisor
"D. Sullivan, Principal Engineer, HEEC
~D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance
"M. Tarkal, Senior Engineer, Licensing E.
Upchurch, Senior Engineer, Modifications M. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
"A. Watson, Harris Vice President
"E.
Willet, Manager, Modification and Outage
"Attended exit interview 2.
NRC Bulletin 88-05 (92701)
a.
Introduction This inspection addressed the licensee's work on Bulletin 88-05 and was conducted to aide in an ongoing NRC investigation of the matter.
Background information and a description of the inspection and find>ngs are provided below.
b.
Background Bulletin 88-05, dated May 6, 1988, informed licensees of two companies that had been found to have furnished fraudulent materials to the nuclear industry.
The two companies were identified as West Jersey Manufacturing Company (WJM) and Piping Supplies, Incorporated (PSI).
The bulletin requested that licensees take specified actions to address the potential safety hazard presented by use of the nonconforming (fraudulent) materials in safety-related applications.
A supplement to the bulletin was issued June 15, 1988, which provided additional information regarding the nonconforming materials and further described the actions to be taken.
The supplement limited the scope of materials involved to ASME and ASTM fittings and flanges.
Actions requested included:
Review of records to identify any use or intended use of WJM or PSI furnished ASME and ASTM fittings and flanges in safety related applications Actions to assure that any WJM or PSI materials identified are suitable for their intended service (to include justifications for continued operation for items not replaced)
Replacement of unsatisfactory materials Retention of records and nonconforming materials P
Reporting of findings to the NRC The bulletin supplement specifically noted chemical composition and tensile strength deficiencies by Carolina Power and Light Company in two WJM flanges.
These flanges were identified as SA-105 material, heat 7218.
They were warehoused at the Harris site and were intended for use in safety-related applications.
Inspection and Findings II The inspector, accompanied by an NRC investigator, examined the actions taken by the licensee to address the bulletin.
In addition, the investigator obtained selected materials and records as evidence for possible legal action against the individuals responsible-for the fraud described in the bulletin.
Details of the inspector's examin-ation and of the items obtained by the investigator are given below.
(1)
Interviews The inspector questioned responsible managers, records personnel and test personnel as to the actions being taken to respond to the bulletin.
Based on these interviews the inspector concluded that the work to address the bulletin was well-planned; involved personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements for the activities they were performing; and that all of the actions required by the bulletin were being properly performed.
The licensee's review to identify materials from WJM and PSI was still in progress, as was the testing and evaluation of materials already identified.
About 63 flanges manufactured by WJM had been identified, but none from PSI had been found.
No WJM or PSI manufactured fittings had been found.
All of the flanges were SA-105 (identical with ASTM A105)
and were being screened for conformance with SA-105 minimum tensile require-ments using hardness testing and a tensile-hardness correlation given in ASTM Standard A370.
Licensee personnel indicated that chemical analyses would be performed once their engineering evaluation had determined where samples should be taken.
It was the inspector's understanding that the only chemical analyses made on flanges thus far were those made on the two uninstalled heat 7218 flanges that had been referred to in the bulletin supplemen (2)
Observation of Material Laborator The inspector examined three flanges in the licensee's test lab.
They had been manufactured by WJM and the licensee had determined them to be nonconforming.
Two of these were described in the bulletin supplement and a third had been discovered subsequently.
None of the three had been installed.
All three were 2<-inch, 150¹,
SA-105 blind end-flanges, heat number 7218.
Two (those referred to in the bulletin supplement)
had had tensile, chemistry and hardness checks.
The third had only been hardness tested.
Pieces of material obtained with the tensile specimens had been brief'ly examined by test personnel micro-and macro-graphically with the conclusion that the materials did not appeared to be plate.
From his observation of the samples and the lab test equipment and interviews with the test personnel, the inspector ascertained that the testing had been satisfactorily performed.
The following were specifically noted by the inspector; Laboratory test personnel stated that the hardness and tensile tests were performed using written procedures in conformance with the applicable ASTM specifications.
The inspector examined (but did not review in detail)
the procedures.
Observations of the flanges for test sample locations and of the broken tensile specimens indicated proper conformance with standard test practices.
All materials, including test pieces, were identified by the licensee and traceable to test records.
In addition, manufacturer's identification (manufacturer's initials, specification, and heat number)
were found on the edge of each flange.
Laboratory personnel stated that chemical analyses of samples from the flanges had been performed by an approved vendor, National Spectrographic Laboratories.
At the inspector's request, licensee personnel took photographs of the flanges and remaining portions of test specimens:
Copies were provided to the NRC investigator and the licensee retained copies.
Field The inspector observed six installed flanges manufactured by WJM which the licensee considered to be possibly deficient based on preliminary hardness testing.
Four were installed in auxiliary feedwater piping and two in diesel generator water jacket piping.
The inspector observed the location of the hardness
test indentations (unusually on the flange edge but sometimes on the face).
The hardness tests appeared to have been satis-factorily performed.
Material specification identification was observed on the edges of the flanges and in some (but not all)
instances the heat number could be identified visually.
At the inspector's request these flanges were photographed and copies were provided to the NRC investigator.
The licensee also retained copies.
(3)
Review of Records The inspector reviewed the licensee's chemical and tensile test records for the two laboratory tested samples and the associated manufacturer's test report.
In addition, he reviewed a list of hardness test results and the manufacturer's test reports for the six (potentially nonconforming)
flanges he had observed in the field.
The test records indicated that the tests had been properly performed and documented.
Significant conflicts between results obtained by the licensee and those on the manufacturer's test reports were apparent.
A summary of test information reviewed by the inspector (licensee test results, manufacturer's test report results and SA-105 specification requirements are provided in Table 1 (Mechanical Properties)
and Table 2 (Chemical Analyses).
From a
comparison of the data the inspector observed the following:
The mechanical test properties obtained by the licensee for the uninstalled flanges indicates that the tensile and yield strengths are much less than required by specification.
The chemical analyses of the uninstalled flanqes indicated manganese content lower than required by specification and carbon (although within specification)
insufficient to achieve required tensile properties in the absence of unannealed, severe cold work (metallography revealed no cold work present).
Hardness values obtained by the licensee for the uninstajled flanges provided further evidence of inadequate tensile properties.
For the given sizes of flanges no hardness requi rements were specified by SA-105.
Hardness values obtain by the licensee on field installed flanges of Heat CND indicated tensile properties that
~mi ht by be1ow specification.
As the tensi1e-hardness correlation is not perfect, additional testing is needed to confirm whether or not the material meets specificatio Although the licensee is still evaluating the data for the field installed Heat A 97 flanges, the inspector concluded that the hardnesses obtained by the licensee are indicative of tensile properties well below these required by specification SA-105.
The licensee's data supports the concerns expressed in NRC Bulletin 88-05.
Copies of the test records were obtained by the NRC investigator as evidence.
3.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 22, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Attachments
TABLE
HECHANICAL PROPERTIES Source Uninstalled Flan es Installed Flan es Heat 7218 Flan es Heat CND Flan es ea an es Harris Lab Test Tensile si le Sl on a ion ar ness Manufacturer 's Report Tensile si le sl on ation ar ness eat reat 44 975 45 740 77 600 ot e orte 71 248 orma lze 87,000 o
core SA-105 Required Tensile le on a ion ar ness ea rea 70 000 min min o
e ulre nnea orma lze or orma lze an em er o
e ulre Heat CND flanges are auxiliary feedwater and heat A-97 are diesel generator cooling jacket
Not actually a
requirement except for very small flanges or fittings where tensile testing cannot be accomplished.
(Apparently based on the tensile-hardness correlation given in ASTM Standard A370)
Attachment
TABLE 2 Chemical Anal ses ource ar on na s>s esu os orus an anese u
ur
)con nuns a
e anges
¹1
¹2
. 045
. 045 0. 32 0. 32 0. 004 0. 004 0. 010 0. 010
< 0.10
< 0.10 SA-105 Re uirement 0.35 max, 0.60-105 0.040 max.
I0.050 max.
0.35 max.
"Heat 7218