IR 05000400/1988002
| ML18005A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A329 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-02, 50-400-88-2, NUDOCS 8803160134 | |
| Download: ML18005A330 (8) | |
Text
~pg Bfcp Vp
~
~
p Cy
<<>>*+>>
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/88-02 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P.
0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:.
December 27, 1987 - January 22, 1988 Inspecto
G.
axw Approved by:
re roc son, ection se Division of Reactor Projects zl~~lse ate sgne ate igne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Surveillance Observation and Monthly Maintenance Observation.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
88Pgibpi34 85000~00 880222 pop gDOCK 0 ppg Q
~
~
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, gA/gC C.
S. Hinnant, Manager of Maintenance L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R.
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J.
L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 25, 1988, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
One Unresolved Item* was identified,
"Steam Dump Selector Switch".
Paragraph 3.b.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Note:
A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in Para-graph 6.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a ~
Plant Tours The inspector conducted routine.plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that systems, valves and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant=
operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; and all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current.
nreso ve items are matters a out which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and inter-views with plant personnel.
The inspector reviewed the shift foreman's log, control room operator's log, clearance center tag out logs, system status logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control status board.
During these tours the inspector noted that the operators appeared to be alert and aware of changing plant conditions.
The inspector evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
He observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
The inspector verified that various plant spaces were not in a
condition which would degrade the performance capabilities of any required system or component.
This inspection included checking the condition of electrical cabinets to ensure that they were free of foreign and loose debris, or material.
Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch On January 21 plant management personnel reported that the reactor power increased above the maximum allowable instantaneous power authorized by Operating License No. NPF-63, which is 102 percent.
The event occurred when maintenance personnel were conducting MST-I0068,
"Turbine First Stage Pressure Loop (P-0447)
Reactor Protection Set 3 Calibration".
As part of the MST, the steam dump mode selector switch was required to be moved from the normal place for power (TAyG) to th'e steam pressure position.
When the switch was moved, the switch malfunctioned and maintained an electrical circuit with both the TA>G position and the steam pressure position.
Simultaneously, maintenance personnel were conducting adjustments to the turbine pressure reference circuit, and as a result of having both TA<G and steam pressure circuits energized, the circuit failed to block the steam dump signal and this resulted in five of the six condenser steam dump valves opening.
This sudden increase in steam demand resulted in reactor power exceeding 102 percent.
The event lasted less than 50 seconds, A blown fuse was found to be the cause of the one condenser steam dump valve which failed to open.
A When the steam dump system was being returned to normal, the operators found that one of the five valves which opened would not close.
The steam dump circuit for the valve which failed to close was tested, and its failure was attributed to having debris (a small amount of rubber gasket)
stuck in the valve's air booster pilot hole.
This blockage prevented the air from leaking from the valve operator when it received the signal to close.
The debris was removed from the booster by maintenance personnel, and when the valve was tested it was found to operate satisfactoril Licensee maintenance personnel tested the circuits for the selector switch and found that the malfunction was attributable to possible defects within the switch.
As a result the switch was tested again, and it was found that it would provide its required function in the TAVG position, 'hich i s its normal position at power operation (Mode 1).
The licensee continues to investigate the cause of the circuit failure.
This event was reported to the NRC Operating License Condition 2.G (a Based on information contained in 1980, the licensee concluded that greater
- than 102 percent required condition.
Duty Officer in accordance with 24-hour reportable occurrence).
an NRC letter dated August 22, instantaneous power excursions reporting under this license This event will be identified as an Unresolved Item,
"Steam Dump Selector Switch," 50-400/88-02-01.
This item will remain unresolved pending an evaluation of the preoperational tests which were done on the steam dump selector switch and the licensee's engineering assess-ment of the switch subsequent to its apparent'failure.
c. 'arris Plant Organizational Changes On January
the inspector was informed by the licensee Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project, that the following management changes were occurring:
The Plant General Manager resigned, and will be replaced on February 1 by the Manager of the Nuclear Training Section.
The Manager of Maintenance resigned, and effective. January 9 his replacement is the previous Manager of Start-up.
The Manager of Milestone Completion also resigned'but is not to be replaced at this time.
The licensee has directed his organization's employees to report directly to the Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project, until further notice.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications and training records associated with the new Plant General Manager and Manager of Mainten-ance and compared their qualifications with.those mandated in TS Section 6.4. 1, and therefore, ANS 3. 1 (September 1979 Draft),
and found them to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector witnessed licensee personnel conducting maintenance surveillance, test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the activities were performed in accordance with licensee requirements.
These observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedure to ensure that administrative controls were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that test instru-mentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of Technical Specifications, any identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service.
The following specific activities were observed:
a
~
The inspector evaluated OST-1026,
"Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation".
The OST was conducted to verify that reactor coolant inventory loss was maintained within the prescribed TS limitations (Reference TS 4.4.6.2. 1.d and 3.4.6.2).
The test data identified the amount of leakage from known valves and the overall accumulated leakage.
Using this data in conjunction with the parameter pres-cribed in TS 4.4.6.2.1.d, the licensee calculated the containment leakage rates.
The test was conducted with the plant in Power Operation (Mode 1); the results were found to be acceptable.
b.
The daily power range heat balance tests required by OST-1004 were evaluated.
This OST was done to verify the accuracy of the power range neutron indication.
The test was accomplished by comparing the calculated thermal power (as required by TS 4.3. 1. 1, Table 4.3-1, Item 2A) with the power range indication.
During the test the plant was maintained at constant power level, steam flow, main steam generator feedwater flow and steam generator levels.
C.
The inspector evaluated the inspections and checks which were completed by OPT-1510.
The OPT was completed to verify the opera-tional readiness for the EDG.
The OPT checkpoints were also conducted to comply with the Transamerica Delaval Owners Group recommendation.
The OPT verified that the controls and switches for the various generator systems and circuits were properly aligned.
It also verified that the various systems and components were operating within their prescribed parameters to 'assure that the EDG would respond, if the need occurred.
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 62700, 37700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities during this inspection period to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolutions, the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented, post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of'ork activities.
a.
The inspector observed maintenance personnel conducting MST-I0012,
"Main Steam Line Pressure Loop 2 P0486".
The MST was conducted to verify accuracy of the electrical portion of steam generator
"B" steam line pressure sensing circuit for main steam pressure trans-mitter PT-486.
b.
The inspector observed repairs being made on the
"B" containment hydrogen monitoring circuit.
The repair work was required to allow the monitor to be returned to service.
The work was authorized by WR-87-BLFIl.
The repair required that the analyzer have its entire
- power supply circuit replaced with a new one.
One of the control boards in the new circuit was found to be defective and was replaced with an identical board taken from the original power supply circuit.
The system voltages were then checked and found to be acceptable.
After the repairs were completed the licensee conducted MST-I0116,
"Containment Hydrogen Analyzer System Calibration, Train A or Train B",
on the
"8" hydrogen analyzer system.
This MST was conducted to verify that the hydrogen analyzer system was calibrated prior to placing it back into ser vice.
The requirements for oper-ability and the surveillance testing associated with the system are in TS Sections 3.6.4. 1 and 4.6.4.1.
C, The inspeytor observed maintenance personnel conducting MST-I0037,
"Delta T/ AVG Loop T-0412 Calibration".
This MST verified the accuracy of the instrumentation and control system for a logic circuit associated with the reactor protection system.
The circuit provides the following functions:
block'f automatic and manual rod withdrawal, start turbine runback, a feedwater isolation in the event of a reactor trip, and P-12 lo-lo AVG interlock (P-12 is an engineered safety features actuation system interlock.).
The MST is required to meet the surveillance requirements of TS 4.3.2. 1 (Table 4.3-2, Item 10b)
and 4.3.1.1 (Table 4;3-1, Items 7 and 8).'
d.
The inspector conducted a
follow-up inspection concerning the licensee's action on TS Section 4.8. 1. 1.2.f. ll.
The inspector docume'nted in RII Report 50-400/87-37, Detail Section 4, that the licensee requested exigency on the above section of the TS.
The licensee. filed this Change Request for the TS in a letter to NRR, dated October 15, 1987.
Th'e proposed change required revising the TS to allow that during the EDG full load reject test, the diesel generator voltage not exceed 110 percent of its voltage at the start of the test.
The change was implemented to replace the old TS requirements which-limited the diesel generator output voltage to a
value of 7590 V during the load reject test.
The inspector observed that in a letter dated October 30, 1987, NRR accepted the proposed TS changes.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
List of Abbreviations ANS EDG MST NRC NRR OPT OST PCR PT QA QC RII AVG TS V
MR American Nuclear Society Emergency Diesel Generator
'aintenance Surveillance Test Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operations Periodical Test Operational Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Pressure Transmitter Quality Assurance Quality Control Region II Average Temperature Technical Specifications Volt Work Request