IR 05000400/1988003
| ML18022A627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18022A626 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-03, 50-400-88-3, NUDOCS 8803280156 | |
| Download: ML18022A627 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/88-03 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:
January
February 20, 1988 Inspector:
G.
F.
ell Date Signed Approved by:
c P.
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verifica-tion and Monthly Maintenance Observation.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted E
Licensee Employees J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G ~
L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J.
L. Harness, Plant General Manager C.
S. Hinnant, Manager of Maintenance D.
LE Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R.
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1988, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
The following new items were identified during the inspec-tion:
Unresolved Item 400/88-03-01, ESW Seal Water, paragraph 4.c.
Unresolved Item 400/88-03-02, Emergency Operating Procedures, paragraph 4.d.
Note:
A list of abbreviations used in this report, is contained in Paragraph 6.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92701)
(Closed)
Unresolved Item* 50-400/88-02-01, Steam Dump Selector Switch.
The inspector evaluated the licensee's investigation of the reator power increase which was attributed to the steam dump selector switch circuitry.
As a result, the following information was determined:
When the selector switch was placed in the steam pressure position the electrical circuit actually remained in the TAVG position.
During the surveillance test which caused the event, the switch was placed in the steam pressure position which was actually the same as the TAVG position.
"Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation The TAVG circuit.
compares reactor coolant system TAVG and a
TREF which is derived -.from the turbine first stage pressure channel (P-446).
P-446 was placed into the test mode, causing a large error signal which would have had no effect, if the selector circuit was really in the steam pressure mode.
However, since the circuit was actually in the T
mode it did not block the large error signal which caused the condenser steam dump valves to open, causing power to increase.
The selector switch control circuitry was found to have a wiring error which occurred when the SSPS cabinets
"A" and
"8" were manufactured by Westinghouse at its Baltimore, maryland plant.
The error occurred when Westinghouse used a
common drawing to manufacture the train
"A" and
"B" SSPS cabinets.
The drawing had notes indicating the required wiring differences.
However, the notes apparently were not adhered to when the
"A" cabinet was wired, causing an electrical jumper to be installed in th'e "A" SSPS cabinet.
The jumper in effect caused the steam dump selector circuit to stay in the TAVG mode.
The licensee conducted a detailed 'inspection of the accessible wiring in both "A" and "8" SSPS cabinets for other possible wiring errors; eleven other errors were found.
Each was evaluated by the PNSC and none of them was found to have an impact on plant safety.
The inspector concurred with these evaluations.
The plant engineering staff recommended that the switch be placed in the TAVG position and remain there until the next outage, and also, as required, the additional eleven errors will be corrected during the outage.
The steam dump circuitry was tested during start-up testing.
However, the tests were conducted to determine if the system operated correctly during normal conditions and not under the conditions which existed when the event occurred.
The control room operators took immediate action to reduce reactor power when the event occurred.
This prompt action helped turn reactor power down at 103 percent.
The event was reported to the NRC Duty Officer as required by the Operating License NPF-63.
The licensee has documented the event on LER 88-003.
This item is closed.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710)
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Plant Tours The inspector conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to ve'rify that the licensee's requirements and commitments
'ere being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that systems, valves and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; and all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel'he inspector reviewed the shift foreman's log, control room operator's log, clearance center tag out logs, system status logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control status board.
During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert and aware of changing plant conditions.
The inspector evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
They observed that the briefings and turnover s provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
The inspector verified that various plant spaces were not in a
condition which would degrade the performance capabilities of any required system or component.
This inspection included checking the condition of electrical cabinets to ensure that they were free of foreign and loose debris, or material.
Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authori-zation to be in the respective areas.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Fan S-3B On February 4, while the plant was operating at 100 percent power, smoke was seen coming from the reactor auxiliary building supply fan motor, a nonsafety-related motor.
The power supply for the motor was immediately deenergized by operations personnel.
The occurrence was reported to the NRC Duty Officer as an Unusual Event in accordance-with the licensee's Emergency Plan.
The UE was declared at 11: 10 a.m.
and was terminated at 11: 18 a.m.
The licensee's Emergency Plan requires a
UE to be declared when a
fire lasts more than ten minutes within the Protected Area, and the supply fan emitted smoke for longer than ten minute Maintenance technicians inspected and tested fan motor S-3B.
The cause of the smoke could not be determined, and the fan was returned to service later in the day.
Emergency Service Water Pumps On February 8, while operating at 100 percent power, problems were experienced when OST-1215 was being performed on the isolation valves for the 1B nonsafety-related bearing seal water booster pump.
This is one of the two pumps which supply seal water to the ESW pumps to assure that the seals are maintained wet when the ESW pumps are not running.
When the plant was being constructed the licensee decided to include these two seal water booster pumps in the ESW system.
The seal water pumps were included to assure that the ESW pumps would not start with their seals dry, thus increasing the pump seal life and reducing the likelihood of pump failure.
Since the two seal water booster pumps are nonsafety-related, they must be isolated from those sections of the ESW pump seal water system which. are required to operate when the ESW pumps are running.
OST-1215 requires the seal water booster pump isolation valves to be tested for operability.
When tested, the valves (1-SW-1335, 1-SW-1338, and a check valve 1-SW-1336)
were found to be inoperable.
This condition was reported to the NRC Duty Officer as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
Due to the valves being inoperable the 1B seal water booster pump was isolated by closing two manual isolation valves which are normally open.
The plant entered into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO while the cause of the inoperable valves was investigated.
The investigation revealed the following:
The electrical indicating switch on valve 1-SW-1335 was found to be defective.
The switch was replaced and tested, and was returned to service in accordance with MR 88-ACWW1.
The check valve (1-SM-1336)
located between the pump and the discharge isolation valve appeared to have a slight leak by its seat.
The valve was disassembled and cleaned.
The valve was sticking slightly open due to mud accumulation on its seat; afterwards the lines were back flushed.
The valve was then tested and returned to service in accordance with MR 88-ACWRl.
'alve 1-SW-1338 was back flushed, cleaned, tested, and was returned. to service in accordance with WR 88-ACWU1.
The licensee's engineering staff is evaluating a
plan which may result in removing these two seal water pumps from the ESW seal water system.
This event will be documented by the licensee and reported on a
LE The matter will be considered unresolved pending resolution of the licensee engineering. evaluation and is identified as Unresolved Item 50-400/88-03-01, ESW Seal Water.
Emergency Operating Procedures On February 9, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, the licensee notified the NRC Duty Officer that one of the site Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP-EPP-10)
had not been promptly revised due to administrative errors.
The recommendations to revise the procedure were made in December 1986 when Revision 2 of the procedure was issued.
The recommendation required safety injection valves 1SI-340 or 1SI-341 to be closed if the plant.had experienced a
LOCA and the RHR system was taking a suction on the containment sump and discharg-ing into the coolant cold legs and simultaneously supplying the high pressure safety injection pumps.
Shutting 1SI-340 or 1SI-341 would reduce the probability that a single RHR pump would experience pump runout and perhaps trip on electrical overload.
1SI-340 and 1SI-341 are the.safety injection valves which would isolate the RHR pump discharge from. the reactor coolant cold legs when the RHR system is
. lined up as described above.
In December 1987 the ONS group discovered this administrative error, and an Advance Change Notice (AC 2/1)
was issued immediately to revise EOP-EPP-10 to include closing 1SI-340 or 1SI-341 when the RHR system is lined up to take a suction on the containment sump'he inspector interviewed members of the ONS group and was informed that other site procedures have been reviewed for similar administrative errors.
During the review no other similar errors were identified.
'n early February the Plant General Manager determined that the above condition should be reported to the NRC Duty Officer.
The inspector was informed that the potential significance of the fai lure to promptly include the recommended changes into EOP-EPP-10 had not been realized when it was initially discovered by ONS.
The inspector interviewed various PNSC members and supervision representing each section of the plant organization.
As a result the.
inspector noted that the site awareness and sensitivity to conducting a
thorough and prompt review of issues which could affect plant safety has been improved during this reporting period.
This'vent was reported by the licensee on LER 88-001.
This matter is being considered as unresolved pending further review of the licensee evaluation and is identified as Unresolved Item 50-400/88-03-02, Emergency Operating Procedure ESF Actuation Signal On February 17, while operating at 100 percent power, maintenance personnel were conducting a
post-maintenance test on the
"B" emergency sequencer.
As a result of the test, the
"B" motor-driven AFW pump and the "B" ESW pumps received start signals.
The AFW pump did not start because it was tagged out of service for unrelated reasons.
The ESW pump received the start signal but did not start.
The licensee investigated the cause of the start signals and the cause of the ESW pump's fai lure to start.
The maintenance technicians attributed the ESW pump's failure to start to the tripping of the electrical overload relay for the pump motor.
Further investigation revealed that the overload relay for the "B" electrical phase was either defective or was adjusted to a
setting on the low end of the adjustment scale.
The -scale varied between 38 to 42 amperes and the relay was set at 38.
The licensee replaced the relay and adjusted the new relay to mid-scale (40 amperes).
The pump was then test started and was found to start as designed; the pump was returned to service.
The licensee investigated the sequencer test circuit and found that the sequence test was satisfactory.
However, the failure of the sequencer to bio'ck the two previously-noted start signals is under investigation.
The sequencer has two buttons on its test panel which are associated with testing the sequencer a start button and a stop button.
The procedure for conducting the test requires that the start button be pushed to cause the sequencer to go through its test automatically within about six to eight minutes.
Once it cycles out, without any action by test personnel, the circuit blocks and holds all of the false start signals back until all of the associated start relays have reset (about nine seconds).
When the start button was pushed, the sequencer test worked as expected and 'as required.
However, engineering wanted the stop button adjusted
.and tested so that if a real SI signal was received during the time period when the sequencer was being tested, then pushing the button would stop the test and allow the real signal to pass the blocks.
The changes were made to the stop button and it was tested, but the results indicate that the time period on the stop button needs to be further studied by engineering, as it appears that when the stop button was pushed it shortened the hold time for the blocks on the false signals.
Thus the start signals for two of the ESF pump motors got through the test circuit.
The licensee continues to evaluate the time associated with the stop button on the sequencer test circuits.
The licensee plans to document the preceding information on an LER.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 62700)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities during this inspection period to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no, maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolutions; the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented; post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
The following activities were evaluated during the inspector's routine monthly maintenance observation:
The quarterly lubrication of the CVCS system was conducted in accordance with Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM-M0010, Rev.
1, Routine Number 16.
The diesel-driven fire pump engine head bolts were torqued and the oil was changed.
This work was authorized by WR 87-BELD1.
After the head bolts were torqued the valves were adjusted and the engine was tested in accordance with Maintenance Periodic Test Procedure MPT-M0036, Rev. 0,.Fire Protection Emergency Diesel Engine Annual Operational Test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
List of Abbreviations AFW C.VCS EOP ESF ESW LCO LER LOCA NRC ONS OST PNSC QA/QC RHR SI SSPS AVG REF UE WR Auxiliary Feedwater Chemical and Volume Control System Emergency Operating Procedures Engineered Safety Features Emergency Service Water
. Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Loss of Coolant Accident Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'Onsite Nuclear Safety Operational Surveillance Test Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Quality Assurance/Quality Control Residual Heat Removal Safety Injection Solid State Protection System Average Temperature Reference Temperature Unusual'vent Work Request