IR 05000400/1988015
| ML18005A490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A487 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-15, NUDOCS 8807120512 | |
| Download: ML18005A490 (6) | |
Text
,ia sar, 'Ip UNITED STATES NUGAE.EAR REGULATORY COI'vIMISSIOI'I REGION It I01 AIARIETTASTnEET, NPtV.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/88-15 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
8ox 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
May 20 - June 11, 1988 Inspector:
G.
F. Maxwell I
i Approved by:
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~is~= >-~
P.
. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects License No.:
NPF-63 Date Signed c.:
> s/J:J ate Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Maintenance Observation, and 10CFR Part 21 Inspections.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8807120512 880623 PDR ADOCK 05000400
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J. L. Harness, Plant General Manager C.
S. Hinnant, Manager of Maintenance J.
R. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiological Control D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 93702)
a
~
Plant Tours The inspector conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that systems, valves and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping'vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; and all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel.
The inspector reviewed the shift foreman's log, control room operator's log, clearance center tag out logs, system status logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control status board.
During these tours the inspector noted that the operators appeared to be alert and aware of changing plant condi-tions.
1'heinspector evaluated, operations shift turnovers and attended shift brie'fings.
He observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
Additionally, the inspector verified that various plant spaces were not in a condition which would degrade the performance capabilities of any required system or componen Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in -the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authoriza-tion to be in the respective areas.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers perform-ing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
b.
Under Voltage Trip Protection On June 3,
the licensee reported an event to the NRC Duty Officer which involved the under-voltage protection for the
"A" train emergency 6.9 kV electrical bus.
The event occurred when Operations personnel were concluding an Operational Surveillance Test (OST)
on the under-voltage trip actuating device for the
"A" train emergency electrical bus.
In brief, the event occurred as follows:
A monthly test, OST-1124 (6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage)
was being completed on the "A" train emergency electrical bus.
Returning the system to normal is accomplished by releasing the under voltage test button.
When the button was released the "A" train emergency electrical bus isolation breaker tripped open causing a loss of "A" train power.
The "A" emergency diesel generator started, as expected, and all other emergency protective equipment started or operated as expected, except two items.
The first item was the "A" Emergency Service Water (ESW)
pump.
However, the control room operators promptly started the motor manually, after noting its failure to startmutomatically.
The second item was a return damper (AC-D4SA) for the "A" emergency battery room which did not open.
Maintenance personnel investigated the cause for the battery room damper not working correctly and found that the travel
. limit switch was sticking.
The switch was cleaned and subsequently tested satisfactorily.
The damper was returned to the operable status later on the same day.
The repair work was authorized by Work Request WR 88-ANEM1.
A special test procedure was written and implemented to determine why the
"A" ESW pump did not start automatically.
The test required inputting an automatic start signal for the ESW pump while blocking the test signal for the other protective equipment powered by the
"A" electrical train.
This test was conducted two times and each time the "A" ESW pump automatically started.
As a. result, the licensee determined that the pump was fully operable and returned it to service on June 3.
The special test
. was authorized by WR 88-ANEK The licensee could not provide a clear explanation for the ESW pump not starting when the loss of power event occurred.
However, the inspector was informed that just prior'o going into the refueling outage (on or about July 16, 1988),
the event concerning the under voltage test and the ESW pump will be intentionally duplicated.
Prior to the duplicate test, the licensee plans to connect metering devices at various test points. within the "1A-SA" undervoltage logic relay circuitry.
The recorded results will be analyzed to further evaluate the test anomaly and the "A" ESW pump auto-start failure.
Vio violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 37700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities during this inspection period to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolutions; the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented; post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
The inspector evaluated in-process work activities on the containment building emergency access door.
The gasket on the door was deformed and was in need of repair or replacement.
The gasket was authorized to be removed and replaced in accordance with WR 88-AMEA1 and WR 88-AMDG1.
The access and control of the repair activity was authorized by Radiation Work Permits RWP 88-0101, RWP 88-0103, and RWP 88-0104.
The'ld seal was removed and the new seal was treated with a special lubricant (part number 725-925-04)
prior to its installation.
The lubricant was used to aid the installation and to help preserve the seal.
Upon completion of the installation a
leak test was satisfactorily completed on the door and it was returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
CFR Part 21 Inspections (36100)
The inspector evaluated a condition which was reported by the licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 21.
The details of the condition were documented by the.licensee in a letter to Region II dated May 18, 1988.
In the letter the licensee pointed out that on or about May 13, Region II was made aware that the Harris Plant had in operation six Limitorque-operated valves which are powered by DC motors that do not have electrical surge protection.
Each of these six valves is installed in the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) syste The licensee discovered the =above condition as the result of investigating the cause of an open shunt field on the DC motor for AFM valve 2AF-V117SA-1.
The licensee plans by October 1988, to make a design change for each of the six affected DC motors.
The design change will require surge protection to be installed for each of the motors.
To assure safe operation of the installed six valves prior to October, the licensee stated that a special test will be completed.
The test will be conducted after each operation of the valves.
The test requires technicians to take resistance measure-ments to make sure that the shunt fields in the motors are not damaged during valve operation.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
5.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 13, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.