IR 05000389/1980007
| ML17208A876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1980 |
| From: | Mcfarland C, Rausch J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17208A875 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-80-07, 50-389-80-7, IEB-80-03, IEB-80-05, IEB-80-3, NUDOCS 8008070413 | |
| Download: ML17208A876 (6) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-389/80-07 Licensee:
Florida Power 8 Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 2 Docket No. 50-389 License No.
CPPR-144 Approved by:.i SUMHARY
. Rau
, Actin ectz.on Chief, RCES Branch Inspection on June 4-6, 1980 Areas Inspected Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida C
Inspector:
C.,R. McFarland Date Signed ate Signed This routine, unannounced inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on site in the areas of construction progress; inspector followup item; licensee identified items and inspection and enforcement bulletins.
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
SPPSPPgq(g
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J J
"W.
N.
ME J.
G.
A. Thompson, Assistant Site Manager M. Hayward, QA Supervisor T. Weems, Assistant Manager, QA Construction Sherman, QA Engineer Pendland, Licensing Crowell, Engineering Power Plant Site Representative Other Organizations B. Fromdahl, Construction Foreman, Chicago Bridge 8 Iron Co.
(CBI)
L Fields, QA Superv'~or, CBI Flanagan, Project Superintendent,'BASCO R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer, EBASCO-J. I. Parker, QC Supervisor, EBASCO U. Barone, Mechanical Engineer, EBASCO L. Pelosi, Mechanical Engineer, EBASCO J.
Soares, Civil QC Inspector, EBASCO-Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 6, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector discussed his recent assignment as principal inspector for St. Lucie 2, and cited the nee for a
CFR 50.55(e)
report for the diesel generator field excitor cables as stated in paragraph 6.c.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a 4 (Closed)
Unresolved Item (URI) 389/79-06-01, RT Technique of B. F.
Shaw Fabricated Welds.
This item concerns the use of a film side penetrameter technique where welds are accessible for a source side penetrameter technique.
The licensee and Ebasco Services Incorporated (EBASCO)
have reviewed and accepted the changes to the B. F.
Shaw ompany (B. F.
Shaw) guidelines for placin'g penetrameters.
The defi-nition of accessibility complies with the ASME code and the B. F.
Shaw corrective actions program.
The inspector reviewed the May 15, 1980 EBASCO letter to B. F.
Shaw which documents the above, and other supporting documentation relative to the radiography (RT) technique tests and the acceptance of the B. F.
Shaw techniques by the appro-priate Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI).
"2-b.
(Open)
URI 389/79-18-01, Use of expansion joint filler material inside containment not qualified to design basis accident (DBA) conditions.
This item concerns the use of Ameron NUKEM 750 caulk for the circumfer-ential expansion joint between the steel containment and the concrete floor inside the containment at elevation 23'
0".
The US NRC April 10, 1980 letter to the licensee requested a technical basis, supported by analysis or experimental data, for the use of Ameron NUKEM 750 as a
qualified caulk to withstand DBA conditions in the Unit 2 containment design.
The licensee is scheduled to submit the design information on or before July 30, 1980.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection a
~
CBI guyed tower crane -
On May 29, 1980 a
guyed tower crane used by Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBI) at the Washington Nuclear Project number
(WPN-3) collapsed into and behind the WPN-3 reactor auxiliary building.
The CBI derrick used at St. Iucie Unit 2 is similar in design and has been taken out of service.
The event at WPN-3 has caused concern to CBI in that they feel that the boom may be over-stressed at some unique angle.
The St. Lucie Unit 2 derrick had been planned for use in lifting the pressurizer.
The inspector reviewed the basic design of the St. Lucie CBI W-2 derrick with CBI construction foreman.
This will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 389/80-07-01 CBI Derrick Capability.
b.
Unit 2 Construction Status - The licensee is working to a schedule to install the first steam generator on June 15, 1980.
The load test of the lift facility was scheduled for June ll, 1980.
The Combustion Engineering (CE) installation guidelines dated February 14, 1980 for the reactor coolant system components, reactor coolant piping, and pressurizer piping are being used for the installation procedures being developed by Bigge Power Constructors (Bigge).
The load testing, loadout, transportation, and installation procedures have been drafted, but final issues had not been developed nor approved by the licensee at the time of the inspection.
The procedures are being modified to not require the use of the CBI derrick that was taken out of service on June 2, 1980 (see paragraph 5.a.).
The inspector observed construc-tion activities in the reactor building, particularly on the reactor vessel supports, and the auxiliary building and talked to various craft personnel.
The inspector also observed work activities in the warehouse areas and work practices in the South-40 storage yar In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were iden-tified.
6.
Licensee Identified Items (LII), 10 CFR 50.55(e)
a
~
(Closed) LII 389/80-01-04, Deficient Pipe Spool Pieces.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's final report to Region II dated April 30, 1980 and the interim report dated January 25, 1980.
The item involves the use of 304 stainless steel (SS) material 'in lieu of 316 SS for certain pipe and valve flange applications.
The licensee's corrective action program was discussed with the EBASCO senior resident engineer and other responsible engineers.
Minor discrepancies (3) in the flange analysis results were clarified and verified for various pressure and temperatures and the evaluation criteria verified for both the large bore and small bore flanges.
b.
(Open) LII 389/80-03-02, Defective Stud Welds.
The inspector reviewed the licensee interim report to Region II dated April 21, 1980, the nonconformance report (NCR) 1071C, deficiency reports (DR) 539C, 540C, 541C and 542C, observed two door frames that had not been installed (D04 and D05) and discussed the corrective action with the responsible civil QC inspector.
The final report will be submitted by July 31, 1980 and will include an explanation by the fabricator, R. V. Harty Co., as to why the stud welds have failed.
c ~
(Open) LII 389/80-07-02, Emergency diesel generator field excitor cables.
On May 2, 1980 the licensee informed Region II of a potential concern regarding an undersized cable routed to the diesel generator field lead box.
As reported in the licensees letter to Region II dated June 2,
1980 the cable has been confirmed to be undersized, and an engineering design change has been initiated to upgrade the cable in size.
Region II does not accept the licensee's evaluation that this is not reportable per
CFR 50.55(e). It appears to be report-able since the design was approved for construction.
report is required.
This item was not inspected.
7.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB)
a
~
(Closed)
IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray Adsorber Cells.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's April 15, 1980 response to Region II and the drawings of the CVI Corporation gasketless type HECA model II charcoal adsorbers supplied to St. I,ucie for Unit 2 (SL2).
The completely covered filters were observed in storage in the warehouse.
The SL2 filters are not the type described in IEB 80-03; The SL2 filters use a welded construction as described in the April 15, 1980 letter.
b.
(Closed)
IEB 80-05, Vacuum Conditions Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's April 30, 1980 response to Region II; compared the design review and design information as required by IEB 80-05; and discussed
the subject with a responsible power plant engineer.
The licensee has design criteria which protects eighteen of the nineteen groups of tanks analyzed.
The one other group, the holdup tanks, are protected against vacuum damage by the regulated nitrogen overpressure syste,f