IR 05000335/1980025
| ML17209A241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1980 |
| From: | Burnett P, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209A234 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-80-25, NUDOCS 8010150053 | |
| Download: ML17209A241 (7) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll 101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-335/80-25 Licensee:
Florida Power S Light Company 9250 Vest Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 License No. DPR-67 Inspection at St. Lucie site on Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspector:
P.
Burne Date Signed Approved by:
'
'U D. R. Quick, Section Chi
,
RONS Branch SUHNARY at Signed Inspection on June 24 to July 2, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 68 inspector-hours on site.
The areas inspected included a review of post-refueling startup tests and observation of control room activities.
Results One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction - failure to use the current version of a procedure, paragraph 5.c).
80X01.5 P059
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
- C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent-
+C. A. Wells, Operations Supervisor-G.
M. Vaux, Jr., Quality Control Supervisor P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
>R. R. Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor
+R. K. Ryall, Reactor Engineering Supervisor H. F. Buchannan, Health Physics Supervisor P. A. Sager, Senior Plant Engineer C. A. Peil, Plant Engineer M. S. Dryden, Assistant Plant Engineer J.
A. Spodick, Plant Coordinator (Training Department)
-J. Walls, Quality Control J.
P. I,ewis, Senior Plant Technician-A. Anderson, Quality Assurance Three shift technical advisors, three nuclear plant supervisors, two nuclear watch engineers and six nuclear control center operators were also contacted.
Other Organizations C. Reuss, Combustion Engineering-Indicates attendance at exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 2, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Post-Refueling Startup Test a
~
Initial CriticalityFollowing Refueling Operating procedure number 0030221 (Rev.
4) having this title was reviewed for content and performance.
The completed procedure that was reviewed covered activities in the period May 7 - 10, 198 The procedure requires that source multiplication be observed at a
variety of sub-critical reactivity configurations.
Three observations were made of the count rate of each detector
'system used at each configuration.
The average count rate was then used to obtain the inverse multiplication (1/m) of the channel.
The procedure requires 1/M plots for only two channels and provides no guidance on how to select the channels.
The inspector performed a chi-square test of each set of channel-con-figuration count-rate observations.
Using a range of probabilities of 5% to 70/
as acceptable he found channels B and C to be consistently unacceptable.
Channel D exhibited symptoms of multiple pulsing, high chi-square probabilities, as the count rate increased.
These observa-tions were outlined to the licensee at the exit interview with the recommendation that chi-square testing of the pulse counting system be used for selection in the future.
b.
Zero Power Physics Tests After reload Subsequent to initial criticality operating procedure 0110052 (Rev. 2)
with the above title was performed.
The completed procedure was reviewed for content and performance.
(1)
Attachment A of the procedure addressed determining the range of zero power testing, above the "noise" on the reactivity computer and below sensible heat.
It also addressed calibration of the reactivity computer by comparing its output for positive and negative periods with results obtained from measuring the periods with a stop watch and determining the reactivity from the inhour equation.
Acceptable agreement was obtained.
The inspector also confirmed by review of the reactivity recorder traces that the application of the computer was limited to the calibrated band (-4.8C to +4.2C).
(2)
Attachment C controlled the measurement of the all-rods-out critical boron concentration.
The measured result of 1381 ppmB was in good agreement with the predicted concentration, 1348+
ppmB.
(3)
Attachment D addressed the measurement, of the isothermal tempera-ture coefficient (ITC).
With all rods out the measured ITC was
+0. 303xlO~'(hk/k)
F with a
corresponding value of +0. 453xlO-"
(LQc/k)/ F for the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC).
This value is acceptable in that it is less than the upper limit of 0.5x10 (Ak/k)/ F given 'in technical specification 3.1.4a.
(4)
Attachment E was used to control the calibration of control element assembly (CEA) groups 7,
6 and 5.
The reactivity computer traces were checked for adherence to the calibrated band, and the reactivity logs were spot-checked for proper resolution of reactivity increments and proper conversion to @Dc/k reactivity units.
No discrepancies were foun Attachment F addressed calibration of CEA groups 4, 3, 2 and 1.
The results were inspected as in Attachment E, and no discrepancies were found The predicted reactivity of groups 1-7 was 4.738 Qk/k and the sum of the measured worth was 4.662@k/k.
An acceptable shutdown margin was obtained.
Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program Operating procedure 0010133 (Rev 2) with this same title was reviewed for content and performance.
The procedure specified the test and surveillance procedures to be performed at power plateaus of 20, 30, 50, 80, and 98/ of rated thermal power.
The review of some of the procedures used in this program was extended backward in time to activities performed in the previous cycle.
(1)
Operating procedure 0030122,
"Reactor Startup" was reviewed as part of this inspection.
Startup number 114 was performed on January 17, 1980, using revision 17 of this procedure.
On February 28, 1980 revision 18 of OP 0030122'was approved for use.
Startup 115 on May 7, 1980 used revision 18.
Startup number 116 on May 9, 1980 was conducted under direction of operating procedure 0 1 1 0055A p Shutdown Malgin Suspension During Zero Power Physics Testing" as called for in that approved procedure.
On May 15, 1980 startup number 117 was conducted using revision 17 of OP 0530122.
This use of an outdated and superseded procedure is contrary to criterion VI of Appendix B to
CFR 50 which is implemented by the licensees Quality Procedure 6.1.
This is item of noncompliance,50-335/80-25-01.
(2)
The following completed procedures were reviewed and found accept-able.
(The dates the procedures were completed are given in parentheses.)
(a)
OP 3200050,
"Calibration and Adjustment of Incore Detector Alarm Setpoints" (5/16/80, 5/19/80).
(b)
OP 3200058,
"Surveillance Requirements for Total Planar Radial Peaking Factor (F
)" (1/ll/80, 2/8/80, 3/7/80 and 5/27/80).
The results of the last performance is closer to the F
limit than the other results.
Presumably this T
stems from the new core having fuel assemblies of higher enrichment than in the previous core.
\\
(c)
OP 3200054,
"Surveillance Requirements for Total Integrated Radial Peaking Factor (F )."
Dates and comments are the ll P
same as for (b) abov (d)
OP 3200059,
"Forced Xenon Oscillation Test," (5/20 to 5/22/80).
(e)
OP 3200057,
"Calculation of PDg RMS Deviation",
(1/24/80, 2/22/&0, 5/27/80).
The deviations late in cycle 3 (1/24 6 2/22 observations)
were about 2/.
For cycle 4 with the higher enrichment fuel the RMS deviation is about 4.3/,
which still satisfies the numerical acceptance criterion applied by the licensee.
OP 3200051, "At Power Determination of Moderator Temperature Coefficient and Power Coefficient," (6/22/79, 1/18/80, 5/24/80).
The requirements of Technical Specifications 3.1.4b, 3.1.4.c and 4.1.1.4.2 were satisfied.
6.
Reactor Operations a.
Test of Automatic Starting of the AuxiliaryFeedwater Pumps The control-room portions of the subject test were observed on June 25, 1980.
With the reactor shutdown and reactor coolant system temperature above 400 F, feedwater flow to steam generator B was cut off.
Generator level slowly decreased to the trip setpoint.
In accordance with the procedure, automatic start was bypassed when the first two trip signals (BGD) actuated.
Following the trips of channels ABC and a built-in system delay of 3 minutes, all three pumps started.
A separate indivi-dual was assigned to time the opening of each AFW valve.
Each used a
separate stop watch. All reported satisfactory results.
b.
Reactor Startup Approximately twenty-four hours of inspection time was spent in the control room observing the final stages of plant heatup and attempts to achieve criticality.
The first attempt was terminated to repair a
reactor coolant pump seal.
After the second heatup the operators experienced considerable diffi-culty in withdrawing control element assemblies (CEA) 8, 6 and 3 in that order.
The elements would move for a time, then the grippers would fail to close as the gripper coil was pulsed and the element would drop anywhere from a few inches to the bottom of travel.
Some of the troubleshooting efforts by a vendor specialist flown in to address the problem were observed.
From discussions it was learned that similar difficulties had been experienced at other plants, but not with the persistence that plagued this unit.
Disassembly of element drive assemblies similarly affected had never.
revealed the source of the problem.
The vendor's speculation was that small crud particles caused the problem and then dissolved under high temperature following a few days, up to ten, operation.
These problems are experienced only after the CEA drive housings are vente Prediction of Critical Condition The predicted critical configuration, RCS boron concentration and CEA insertion, was in error by more than 1'/ M/k.
In accordance with the startup procedure the unit was shutdown until the discrepancy was resolved.
The licensee ascribed the difference to several contributors:
(1)
The operator used the wrong boron worth curve to calculate the reactivity balance for conditions prior to the last shutdown, (2)
The decay of Np-239 to Pu-239, a reactivity increase, is not addressed in the procedure, and (3)
The xenon calculation has some unquantified errors in it.
Use of the correct boron worth by itself was sufficient to bring predicted and actual critical configuration within the acceptance criterion specified in the procedure.
(No technical specification is involved here.)
Further licensee review of the problem and improvements in the prediction proc'edure will be followed up by an inspector (50-335/80-25-02).