IR 05000335/1980036
| ML17209A701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1981 |
| From: | Elrod S, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209A700 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-80-36, NUDOCS 8103050428 | |
| Download: ML17209A701 (20) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I 1II1 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-335/80-36 JAN 2 9 >88~
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light'ompany 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Fl 33101 Facility: St. Lucie Unit
Docket No. 50-335 License No.
DPR-67 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce Florida Inspector:.
S. A.
E d
Approved by: C-C. A. Julia
, Acting Section Chief, RONS Branch SUMMARY Inspection on November 10-28, 1980 Areas Inspected Date Signed
~Z>> ei Date Signed This.'routine. inspection involved. 78 inspector-hours onsite in the. areas of followup. of previous. inspection findings,, followup of IF Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices; followup of Licensee Event Reports; plant, operation; actions taken with respect to NUREG 0578/0660, Site Emergency Drill.
Results Of the-six areas inspected, no apparent violations or-deviations.
were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C.
%J J.
- C
- G R.
A.
R.
B.
H.
J.
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A.
L.
N.
C.
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M. Wethy, Plant Manager H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent E; Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent A. Wells, Operations Supervisor M. Vaux, guality Control Supervisor
'.
Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor J. Collier, Instrument and Control Supervisor R. Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor W. Mikell, Outage Coordinator F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor.
G. West, Security Supervisor D. Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor W. Marvin, Nuclear Plant Supervisor W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor D. West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor L.. Burton,. Nuclear Plant: Supervisor B.. Vincent; Assistant Plant Superintendent-Electrical A. Dillard,, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Mechanical W.. Bailey,. guality Assurance. Supervisor West;. Technical Staff.
Walls, guality Control Staff'ther licensee.
employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift technical advisors, arid security force members.
+Attended. Management. Interview Management Interview The inspection'cope and findings were summarized on November 28, 1980 with those-persons indicated in Paragraph
above.
The status of items, included in, this report: was addressed..
Licensee Action on, Previous'nspection Findings (Cl osed)
Infraction 50-335/80-17'-02.'.
Thi s. item concerned.
failure.- to report. to the.
NRC; Operations; Center. within: one: hour a situation where the'eactor had.
not, responded as anticipated Review of Licensee responseL-80-377 indicates that. corrective, action appears adequate.
(Cl osed)
Infraction 50-335/80-14-01.
This item concerned failure to report to the NRC via Licensee Event Report the discrepancies identi-fied during the. Periodic Testing of Engineered Safety Features in 1979.
The'eport, has been submitted as LER 80-24.
Review of this LER and FPL letter L-80-181 indicate that'he matter is resolve (Closed)
Unresolved Item 50-335/80-35-08.
This item concerned the, power supply circuit for Power Operated Relief Valve(PORV)
1402 which was reported as being powered from a
vital source via Class 1-E components yet later was removed from a
non-class 1-E power panel.
Further investigation shows that the NRC requirement was to have the circuit breaker at the vital source be Class 1-E not the entire circuit from the vital source to the PORV.
In this case, the licensee originally met. the requireqent as reported and was taking additional action to further improve circuit reliability.
This item was not found to involve noncompliance.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is require to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve. noncompliance or deviations.
A new unresolve item identified during this inspection is discussed in Pa'ragraph 7.
Information Notices The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure-their receipt and review by appropriate management.
IE Information Notices are considered closed upon receipt and review.
IEN-79-31 IEN-79-32 IEN-79-33 Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS)
Separation of Electrical Cables. for HPCI and ADS'mproper Closure of Primary Containment: Equipment Access.
Hatches IEN-79-34 IEN-79-35 IEN-79-36'EN-79-37 IEN-80-24-'EN-80-32 IEN-80-34-Inadequate.
Desi'gn of Safety-Related'eat Exchangers Control of Maintenance, and Essential Equipment Computer Code. Defect In Stress Analysis of Piping Elbow Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Discs.
Low Level Radioactive Waste Burial Criteria-Clarification. of Certain Requirements. for Exclusive-Use; Shipments, of-Radioactive Haterial s.
I Boron Dilution of Reactor Cool'ant during Steam Generator.
Decontamination IEN-80-36 IEN-80-3T Failure of Steam Generator Support Bolting, Containment Cooler Leaks and Reactor Cavity Flooding at Indian Point Unit. 2
IEN-80-38 IEN-80-39 IEN-80-40 Cracking In Charging Pump Casing Cladding Malfunctions of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation Excessive Nitrogen Supply Pressure Actuates Safety-Relief Valve Operation To Cause Reactor Depressurization The following. IE Information Notice was not sent to St.
Lucie. It is closed as "not applicable".
IEN-80-35 6..
IF Circulars Leaking and Dislodged Iodine-124 Implant Seeds The following IE Circulars were reviewed to'determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate. action had been taken or planned:
IEC-80-01, (Closed)
Service Advice for General Electric Induction DISC Relays.,
St Lucie Unit 1. has several Type.- IJCV Relays associated with Emergency Diesel Generators 1A and 1B.
Facility records and discussion with the technician who performed the work indicate servicing in accordance with the circular.
IEC-80-02.
IEC-80-17 (Open) Nuclear Power-Plant Work Hours..
This'E Circular was previously closed in Inspection Report. 80-22 based on facility staff plans to investigate this issue..
The circular is re-opened because plant Administrative; Procedure AP.-0010119, issued October 31, 1980 in response to, an NRC. letter (Eisenhut-Licensees;.
Interim Criteria for Shift Staffing; July 31, 1980)
failed to address position 1.b of the Circular, i.e.,
that. facility staff members should have at; least a
hour break between work periods.
NUREG. 737,, recently received at. the. facility, contains a
modification to the above letter and several'ew NRC posi'tions The. facility. staff is. currently re-addressing.
this issue, IE Circular 80'-02 remains open pending.
review by, the. inspector. of the: revision to AP-0010119..
(Open)
Fuel Pin Damage due. to Water Jet from Baffle, Plate Corner.
The. licensee contracted Combustion Engineering Inc.
(CE) to assist in evaluation of St.. Lucie Unit 1.
CE letter F-CE-7376 of-September 17, 1980 provides the results that differential pressure across St.
Lucie's
(
IEC-80-18 IEC-80-22 IEC-80-23 Core Shroud is oppos ite in direction to the plants cited in the circular.and that the other conditions mentioned have not been observed'n CE plants.
IEC 80-17 remains open pending licensee review of the CE'valuation.
(Closed)
CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems.
This Circular is closed.
based on review of licensee records and discussions with licensee management personnel responsible for design and engineering work in this area.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Confirmation of Employee gualifications.
The Florida Power and Light Company general office procedure for handling applications for employment requires that education and qualifications be verified prior to employment.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this circular.
(Cl osed)
Potential Defects in Bel oit Power Systems Emergency Generators..
St., Lucie uses Emergency Diesel Generators manufactured by Electro-Motive Division of General Motors.
This circular is not applicable to St.
Lucie.,
7.
IE Bull etins'he:
fol'lowing IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received.
and reviewed by appropriate management',
responses, where necessary,,
were. 'accurate and
.complete, and that action taken, if required,. was, compl etc..
IEB-80-01 IEB-80-02 IEB'-80-03 IEB-80-04 (Closed) Operability of: ADS'alve pnuematic supply.
This IE Bulletin is not applicable to St. Lucie.
(Closed)
Inadequate guality Assurance for Boiling Water Reactor Components.
This= IE Bulletin is not'pplicable to St; Lucie; (Open)
Loss: of. Charcoal from Standard.
Type II, 2 inch, Tray Adsorber cells This. IE Bulletin remains open pending.
location by the-licensee.
of the data the licensee's.
bulletin response.
is. based, on; This unresolved item is a potential. item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criteria, XVII..
(UNR 50-335/80-36-05)
(Closed) Analysis of Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Additio (
IEB-80-07 IEB-80-13 IEB-80-14 IEB-80-17 IEB-80-20 The licensee had previously committed to supplement their response due to a plant modification to provide automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater.
This supplement has been received.
This IE Bulletin and Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-22-01 are closed.
(Closed)
BWR Jet Pump Assembly Fa'ilure.'his IE Bulletin is not* applicable to St. Lucie.,
(Closed)
Cracking In Core Spray Spargers.
This IE Bulletin is not applicable to St. Lucie.
(Closed)
Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Capability.
This IE Bulletin is not applicable to St. Lucie.
(Closed)
Failure of Control Rods to Insert During BWR Scram.
This IE Bulletin is not applicable to St.
Lucie
.
(Closed)
Failure of Westinghouse type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Switches.
IEB-80-22 St.
Lucie Unit 1 has such switches in the. Local Control circuit. of 4.16kv and 6. 9kv circuit breakers.
The switches are not used for normal operation and the neutral position contacts are not. used at all.
Upon review of FPL letter L 80 300 of September 12, 1980 responding to the Bulletin and discussions with plant supervisors, the inspector had no further-questions..
(Closed)
Automation Industries, Model 200-520-008 Scaled.-Source.
Connectors.
St. Lucie'nit
contracts for. any radiography work needed.
and. doesn't own such sources.
This IE Bulletin is closed. as "not applicable."
Licensee Event Report Review The. following LER's.'ere: reviewed. to verify that. reporting requirements'ad.
been.met, causes had; been identified, corrective actions; appeared appropriate;.
generic'. applicability had been considered,.'and the LER forms. were complete.
Additionally,, for those reports identified by asterisk,,
a more detailed review was performed to verify that.
the licensee.
had reviewed'he events, corrective. action had been taken, no unreviewed. safety questions. were. involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identifie (
- LER 80-04
- LER 80-08-
- LER 80-09 LER 80-11 LER 80-14
- LER 80-15
- LER 80-16-LER 80-17 LER 80-18 LER 80-19 LER 80-'0 LER 80-22 LER 80-24.
- LER 80-25 LER 80-26 LER 80-28'ER 80-29 LER 80-31 Improper Electrical Lineup in Switchyard.
Corrective action included installing indication lights in the Control Room and verification of position during daily surveillance.
Safety Injection Tank Sample Valves Mislabeled.
Corrective action was incorporated as a plant change/
modification 314-77.
Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Refueling Water Tank Level Detector Setpoint Drift Defecti ve Thermocoupl e Amplifier in Shi el d Building Ventilation System.
Discrepancies found during periodic test of Engineered Safety features.
Followup on evaluation of Diesel Generator timing relays is an Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-36-02.
(Part 21 Report)
Use-of Rosemount Inc; Pressure Transmitters. with Containment Vacuum Relief Valves.,
IEB 80-16 refers to this condition.
(Part. 21 Report)
Cracks. in Socket Welded Elbow Fittings.
Inoperable Discharge: Monitor.
Personnel Air Lock Leakage..
1C Auxilary-Feed Pump-Governor Out of Adjustment.
Malfunction of. Digital Data. Processing System Discrepancies discovered during integrated test of engineered safety features (1979).
Noncompliance 80-14-01, issued in this case, has been resolved.
Mainsteam Stop Bypass Valve: Stems Inadequately Sized..
Foll'owup of: long-term corrective. action is.. inspector followup. item 50-335/80-36-01.
Missed Surveillance of Fire Stations.
Low Pressure Trip Power-Supply Failed.
Loss of Component'ooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps and resulting Natural Circulated Cooldown.
Missed Surveillance of Delta-T Powe LER 80-37 Containment Radiation Channel Failed.
LER 80-39 LER 80-41 LER 80-44 LER 80-47 Dose Equivalent Iodine Spike Greater than 1.0 uCi/gram.
Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate excessive.
Digital Data Processing System Failed.
Seal Water Pump Failure (Charging Pumps Seals).
- LER 80-53 Core. Protection Calculator Power Supply Failed.
LER'0-54 Failure to Conduct Personnel Air Lock Leak Test.
The following LER's all involved dropped control element assemblies.
This subject is discussed further in Paragraph 9.
LER 80-5 LER 80-7 LER 80-10 LER. 80-23 LER'0-32.'ER 80-33 LER 80-34 LER 80-35 LER 80-36 LER 80>>38 LER 80-40 LER 80-42.
L'ER 80-43 LER 80-'5 LER 80-46 LER 80-48 LER 80-49 LER'0-50 LER. 80-51.
LER 80-.52 Control Element Assembly Power Supplies The licensee-has'.
reported, during the Spring, and Summer of 1980 a
significant number of occasions
{20) where control element assemblies were
"dropped", i.e.,
automatically inserted into the core region, usually when the reactor was at power.
Investigation shows that this problem. was usually caused by a failed. power supply in the Rod Control Circuit Evidence:- of a heat correlation is strong..
With regard to the 1980'ccurances.,
the Ticensee had.
previously contracted because of power supply.: failures',
with, the Nucl'ear.
Steam Supply System.
{NSSS)
vendor Combustion: Engineering (CE), to provide. a more reliable. power supply system which. involved duality. of. power supplies The power supply vendor had also changed.
models of. power supply.
The licensee had changed to the..new power supply during the Spring 1980 refueling, installed the-hardware= to. allow dual power supplies, and returned the:
old power supplies to the vendor for modification; Upon modification
of the old power supplies, they were to have been installed as the dual units.
The new power supplies failed at such a rate that the old power supplies were re-installed singly and samples of failed new power supplies returned to both the NSSS vendor and the power supply vendor for evaluation.
No dropped CEAs have recently occured since this action was taken. 'hile no instances have occurred where CEA's have failed, to insert.
each dropped CEA is an unplanned transient both on core flux levels. and fuel'lad temperature.
Resolution of this problem will be followed up as Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-36-03.
10.
Timeliness of Licensee Event Reports.
During review of 1980 Licensee Event Reports, the inspector identified nine of 54-reports that were submitted to the NRC beyond the time limit of thirty days.
The majority of these reports, usually due on a
weekend, wire mailed the next working day.
The licensee indicated that their policy was to apply
CFR 2 criteria, which is used for licensing and enforcement correspondence.
No relief is mentioned in the Technical Specifications.
Region II Hanagement has ruled this practice acceptable for LERs,. but stated that. it did not apply to other Technical Specifica-tion time. limits the
day review of temporary procedure changes..
l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the area. of LER submittal timeliness
Task. Action Plan. II,, E,. 4,. 1 Containment. Isolation Dependability.(NUREG.
0578 Item 2.1'.4)
The. inspector reviewed licensee action taken in accordance with the NRC positions.
Items: reviewed included.
NUREG, 0578 and amplifying letters; licensee responses dated January 11, and April 3, 1980; NRC staff.
evaluation dated April 1T,. 1980; and Plant Change/Modification package PQl565-79..
In addition to identification of all non-essential (in case of major accident)
containment penetrations, the licensee's action was to modify the control circuits for engineered safeguards.
such that actuation of each Safety Injection Actuation Group, in turn, actuates the correspondingly numbered.
Containment Isolation Group in the same train..
The design is such. that: a containment isolation signal does not.
initiate. safety injection.
NUREG-'737 of-October 31,.
1980 added.
three..
new~
NRC positions with compliance.
dates of January 1,
1981. and. July 1, 1981.
For this reason-TAP II'.E. 4.2 must remain open though the licensee.
appears to comply with the. original NRC. positions No items of Noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are (
12.
SITE EMERGENCY DRILL A site emergency drill coordinated with Local and State Disaster Preparedness Agencies was conducted November 13, 1980 with a pre-drill conference among site monitors on November
and two post drill critiques-a public critrique conducted by the State of Florida on November 14 in Ft.. Pierce and a plant critique conducted by the plant emergency coordinator on-site on November 17, 1980.
The off site (State)
portion of the drill was a
major disaster preparedness drill exercising communications and coordination of radiation monitoring forces, County Sheriff and fire departments, State Police including airborne cabaility, and county disaster preparedness personnel.,
Communications monitored in the control room at the plant indicated no major problems with communications or coordination.
The site portion of the drill was conducted while the reactor remained at power.
This portion included control. room walk through of actions taken,
"drill" emergency reports notifying agencies and corporate offices in accordance with the.
emergency plan, a first aid drill involving a contaminated casualty and site evacuation..
The number of
'rill monitors appeared adequate and observation by the inspectors of drill monitor activities revealed'o-items of concern in this area.
The site evacuation was expeditious.
Observation by the inspectors of regrouping and dress-out of re-entry terms revealed no items of concern in this area.
The inspector will pursue.
as Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-36-04-'eview of the written 'plant drill critique and any corrective actions identified therein by the licensee.
13.
Plant. Operations The inspector monitored control room operations frequently during the inspection.
Areas monitored included shift staffing, 'operational parameters, surveillance testing and alarm indications.
Discussions with the operating staff and plant; management.
were, held frequently.
Significant areas discussed included. planned. activities,. plant. status, and. technical'esponses to IE: Headquarters information requests.
The, inspector.
conducted several tours. of. plant areas.
Observations were.
made. of'ork in progress;, of'lant housekeeping-and vital area controls.,
No items. of noncompliance: or deviations were identified in this are ~ ~
I