IR 05000389/1980005

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IE Investigation Rept 50-389/80-05 on 800408 & 21-24. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure Requirement to Use Certified Nondestructive Examination Personnel
ML17208A867
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/09/1980
From: Long F, Mcguire D, Vandoorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17208A863 List:
References
50-389-80-05, 50-389-80-5, NUDOCS 8007310235
Download: ML17208A867 (8)


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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 JUN -9%80 IE Investigation Report No. 50-389/80-05 Subject:

Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Allegation Regarding Magnetic Particle Inspection of Safety-Related Welds Period of Investigation:

ril 8-24, 1980 Investigators:

D. R. McGuire, Investigator Offi of the Director

/

/

P. K. VanDoorn, Metallurgical Engineer Reactor C

t tion 6 Engineering Support Branch b Ego a

e Reviewed by:

F. J. Long, Acting De Director ate

TABLE OF CONTENTS I.

INTRODUCTION II.

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION III.

CONCLUSION IV.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION A.

Persons Contacted B.

Allegation, Discussion and Findings

INTRODUCTION

'An individual contacted an NRC:Region II representative and expressed concerns regarding magentic particle inspection (MT) of safety-related welds at Florida Power and Light (FPM ) Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.

An investigation was conducted into the following specific allegation:

During August and September of 1979 and individual who was not certified to perform MT inspection was allowed to perform MT inspections without total supervision.

A qualified individual signed for the inspections.

The onsite investigation at the St.

Lucie site commenced on April 8, 1980 and was completed on April 24, 1980.

During the period of April 8 and April 22-24, 1980, the investigators formally interviewed onsite, 15 quality control (QC) personnel employed by United States Testing Company (U. S. Testing),

the FPM subcontractor for nondestructive examination (NDE) services.

In addition to conducting interviews, the investigators reviewed the training program for NDE inspectors, reviewed MT inspection records and reviewed inspector certification records.

The onsite investigation concluded on April 24, 1980 with a meeting of NRC, U. S. Testing management and FPRL management personnel during which the investigators outlined the preliminary results of the inves-tigation.

During the investigation one item of noncompliance (Infraction 50-389/80-05-01:

Failure to follow procedure requirement to use certified NDE personnel)

was identified on April 22, 1980.

The item concerns the fact that, based on an interview of a certified MT inspector, one individual who was not certified was allowed to perform MT inspections without total supervision.

The certified inspector further indicated that it was his understanding from his supervision that the individual who performed the inspections was Ievel I certified.

The certified inspector voluntarily restated the above to the FPSL Quality Control Superintendent Construction and Project Quality Control Supervisor in the presence of the NRC investigators on April 24, 1980.

This.investigation was conducted under the authority provided by Part 1.64, Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations and required a

total of 58 man-hours of investigative effort.

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION The scope of the investigation included the following:

A.

B.

C.

D.

Interviews with 15 QC personnel.

=Review of QC inspector training program and procedures.

Review of MT inspection records.

Review of MT inspector certification III.

CONCLUSIONS The allegation was substantiated in that one individual who was not certified was allowed to perform MT inspection without total supervision.

One item of noncompliance (see paragraph IV.B.) was identified.

IV.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION A.

Persons Contacted In addition to the alleger, the following individuals were contacted:

Florida Power and Light Company (FPGL)

B. J. Escue, Site Manager W. B. Derrickson, Project General Manager D. R. Stone, QC Superintendent Construction W. M. Hayward, QA Supervisor J.

A. Thompson, Assistant Site Manager J. L. Parker, Project QC Supervisor D. R. Cooper, Sr.,

QA Engineer E.

W. Sherman, QA Engineer L. T. Page, Records Supervisor J.

R. Pendland, Nuclear Licensing Representative United States Testing Company (U. S. Testing)

T. D. Geissinger, QC Supervisor H. E. Lindstrom, Document Control Supervisor - Training In addition, 15 U. S. Testing QC personnel were formally interviewed on site.

Note:

The pronoun "he" is used throughout this report without

'egard to the sex of the individual to protect the identity of confidential sources to the maximum extent possible.

B.

Allegation, Discussion and Finding 1.

Allegation During August and September of 1979 an individual who was not certified to perform MT inspection was allowed to perform MT inspections without total supervision.

A qualified individual signed for'the inspection.

Discussion The investigators reviewed the QC inspector training program and procedure requirements, reviewed MT inspection records, reviewed MT inspector certifications and interviewed QC personnel.

a ~

Program/Procedure Requirements U.

ST Testing has established an inspector training program which meets or exceeds the guidelines of the American Society for Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-lA, 1975 Edition.

Applicable FPM

'procedures are QI-9.4, Rev.

1, Magnetic Particle Inspec-tion; QI-2.7, Rev. 4, NDE Personnel Qualification and Certification and QP-2.9, Rev.

1, Qualification of QA Audit and QC Inspection Personnel.

These procedures require QC inspectors to be certified to Ievel I or Level II requirements of the inspector training program prior to performing any QC inspections without total supervision.

b.

Review of MT inspection Records 8 MT Inspector Certifications The investigators reviewed all weld traveler packages for all carbon steel piping systems for which welding had been accomplished to date and which contained safety-related welds to determine if MT inspections were performed during the time frame of the allegation.

Systems reviewed included Diesel Oil (DO), Condensate (C), Boiler Feed (BF), Main Steam (MS), Circulating Water (CW) and Component Cooling (CC).

The CC and CW systems were the only systems for which MT inspections of safety-related welds had been performed during the time frame of the allegation.

The investigators reviewed all MT inspection reports of completed welds for the CC and CW systems and verified that all inspectors who signed MT inspection reports during the time frame of the allegation were properly certified Level I or Ievel II inspectors in accordance with the training program.

No co-signatures were noted for MT inspections signed during the time frame of the allegation.

c ~

Interviews of QC Personnel Two U.

S. Testing QC personnel were interviewed on April 8, 1980.

These -two personnel were reinterviewed and an additional 13 U. S. Testing QC personnel were interviewed during April 22-24, 1980.

Each individual

was asked if he had allowed any uncertified inspectors to perform MT inspections without total supervision or had knowledge of it taking place.

Each individual was also asked if he had ever signed for a required MT inspection which he had not personally performed or witnessed.

Fourteen individuals answered

"no" to the above questions and signed statements to that effect.

One individual who was qualified to Level II requirements for MT inspection, stated that he had allowed one individual during the time frame of the allegation to perform MT inspections without his total supervision.

The individual stated that he thought he had co-signed with the other inspector in at least one case

.

He also indicated that it was his understanding from his supervision that the other inspector was Level I certified for MT inspection.

A review of the inspector certifica-tion records by the investigator revealed that the individual who was allowed to perform the MT inspections without total supervision was not certified to perform MT inspections:

he was certified to Level II requirements for visual and liquid penetrant inspection and was in training for MT inspection.

The interviewee voluntarily restated, to the FPRL equality Control Superintendent Construction and Project Quality Control Supervisor in the presence of the NRC investigators, the fact that he had allowed the uncertified ihspector to perform MT inspections without his total supervision and that it was his understanding from his supervision that the uncertified inspector was Level I certified.

3.

Finding The allegation was substantiated.

Based on an interview of a certified MT inspector conducted on April 22, 1980 it appears that one inspector who was in a training status but was not yet certified to perform MT inspection was allowed to perform MT inspections without total supervision.

FPSL Procedure No. QP-2.9, Rev.

1, qualification of QA Audit and QC Inspection Personnel requires MT inspectors to be certified to Level I or Level II requirements prior to performing MT inspections without total supervision.

The interviewee stated that it was his understanding from his supervision that the uncertified inspector was Level I certified.

This is in noncompliance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and is Infraction 50-389/80-05-01 - Failure to follow procedure requirement to use certified NDE personnel.

No additional items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.