IR 05000335/1980038
| ML17209A957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Bibb H, Elrod S, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209A953 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-80-38, NUDOCS 8104200459 | |
| Download: ML17209A957 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-335/80-38 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 License No.
DPR-67 Inspection at St. Lucie Site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
S. 'A.
E ro Date H.
E.
ibb Approved by:
C. Julian, ting ection se
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rane a
e 2/i~ g/
a e
SUMMARY Inspection on December 1-31; 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 99 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Followup of Previous Inspection Findings, Followup of IE Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices, Breaker Malfunctions, Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Design, and Plant Opera-tions.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; two apparent violations were found in two areas (Failure to maintain procedures
- see paragraph 10, and Failure to implement procedures-see paragraph 11).
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C.
M. Wethy, Plant Manager
- J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
- J.
E. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent C. A. Wells, Operations Supervisor G.
M. Vaux, guality Control Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor A. J. Collier, Instrument and Control Supervisor P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
- R.
R. Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor B.
W. Mikell, Outage Coordinator H. F.
Buchanan, Health Physics Superv'isor J.
G. West, Security Supervisor 0.
D. Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor A.
W. Marvin, Nuclear Plant Supervisor L.
W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor N.
D. West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor C. L. Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor M. B. Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Electrical T. A. Dillard, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Mechanical
- A. W. Bailey, guality Assurance Supervisor J.
Krumins, Engineer
.
Other licensee employees included technicians, operators, and shift technical advisors.
- Attended one or more management interviews Management Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 15, 1980 and January 6,
1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deficiency 50-335/78-19-01 - Labeling of Radioactive material containers.
The licensee's response was reviewed by NRC Region II staff who had no further questions.
(Closed) Deficiency 50-335/78-19-02 - Posting of Notices to workers.
Copies of the posted material was reviewed by NRC Region II staff with no comments.
(Closed)
Followup Item 50-335/77-09-03 (Paragraph 5.c of inspection report 77-09) - Procedures for gaseous waste concentration ratios.
Chemistry procedure C-174 has been reviewed by NRC Region II staff with no comment d.
(Open)
IEB 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety related Systems.
Review of plant work order'and the licensee's response to the Bulletin indicate that the settings and adjustments included in GE Service Alert Letter No.
175 (CPDD) 9.3 dated April 2, 1979 have been accomplished on the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers at St. Lucie.
The Bulletin remains open pending upgrading of the preventive maintenance program (Procedure HP-011-0060)
to address the shunt trip device.
See paragraph 10 of this report for fur ther details.
6.
IE Circulars The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned:
a ~
(Closed)
IEC 78-03 - Packaging Greater Than Type A quantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material for Transport.
This Circular is closed based on previous inspection 78-17 and resolution of inspector Followup Item 78-19-06 (paragraph 3 of this report).
b.
(Closed)
IEC 80-24 - AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunctions.
This circular is not applicable to St. Lucie.
c.
(Closed)
IEC 80-25 Case Histories of Radiography Events.
This circular is not applicable to St. Lucie.
7.
IE Information Notices The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure their receipt and review by appropriate management.
IE Notices are considered closed upon receipt and review:
a.
IEN 80-41 - Failure of Swing Check Valve in the Decay Heat Removal System at Davis-Besse Unit No.
b.
IEN 80-42 - Effect of Radiation on Hydraulic Snubber Fluid c.
IEN 80-44 - Actuation of ECCS in the Recirculation Mode While in Hot Shutdown d.
IEN 80-29 (Supplement 1) - Broken Studs on Terry Turbine Steam Inlet Flange.
The following IE Information Notices were not sent to St. Lucie.
They are closed as not applicable.
e.
IEN 80-43 - Failures of the Continuous Water Level Monitor for the Scram Discharge Volume at Dresden Unit No.
(Closed)
Followup Item 50-335/78-19-05 - Revision of Procedure HP-
'30 to Include Personnel Neutron Mointoring.
This procedure has been reviewed by NRC Region II staff with no comments.
This item and attendant item 78-PC-03 are closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item 50-335/78-19-06 - Revision of Procedure HP-40 to include a caution not to ship greater than Type "A" quantities of LSA radioactive materials in non-specification containers.
This was a result of IE Circular 78-03.
This procedure has been reviewed by NRC Region II staff with no comments.
(Closed)
Followup Item 50-335/78-19-07 - Revision of procedure HP-32 to conform to pocket dosimeter drift check specifications of ANSI N13.5.
This proc'edure was reviewed by NRC Region II staff with no comments.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
New-unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 11, 5.
IE Bulletins The following IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received and reviewed by appropriate management, responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete, and that action taken, if required, was complete.
a
~
b.
c ~
(Closed)
IEB 78-04 - Environmental gualification of certain stem-mounted limit Switches inside Reactor Containment.
This Bulletin is administratively closed based on the inclusion in IEB 79-01B of the concerns expressed in IEB 78-04.
The inspector verified that limit switches which might require licensee action under IEB 78-04 are included in licensee action plans for IEB 79-01B.
Outstanding Items List item 78-PC-09 related to re-opening this Bulletin in 1978 is also closed.
(Closed)
IEB 78-01 - Flammable Contact Arm Retainers in GE CR-102A Relays.
This Bulletin and Followup Item 79-06-09 are closed based on review of licensee response, review of plant records of contact arm replacement in all load centers, and interviews with the Electrical Supervisor who was responsible for the replacement.
(Closed)
IEB 80-25 Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BHRs.
This Bulletin is closed as Not applicable to St. Luci f.
IEN 80-45 - Potential Failure of BWR Backup Manual Scram Capability 8.
Licensee Event Reports Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting require-ments had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review wa's performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
- LER 80-55 lA Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to load and also overheated.
See Paragraph 9.
- LER 80-56 lA Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling water Relief Valve Lifting.
See paragraph 9.
LER 80-57 - Failure to Compensate Upon Finding'ut Fire Hose.
LER 80-59 - Loss of Control Element Assembly Position Indication.
LER 80-63 - "C" Pressurizer Pressure channel drifted.
- LER 80-64 - Cold Leg Temperature above 542o F.
- LER 80-67 - Trip Circuit Breaker undervoltage Coils Failed to Function.
See paragraph 10.
9.
Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Systems During review of Licensee Event Reports 80-55 and 80-56 concering 1A Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling water systems, the inspector observed that:
a.
The cooling system for the 16 cylinder engines has a radiator that extends about five feet above the top of the expansion tank with no atmospheric vents for removing air while filling the system.
Fill water is added via pipe connection to the expansion tank.
b.
The only water level indicator is on the expansion tank.
The water level in the radiator can not be determined by the operator.
c.
The licensee stated in LER 80-56 dated October 27, 1980 that Engineering assistance had been requested for a design review of the diesel engine cooling system.
The request was submitted December 30,-
198 The following additional inspector observations were not included in LERs 80-55 and 80-56:
d.
No pressure gages are installed on the cooling water system.
The current'operating practice is to fill the expansion tank solid and lift the cooling water relief valve, stated to be set at 12 psig.
The shutoff head of the demineralized water pump used to fill the system is about 140 psig-far above the radiator design pressure of 35 psig or expansion tank design
=-
pressure of 50 psig.
'I The design pressures of other system components and some hose connections are unknown to the inspector.
The licensee does not know if the relief valve size is adequate to limit system pressur e nor what system pressures have been attained in the past.
The licensee has been requested to include this consideration in their request for engineering assistance.
Engineering evaluation of the Emergency Diesel Generator cooling water system is inspector followup item 50-335/80-38-03.
Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Malfunction On November 30, 1980, plant operators were performing ground-location procedures for vital "A" DC bus.
Part of the procedure is to de-energize the DC control power to two trip circuit breakers (TCBs) at a time.
The breakers are designed to trip on under-voltage with a loss of control power.
The four TCBs with control power from "A" bus (TCBs 1, 3, 5, 7) did not trip on undervoltage when their control power was de-energized.
The operators verified that the redundant active shunt trip was functioning and conducted further testing of the undervoltage trips.
TCBs 1, 3, and 7 would randomly trip with time delays from 5-30 seconds, TCB 3 would not trip at all.
Testing of the TCBs 2, 4, 6 and 8 with control power from vital "B" DC power demonstrated that those TCBs do trip on undervoltage.
During testing of TCBs 2, 4, 6, 8 the plant tripped.
While shutdown, the undervoltage trips were adjusted.
Plant recovery appeared to be normal.
Licensee investigation revealed that the periodic logic matrix test procedure, OP 1400059, does not presently verify that the under-voltage trip and shunt trip independently trip the TCB.
The investigation also revealed that TCB 9, a bus tie breaker for the two'otor generator sets, has an undervoltage trip powered from the same circuit as TCBs 2. and 6.
This arrangement is not conducive to independent verification of TCB undervoltage trip operation, or to ground procedures for Vital "B" DC power.
Request for Engineering Assistance 266 has been written to obtain a
plant change to separate control power to TCB 9 from TCB 2 and TCB 6.
The licensee states that the logic matrix test procedure will,
after TCB control power is separated from TCB 9, be modified to test undervoltage coils by removing DC control power from them.
The licensee also stated that portions of maintenance procedure HP-011-0060 would be performed monthly to ensure operability of under-voltage trips.
This procedure has in fact been scheduled for early January 1981.
The inspector observed the following additional conditions with respect to trip circuit breakers.
The present light indicators of undervoltage trip and shunt trip operation do not conclusively indicate operation.
A shunt trip coil may be mechanically frozen or have an open coil wire and the. trip not function - yet the associated light would still operate.
Undervoltage coils have been demonstrated to not trip the breaker - yet the associated light still operated.
The present trip relays and manual trip switches simultaneously operate both the undervoltage trips and shunt trips such that one cannot determine if both operated.
A review of the reactor trip switchgear wiring diagrams shows that a local trip circuit exists that uses the shunt trip device only.
A test using this local trip circuit, when complemented by the proposed test of the undervoltage trip by de-energization, would test both redundant breaker trip funciton.
During the course of this review, the inspector reviewed proposed changes to maintenance procedure HP-0110060 which performs periodic (18 month or refueling outage)
maintenance on trip circuit breakers.
This procedure was inadequate in that it does not address lockwiring of undervoltage trip device settings as specified by General Electric Service Advice letter 175 (CPDD) 9.3 and does not address maintenance of shunt trip devices at all.
Other procedural defects include lack of tolerances on settings and lack of instructions to the mechanic to show as-found conditions, actions taken, and as-left conditions.
The above inadequacy is an example of failure to maintain procedures.
in violation of Technical Specification 6.8. 1(a) (50-335/80-38-01).
11.
Review of Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions about planned safety related activities were held frequently with various members of the plant management and operations staff.
Selected portions of current plant operating logs and data sheets were reviewed during this report perio 'a +
The inspector conducted several tours of plant areas.
Observations were made of work in progress, of plant housekeeping, and vital area controls.
On December 2,
1980, the inspector observed that four fire extinguishers located in the reactor auxiliary building and available for use had not been inspected during the month of November 1980.
Licensee investigation determined that they had been omitted from the plant work order for the inspection but were identified on the map used to locate extinguishers.
They were promptly inspected and were in fact operable.
This item is unresolved pending determination by the inspector of requirements (Unresolved Item 50-335/80-38-05}.
On December 19, 1980 the tags for plant clearances12-033 and 12-034 were inspected.
,The tags were not signed by the operator hanging them, valve numbers were not used and two of the tags were on the wrong valve, i.e.,
two valves each had tags for both "cooling water inlet" and "cooling water outlet".
This is an example of failure to follow procedure OP 0010122 as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1(a)
(50-335/80-38-04).
A partially completed inspector audit of control panel annunciators has shown that approximately 65 annunciators differ from the wording shown on controlled copies of the control wiring diagrams (CWD} of the annunciator panels.
Drawing changes yet to be made and flagged by a stamp on the CWD are not included in the above figure. Details were provided to the plant manager on January 2, 1981 for investiga-tion.
This condition is unresolved pending determination of the cause.
This audit will be continued during future inspections (Unresolved Item 50-335/80-38-06).
A partial review was conducted of off normal operating procedure 0030131-Plant Annunciator Summary Revision 11.
The review consisted of verifying the titles of the annunciators against the titles shown in the procedure.
Over 80 discrepancies, some associated with safety related systems, were found.
Minor typographical errors are not included.
Additionally, the alarm setpoints shown in the procedure for Safety Injection Tank Levels were considerably in error, being in the 50-60Ã level range vice the existing 78-85%
level range.
Copies of the inspectors work sheets were provided to the Plant manager.
This review will be continued in greater depth.
Failure to maintain off normal operating procedure 0030131 is an example of failure to maintain procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.8. 1(a) (50-335/80-38-02).
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