IR 05000335/1980023
| ML17208B015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1980 |
| From: | Herdt A, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17208B014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-80-23, 50-389-80-09, 50-389-80-9, NUDOCS 8009240071 | |
| Download: ML17208B015 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 AVG -5 1980
'eport Nos. 50-335/80-23 and 50-389(80-09 I,icensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FZ 33101 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.
DPR-67 and CPPR-144 Inspection at St. Iucie site at Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspector:
P. K.
a o rn Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch e'c Date Signed ate Signed SUMMARY Inspection on July 15-18, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, unannounced inspection involved 25 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of review of records associated with work performed during an outage in the areas of installation welding, weld rod control, core drilling, hanger installation, nonconformance report control, and inspector qualifications (Unit 1); inspector certifications (Unit 2);
and utilization of I,evel I inspectors (Unit 2).
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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J. Escue, Site Manager (Unit 2)
M. Wethy, Plant Manager (Unit 1)
T. Weems, Assistant Manager QA-Construction C. Basbury, Services Superintendent (Unit 2)
M. Hayward, QA Supervisor (Unit 2)
W. Bailey, QA Operations Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Stone, Construction QC Superintendent E. Lamp, Project Construction Supervisor (Unit 1)
L. Parker, Project QC Supervisor (Unit 2)
T. Hamilton,,QC Supervisor (Unit 1)
V. Smart, Construction QC Level III Examiner W. Sherman, QA Engineer (Unit 2)
C. McAfee, Senior QA Engineer (Unit 1)
G. Becker, QC Engineer (Unit 1)
Wagoner, Construction Supervisor (Unit 1)
Other Organizations United States Testing Company (U. S. Testing)
- T. D. Geissinger, Assistant Project Manager (Unit 2)
- C. L. Engel, QC Supervisor (Unit 1)
H. R. Sparks, Inspector Supervisor (Unit 2)
W. Boyson, Inspector Supervisor (Unit 2)
EBASCO Services, Inc.
(EBASCO)
- K. N. Flannagan, Project Superintendent (Unit 2)
- R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer (Unit 2)
-Attended exit interview 2 ~
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 18, 1980 with those persons indicated in Parargaph 1 above.
e 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
'ot inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5e and 5f.
5.
Special Inspection Effort This inspection effort was performed because several individuals recently expressed concerns to NRC:RII regarding work and inspection practices at St. Iucie Units
and 2.
Unit l concerns related to work performance and inspections performed during a recent outage.
Unit 2 concerns related to certification of inspectors and performance of inspections.
These concerns (paraphrased)
and the inspection effort performed related to'each concern are as follows:
Unit 1 a.
The telescopic crane base located in the reactor containment building was fabricated using poor material and the welds made were of poor quality.
The inspector reviewed the work package (PC/M 62079)
and determined that the crane installation received an engineering safety analysis and that the crane is designed to prevent failure and subsequent damage to safety related equipment during operation.
Since the safety analysis assumes adequate installation it is considered necessary to observe actual installation.
Due to inaccessibility the material and welds could not be observed, Therefore, until the necessary observation can be performed during the next outage this will be Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80"23-01, Observation of crane base within containment.
It is noted that only the crane base has been installed to date.
b.
The oil collection system for Reactor Coolant Pumps was installed without approved drawings and welding was poor.
The inspector reviewed the work package (PC/M 37-80) for this work which included general instructions for installation. It was deter-mined that final as built drawings are not yet established and this is being followed via NCR 2/30-109.
Due to inaccessibility, the welds could not be observed.
Until it can be verified that final drawings are being adequately established and welds can be observed this will be Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-23-02; Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pump oil collection system.
c ~
Veld rod control was poor in that weld travelers did not have rod slips attached and rod slips were not dated.
The inspector reviewed selected weld travelers for inclusion of dated rod slips and found no discrepanci:es.
Weld travelers reviewed included those associated with the work packages listed in paragraph 5e below
and travelers for Charging Pump Suction Stabilizer Weld Nos.
FW20 of Line CH 368, FW l of Line CH 381, FW 17 of Iine'CH 967 and FW 18 of Line CH 967.
On July 16, 1980, the inspector noted that inspections reports for the Charging Pump Suction Stabilizer welds listed the acceptance standard as the USAS Code for Pressure Piping, B31.1 in lieu of the required Code which is ANSI B31.7-1969, Nuclear Power Piping.
The inspector was informed by licensee personnel that a
complete review had been performed and showed the acceptance standards for both codes to be identical.
The inspector verified this for liquid penetrant inspection.
The inspector requested that FPRL document that the codes are identical for-record purposes.
This was accomplished satisfactorily by the FPSL Level III examiner via memo-randum on July 17, 1980.
The inspector also noted that the QC inspection procedures being utilized for the Unit 1 outage did not include the B31.7 code as reference or in the acceptance standard lists.
The inspector informed FPM. that this could be a source of confusion and procedures should clearly address the applicable codes.
Until it can be verified that QC procedures have been changed to include the B31.7 code this will be Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-23-03, Inclusion of B31.7 into QC procedures.
The Reactor Coolant Vent system was installed without the required Authorized Nuclear Inspector (A.N.I.) inspections.
The NRC inspector reviewed requirements for St.
Lucj.e Unit 1 and determined that an A.N.I. was not required for this installation.
A review of code requirements for St.
Lucie Unit 1 was also performed during a previous inspection (See NRC:RII Report No
. 50-335/80-15).
Hanger installation was inadequate in that material traceability was poor and only visual inspection was performed.
The inspector reviewed QC and weld records associated with hanger work packages PC/M 54-80 and PC/M 59-80, procedure requirements and Noncon-formance Reports concerning hangers.
Procedure requirements are contained in Ebasco Specification FLO 9110-AS-12, Rev. l Structural Steel; QI 9.2, Rev.
2, Inspection of Field Welding; QI 10.1, Rev.
2, General Requirements for the Conduct of Inspections and QI 10.14, Rev.',
Hangers Supports and Restraints Installation Inspection.
NCR's reviewed included Nos.
150/344-087, 150/344-095, 150/344-102 and 150/344-113.
It was verified that visual inspection only was required for hanger welds and that material traceability was a problem but had been identified via NCR's and was properly handled via the NCR program requirements.
On July 16, 1980, the inspector noted that several different forms were being used for hanger installation weld inspections.
These were General Inspection Report (QI-10.1, Rev. 2) Activity Inspection Report for Welds not Uniquely Identified (QI 9.1; Rev.
3) and Hanger Inspec-tion Report (QI 10.14, Rev. 0).
QI 10.14 is written specifically for hangers and appears to be the controlling document.
This procedure
-4-does not clearly allow use of forms from other.QI's.
A review of thecal'9.1 form revealed, that it is equivalent to the QI 10.14 form, for inspection of welds.
FPM, personnel prepared and approved pro-cedure change SL-TC-78 to QI 10.14 during the inspection to clearly allow use of the equivalent QI 9.1 form for weld inspections.
It was not determined that the QI 10.1 form was equivalent and therefore reinspection is required for the hangers involved.
Until the results of the reinspection can be reviewed and visual inspection can be performed by NRC to determine the extent of this problem this will be Unresolved Item 50-335/80-23-04, Inspection of hanger installation welds.
Cores were drilled in the control room resulting in damage to rebar and wiring; repairs may not have been made.
The inspector verified that damage was done to rebar, a ground wire and
12 gauge wires enclosed in conduit.
These problems are being properly addressed, however, via the NCR system (Ref:NCR Nos.
Dl/77-074C and 48/5-063).
The NCR for the wiring has not yet been closed out.
During this inspection this inspector questioned whether open items carried on NCR's and Deficiency Reports (DR's) were formally addressed prior to plant start-up.
FPM, personnel indicated that open items are addressed but no formal requirement exists.
A formal program to assure that open items are adequately reviewed prior to start up appears to be necessary.
Until this requirement is addre'ssed this will be Unresolved Item 50-335/80-23-05, Program for review of open items prior to plant start-up.
g ~
Inspectors were not adequately qualified.
The inspector reviewed qualification records for nine of 24 inspectors utilized for the outage and reviewed a
QA audit of qualified records.
No significant discrepancies were noted.
h.
Deficiency Reports and Nonconformance Reports are not receiving proper action.
The inspector reviewed selected NCR's associated with the various work packages reviewed.
Several NCR's reviewed appeared to be adequately addressed.
NCR's are still open.
FPSL personnel indicated that these have been reviewed for significant problems prior to plant start-up.
The formalized program to assure that this is done is addesssed via the previously described Unresolved Item (paragraph 5.f).
Unit 2 a ~
Recently, QC NDE inspectors have been certified to Level II without adequate testing and without having spent the necessary time as a
Level I inspecto,
-5" The inspector reviewed the records of the only two QC inspectors recently involved with upgrading to Level II.'ne is still in progress.
The inspector held extensive discussions with QC personnel in this regard and reviewed the training program.
In addition the inspector requested that the two QC inspectors perform a ultrasonic test on a mockup to be witnessed by the inspector.
'This was accom-plished and the QC inspectors adequately identified all known defects in the mockups.
No discrepancies were noted during the record 'review.
During this inspection it was determined that clarification of procedure QI 2.7, Rev.
4, NDE Personnel Qualification and Certification would be beneficial in the area concerning experience credit given to QC inspectors based on work performed for previous employers.
Procedure change SL-TC-77 was prepared and approved during the inspection.
This change adequately provides the clarification.
b.
QC inspectors are performing UT inspections by themselves even though they are only certified to Level I.
A review of the inspection program requirements revealed that use of Level I inspectors by themselves is allowed. It is noted that this program was also reviewed previously and reported in NRC:RII Report 50-389/80-05.
The inspector cautioned FPRL regarding use of Level I inspectors for UT inspection since this is a fairly difficult inspec-tion to perform.
This does, however, appear to have been adequately controlled to date.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.