IR 05000387/1979015
| ML17138A746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1979 |
| From: | Cerne A, Galla R, Mcgaughy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17138A742 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-79-15, 50-388-79-09, 50-388-79-9, NUDOCS 7908200288 | |
| Download: ML17138A746 (21) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-387/79-15; 50-388/79-09 Docket No. 50-387; 50388 License No.
CPPR-101; CPPR-102 Priority Category A
Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 e
Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:.
April 2-27, 1979 Inspectors:
al o, ent Reactor Inspector date signed A.. C. Cerne,, Reactor Inspector date signed Approved By:
R. N. McGaug
,
ef, Projects Section, d t signed RCGES Branch Ins ection Summar Unit 1 Ins ection on A ril 2-27 1979 Re ort No. 50-387/79-15 Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspector and a
regional based inspector of work activities relative to:
installa-tion and welding of reactor coolant pressure boundary and other piping; storage of reactor vessel and internals; reactor building superstructure installation; installation of containment electrical penetrations; and review of actions pursuant to 10 CFR 21 and
CFR 50.55(e) reports.
The inspector also performed plant tours and reviewed licensee action on previously identified items.
The inspec-tion involved 60 inspector-hours, including 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> during off shifts, by the NRC resident inspector and 16 inspector-hours by a regional based inspecto Results:
Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in three areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were identified in two areas.
(Xn'fraction failure to inspect purging for tack welds Paragraph 4.b.; Deficiency failure to provide a documented. instruction to control storage and maintenance inspections of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Paragraph 6).
Unit 2 Ins ection on A ril 2-27 1979 Re ort. No. 50-388/79-09
@regs Xns ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspector and a
., regional based inspector of:
storage of reactor vessel and internals and reactor building superstructure.'nstallation.
The inspector also performed plant tours and reviewed licensee action on previously identified items.
The inspection involved 15 inspector-hours by the NRC'esident. inspector and, seven inspector-hours by a regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of. noncompliance were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an Note L., Ballard, Site QAE R. Beckley, Site QAE G.
P.
E.
T ~
S.
R.
J.
W.
T.
R.
A.
M.
Burvis, Site QAE Capotosto, Site QAE Carroll, Site QAE Clymer, Site QAE L. Denson, Assistant Project Construction Manager H. Featenby, Project Construction Manager Green, Resident NQAE H. Gulliver, Senior Project Engineer NQA F. Oldenhage, Resident Engineer Prego, Site QAE R. Sabol, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance D. Waldrop, Senior Accountant Auditing Division 1, 2,
32,3,4 Bechtel Cor oration Y.
M.
J.
D.
M.
G.
N.
T.
J.
A.
R.
H.
J.
B.
W.
G.
G.
S.
Ananda, Civil QAE K. Boone, Lead Welding Engineer Dahnert, Piping QCE Dharia, Field Engineer A. Drucker, Electrical QAE Gelinas, QC Lead Engineer Piping Mechanical D. Griffin, Assistant Project Field Engineer M. Green, Subcontract Field Engineer Khandar, Mechanical QAE Konjura, Mechanical QAE Lamb, Assistant Lead Welding QCE Lilligh, Project QAE O'ullivan, Assistant Porject Field Engineer Ott, Lead Welding QCE Ross, Assistant Lead Welding Engineer Sager, Civil QCE Schrader, Project Field Engineer A. Seiler, Civil QCE
1, 2,
3
41,3,4
N. 0. Shah, Resident Civil Group Supervisor A. Spielhagen, Project Field Engineer
K. Stout, Assistant Project Field QCE
C. Turnbow, Field Construction Manager General Electric Com an Nuclear Ener Division (NED Note E. A. Gustafson, Site Manager T. M. LeVasseur, QC Representative C. Roof, Mechanical Engineer Nuclear Installation Services Com an (NISCo T. S. Kopac, Site Manager J. Michels, QCE J. Reinier, Field QA/QC Manager Peabod Testin Com an M. Whalen, NDE Supervisor Anchor Darlin Valve Com an J.
S.
Swabsky, Field Engineer Notes 1 denotes those present at exit interview, April 6, 1979 2 denotes those present at exit interview, April 12, 1979 3 denotes those present at exit interview, April 19, 1979 4 denotes those present at exit interview, April 27, 1979 The inspector also interviewed other PP&L employees as well as employees of Bechtel, Peabody Testing Company, and General Electric Company.
2.
Plant Tour Units 1 and
The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspection of the plant.
The inspector examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory re-quirements or license conditions.
Particular note was taken of
presence of quality control inspectors and quality control
-.evidence such-as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equip-ment.preservation.
The inspector interviewed craft personnel, supervision and Quality Control personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s a 0 (Open) Unresolved Item (387/79-10-01):
Requirements for
"Information Only" Radiographs.
The inspector reviewed eight weld joints which had "information only" radiographs made during welding.
The inspector verified that repairs were being accomplished based on the "information only" radiograph of a completed weld.
The resulting final documentation package therefore shows only one acceptable radiograph but with repair areas visible on the radio-graphic film.
The "information only" radiographs are destroyed after completion of the weld joint.
Documentation of liquid penetrant testing joint VRR-B31-2-FWB1, as noted in Inspection Report No. 387/79-10, has been incorporated into the documentation package for that weld.
Documentation for the following weld joints was reviewed during this inspection:
VRR-B31-1-FWB12 VRR-B31-2-FWB14 VRR-B31-2-FWB17 VRR-B31-1-FWA10 VRR-B31-1-FWA11 VRR-B31-1-FWA12 VRR-B31-1-FWA13 VRR-B31-1-FWA14 All of these welds will be removed and rewelded during the licensee's Recirculation System Riser Piping Modificatio The licensee's representative has reviewed this matter and agreed to retain radiographs of welds where welding is completed.
The licensee's representative has stated that the "information only" radiographs were taken of certain welds due to purge dam and purge hose obstructions on the radiographs.
This matter remains unresolved pending review of the licensee's completed actions.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (387/78-15-02 and 388/78-13-02):
Failure to use specified curing compound for spray pond.
The inspector reviewed Bechtel Supplier Deviation Disposi-tion Request (SDDR) for Dick Corporation Nos.
034 and 040, Bechtel Quality Assurance Request (QAR) F-435, and the manufacturer's instructions for the Type 1 curing compound used (Horn Cure Seal 150)
~
These documents indicate not only the approval and technical justification for the use of type 1 curing compound, but also the completion of formal QC training on concrete curing methods to prevent
'recurrence of a similar procedural infraction.
The. inspector also examined the sealant repairs accomplished on existing spray pond cracks, interviewed responsible licensee personnel on the disposition of future repair work, and reviewed SDDR Nos.
041, 044, and 045 relative to the crack repair.
He has no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (387/79-03-04):
Failure to control structural steel arc strikes in accordance with code requirements.
The inspector reviewed Revision A to the Gives Steel Company
"Welder Instruction/Training Program" and Welding Instruction
"WPS-3" and Revision B to Cives Procedure "Field Touch-Up-1" to.verify that procedural controls over the identification and disposition of arc strikes on the Reactor Building Superstructure steel have been established.
He noted documentation of the reinspection of the completed structural steel for arc strikes in a Gives message to Welding File, February 23, 1979.
The inspector also reinspected those areas where arc strikes had been previously identified and spot-checked other structural steel pieces and areas to determine if the new programmatic controls over arc strikes were being properly implemente.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar and Safet Related Pi in
~(Weldin )
The following listed activities were examined and verified that they were being-performed in accordance with the ASME Section III and IX Codes,.
PSAR Appendix D, the Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual Section III, Site Specification M 204, M 207, drawings M-198 and M-199, NCR 3391, GE Specification 22A4638, and Peabody Testing Procedure IPPT-300-39-03.
a ~
Weldin Unit
Welding of:.
Feedwater Nozzle Safe End N4C- -150 0 VRR B31-1 FW-A23'CA
- 141-1 FW-2 DLA 101-1 FW-2 The inspector verified selected detailed drawings, welding proc'edure, base and filler material as specified, welder qualific'ation, quality control documentation, weld appear-ance, welding variables such as gas flow and amperage, and nondestructive testing activities as appropriate.
Except as noted in Paragraph b,
no items. of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Ins ection of Tack Welds During observation of the welding of the Recirculation System Bypass Line, DCA-141-1, the inspector observed that tack welds were completed on April 4, 1'979.
The inspector subsequently noted that the Weld Card, Form WR-5, Revision 8 had not been initialed and dated to indicate Quality Control verification of gas purging the interior volume of the pipe prior to welding.
Discussions with licensee and contractor personnel indicated that it is the standard practice for Quality Control personnel to inspect the final alignment tack welds and gas purging after the tack welds have been completed.
Welding department personnel stated that'the tack welds are visually 'examined and any defective tack welds are remove The inspector stated that the visual inspection alone of the tack welds, did not provide assurance that the tack welds would be free of all deleterious conditions.=
The Bechtel BQAM ASME III, Appendix 3, WD-1, Revision 4, Section 7.4, requires, for Item (13) of the Weld Card, Form WR-5, that Quality Control shall verify, before welding begins, that purging is being performed as required.
The inspector stated that this requirement appeared to apply to the gas purging for tack welds since the tack welds become a part of the finished weld.
Failure to follow the documented procedures regarding the inspection of purging for tack welds is contrary to the requirements of
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
(387/79-15-01)
C ~
Nondestructive Testin Unit
Liquid Penetrant Testing of:
HBB-125-2 FW-10 HBB-126-2 FW-8-R-1 Radiographic Inspection of:
VNB-B21-1 FW-C7
'%he inspector verified, as appropriate, surface preparation, qualification of examiners, and testing technique.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar and Safet -Related Pi in Unit
a 0 Pi in S stem Work in Pro ress The inspector examined work activities for the Core Spray System and the Recirculation System Bypass Line.
The inspector observed activities including handling, protection, initial fit-up and alignment work, and identification.
The inspector reviewed associated QC inspection'ecords, nonconformance reports; verified correct materials were installed; and verified that work activities were in accordance with applicable procedures and specifications.
The above activities were evaluated against criteria established in the following documents:
FSAR Sections 5.4.1 and 6.3.2.2.3 PSAR, Appendix D
Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual,Section III ASME Code Section III Bechtel Spefications:
M204 and M201 Drawings:
M-199, M-152, M-143, M-26-2, M-26-12, DCA-107-1, and DCA-141-1 Nonconformance Reports:
3510, 3589, 3732 No items of noncompliance were identified.
Two unresolved items are described in paragraphs b.
and c., below.
Recirculation B
ass Line Sensitization Tests The inspector reviewed material test reports relative to Recirculation System Bypass Line Pipe Spools DCA-141-1-1 and DCA-141-1-3.
Bechtel Drawing DCA-141-1 provides direction to the piping vendor regarding the completion of sensitization tests in accordance-with ASTM A262, Practice A and Practice E.
The inspector noted that for the SA 358 material, Heat No.
V73526, the magnification used for visual examination as part of Practice A testing was not in accordance with ASTM A262.
The inspector found no documentation to allow this test modification.
In addition, the inspector found no documentation that >the Practice E test of ASTM A262 had been completed for this heat of material.
The inspector noted that the documentation for the SA403 material, Heat No. 76246, did not include a verification of completion of the bend test required by paragraph 36, Practice E of ASTM A 262-77.
The inspector stated that the incomplete status of the aforementioned records was considered unresolved pending review by the licensee.
(387/79-15-02)
Control of Field Detail Drawin s The inspector reviewed Core Spray System drawings to verify that piping work in progress agreed with design drawings.
Preparation, changes and control of field detail drawings
is accomplished in accordance with Field Procedure FP-P-ll, Revision'3.
The inspector noted that small piping isometric drawings had not been revised to include changes required due to relocation of valves as shown on large piping isometric DCA-107-1.
The small piping drawing changes are listed as item No. P-406 on the Design Restraint List dated April 17, 1979.
The changes were posted to the list on March 19, 1979.
The inspector inquired if the changes to these isometric drawings were in accordance with FP-P-11 Section 4.0.
The licensee's representative committed to review the implementation of FP-P-ll.. This item is considered unresolved pending that review.
(387/'79-15-03)
d.
Pi in S stem Installation Verification The inspector examined two partially completed piping runs and verified that they were installed in accordance with approved drawings.
Piping runs examined were:
(1)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Class I Steam Line from Main Steam Line "C" to Containment Penetration X-10.
(2)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Class II Steam Line from Containment Penetration X-10 to the RCIC Turbine.
The inspector verified conformance to FSAR Section 5.4.6 and drawings DBA-105-1, DBB-109-1, DBB-109-2 and M-149.
No items of noncompliance. were identified.
6.
Reactor Vessel Installation Units 1 and
The inspector examined protection of the installed reactor vessels and stored closure heads for compliance with site procedures and PSAR Appendix D commitments.
The inspector reviewed the Bechtel procedural requirements for vessel protection and verified that required inspections and preventive maintenance were being accomplished except as noted below.
The inspector observed that unused openings were covered as required and that Unit 1 access was controlle The inspector determined that the Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel had been released to GE Installation and Service Engineering (GEI&SE).
Subsequent to the release, Bechtel letter FSC-80-23, GEI&SE was responsible for all work with-in the vessel, and its maintenance and storage, including the maintenance of the top flange stud holes.
The inspector inquired what GEI&SE procedural requirements governed the maintenance of the stud holes.
The inspector was informed that inspections were being conducted in accordance with verbal direction.
The inspector noted that inspections had been documented in September 1978 and February 1979.
The inspector reviewed GE FDDR KRI-038, Revision 0, which provides site specific storage.
and maintenance requirements for the reactor vessel.
The inspector determined that GEI&SE had no documented procedure implementing GE NED requirements found in FDDR KRI-038.
The inspector stated that the failure to provide a docu-mented instruction to control storage and maintenance of the Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII.
(387/79-15-04)
7.
Reactor Vessel Internals Units 1 and
The inspector examined protection of the stored reactor vessel internals for compliance with site procedures and PSAR Appendix D commitments.
The inspector reviewed, the procedural requirements for internals protection and veri-fied that required inspections were being completed.
The inspector observed in-plant storage of the steam dryer and the shroud head and separator for Units 1 and 2 and the Unit 2 shroud.
Documentation reviewed by the inspector included:
Field Inspection Procedure G-5, Revision
Project Special Provisions Notice SF/PSP'-5.1, Revision
Equipment Maintenance Requirements and Record (EMRR)
Form for Units 1 and 2 steam dryer and the shroud head and separator and the Unit 2 shroud No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Containment Penetrations Unit
The inspector observed the installation of containment elec-trical penetration 1W107 and reviewed pertinent documents to verify that they were technically adequate, current and approved.
The inspector verified that the installation activities were being conducted in accordance with commitments in the PSAR Appendix D; FSAR Sections 3.1.2.5 and 3.8.1; Bechtel Specification E-135; Westinghouse Installation Instruction PEN-TR-76-19, revised March 8, l979; QCI 6.6, Revision 5; and FCI-E-122.
The inspector examined the following relative to the above:
Method of assembly consistent with design requirements Measures to protect installed components Installation including handling and bolting QC inspection activities Installed. penetration identification No items of noncompliance were identified.
P 9.
Lockin Nut on Limitor ue Valve 0 erators By letter to the NRC dated March 2, 1979 the licensee forwarded an interim report pursuant'o
CFR 50.55(e)
regarding the staking of a locking nut on Limitorque valve operators.
During this inspection, the inspector observed the inspection of one limitorque operator locking nut.
The inspection was
'conducted in the presence of a Bechtel Field Engineer and an Anchor-Darling Valve Company representative.
Examination of the locking nut of all limitorque valve operators is required by the disposition of Noncomformance Report No. 3424-IE Circular 79-04 addresses the loose locking nut situation on a generic basis.
Resolution of the 10 CFR 50;55(e) report will be examined during a future inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Diesel Overs eed Shutdown Valve S rin By letter to the NRC dated July 25, f978 Cooper Energy Services submitted a report pursuant to 10 CFR 21 regarding a potential defect in a spring which operates the overspeed shutdown butterfly valve on the engine air inlet connection.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that replacement springs had been installed in the four Cooper diesels at Susquehanna.
The above work was documented by site Quality Control on Quality Control Inspection Record 24.0-H-30-0G-501-2 on July 28, 1978.
The inspector inquired how the replacement springs; could 'b~difgerentiated'rom.the original-spr~s, This inspector statexK that.further'eview of this matter wou3.6-he..conducted during a subsequent inspecti'on.
No items. of noncompliance'were id'entified..
11.
Reactor Buildin Su erstructure Steel Records The inspector reviewed a portion of the quality records
. associated with the material for the Reactor Building Superstructure steel and its erection.
Since not all work was complete and only a portion of the completed records was available onsite, the inspector could neither determine the inspection status of specific field items, nor verify the adequacy of the overall record program.
This could be an area of interest for future NRC inspection efforts.
The inspector did, however, determine that a high strength bolting inspection program had been documented and that the available certificates of conformance for structural steel members and welding electrodes indicated compliance with both the technical and documentation requirements of the governing specification (Bechtel Spec.
C-66, Revision 2).
By random visual inspection of field connections, the inspector identified, through AISC required markings, the use of proper bolts and nuts, verified washer installation, and spot-checked joint configuration and structural member identification with reference to applicable drawings (Bechtel drawing C-324, Revision 12 and Gives drawing E26, Revision, C).
The following types of documents were included in the review of available records:
Gives Steel Company Bolting Inspection Forms
-14-Gives Statements of Conformance, Material. Receiving Reports, and Plumbing Inspection Forms for the structural steel Valley Welding Supply Company and Lincoln Electric Company Certificates of Conformance for low hydrogen welding electrodes; The inspector also noted that Bechtel had assumed the gC function from Gives for the major portion of the. remaining structural steel erection for the Reactor Building Superstruc-ture.
Interviews with the responsible Bechtel Subcontract engineers indicated that the extent of work involved in this turnover has been formally documented.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Structural Steel Su orts for CRD H draulic Control Units The inspector examined the overall condition of the Unit
structural steel framework which provides support not only for the structural members tied into the control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic control units, but also for some overhead safety-related pipe support assemblies.
Specific attention was directed to the condition of the welded and bolted oonnections and the coatrol over arc strikes.
Since most of the bolted joints'were connec'ted w~high=strength A490'olts and the steel itself was determined to be A36 material, the.inspector cheeked for hardened washer placement under both the nut and bolL head as required by the AISC Specification governing A490 bolted joints.
In most cases, the washer had been placed only under the element turned in the torquing operation.
The inspector reviewed Wiliamstown Steel Co.
Drawing 1E, Revision 3 and Nuclear Installation Services Company (NISCO installation subcontractor)
Drawing 180-1033-1, Revision 5, and determined that while commitment to AISC requirements had been made the, design allowed.the. usa og either A490 or A325 bolts.
Use of a single. washer would have. been acceptable with A325 bolts..'owever, since.A490. bolts.were used, two washers are required.
The concern is that'galling may have occurred in the joint area with the torquing of the A490 bolt against the A36 steel, without the washer present.
Pending further investigation by the licensee and engineering analysis of the results, this item is unresolved.
(387/79-15-05).
0
Additionally, the inspector was informed that Bechtel Corporation had classified the subject structural steel as "non Q" with the connotation that it is not related to safety.
While this work had'een designed to seismic 1 requirements and had received NISCO QC inspection, its "non Q" status placed it outside the purview of the normal Bechtel QA program.
The Susquehanna PSAR in paragraph 3.2.1 indicates, however, a commitment to Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.29 which confirms the applicability of QA requirements to the struc-tural steel in question, based upon its supportive nature to certain known safety-related systems.
Pending NRC review
'f the )ustification for the absence of normal QA'program-matic controls over the erection of the subject structural steel framework, this item is also unresolved.
(387/79-15-06).
13.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5b, 5c, and 12.
14.,
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility management (dates and attendees are denoted in Detail 1) to discuss inspection scope and finding ll l