IR 05000361/1981015
| ML20032A859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Burdoin J, Eckhardt J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032A849 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-81-15, 51-362-81-04, 51-362-81-4, NUDOCS 8111020478 | |
| Download: ML20032A859 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF IHSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ION V 50-361/81-15 Report flo.
50-362/81-04 CPPR-97, -98 License flo. 50-361, n-362 Priority Category Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Construction Si te, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted: July 20-24, 1981
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Inspectors:
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J H. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector Da te' Signed
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j. F.13urdoin, Reactor Inspector Date Signed-Date Signed C
!U7 9/29 /gl Approved by:
T. W. Bishop, Ch'ief Date Signed Reactor P'9jects Section 1 Summary:
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Inspection on July 20-24,1981 (Report Nos. 50 361/81-15 and 50-362/81-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities involving licensee action on 50.55(e) items, electrical cable installation, instrumentation installation, and safety related component auality records review.
ine inspection involved 62 ansite inspection hours by two NRC inspectors.
Resul ts: No i tems of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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IE:V Form 219 (1)
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DETAILS 1.
Individuals Conticted a.
Southern Cal 1fornia Edison Company
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Ouali ty Assurance
- J. J. Wambold, Construction fianager
- C. R. Horton,. Startup QA Supervisor.
- T. 0. Gray, Construction QA Supervisor
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- D. B. Schone, Si te Project Engineer
- N. M. Ferris, OA Engineer
- D. R. Hoffnan, Pr'oject Constru ? tion Engineer V. A. Gow, QA Engineer
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R. T. Cantrell,.QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)-
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- L. W. Hurst, Project Q Manager.
- J. W. Sheppard, Project QA Supervisor
- W. D. Nichols, Project Field. Engineer
- J. H. Mc Carty, Project QC Manager
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Bolei, Electrical Construction R. H. Medina, QA Engineer T. L. Fluhart, Field Engineer, Electrical G. B. Clothier, Lead Discipline QC Engineer K. P. McNeal, QA Engineer R. M. Wi tter, QC Engineer, Instrumentation
Denotes those attending exi t interview.
2.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Item The licensee's action on a 50.55(e) item concerning deficient calculations for safety related pipe supports was examined.
The licensee initially notified the Region V office on June 7,1979 of a problem concerning lack of documented design calculations for certain safety related pipe supports for which drawings had been released for construction (final report subnitted July 6,1979).
Bechtel and SCE 0A personnel originally identified the problem during audits of the pine support design area.
The design of the subject pipe supports were based on calculations and analyses which were not being formally documented or retained as required by applicable design control procedures.
This resul ted in extensive recalculations and verification prior.to system turnover.
to startup to confirm the adequacy of safety related pipe supports.
The Bechtel design control procedure.was revised July 12, 1979 specifying a hold point requiring design engineering confirmation of the adequacy l
.x of design calculations and documentation.
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Th7 final 50.55(e) report was amended: April 7,1980 'to. include additional deficiencies related to pipe support design' activities including insufficient pipe bearing surface, frictional loading of pipe' support framing, lack of reinforced branch connections, use of dissimilar metal ~ attachments, embed plate stiffness, an,i use of structural ties instead of dummy s tubs.
These deficiencies,have been corrected.
The licensee's OA organization perforr:ed an audit (report BPC-7-80)
Oc tober 27-28, 1980 of the Bechtel 0A program procedures related to control of piping systems and support design calculations, associated design changes, and corrective action committed to in the 50.55(e)
final reports.
The audit confirmed Bechtel's implementation of the corrective action.
- This item is closed.
3.
Electrical Cable Installa tion - L'.it 2
Electrical.caisles and raceways installed in Unit 2 sufety equipment building,) fuel handling building, and containment (45 and 63 feet
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ele' a tion were examined to ascertain compliance with the FSAR, construction specification CS-E6, and drawing 39402 " Conduit Physical Separation Guide". Particular attention was given to cable fire protection and separation between different divisions. A meeting was held with the licensee's and Bechtel's representatives regarding cable separation reaut remen ts.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Instrumentation Installation - Unit 2 The inspector reviewed the Unit 2 Plant Protection Systems, Plant Control System and selected instrument components described in detail below to. ascertain compliance with the FSAR and construction specification CS-J3.
a.
Plant Protection System 5, The Reactor Trip Systeo (RTS) and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) were reviewed.
The steam generator level parameter of the RT3 for steam generator 88 and HI-M containment pressure and low pressurizer pressure of the ESFAS were ir.;pected from the NSSS parameter taps and transmitters to the instrumentation in the control room.
The installation of the plant protection systems components were exanined for:
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-3-(1)
Identification and Location - proper type of instrument component with proper range, rating and proper location.
(2)
Supports and Protection - physical protection from missiles and high energy line breaks.
(3)
Independence - physical separation between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating device in control panels.
(4) Testing - calibration of indicating instruments in the control room and pressure and level transmitters (sensors).
(5) QC Inspection - including generation of inspection records during inspection activities by QC personnel.
1r e calibration of some of the control room instruments and parameters transmitters had not been performeJ for as long as 18 months, and the calibration tabs were missing from some of the instruments in the field. Also, in a few instances the calibration dates on the instrument tabs did not agree with calibration records maintained in the instrument shop.
These items were reviewed with the licensee who stated that a program of recalibrating all safety related instruments prior to fuel load was presently in progress.
This program had been developed to assure that all safety instruments were recalibrated within 90 days of scheduled fuel load.
No deviations or i tems of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Plant Control Systen Two process variables, feedwater flow and component cooling water pressure for the plant control system, _were inspected from the parameter taps or transmitters to the instrumentation in the control
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room.
Also reviewed were two wide range containment pressure indicating instrument systems (TMI requirement) from containment pressure taps, including the pressure transmitters, to the instrumentation in the con trol room.
The instrument systems and components were inspected for:
(1) Location and separation.
(2) Mounting supports for tightness and protection from potential missiles.
(3) Testing - calibration of instruments and sensor transmitte.
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-4-The same cmaments with respect to calibration of instranents (paragraph 4.a above) apply here and resolution by present recalibration program is also applicable.
In addition, the separation of t:t two (redundant) containment
pressure (wide range) transmitter; was considered by the inspector to be questionable from a point of protection from missiles.
t The docunentation of the high energy line break (HELB) review was not available during the inspection, and the licensee committed to make this analysis available during a subseouent inspection.
This item is considered open pending review of the HELB analysis (50-361/81-15/01).
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Safety Related Components Ouality Records i:2 view - Uni t 2 Quality records including receipt inspection, manufacturers certification, and installation records for the Unit 2 low pressure safety injection pumps and containment spray pumos were reviewed.
No deviations or items of nonconoliance were identified.
6.
Management Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on July 24, 1931.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed.
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