IR 05000361/1981007
| ML19350D954 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1981 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Eckhardt J, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350D952 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-81-07, 50-361-81-7, 50-362-81-02, 50-362-81-2, NUDOCS 8105270341 | |
| Download: ML19350D954 (7) | |
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O U. S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY ColetISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-361/81-07 Report No.
50-362/81-02
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Docket No.
50-361/362 License No.
CppR-97/98 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Comoany 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspec: ion conducted:
April 7-10,1981 Inspectors
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JcA ct nspector date ' signed
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J. F. Bdrdoin, React $ Inspector-i Date Signed
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Approved By:
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/N f-21-fI D 3 Pdrsch, cting Chief, Reactor Projects Secti.on 1 Date Signed
Su:: mary :
Inspection on Aoril 7-10,1981 (Report No. 50-361/81-07 and 50-362/81-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities involving licensee action on previous inspection findings, 50.55(e) reports, and IE Bulletins and Circulars. The inspection involved 44 onsite inspection hours by two NRC inspectors.
Resul ts: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Individuals Contacted a.
Southern California Edison Comnany (SCE)
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- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- P. A. Croy, Project GA Supervisor
- L. A. Pfandler, QA Engineer Trainee S. Balog Engineer
- C. R. Horton, Startup QA Supervisor
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- J. J. Uambold, Project Manager b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- H. F. McClusley, Project Manager
- J. E. Geiger, Project QA Manager
- E. Moenar, Field Construction Manager P.. Cook, QC Engineer
- W. D. Nichols, Project Field Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findincs.
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The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following item.
(Closed) Moncomoliance (50-361/79-26/01) Failure to Properly Calibrate Position Indication Devices on Reactor Pressure Vessel Examination Tool Ultrasonic examinations had been conducted on both Unit No. 2 reactor vessel hot leg nozzles with ultrasonic search units that had not been position calibrated. A systen of periodic position calibration to ensure search unit position accuracy had not been established for the nozzle bore examination rotator, nozzle bore examination boom extension, vessel-to-nozzle examination traversing arm and the vessel bottom head examination pivot boom.
The licensee responded to this item of noncompliance in a letter dated January 2, 1980. Corrective actions included engineering change notices which recuire position calibration of the affected equipment.
Examinations conducted prior to November 8,1979 with the nozzle bore examination rotator were voided and repeated utilizing the revised position check calibration procedure. Other examination devices were checked and position calibration was found to be within specifications.
The inspector examined the engineering change notices and documentation of the position calibration checks and considers them satisfactory.
This item is close _
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3.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Item The licensee submitted a final 50.55(e) report on April 9, 1979 (amended on August 6, 1979) dealing with improper staking of lock nuts on Limitorque valve operators. The improperly staked lock nuts could cause the lock nut to back out and allow the stem to become disengaged from the splines resulting in a loss of drive to the vulve stem. The licensee identified all valve operators with this condition and has completed proper staking and inspection. The inspector reviewed the nonconformance reports associated with these valves to assure all valves were inspected and examined.six valves in Unit 3 containment to assure proper staking. This item is closed.
4.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and Circulars The following IE Bulletins and Circulars were reviewed by the inspector to determine the promptness and thoroughness of licensee actions to correct or avoid those known or potential deficiencies:
Bulletin 79-09, Failure of GE Tyoe AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety a.
Related Systems The failure to trip of some GE type AK-2 circuit breakers on undervoltage (UV) was traced to either binding within the linkage mechanism of the UV trip device and trip shaft assembly or out-of-adjustment conditions in the same linkage mechanism. The licensee has develcped, for San Onofre Units 2 and 3, preventive mainten'ance procedure Number MPES008 to assure design performance of the GE type AK-2 circuit breakers. This item is closed.
b.
Bulletin 79-28, Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures The licensee has identified where NAt1C0 Model EA180 stem mounted limit switches are used in safety-related applications.
Top cover replacement gaskets have been provided and installed on NAMCO EA 180 Timit switches which utilized inferior quality gaskets from the specified eroduction lot.
These modifications were completed February 10 1981.
This item is closed.
c.
Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls I: had been found at North Anna Plant that re-setting of ESF resulted in changing position of safety-related equipment from v.mergency made to normal mode. Both the NSSS supplier and A&E nas stated that this cannot occur at SONGS 2 and 3 because of uniaueness of the design. Verification that re-setting of ESF signals does not result in changing position of safety-related equipment from emergency mode to normal mode will be required during pre-operational testing or during start-up through system line-up tests.
This item will remain open pending confirmation of this actio '
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d.
Bulletin 80-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds An NRC inspection at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, identified that certain nondestructive examinations performed on containment penetration welds did not satisfy the applicable ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code requirements. The welds in question were the primary piping containment penetration ~ flued head (integral fitting) to outer sleeve welds which form a part of the containment pressure boundary.
The licensee has detennined that San Onofre Units 2 and 3 utilize flued head design for penetration connections. All of the above mentioned connection welds are inspected in accordance with the 1974 Edition through Summer 1974 Addenda of the ASME B&PV Code and Regulatory Guide 1.19 which requires a radiographic examination (RT).
Initial RT's that revealed indications outside the Code specified limits resulted from lack of fusion, slag and incomplete
penetration. Welds that were found to be unacceptable by the initial RT were repaired and re-radiographed until the ASME Code.
criteria was met.
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This item is closed.
Bulletin 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies e.
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ITT Ge'neral Controls reported the use of springs having incorrect
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material installed in Models AH-90 and NH-90 series hydra-motor actuators. The licensee's NSSS vendor (CE) identified that two of said actuators are used in the spray chemical addition sys. tem.
This item remains open pending receipt and review of a submittal on this subject presently being prepared by the licensee.
f.
Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design It was determined at an operating plant tha't a concrete masonry wall with questionable structural integrity was used to support seismic category I piping. The licensee reviewed the design of SOMGS 2 and 3 and has determined that no masonry walls are used for Category I structures. This item is closed.
Bulletin 80-16, Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc.
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Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters With Either "A or "0" Output Codes The licensee had determiend that no Rosemount, Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 transmitters are used for control, protection, or indication in safety related systems at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
Six Model 1152 transmitters associated with the control room emergency air conditioning and ventilation system func' tion to initiate annunciator /
alarms in the control room.
In the safety analysis, no credit is taken for the annunciator and alarm system. This item is closed.
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Bulletin 80-19, Failures of Mercury-Wetted ffatrix Relays in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants besigned by Combustion Engineering The licensee determined that mercury-wetted matrix type relays are not used in the reacter protective systems at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
This item is closed.
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Bulletin 80-20, Failures of Westinghouse Tyne W-2 Soring Return to Neutral Control Switches The licensee detennined that Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches are not used in safety system design at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
This item is closed.
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Bulletin 80-21, Valve Yokes Suoplied by MALCOLM Foundry Comoany, Inc.
The licensee determined that no active valves with yokes manufactured by MALCOLM Foundry Inc. were supplied or are due to be supplied for use in safety related systems at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
This item is closed.
k.
Circular 79-18, Procer Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves The licensee determined that no Target Rock safety relief valves are used at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
However, steps have been taken to be assure that the Dresser Industries safety valves supplied for the pressurizer will be insulated in strict accordance with the manufactures instructions. This item will remain open pending completion of this work.
1.
Circular 79-23, Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Coerate
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The Gould, Inc., Electrical Products Group, reported to the NRC on September 11, 1979 pocential defects in certain NEMA Size 3, starters and contactors. The faulty _ units manufactured between June 1, 1978 and August 30, 1979 are code dated 7822 to 7935. The licensee reviewed his records and determined that eight (8) NEMA size 3 starters could possibly fall into this category.
Replacement kits were obtained from Limitorque Corporation and the modifications to the eight starters were completed October 1979. This item is closed.
Circular 80-09, Problems With Plant Internal Communications Systems m.
Two plants (Kewaunee and Davis-Besse) experienced degradation of some plant communication systems following loss of offsite power.
The degraded systems were energized from non-safety buses.
The
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licensee's review of the design for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 has identified that the PABX telephone and NRC Emergency Notification System are powered from the 16-hour telecommunications battery. The key telephone exchange, which services five key telephone sets in the technical support center, is supplied from
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a 120 volt AC uninterruptible power supply. A second is. sue which grew out of the problem at Kewaunee was the inducement of false signals in electronics equipment when two-way portable radios were used as a substitute for the plant comunication system.
Start-up procedure, No. 2AC-483-01, includes testing to determine the extent of this influence on electronics equipment.
This item
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will remain open pending completion of the test.
Circular 80-10, Failure to Maintain Environmental Oualification of n.
Ecuioment The wrong class of insulating material had been used in reconnecting motor leads following maintenance at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant.
This resulted in degrading the environmental cualification of the motor. The licensee stated that adeouate administrative controls will be instituted, maintenance procedures prepared and training of maintenance personnel conducted to ensure proper environmental qualification of equipment is maintained. This item will remain ooen.
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Circul'ar 80-12, Valve Shaf t-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mountec Below Horizontal Axis It has been determined that improper orientation of Pratt butterfly valves has caused the valve-shaft-to-actuator key to fall out of place.
This in turn resulted in valve inoperability. The licensea has inspected the orientation of all Pratt butterfly valves and determined that none were found to be susceptible to the failure made described in subject circular.
This item is closed.
p.
Circular 80-16, Operational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 51000 Analog Trio Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters The NRC has recently bcan advised through a 10 CFR 21 report that operational deficiencies exist in Rosemount Model 510D0 trip units and Model 1152 pressure transmitters.
The Model 1152 pressure transmitters have a capacitor common mode failure when ghe transmitter operating environmental temperature is greater than 175 F, and when the damping potentiometer is rotated clockwise.
The licensee has reviewed his design and determined that no Rosemount Model No.1151 and 1152 pressure transmitters and 510D0 trip units are-used for control, protection, or indication in safety related systems at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
Six Model 1152 transmitters associated with the control room emergency air conditioning and ventilation system function to initiate annunciator / alarms in the control room.
In the safety analysis, no credit is taken for the annunciator and alarm system. This item is closed.
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Circular 80-17, Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water det from Baffle Plate Corner The licensee has concluded that due to the differences in design between the Westinghouse and the CE reactor internals, fuel pin damage due to water jet impingement is precluded at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
This item is closed.
Circular 80-22, Confirmation of Employee Oualification r.
The licensee's and Bechtel's employment procedures both require, as a condition of employment, that an individual's technical and.
educational qualifications be verified. This item is closed.
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Circular 80-23, Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators The licensee has determined that no generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems are used in either Class I or non-Class I application at San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
This item is closed.
5.
Management Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on April 10, 1981. The scope of the inspection and the inspectors'
findings, as noted in this report, were discussed.
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