IR 05000361/1981006
| ML19345H433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1981 |
| From: | Book H, Fish R, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H429 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-81-06, 50-361-81-6, NUDOCS 8105200281 | |
| Download: ML19345H433 (5) | |
Text
.
'
.
.
U. S. tiUCLEAR RECUL\\ TORY C0"MISSIO:t 0FFICE OF I;SPECTIO t AliD E!!FoRCEME T O_
RECIO 1 V Rap 7rt }lo.
50-361/81-06
.
Do'che t !!o.
50-361 CPPR-97 1.icense tio.
safeguards croup Southern California Edison Company I.icens ee :
F.
V.
DUA GUV 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, C611fornia 91770 an On W e 2 Facility !!a=e:
San Onofre Site, San Diego County, California Inspection at:
liarch 30 - April 3, 1981 Inspection ie;nducted:
Inspectors:
M Mjb20k[
R. F. Fish., Radiation Specialist Dite S'igned
.
.
.
L:
-
,
--.a
'
Date Signed
.
Approved By:
MM Nof/
F. A. Wens.lawski; Chief, Reactor Radiation Protection Sec. date Cigned
-
/
i Approved By:
0-t
,
H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch Date Signed
~
- Sur=ary:
..
,,,
,
~
Inspection on March 30-April 3,1981 (Report No. 50-361/81-06)
'
- @ -
.
~
.
.
.~;...
Areas Insoected: Routine, unannounced preoperational inspection of licensee.
action on previous inspection findings, coolant radwaste system, miscellaneous.
_
liquid waste system, gaseous radwaste ' system, control of areas adjacent 'to
..q
-
the fuel transfer tube end action on IE bulletins. The inspection involved
-. - -
33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> of onsite time by one inspector.
.
,
,
Results: flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
,,
.
O e
.
o
.,
a
..
.
.:....
..:.
l'
l RV Form 219 (2)
,,..
,,,.
.. n.;.:;;.::,
.
.
'
. e ;,' t,
,.;j,9,.,[,,.{*y
.,;.,g
.
.
-
.
i...
.
,
,
_
-
.:.
e.. ~,,, ;. w......::.
.
'
.
'
-- - R 8105(00Q$l
-- -
--
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Fersons Contacted Southern California Edison Comoany
- P. Croy, Project 0A Supervisor, Units 2/3 D. Stonecipher, Supervisor, Operations QA/QC
- D. Schone, Project Engineering Site Representative
- J. Albers, Chemical and Radiation Protection Engineer A. Prosser, Chemist
- A. Sistos, Mechanical Engineering Design Site Representative Others R. Gray, Radiological Engineer (Contractor)
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) During the exit interview on April 3,1981 the inspector was provided with a copy of the Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) response to Southern California Edison's (SCE) request for an evaluation of NRC inspt..Jr contents relative to the sampling of gaseous effluents. According to BPC, ANSI N13.1 had been followed as closely as possible with respect to the installation of these sampling systems. However, BPC did state that quantitative evaluation of sample line length on representative samplir,g for particulates and iodine had not been perfonned. SCE is continuing to evaluate this matter in order to assure an accurate assessment of the particulate and iodine activity in the gaseous effluents released to the environment.
(0pm) This inspection did not include any discussion of the staffing of the Chemistry and Radiation Protection organization.
'
3.
Radioactive Waste Systems a.
Coolant Radwaste System (CRS)
The Coolant Radwaste System has been described in Section 11.2.2.1.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This inspection included a visual confirmation that the components of the CRS shown in.2ble 11.2-1 and Figure 11.2-1 (Sheets 1 and 2) of the FSAR had been installed.
Piping associated with the components was also observed to be present, but the inspection did not include a tracing of the piping.
-
.
._
-
_
_
. - _ _ _ _ - _ - _
.
__ _ _-..-__
_.
-
-.. -
-
-.
.
.._
--
.
e
2-
-
,
b.
Miscellaneous Liquid Waste System (MLWS)
The Miscellaneous Liquid Waste System has been described in Section 11.2.2.1.4 of the FSAR. This inspection included a visual confirmatien that the components of the MLWS shown in Table 11.2-3 and Figure 11.2-3 (Sheets 1-4) of the FSAR had been installed., Piping associated with the components was also observed to be present, but the inspection did not include a tracing of the piping.
c.
Gaseous Radwaste System (GRS)
The Gaseous Radwaste System has been described in Section 11.3.1.1
!
of the FSAR. This inspection included a visual confir.r.ation that the components of the GRS shown in Table 11.3-1 and Figure 11.3-1
'
of the FSAR Fad been installed. Piping associated with the components
.
was also observed to be present, but the inspection did not include
!
a cracing of the piping.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Areas Adjacent to the Fuel Transfer Tube Areas outside the Containment Building that are adjacent to the shielded i
fuel transfer tube were examined during this inspection. These areas
'
have been shown on Figures 12.3-32 (Elevation 15 feet) and 12.3-33
'
(Elevation 30 feet). The fuel. transfer tube is located at Elevation 28 feet 6 inches. On the 15 foot level the gate barrier had been installed, but the bar barrier in the pipe chase that prevents entrance to the area
near the transfer tube from the south had not been installed. There
'
l were indications that work was still being performed in the pipe chase area which would explain why the bar barrier had not yet been erected.
The door to the area on the north side of the transfer tube at the 30 foot level had been installed. The gate that will control the entrance
,
l to the area south of the trant/cr tube at the 30 foot level had been installed. Two potential additional entrances to this area south of the transfer tube at the 30 foot level were also observed. One was
,
l a ladder, permanently attached to the wall, that provided the opportunity for a person in the uncontrolled area around the transfer tube at the 15 foot level to enter this controlled area on the 30 foot level. The only control at the top of this ladder was a single unlocked bar that appeared to be for the purpose of preventing an individual from accidentally
-
,
l falling through the hole in the floor where the ladder was located.
The space between the containment building and the wall that defines
'
the controlled area south of the transfer tube was sufficient to permit entrance into the controlled area. According to Figure 12.3-33 of the FSAR radiation levels in portions of this controlled area south of the transfer tube may exceed 100 mr/hr during periods when spent fuel is being transferred through the tube to the Fuel Building.
No itens of noncompliance or deviaticns were identified.
i
-
-
=M'y*$ t-t-c.N-g*w--
me**-weym.fg 3--we 7%yevveg---m-,-.----eww g..g
,, --
g--,--.nu
-%-----g ewa e guer - a g,-,.-a,-
--w- -,
-
- - - -
.
.-
.--
- -..
. _ - - _ _.
_..
-
.
.
-3-5.
Actions on IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
IEB 90-03. Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 inch. Tray Adsorber Cells On January 28, 1981 the process for receiving the charcoal adsorber cells (filters) to be used at Units 2/3 was examined. The wooden containers with the filters inside had been received by BPC and stored in their warehouse. Upon receipt the containers were examined for damage. This examination did not include opening the sealed plastic bag around each filter. Records of the receipt examination were made and placed in the BPC file. The examination of these records also disclosed that information on the material certification, shop leak test results, certification of compliance and quality class certification had been received in August 1976 and r:: 10 :ted in another related file. According to the warehouse personnel, the silica gel inside each wooden container is checked on a regular frequency and replaced when necessary. Also the humidity and temperature are being measured twice daily in the warehouse used to store these filters. At the time of installation into the housing, the filters will be examined for damage and records of such examinations will be made.
On January 28 a wooden box, identified as No. 3376B, was opened and the contents examined. There were 19 filters in the box and each was wrapped with a protective paper cover and sealed in a plastic bag. Test cannisters, also sealed in a plastic bag, were in the box. One filter was removed, the plastic bag opened and the filter examined. The design of the filter was found to be as described in the March 31, 1980 letter to the Region V Office of the NRC that responded to IE Bulletin 80-03. A tag on the filter showed the serial number (59029), the date of the testing (1/18/80), the initial resistance (1.0 inches w.g.), the the per cent penetration (0.007%), the tested flow rate (part number, 333 cfm)
and the media lot number (0149).
Item is closed, b.
IEB 80-10, Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored. Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment SCE provided the inspector with a copy of a February 10, 1981 letter from BPC that discusses an evaluation of the systems in Units 2/3 for possible problems described in IE Bulletin 80-10. The letter states that a number of the non-radioactive systems have been equipped
.-
.-
-4-with radiation monitors. There are no cross connections between floor drains or sumps and the stom drains. The instrument air system, which is not connected directly to radioactive systems, is used to actuate valves and other devices that are separated rechanically from radioactive systems. The sanitary facilities do not have cross connections with radioactive systems. The nuclear service water, service air and nitrogen systems have check valves close to inter-connection locations with radioactive systems to prevent their becoming contaminated. The only system having a potential for becoming contaminated that is not monitored by instrument is the chilled water system (CSW) which interfaces with radioactive systems at the sample coolers.
BPC recomended a periodic sampling of the CHS to assure it does not become contaminated unknowingly.
The licensee stated that the laboratory sampling procedure to be used at Units 2/3 had already been modified to provide for a periodic sampling of the CWS.
In addition the licensee indicated they would be recoasidering the BPC statement about the adequacy of preventing contamination of the nuclear service water, service air and nitrogen systems and whether these systems should also be added to the periodic
!
sampling program. This item is still open.
6.
Exit Intervie.w At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector met with those persons identified in paragraph 1 of this report. Mr. D. E. Nunn, Manager of QA, C. R. Forton, Startup QA Supervisor, and D. W. Strohman, (BPC) Startup QA Supervisor were also present. Mr. R. J. Pate, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, attended the exit interview. The scope of this inspection and the findings were described. SCE was informed that there were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified. The two potential uncontrolled entrances to the area imrrediately south of the shielded fuel transfer tube on the 30 foot level were identified as needing additional consideration and possible action by SCE (see paragraph 4 for details).
SCE personnel said they would examine this situation and take any action considered necessary to properly control the entrance to the area south of the transfer tube. The inspector also noted that the bar barriers in the pipe chase south of the transfer tube on the 15 foot level had not yet been installed; however, it appeared that work was still being perfonned in the area. Confirmation of the installation of the bar barrier will be made during a subsequent inspection.
.
- - -..
-
.
-
-
-,
.
. _ _.
- _ -.
_.
-.