IR 05000361/1981004
| ML19350E453 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1981 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Hernandez G, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E444 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-81-04, 50-361-81-4, 50-362-81-01, 50-362-81-1, NUDOCS 8106230089 | |
| Download: ML19350E453 (6) | |
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U. S.11UCLEAR RECUL\\ TORY C0!ctISSIO:t
OFFICE OF I!;SPECTIOff A!iD E!! FORCE.".r.:.T -
REGIO t V
..50-361/81-04-Report 1:o. 50-362/81-01
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D:irket tio. '50-361, 50 362 t.icense rio. CPPR-97, CPPR-98 ~ safeguards c.oup
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Liesnsee: Southern California Edison Company
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2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 recility trace: San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Construction Site, San Diego County, California tiarch 3-6, 1981 Inspectionconduhted:
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Inspector.
H Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector.
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s G.Hernapdez,P[actorInspectc-D' ate signed
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Date Signed
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Approved By:
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Reactor Projec[ecting Chief
. f. (irsch,
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/ Da'tc Signed ts Section 1
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Inspection on f4 arch 3-6, 1981 (ReDort No. 50-361/81-04 and 50-362/81-01)
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Areas Insnected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities including:. licensee action on previous inspection findings, safety related pipe welding, installed reactor vessel and component
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cleanliness, safety related component installation and electrical ~ cabinet
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internal wiring. The inspection involved 48 onsite inspection hours by two NRC inspectors.
.Results: Of the areas inspected, one item of ndncompliance was identified in the area of electrical cable separation (paragraph 6).
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DETAILS li-
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Individuals Contacted a.L Southern California Edison Company
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Ouality Assurance-
- P. A. Croy, Project CA Supervisor
- V. A. Gow, QA Enoineer-
- R. Cantrell, QA Engineer
. G. P. Vascos, QA Engineer
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- N. M. Ferris, QA Engineer
- L. A. Pfandler, QA Engineer
- H. L. Richter, Protect Engineer
- K. A. Slagle, Starsup Engineer
- C R. Horton, Startup.QA-Supervisor b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bachtel)
- R. L. Patterson, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. E. Geiger, Project QA Manager
- J. H. McCarty, Project OC flanager
- W. D. flichols, Project Field Engineer
- J. S. Kartz, Assistant Project Field. Engineer
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- Den *,es those attending exit reeting.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following items:
a.
(Closed? Deficiency (50-361/79-06/01): Control of pink, drawings Cn the field.
Eighteen drawings in various areas of Unit flo. 3 were checked for
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compliance with the requirements of WPP/QCI No.19 "Dist-ibution and control of design and field generated documents". All drawings
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were found to be in conformance with the requiremants and found to be of the most current revision as indicated by the computer
printout of February 27, 1981.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-361/80-08/01): Welding criteria for
_ he emergency water chiller units.
t Investigation by the licensee had determined that the Auxiliary Building Emergency Water Chiller Units Nos. E-335 and E-336 are the only two safety related units supplied by Carrinr Corporation-to Eqchtel Power Corporation. Examination of Contract Specification No. S023-410-7 Addendum 1, page 1, item 2, defines the boundaries
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for ASME Section III as the condenser and cooling water pressure-boundaries only, with the refrigerant piping welds being governed by ANSI B9.1, "The Refrigerant Piping Standard". The refrigerant piping welds were the welds that were originally questioned in this concern. Therefore, the inspector is satisfied that the velds conform to the contract speci'%ation and the governing standard.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Followuo Item (50-361/78-13): Containment shrinkage cracks.
On February 5, 1981, the Unit 2 containment concrete surveillance areas 3, 5 and 7 (located above the doce springline) were re-examined by five Eechtel and SCE engineers, two of whom measured the ciack widths-during the structural integrity test (SIT) in December 1980.
The purpose of the re-examination was to provide supplerntal shrinkage crack width data for comparison with ACI corrosion control guidelines.
During the SIT, the crack widths were measured directly on the surface of the concrete and in many cases across surface irregularities such as small voids and chips along the crack edges. The re-examination was performed to verify that the true crack widths were less than the ACI guideline value of 0.013 inches to limit corrosion of the reinforcing steel. The re-examination consisted of measuring the crack widths both at the concrete surface and just below the concrete surface where there were no effects due to irregularities. The measurements were made with a hand held microscope with a linear
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scale incorporated into the optics. The largest measured crack width was 0.010 inches.
On March 4, 1981, the inspectors measured the cracks in the same surveillance areas using the same hand held microscope.
Again, the largest crack width measured was 0.010 inches.
It was determined that the difference between the crack widths recorded during the SIT and the actual crack widths was dua to many of the cracks being measured (during the SIT) across the smull irregularities at the crack su: face.
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-3-The inspectors concluded that the shrinkage cracking on the containment dome is within ' acceptable limits and poses no significant potential for corrosion of reinforcing steel and post.sioning tendons.
This item is closed.
3.1 Safety Related Pipe Welding a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector observed field welding of safety related piping at-various stages of completion to verify compliance with the requirements of the_ applicable codes, standards, work performance, and inspection procedures. The following field welds in Unit 3 were examined:
Drawing No.
Weld No.
Stage (1 S3-1206-ML-047 DD(C)
Fit-up (2 S3-1212-ML-036 BP Complete (3 S3-1201 #L-058 G
Intermediate pass 4 S3-1204-ML-152 L(C)
Complete 5 -S3-1201 4 -040 EE Insert & Tack 6)S3-1204-ML-038 CS Complete No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Review of Quality Rea rds The quality records associated with the above welds were reviewed for compliance with the licensees procedures and the applicable codes and standards.
This record review verified that the welders were qualified and qualified for the process being used, were using the proper weld filler material and that the appropriate Quality Control inspections were being accomplished.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Safety Related Components
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Valve Installation During the closecut of the aforementioned drawing control item the inspector encountered craft personnel at the 24' elevation of the Unit 3 Radwsste Building, cutting out, rotating, and re-installing a valve with the valve flow arrow against the flow. Subsequent investigation determined that the licensee had raceived, from combustion Engineering, three valves with the mechanically affixed flow arruw opposite to the actual flow conditions. This was discovered after licensee personnel noted that the valve actuators were oriented 180 degrees -from that called out on the drawings. Accordingly, this discrepancy was documented by the licensee on Nonconformance Report Number N-789 and duly dispositioned on February 11, 1961.
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These valves.are one inch buttweld end control: valves manufactured.
'by'ITT Hanner-Dahl and each unit utilizes two.such valves in the
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Chemical and-Volume Control System downstream ofj ths Letdown Heat'
' Exchangers. The' fourth valve had the. flow arrow oriented correctly.
At the present time both Combustion Engineering and-the licensee-are evaluating the generic implications and regulatory reporting
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requirements.. :The results' of these evaluations will be reviewed -
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during a future inspection. Thisis'an.openitem:(50-362/81-01/01).
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b.
Ch:rging Pump Installation
. The ainstalled Unit.3 charging pumps were examined to ascertain compliance; with equipment maintenance' requirements.- In particular, cleanliness, equipment protection, and avidence of space h9aters being energized was checked.-
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
'5.
' Unit 3 Reactor Vessel The installed Unit 3 reactor vessel was examined to determine cleanliness--
conditions.and protection controls to prevent physical damage.- The core support barrel was installed within the reactor vessel.
Cleanliness, access,-and damage controls appeared satisfactory.
While in the reactor vessel linear indications were noted on the four
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core shroud guide lug shims.. The shims were attached to the guide lugs which are forged into the core' support' barrel. The indications were visible due to liquid penetrant residue remaining on-the shims.
-Investigation revealed that the shims had been liquid penetrant tested on March 2, 1981. On March 6, 1981, the licensee wrote nonconformance report F-350 to docunent the condition.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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~ Internal Wiring in Electrical Panels Internal wiring in electrical panels (including field installed wiring)
was exanined to asce'rtain compliance with Bechtel specification CS-E03, Rev. 7 " Cable Splicing, Terminations, and Supports". Specifically, separation of field cabling within enclosures:for redundant and associated circuits was examined.
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Paragraph 11.1 of CS-E03 states in part that..." Safety related (Class IE)
power, control and instrumentation field cables of different safety related separation groups (A, B, C or D) entering a control switchboard,
-equipment. cabinet, panel or terminal box shall maintain a 6 inch minimum physical separation between field cables of redundant safety related.
separation groups or field cables and internal cabinet wiring of redundant safety related separation groups...." The inspector identified the fcilowing _ items which are not in confonnance with thir. requirement:
a.
In Unit 2 process instrumentation cabinet 2L188, a Class 1E Channel A cable bundle from the Channel A portion of the cabinet and a Class IE~ Channel B cable bundle from the Channel Piportion of the cabinet were routed within two inches of each other in the lower portion of the cabinet prior to being routed into conduits.
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In Unit 3 3rocess instrumentation cabinet 3L188, redundant Channel A and B ca)le bundles were within four inches of each other in tM lower portion of the cabinet prior to being routed into condt ts, c.
In the Unit 2 engineered safety features cabinct, two cases were identified where the free air space between redundant safety groups was only four inches.
In the Unit 2 reactor protection cabinet, one case was identified where the free air space between redundant safety groups was only one inch.
All of the above identified items were field installed wiring. This is an apparent item of noncompliance (50-361/81-04/01 and 50-362/81-01/02).
7.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on March 6, 1981. The scope of the inspection and of the inspectors'
findings as noted in this report were discussed.
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