IR 05000206/1981042
| ML20040E759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1982 |
| From: | Miller L, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040E756 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-81-42, IEB-79-13, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8202050320 | |
| Download: ML20040E759 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-206/81-42
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Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee: Southern California Edison Company P. O. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at: San Onofre, California Inspection conducted: November 30, 1981 - January 4, 1982 Inspectors:
fgh A 7 2, / TQ e
U Date Signed 3 L.i Milt,ep, SerOor Ppsident Inspector, Unit 1 Approved by:
ad MAA.ANK4 2 ~2,19 I 2-G41WetWg, C(eft Reactor Projects Section F V
Date SQned '
Rehetor Operations Project B~ ranch Summary:
Inspection on November 30, 1981 - January 4, 1982 (Report No. 50-206/81-42)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, resident operational safety verification; monthly surveillance and maintenance observations;. follow-up on IE Bulletins, licensee event reports, Notice of Violation, an NRC Valve Testing, and inspector Order on Primary Coolant Isolation _ inspection.
identified items; and independent The inspection involved 70 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8202050320 820122 PDR ADOCK 05000206 O
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O DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- W. Moody, Deputy Station Manager
- H. E. Morgan, Operations Manager
- M. Wharton, Supervising Engineer
- R. Santosuosso, Maintenance Manager
- D. K. Nelson, Project Manager, Unit 1 B. Katz, Assistant Station Manager, Technical H. B. Ray, Station Manager G. W. Mcdonald, Qudity Assurance l Supervisor, Unit 1 The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees during this inspection.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview bn January 4,1982.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed Control Room operations frequently for proper shift manning, for adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operation, and appropriate recorder and instrument indications.
The inspector discussed the status of annunciators with Control Room operators to determine the reasons for abnormal indications, and to determine the operators' awareness of plant status.
Shift turnovers were observed.
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The Control Operator's log was. reviewed to obtain information on plant conditions, and to determine whether regulatory requirements had been met.
Other logs, including the Watch Engi.2er's Log and Stean Generator Chemistry Logs, were also reviewed. The west header of the safety-injection pump discharge piping outside of containment, the charging pump safety-injection piping, and the diesel generator starting air piping were verified to be properly aligned.
However, as in the previous month, discrepancies in the drawings for these systems were observed. While checking the configuration of safety-injection discharge piping downstream of the west feedwater pump, the inspector noted three branch lines connected to the piping (line 6005) which were not reflected on the drawing (568769-15,
" Safety Injection System").
Each branch line was isclated with a manual valve.
Downstream of two of the valves were 3/4" stainless steel lines which led to portable containers for radioactive liquid.
Licensee personnel stated that these lines were used to sample.the boron concentration in the lines, to collect leakage, and to vent and drain the safety-injection system during shutdown periods. They also stated that vent ard drain valves were specifically excluded by Note 3 of this drawing. However, none of the controlled drawings furnished by the licensee showed these valves, while other valves with similar function were shown on the drawing. Based on these observations, the inspector concluded there were omissions in this I
drawing which indicated some inconsistencies in the licensee's drawing syste _
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-2-As a result of this discrepancy, as well as others previously noted (e.g., see Inspection Report 50-206/81-40), an informal meeting was held on December 7 with a licensee representative to discuss these deficiencies and the licensee's proposed corrective action.
The representative agreed that action would be started within thirty days to increase the assurance that the configuration of safety-related systems was substantially correct.
In addition, the licensee has agreed to inspect other safety-related valves similar to CV-36, to ensure that their pneumatic lines are properly connected.
This item remains open pending review of the licensee's corrective action in this area (01 50-206/81-42-01).
Radiation restricted area access points were generally safe and clean. Several radiation work permits were examined and found to be completed correctly.
In addition, several radiation friskers were observed to be operating properly. Radiation areas observed in the Auxiliary Building were correctly posted.
The Physical Security Plan appeared to be propetly implemented.
The inspector verified that selected security posts were properly manned, isolation zones were clear, personnel sear ches were performed when required, vehicles were controlled within the protected area, and personnel were badged and escorted, as necessary. ' Protected area barriers did not appear to be degraded. Plant housekeeping was adequate.
Fire barriers appeared intact. The equipment control log and tagout log were audited. No significant discrepancies were identified. Several tagouts were verified to have been hung as indicated on the equipment control form.
A spot check of the storage of spare parts was performed.
Procurement personnel were requrested to locate reactor coolant pump "0" rings and backup rings which the vendor had provided the licensee during the most recent reactor coolant pump inspection. These parts were readily retrieved from storage by licensee personnel.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Independent Inspection TI.e inspector investigated three events during t51s inspection period which were potentially significant.
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During reviews.of Control Room logs, the inspector noted that the south waste gas decay tank had been removed from service due to an apparent unexplained pressure drop from the tank.
When the; inspector discussed this matter with the Unit Superintendent on December 4. the Superintendent proposed prompt testing of the Other two waste gas decay tanks for leakage.
This testing was performed on December.5 and 6, and a pressure drop was observed from'the center waste gas decay tank (7 psi in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)J The test results were ambiguous, however, since tank temperature was not considered. The inspector reviewed the daily tank pressure readings for August, 1981. These were also inconclusive ?n establishing whether or not leakage was present. The licensee performed an integrated tank leak test on December 11 whid, indicated that unmonitored leakage was slight from the tanks when all the tanks were at the same pressure (approximately 90 psi). At the Exit Interview, a licensee representative confirmed that further testing would be conducted to attempt to identi *y the leak pathways, if any (0I 50-206/82-42-02).
b.
The licensing project manager notified the inspector that the licensee had discovered three corroded steel columns (H-12, H-2, and G-5) in the feedwater heater area of the turbine building. The inspector examined the corroded columns as well as several others in the area. On the columns identified by the licensee, base metal corrosion had occurred in the lower 4 - 6 inches, to a depth.of approximately 1/4 to 1/2 inch.
No significant wastage was noted by the inspector on several other columns which were checked. The inspector reviewed the estimate of the extent of the corrosion with the. cognizant contractor engineer, and concluded that conservative estimates of the extent of the corrosion had been made. At the Exit Interview, a licensee representative stated that the corroded columns would be The licens' e evaluation of the repaired at the next outage.
e observed corrosion concluded that the strength reduction of the turbine building was acceptable. This conclusion was reviewed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This item is closed.
c.
During a review of the Control Operator's log, the inspector noted on December 17, 1981, that the licensee had isolated most of the Ashcioft pressure gauges in the diesel generator local control panel and auxiliaries. The inspector determined that this was done as the result of the recognition on November 17, 1981, by a licensee employee that Ashcroft pressure gauge Style 1279 had failed a seismic qualification test performed in 1977 by Wyle Laboratories for the licensee.
This report (dated July 14,1977) indicated that as a
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-4-f.:11t of the test, the gauge had developed a small leak in the end of the stainless steel Bourdon tube where it connects to the gauge pointer mechanism. As a result of this determination, the licensee developed a list of all such gauges in safety-related systems and non-safety related systems containing combustible fluids in preparation for undertaking corrective action.
A licensee representative subsequently ' stated that a seismic qualification test for the diesel generator local control panels established the seismic qualification of all of the pressure gauges mounted in that panel. Therefore, the licensee removed the isolation applied to.those gauges. When the inspector reviewed this Wyle Laboratories test report, dated June 9,1976, it was found that the report did not specify the type (vendor and style) pressure gauges which had been installed in the panel for the test, and did not include pressure gauge performance as a test criteria. Accordingly, the inspector concluded that this report did not demonstrate that the Ashcroft pressure gauges currently installed in the panel were seismically qualified. A licensee representative stated that additional vendor data from the diesel generator manufacturer and Ashcroft had been requested and would be made available for review upon receipt. This item remains open (0I 50-206/81-42-03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified at this time.
4.
Follow-up on Notice of Violation 81-31 (Waste Gas Decay Tank' Rupture)
(Closed)
The inspector verified that the licensee had added and emphasized precautions concerning combustible gas limits in the applicable procedures, and had implemented a Chemistry Information Report from chemistry technicians to the Watch Engineer to improve communications.
This action appeared adequate. This item is closed.
l 5.
Followup on IE Bulletins IEB 79-13 (Cracking on.Feedwater System Piping) (Closed)
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's responses to this Bulletin, and concludes that the licensee's responses are adequate. This Bulletin is closed.
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-5-IEB 79-14 (As-Built Seismic Configuration Audit) (Closed)
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's responses to this Bulletin.
The major discrepancy outstanding is that the licensee was unable to retrieve seismic input information for some systems, and therefore could not validate those piping configurations. The licensee has proposed. postponement of that work until the~ Systematic Evaluation Program review occurs. The details of these emissions are in the
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licensee's August 10 and September 10, 1979, and January 14, 1980 letters. The review of this Bulletin is closed, but this discrepancy will remain.a separate open item until the acceptability of this postponement is determined (0I 50-206/81-42-04).
6.
NRC Order on primary Coolant Isolation Valve Testing (Closed)
The inspector verified that the licensee had performed leakage testing for the three applicable safety-injection check valves (867A, B and C).
The extrapolated leak rates for these valves were ac'ceptable.
This item is closed.
7.
Follow-up on Inspector Identified Items 0181-37-04 (Silicone Contamination of 4KV Switchgear) (Closed)
The inspector d'iscussed the licensee's corrective action for this event in detail with several licensee representatives. The licensee provided the inspector with a detailed internal investigation report dated November 17, 1981, which comprehensively developed the cause for the event and proposed corrective action. At the Exit Interview, a licensee representative stated that in the future, the silicone sealant process would be procedurally controlled and field tested prior to its use over switchgear, and that all modifications done in proximity to safety-related equipment would be controlled by approved procedures. The inspector concluded that the licensee had identified.and thoroughly investigated this failure to control the special sealant process and had taken timely
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corrective' action to prevent its recurrence. This item is closed.
8.
Follow-up on. Licensee Event Reports (LER)
a.
LER 81-028 (Faulty Sequencer Operation) (0 pen)
The inspector reviewed this report and discussed tts mechanism of the circuit malfunction with licensee personnel and with members of the technical staff of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
This item remains open pending further discussions.
In the interim, the licensee's proposed corrective action is acceptable.
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LER 81-023 (Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation) (Closed)
The inspector verified that operators are now required to regularly check the containment spray actuation ststem logic cabinet power supply voltages. The inspector confirmed that training for instrument technicians has been scheculed for the week of January 22, 1982. This item is closed.
c.
LER 81-027 (Low Refueling Water Storage Tank Boron Concentration)
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(Closed)
The inspector reviewed this report, and discussed the cause of the event and the proposed corrective action with the licensee.
A licensee representative stated that reconstruction of the event indicated that several hours of recirculation of the. tank was necessary to assure a representttive sample, but that this had not been recognized prior to the event. The licensee has modified the sampling procedure to require at least eight hours of tank recirculation prior to sampling. This item is closed.
d.
LER 81-024 (EFCOMATIC Valve' Actuators) (0 pen)
The inspector determined that the licensee had not developed a schedule for refurbishment of the actuators by December 31, as originally committed, but planned to have this schedule by January 22. The inspector expressed concern that this work proceed expeditiously due to the deficiencies in the existing actuators. Licensee representatives reaffirmed their comitment to refurbish and replace these actuators. This item remains open.
e.
LER 81-026 (Improper Pneumatic Connections to Feedwater Recirculation Valve) (Closed)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's safety evaluation of this event
dated December 21, 1981. This evaluation concluded that up to 40 minutes would be available to operators to isolate the feedwater recirculation line (thereby stopping inventory loss to the condenser hotwells) before the recirculation pumps could have insufficient net positive suction head (NPSH). A licensee representative stated that although the pneumatic connections to the valve had been corrected, station procedures would also be modified to ensure that, even with failure of the valve to close, isolation would occur within this time, and that a longer term design change would be developed to increase the reliability of isolation.
In addition, as noted in Paragraph 2, the licensee has started a program to inspect promptly all safety-related systems to ensure they are in the correct configuration. This program is still being developed. The review of this item is closed, but the review of the licensee's configuration control system remains open (0I 50-206/81-40-03).
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-7-In a re:ated matter, the inspector 'noted that the supports for the valves / valve actuators in these lines did not appear to be seismically capable. The inspector requested the licensee to retrieve the seismic design information for these supports. This item remains open.(01 50-206/81-42-05).
9.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance Observations The inspector observed the following maintenance and surveillance activities:
(a) Hydrogen Recombiner Operability Test (b) Boric Acid Flow Verification Test (c) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test (d) Diesel Generator Monthly Preventive Maintenance The inspector determined that these activities.were performed in accordance with approved procedures, did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operation, and were approved by the Watch Engineer prior to the work.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10. Exit Interview A meeting was held on January 4,1982, to summarize the scope and findings of this inspection. Significant findings are discussed in the text of the report.
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