IR 05000206/1981022
| ML20009E118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1981 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Elin J, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E116 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-206-81-22, NUDOCS 8107270130 | |
| Download: ML20009E118 (6) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- . . , U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fEISSION OFFICE OF INSPii.7 TION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.50-?n6/R1-?? Docket !!o. 50-906 _ License No.
nPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee: Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, Califo.rnia Inspection conducted: June 2-5, 1981 [[. .[/ NA - 7!7[8/ Inspectors: ~ ner, Reac r Irispector 'Dete Sign 9d W. J I, w kD e 7 / 8 /61 J. O. Elin, Reacter Inspector Date Signed \\Os 7 /8 /8l Approved by w J. H. Eckhardt, Atting Chief, Reactor Projects Sec.1 Date Signed Reactor Construction Project Branch SunTaary: t Inspection on June 2-5, 1981 (Report No. 50-206/81-22) Areas Inspected _: Routine, announced inspection of facility modifications and repair of circumferential welds on the main steam piping.
l l The inspection involved 46 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
! Results: Three items of noncompliance were identified in the areas of radiographic examination (paragraph 2a), electrical cable separation (paragraph 3) and electrical panel anchoring (paragraph 3).
l l l 0107270130 810709 RV Form 219 (2) PDR ADOCK 05000206 G PDR
. , DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
Southern California Edison (SCE)
- L. T. Papay, Vice President, Advanced Engineering
- H. E. Morgan, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- D. K. Nelson, Project Manager
- N. R. Dickinson, Project Construction /Startup
- G. W. Mcdonald, Quality Assuranca/ Quality Control Supervisor
- F. Briggs, Compliance Engineer
- J. D. Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- E. Gault, Compliance Engineer J. M. Curran, Plant Manager H. A. Timons, Quality Assurance Engineer J. Buckles, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Supervisor R. Montroy, Quality Assurance Engineer M. Marsh, Construction Engineer C. Moran, Construction Engineer A. Kaneko, Lead Electrical Design Engineer R. Berkshire, Engineering Site Representative B. Barnes, Electrical Design Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- F. Henry, Project Manager
- G. L. Renfeldt, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Supervisor
- R. Retana, Quality Control Inspector c.
Mobile _ Inspection Service, Inc.
M. D. Fratt, NDE Level III Denotes attendance at management interview on May 15, 1981.
In
addition, Mr. R. J. Pate, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector, attended the interview.
2.
Welding Activity Associated with Modifications and Repairs a.
Containment Penetrations for Post Accident Sampling System Lines The post accident sampling system consists of sampling lines for obtaining samples of the containment atmosphere and of the reactor coolant. These sampling lines were not installed as of this inspecticn.
However, the two containment penetrations installed to accomodate these sampling lines were inspected for compliance to the design change and applicable code requirement. , . t h i-2-I' l The two mechanical penetrations inspected, B-16A and B-168, are . ten inch ellipsoidal weld caps with nine pipes (1/2" D x 3' L) welded to each cap. Sampling lines will pass through these pipes , into the containment sphere.
' ! Inspection of the following items associated with the installation of these penetrations were performed by the inspcctor: (a) Design Change No. 80-07 of 4/8/80 which authorized this.
, work.
(b) Design Drawing No. 235398 - Sphere Penetration Sample Line ' Cap No. B-16A and B.
(c) ASME code requirements as specified in the design change ' and drawing.
l d) Visual inspection of the two penetrations.
e) Field weld checklist (traveler) for each welded penetration.
, f) Construction Inspection Data Report for installation of the ! penetrations.- (g) radiographic examination.
, During examination of the radiographs for mechanical penetration
l B16A and B, the inspector noted that the radiographs did not contain , an adequate number of penetrameters as ' required 'by Code (ASME t Section V, Article 2) whenever the radiographic density through the area of interest varies by more than minus 15% or plus 30% from the density of the penetrameter.
In addition, the radiographs- ' did not show the lead letter "F" on the film as required by Coe whenever the penetrameter is placed on the film ' side of. the par t..
The inspector also noticed the radiographs showed weld ripples i through the area of interest; this is not allowed by Code since i these ripples could mask discontinuities.
The failure to l use the proper radiographic technique in accordance~ with applicable
Code requirements is considered an apparent item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes ' (50-206/81-22/01).
b.
Main Steam Line Repair Welds Weld defects in five circumferential welds on the 24-inch main steam piping have been repaired. The radiographs were reviewed by the inspector during a previous inspection (IE Report No.
50-206/81-16).
During this inspection the inspector examined the nonconfonnance reports (NCRs) which initiated the repair work on these welds. -Separate NCRs were prepared for each weld requiring repair. The following items were reviewed: the repair program; weld procedure (PI-AT-Lh); specific work plan which
involves 15 steps ranging from installing scaffolding to radiographic examination; pressure test requirements, Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) hold points; postweld heat treat chart; field i . -,., -, -. - -, -, - -, -, -... - - - .. - -. -, - - -.-.~. - . -.
. - . , -3-welding checklist; and Filler Metal Withdrawal record. All these items contained the necessary QC and ANI approvals as. required, and appeared to be in accordance with procedural and ASME requirements.
The inspector reviewed the hydrostatic test procedure TP-TMI-2.1.7-21, Rev.1 of 5/12/81 for compliance to pressure test requirements of ASME Section XI. The steam generator (SG)'was pressurized to 1231 psig for a minimum of 4 hours; pressure was applied to the secondary side of the SG from thf feedwater dischargo valves to the main steam isolation valves. 1.a test ~results, approved 6/3/81, reported that no leakage was dei.ected at the main steam line weld repairs.
No items of noncompliance or deviations wers identified, c.
Addition of Seismic Supports for A/C System for the Technical 3upport Center All the beams were fabricated by Brown Yard (supplier) prior to shipment.
Bechtel bolted the seismic support in location.
The welding activities associated with this work are non-safety related. However, the inspector did examine the performance of two in-process welds for compliance with Bechtel's welding program and AWS D1.1 requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Electrical Modifications to Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspector reviewed the electrical modifications made to the auxiliary feedwater system in response to NUREG 0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations, and to NUREG 0737, j Clarification Of TMI Action Plan Requirements. This review consisted of a walkdown of wiring installed in the vicinity of the auxiliary ' feedwater pumps and in the control room for compliance with paragraph 4.6 of IEEE 279-1971 as required by section II.E.1.2 of NUREG-0737.
The licensee'; Design Criteria Manual for TMI Modifications required
I that beyond the interface point with existing systems, the criteria of IEEE 384-1977, and Regulatory Guide 1.75 would provide for isolation or separation of the electrical equipment and circuits of one redundant ! system from those of other redundant systems as specified in IEEE-279.
l l The licensee's cable. installation in the vicinity of the auxiliary feedwater pumps appeared to comply with these standards.
l The licensee's installation of new cable in control room instrument panels did not appear to comply with'these standards in two situations: l I n . . . . ... . .. .. .. .
.... .. . . -4-(a) Panels C-69 and C-70, installed during this outage to provide automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater, did not maintain the 6 inch separation between Class IE circuits and non-Class IE circuits as required by IEEE 384.
(b) Cables installed as a result of TMI modifications within previously existing control room panels did not maintain the 6 inch separation between redundant Class 1E circuits as required by IEEE 384.
In the first situation, although these panels, as new equipment, were to comply with the requirements of IEEE 384 by the licensee's Design Criteria Manual, the inspector was unable to identify where these criteria were prescribed in documented instructions, procedures or drawings.
The instructions and drawings detailing the installation of panels C-69 and C-70 did r.ot define cable separation requirements within these panels or detail cable routings sufficiently to insure compliance to the design criteria.
Accordingly, on June 3 and 4, -1981 it was found that the required 6 inch separation had not been maintained between Class IE and non-Class 1E circuits internal to the new auxiliary feedwater instrumentation panels C-69 and C-70.
The failure to install circuitry in accordance with requirements is an apparent item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings (50-206/81-22/02).
In the situation within existing panels, the previously established criteria (FSAR and amendments) for San Onofre Unit I were to apply throughout the existing systems, including the interface point, according to the design criteria.
However, beyond the interface point, for new systems and equipment, the criteria established in IEEE 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 were to apply. The licensee interpreted the interface point as the entire panel and its vicinity, and, as no separation requirements within panels were defined in the FSAR or its amendments, no separation requirements were imposed.
Since the licensee imposed no separation criteria within these panels, the actual installation of the new cables appeared to compromise independence and separation to a greater extent than was allowed by existing component location.
Redundant trains exited separate conduits to conmon bundles even though termination points were not located within close proximity of each other. These common routings were up to 10 to 15 feet in length.
Furthemore, new cables, in control room panels, were not routed so as to provide separation from new safety related components. The licensee stated that IEEE 384 requirements were met "where possible" and that, as it was not possible to meet separation requirements within existing panels, no attempt to control this aspect of_ new cable installation was made.
This item is unresolved pending receipt and evaluation of the licensee's technical rationale for not fully complying with the requirements of IEEE 384 when installing new cabling in and adjacent l to existing safety-related panels (50-206/81-22/03).
l t
< - .- ,... -5-During the review of auxiliary feedwater system components the inspector observed that the six drilled-in expansion anchor nuts on panel C-69 had not been torqued in accordance with WPP/QCI 20.12, " Installation of Concrete Expansion Anchors".
Indeed, the inspector observed threads visible below the nut indicating the nuts were not even " hand tight" or " snug". The licensee stated that the mounting base for C-69, which was secured to the floor by the expansion anchors, was not to be removed with the removal of the old panel (C-66). The bolts attaching the panel C-66 to the mounting base were to be removed and reinstalled with panel C-69.
The licensee's quality control inspection program did insure these bolts were properly torqued.
However, the removal of C-66. inadvertently included the removal of the mounting base (unbolting of six expansion anchors).
This mounting base was reinstalled without inclusion in the quality control inspection program.
The licensee inspected panel C-71 and found a similar situation existed on this panel.
The failure to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with prescribed instructions, procedures, or drawings is considered an apparent item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings (50-206/81-22/04).
4.
Management Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5,1981.
The inspection scope and findings were discussed. The licensee indicated that the findings would be reviewed and appropriate actions would be initiated.
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