IR 05000348/1993002
| ML20044B982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044B981 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-02, 50-348-93-2, 50-364-93-02, 50-364-93-2, NUDOCS 9303160040 | |
| Download: ML20044B982 (13) | |
Text
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UfdlTED ST ATES
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MUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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REGION li n
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., j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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Report Nos.:
50-348/93-02 and 50-364/93-02 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:
NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 8 - February 10, 1993 Inspectors: M M/C.
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e/ F r Resident Ins ector Date Signed Georg/. N xwe.'1, S
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J89E EntInspectorj Date Signed Michpl
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Approved by: 'IW NCEd
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Floyd S. pahtrbT1, Chtef
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Date'Signdd Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, licensee self-assessment, and Unit 2 forced shutdown activities. This report also has an enclosure which summarizes activities performed during the recent Unit 1 outage. Deep backshifts were performed January 17, 31 and February 5, 1993.
Results:
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During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed start-up activities associated with the recent Unit 1 outage. On January 30, a decision was made by the licensee, to shutdown Unit 2 and repair a code safety valve, paragraph 3.
On February 2, while the unit w2s in cold shutdown and during surveillance testing of emergency core cooling valve.;,1,384 gallons of primary water was injected into the reactor coolant system. This event resulted in an unresolved item, paragraph 5.b.
On February 3, while conducting a surveillance test, a power-operated relief valve (PORV) actuator was leaking air. A PORV block valve closed beyond the torque switch settings, paragraph 5.c.
On February 5, another unplanned injection occurred on Unit 2 during a surveillance test.
9303160040 930304 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
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This event will be tracked as an inspector follow-up item, paragraph 5.d.
During the inspection period,.the resident inspectors reviewed documentation associated with Unit 1 eleventh refueling outage activities, Attachment 1.
No violations or deviations were identified. Results of this inspection t
indicate that other activities reviewed were adequate.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- C. Buck, Technical Manager R. Coleman, Modification Manager L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste
- C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- E. Vines, Plant Operator
- G. Waymire, Shift foreman - Operations
- Attended the exit interview Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office. personnel.
On February ? - 3, D.M. Verrelli, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, Region II, met with resident inspectors and observed inspector activities.
On February 2 - 3, S.T. Hoffman, Project Manager, NRR, was on-site to follow-up on open items and to review activities associated'with the-service water dam and dike (ultimate heat sink) audit.
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On February 2 - 5, R.W. Writ t, Project Engineer, Project Section 18, Region II, was on-site for the audit ofJ the service water dam and dike
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and to assist the resident inspectors (Inspection' Report 50-348,364/93-
01).
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Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
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2.
Plant Status
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a.
Unit 1 Status
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t Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the
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reporting period.
b.
Unit 2 Status
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Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the-I reporting period.
However, on January 30, the unit.was shutdown l
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in order to repair a leaking pressurizer (PZR) code safety' valve.
The reactor was returned to power (critical) February 9 at 10:32 a.m. and achieved Mode l' operation, February 10 at 5:07 a.m.
c.
NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During.the week of January 19, Region II Security and Safeguards personnel conducted a routine inspection of the site safeguards systems and security staff.
Results of the inspection are documented in Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-03.
On February 2 and 3, NRC NMSS, NRR, Region II and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission technical advisory staff personnel conducted a special safety audit of the FNP service water dam and dike.
Results of the inspection are documented in Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-01, and in an audit report which will be submitted'to NRR from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
3.
Operational Safety Verification and Licensee Self-Assessment (71707 and 40500)
The resident inspectors conducted routine plant tours to a rify license requirements were being met.
The inspection tours included review of site documentation, interviews with plant personnel and an on-going evaluation of licensee self-assessment.
Plant Shutdown To Repair Code Safety Valve - Unit 2 On January 30, a decision was made to shutdown Unit 2 for repair of the
"B" code safety valve (Inspection Report 50-348,364/92-25, Paragraph
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3.b.; Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-364/92-25-01 and Inspection Report 50-348,364/92-35, Paragraph 3.b.).
At 4:00 p.m; the unit began ramp down and on January 31, at 4:36' a.m., the reactor was manually tripped. The safety valve was removed February 1 and a "new" code safety was installed. The "new" valve was successfully tested at pressure and rated ternperature on February 7.
The reactor was returned to power (critical) February 9 at.10:32 a.m. and achieved Mode 1 operation, February 10 at 5:07 a.m..
During the repair / replacement of the valve, an injection of 1,384 gallons of water into the open RCS occurred, (See paragraph 5.b).
No water was spilled and no one was contaminated.
The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions and
"B" code safety valve " replacement / post-repair activities". IFI 50-364/92-25-01, "High pressurizer "B" code safety valve tailpiece temperature excursions", will remain open until completion of post-repair items.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel generally conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable'-
procedure.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed various licensee preventative and corrective maintenance activities to determine conformance with facility l
procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
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MWR-254493; Main feedwater regulating valve "A" loop travel stop indicator broken - investigate and repair The inspectors noted that a new indicator was obtained and installed by FNP maintenance personnel.
The reason for the broken indicator was not readily apparent. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR.
a MWR-268727; Excess letdown control valve (HCV-137) controller had a moderate air leak - repair Inspectors observed maintenance department trouble-shooting efforts. Maintenance personnel found the leak, tighten controller air fittings and verified no further leaks from the fitting joint.
The valve was subsequently " cycled" to ensure proper valve movement. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with
directions contained in the MWR.
a MWR-269296; Replace Unit 2 pressurizer code safety valve "2B"
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Inspectors observed valve venting and removal activities. During the removal of the valve, a jacking device was used to vent i
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upstream residual pressure prior to unbolting the valve from the tailpiece flange.
After unbolting the valve, the valve was placed in plastic bagging and appropriate radiological control measures were performed. The valve was moved to the 155 ft. elevation " hot machine shop" for further evaluation.
Activities were performed in accordance with the " Crosby" relief valve vendor manual (7597-20-M61-Il4-1), directions contained in the work request and maintenance procedure 0-MP-3.3, Revision 0, Removal and Replacement of a Pressurizer Safety Valve.
m WA103808; Performance of 0-ETP-3610, " Determination of Movable Detector Operating Voltages" by I&C personnel Inspectors observed portions of this work authorization being l
performed and noted that proper materials and calibration
equipment were obtained from the I&C maintenance area. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the work authorization and the procedure.
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i No violations or daviations were identified in this area. The results of
inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both operations and
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maintenance personnel generally conducted assigned activities in l
accordance with applicable procedures.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components in order to verify that such activities
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were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory and licensee technical specification requirements.
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a.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
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a 1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements
2-STP-1.0 Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 i
Inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
s 2-STP-21.3; TDAFW Steam Supply Valves Inservice (ISI) Test
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Inspectors observed satisfactory stroke testing of the steam i
supply valves from steam generators (S/Gs) "2B" and "2C" and
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testing of the pump steam supply warm-up valves.
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2-STP-22.6; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train "B" Functional
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a Test
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The inspectors observed that the pump started satisfactorily and system valves changed to the " called-for" position.
a 2-STP-45.10; Main Feedwater Stop Valves Cold Shutdown ISI Test t
Inspectors observed satisfactory stroke testing of the Unit
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2 main feedwater stop valves.
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m 2-STP-45.ll; Functional Testing Of PORV 445 Inspectors observed portions of the test.
The test revealed that PORV 445 actuator had an excessive air leak.
Actuator bolts were tightened and MWR-270920 was issued to repair the
leaks.
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b.
Injection Of 1,384 Gallons of Primary Water To The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) - Unit 2
On February 2, during performance of STP-45.4, "ECCS Valve ISI
Test During Cold Shutdown", Steps 5.8, 5.9.1 and 5.9.2, the operator inappropriately opened the charging pump cross-connect valves "8132 A&B" prior to closing hot leg safety injection valve
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"8886"; a valve which was to have been cycled open and then
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closed. An observer, who was timing valve "8886" operation, noted
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that the valve had been stroked open, called the board operator to
ask why the valve had not been stroked closed.
During this time,
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control panel alarms indicated that an injection was in progress
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and water level was being lost from the volume control tank (VCT).
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The observer stated that he had heard flow noise through valve
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"8886" and reconnended that valve "8886" be closed.
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Before valve "8886" was closed, pressurizer (PZR) level increased
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from approximately 80 percent to 94 percent, VCT level decreased j
to less than 5 percent. The low level " switch-over" feature l
opened the suction valves from the RWST and closed the VCT suction valves. A total of 1,384 gallons of water was injected from the
'l RWST and VCT to the RCS, During the event, the "B" PZR code j
safety valve was being replaced by maintenance personnel (See j
Paragraph 4 MWR-269296).
j Subsequent actions by operations personnel included; 1)
i verification of valve "8886" closure, 2) increasing RCS letdown flow, 3) decreasing charging flow, 3) restoring PZR level to about
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80 percent, 4) restoring VCT level, 5) reopening of the VCT outlet
valves and 6) closure of the RWST suction valves. No water was.
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spilled and no contamination of personnel occurred. The operator
was " coached" and the operations staff was directed to adjust i
their own individual operating practices to ensure that one step f
of a procedure is completed "in full" prior to taking actions for i
the next step of the procedure.
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The plant operations staff documented the circumstances, which resulted in this injection of water, in plant incident report, IR-2-93-28 and indicated that valve "8886" was in the process of t
shutting when valves "8132A&B" were opened.
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In addition to the apparent procedure violation, the inspectors f
will review the licensee's final root cause analysis to determine;
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1) if STP-45.4 was violated, 2) if additional clearance tags, l
caution tags or other visible administrative controls as
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referenced and recommended by administrative procedure, AP-14,
Safety Clearance and Tagging, Revision 12, Step 7.1, should have
been implemented prior to conducting the test, and 3)-if allowing j
this test to be conducted with personnel working on the
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pressurizer code safety valve was a violation of AP-16, Conduct of
Operations - Operations Group, Revision 22, Step 3.1.10,4.
i This issue is similar to safety clearance and tagging problems
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experienced during the Unit 1 outage as discussed in Inspection
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This item is identified as unresolved item UNR 50-364/93-02-01,
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Inappropriate operator action results in injection of primary l
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water to the RCS. This item will remain open pending resolution j
of the issue.
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c.
PORV Air Leakage and Block Valve Binding - Unit 2 l
On February 3, during performance of surveillance test, 2-STP-45.11, " Miscellaneous Cold Shutdown Inservice Valve Test", on the i
Unit 2 PORVs and associated block valves, the air actuator for
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PORV "445A" was found to be loose and leaking air. An MWR was l
written to tighten the loose parts and connections.
Maintenance
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personnel completed MWR actions, February 3.
Also, during closure testing, PORV block valve "8000B" was found to have gone beyond
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the established actuator torque switch settings and, this, in turn, tripped the valve actuator power supply on overload.
MWR 270921 was written to troubleshoot the cause of the thermal
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overloads opening during valve stroke.
Initial inspections of the
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torque switch verified that the switch was operable and did not
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appear to be damaged.
Later inspections revealed grease weeping from the top joint between the spring cartridge cap and the main
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housing. This was the first evidence that a " hydraulic locking
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spring pack was hydraulically locked and prevented the switch from l
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Grease level in the MOV was satisfactory and the housing vent was
not clogged.
However, the spring pack and cartridge cap were full of grease. This was determined to be caused by the actuator having a tilt due to a slope in the piping and grease migrated to
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the spring pack area. No visible degradation of the internal i
gearing was noted. However, the stop nut for the stem had moved
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about an eighth of an inch. This was determined to be caused by
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"over-thrusting" due to hydraulic locking.
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l Westinghouse was contacted to assess valve "over-thrusting". All i
internally stressed components were replaced and a grease relief kit was installed for relief of grease from the spring pack back to the main housing.
Procedures are now being revised to note if other MOVs are placed on a " tilt". A walkdown is planned for the l
next Unit I and 2 outages for inspection of " tilted" MOVs.
d.
Safety Injection (SI) When Exiting Surveillance Testing - Unit 2
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On February 5, at 3:48 a.m.,
an SI occurred on Unit 2.
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had performed and was exiting, STP-33.0A, Solid State Protection System Testing. When the SI signal " blocks" failed to reset (or were not reset). This surveillance is a prerequisite in preparation for a mode change from a cold shutdown to a hot shutdown condition. Management is continuing to investigate the cause of the event.
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The SI caused all associated SI train "A" equipment to actuate.
RCS pressure was approximately 300 psig which was above the low head SI pump shutoff head of about 250 psig.
The "A" high head SI (HHSI) pump injected approximately 100 gallons into the RCS and PZR level increased from 20 to 22 percent. The HHSI pump was secured approximately 2 minutes after actuation. The "lC" and "1-2A" D/Gs auto-started but did not tie to the vital busses as the busses were already energized from off-site power.
Phase "A" containment and MSIV isolation signals were also received. All systems, including the D/Gs, MSIVs and containment SI components functioned as expected and were returned to normal line-ups following the event. During the event RCS temperature increased from 190 degrees F to 192 degrees.
Until the inspectors can fully determine the circumstances, this item is identified as an inspector follow-up item (IFI) 50-364/93-02-02, Safety injection when exiting surveillance testing.
No other violations and no deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in this area indicate that personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
6.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on February 9, 1993, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
UNR 50-364/93-02-01 was initially identified as an NCV; however, based on additional information obtained by the inspector after the exit interview, the licensee was informed that this issue would be unresolved pending additional inspection findings.
The licensee was informed that IFl 50-364/92-25-01 remains open. During i
the exit interview, the inspectors requested that they receive detailed
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information concerning the "as found" condition of the removed "2B" code safety valve.
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 50-364/93-02-01 (UNR)
Inappropriate operator action results in an injection of primary water to the RCS.
50-364/93-02-02 (IFI)
Safety Injection when. exiting surveillance testing.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations AFW
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"As Low As Reasonably Achievable" A0P
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Abnormal Operating Procedure AP
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Administrative Procedure CVCS
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Chemical and Volume Control System CCW
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Component Cooling. Water CS
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Containment Spray System DDFP
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Diesel Driven Fire Pump D/G
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Emergency. Diesel Generator ECP
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Emergency Contingency Procedure EIP
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Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EOF
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Emergency Operatioes facility EP
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Engineered Safety Features FNP
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Farley Nuclear Plant GPM
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Gallons Per Minute HHSI
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High Head Safety Injection HSB
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Hot Stan&y I&C
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Instrumentation and Controls IN
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Information Notice 151
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Inservice Inspection IST
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Inservice Test LC0
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Limiting Condition for Operation LHSI
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Low Head Safety Injection LLRT
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Local Leak Rate Testing LER Licensee Event Report
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MDFP
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Motor Driven Fire Pump MOV
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Motor-0perated Valve MOVATS
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Motor nperated Valve Actuation Testing MSIV
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Main Steam Isolation Valve MWR
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Maintenance Work Request NI
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Nuclear Instrumentation
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Nuclear Steam Supply System l-0ATC
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Operator.at the Controls OSHA
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Occupational Saf ety and Health Administration PCN
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Plant Change Notice
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Plant Change Request
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Plant Modifications Department l
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Power Operated Relief Valve PPB Parts Per Billion
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Parts Per Million PR
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Power Range-PRT Pressurizer. Relief Tank
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PSID
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Pressure per Square Inch Differential PZR
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Pressurizer RCP
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Reactor Coolant Pump RCS
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Resistance Temperature Detector
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Refueling Water Storage Tank S/G
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Safety Injection SAER
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Safety Audit and Engineering Review SCS
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Southern Company Services
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Shift Foreman - Inspecting
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Shift Foreman - Operating
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Steam Generator Feedwater Pump S0
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Systems Operator
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Spent Fuel Pool SNC
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company r
50P
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Standard Operation Procedure
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Systems Performance Group SPDS
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Safety Parameter Display System SS
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Shift Supervisor
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SSPS
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Solid State Protection System
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"Stop, Think, Act, Review"
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Surveillance Test Procedure
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Service Water System TS
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Technical Specification VCT
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Volume Control Tank
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Work Authorization
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ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 ELEVENTH REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY (60710)
The resident inspectors noted that the Unit 1 eleventh refueling outage was scheduled for 54 days and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Actual outage duration was 67 days, 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> and 39 minutes.
Some major contributors to the delay included:
a Nozzle dam installation a S/G eddy current testing and sleeving a
RHR pump work u
Diesel generator work The inspectors also noted that plant management emphasized outage safety and a reduction in " risk" by:
Extending the outage 3.5 days to unload the core prior to mid-loop m
operations.
Minimizing plant time at mid-loop with a loaded core, by m
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performing all corrective / preventative maintenance during mid-loop operations with an unloaded core.
Performing a safety assessment of the initial outage schedule.
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Establishing and monitoring outage safety parameters during the a
outage period.
This helped tracking of both plant and personnel performance. These parameters were displayed in many areas of the plant and were updated on a daily basis.
s Plant management continued to emphasize improvements in overall plant safety and risk reduction by:
Providing a detailed review of all outstanding corrective and a
preventative maintenance items performed to ensure no outage work which could affect plant reliability was deferred.
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Upgrading the plant with the use of the design change process.
s This process improved the margin of safety and plant reliability; i.e., installation of station blackout modifications and replacement of original small bore carbon steel service watar piping with stainless steel.
FNP management also continued to emphasize improvements in human performance and personnel communications. These enhancements included:
m Establishment of the " STAR" ("Stop", "Think", "Act" and " Review")
personal self-assessment program.
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m Performance of root cause analysis following INPO guidelines.
m Increased use of pre-job briefings, particularly in areas of infrequently performed tasks and evolutions.
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Attachment 1
m Additional simulator training on start-ups with positive moderator temperature coefficients.
m Periodic plant-wide " stand downs" in order to perform briefings which emphasize commitments to safety and outage progress.
Significant events which occurred involved, 1) contamination of a worker during local leak rate testing due to inadequate tagging of the system,
[See Inspection Report 50-348/92-24, Paragraph 3.b(3)] and 2) an ESF actuation during surveillance testing due to inappropriate jumper placement (See Inspection Report 50-348/92-25, Paragraph 5.b.).
Numerous, less significant, events were identified using the " STAR" program and incident reports were generated and presented. The following areas were common to most of the outage events:
a Poor communication - The biggest failing in this area is the lack
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of feedback between personnel.
Personnel assumed instructions and information was understood without verification and personnel providing information did not actively demand feedback.
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e lack of self-verification - Personnel were not always asking if their actions were in agreement with instructions or if the indications they received were expected and, at times, they failed to fully use all the elements of " STAR".
The resident inspectors noted that throughout the outage there was an i
improvement in personal safety awareness on the part of each outage employee and contractor.
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t Site management indicated that implementation of the above program
changes and " enhancements" contributed to a reduction in the number of sianificant events that occurred during the outage. Management concluded
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that the outage was a success based on the improvements achieved in the
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area of human performance.
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