IR 05000348/1993011
| ML20046B720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046B714 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-11, 50-364-93-11, NUDOCS 9308060111 | |
| Download: ML20046B720 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES
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k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
REGION 11 5,
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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%,.... 4 Report Nos.:
50-348/93-11 and 50-364/93-11 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 21 - June 29, 1993 Inspectors:
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9.3 G. F. (Maxwell Se or Resident Inspector DaAe Sfgned
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gw M. J./ Mo esi t. Inspector Bate / Signed R. W. Wright, Project Engineer M. A. Scott, Resident Inspector, St. Lucie B. R. Bonser, Sr. Resident Inspector, Vogtle I
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Approved by:
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Floyd S. Cantrell, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Se'ction IB l
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, licensee self-assessment, industry technical issues and event reports and follow-up of various plant events. Deep backshifts were performed June 3, 4, 16 and 17, 1993.
Results:
On May 21, operations personnel deferred lubrication of certain valves until
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the qualification of the available grease was determined, paragraph 3.
Recent industry technical issues were addressed satisfactorily by the licensee, i
paragraph 6.
On June 23, the inspectors attended a meeting of the Plant Operations Review Committee, paragraph 7.
Licensee action was taken on previous inspection findings and event reports and was adequate, paragraph 8.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnei were adequate.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review C. Buck, Technical Manager
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R. Coleman, Modification Manager P. Crone, Superintendent, Operations Support
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L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
- R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
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J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- W. Jaasma, Safety Audit and Engineering Review - Lead Auditor i
- Attended the exit interview Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations i
personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.
From June 7 - 10, R. Wright, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Branch IB, assisted the resident inspectors in performance of inspection
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activities.
From June 14 - 18, M. Scott, Resident Inspector, St. Lucie, assisted the resident inspectors in performance of inspection activities.
From June 21 - 25, B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle, assisted the resident inspectors in performance of inspection activities.
On June 25, P. Stohr, Director, RII Division of Radiation Safety and
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Safeguards, toured FNP in preparation for an upcoming licensee assessment.
On June 29, A. Gibson, Director, RII Division of Reactor Safety, toured FNP in preparation for an upcoming licensee assessment.
Acronyms and initializations used.throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status a.
Units 1 and 2 Status Units 1 & 2 operated at full power for most of the reporting period.
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b.
NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During the week of June 21, Region II Radiological Effluents and Chemistry personnel conducted an inspection of chemistry /
radiological waste training, documentation, and handling (report 50-348,364/93-12).
During the week of June 28, Region II personnel from Division of Reactor Safety conducted an inspection in the area of engineering and technical support (Report 50-348,364/93-15).
c.
Changes in Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) Personnel On May 1, SNC's board of directors elected Mr. J.D. Woodard, Vice President (Farley) to Executive Vice President of Southern Nuclear Operating Company.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements were being met. Tours included review of site documentation, interviews with plant personnel and an on-going evaluation of licensee self-assessment.
Status / Implementation of New Lubrication Program Controls - Unit 2
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On May 21, the inspectors observed that day shift opirations personnel obtained four (4) one-pound tubes of grease from the warehouse for use
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in the Unit 2 TDAFWP trip / throttle valve. The attarhed FNP acceptance tag did not list batch numbers for the grease. An aperations review of the purchase order did not identify the references to batch number (s).
Storeroom personnel stated that the original 35-pound containers had been transferred into one-pound tubes. This action of placing grease from the larger containers into tubes without reference to the. batch numbers on all the tubes, was not per FNP's "new" lubrication program control guidelines (SNC letter dated February 23, 1993, responding to Notice of Violation). Operations personnel decided not to use the grease and did not lubricate the TDAFWP until the identification problem was resolved. On June 7, after discussions with vendor personnel,
store-room personnel were able to identify proper batch numbers for the grease. The inspectors verified that storeroom forms have been revised to reflect batch number requirements for future purchases. The
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inspectors noted that the above licensee actions were consistent with FNP's efforts to improve their lubrication program, and the inspectors will continue to monitor such controls.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure..
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed.various FNP preventative / corrective maintenance l
activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work j
requests and NRC regulatory requirements.
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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
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MWR-277641; "I-2A" D/G "A" air compressor repair internals j
While performing preventative maintenance activities on the "A"
air compressor, metal shavings were found in the compressor
crankcase. The inspectors observed the internals area being
cleaned,. parts being replaced, and the crankcase inspection. The l
compressor was returned to service after testing. The work
performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions
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contained in the MWR and air compressor service / technical manual.
b.
MWR-277903; Unit 2 TDAFWP Local Control Panel - blown control
lamp - replace-l Troubleshooting revealed a blown control valve "open" light. The
inspectors observed the installation and testing of the
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replacement bulb. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR.
c.
MWR-253915; Clapper valve "2TR-64" pressure switch - possible
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grounding problem - investigate and repair
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D.C. grounds in the Unit 2 turbine building appeared when the
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clapper actuated. The' inspector witnessed checks being made on
pressure switch connections, terminals cleaned and the wires being i
reconnected. No other grounding was apparent. Work performed was
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satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the
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MWR package.
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MWR-251375; Diesel generator 20 jacketwater return header temperature indicator would not
calibrate properly.
The inspectors observed that the associated temperature indicator (TI 573) was replaced. The test records examined verified that the new indicator was properly calibrated and placed into service.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of
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inspections in the maintenance area indicate _that both operations and-l maintenance personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with
applicable procedures.
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-
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related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory i
and licensee technical specification requirements.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
a.
1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements i
2-STP-1.0 Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 The inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
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b.
1-STP-10.0; ECCS Subsystem Flowpath Verification Test The inspectors observed satisfactory verification of ECCS subsystem alignment.
Proper alignment was determined and documented.
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c.
1-STP-27.2; On-site AC Distribution The inspectors verified proper electrical alignment l
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for the specified buses that are energized from AC sources other than the emergency diesel generators.
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Those verified were for 4160V AC, 600V AC and for the
DC battery buses.
d.
1-STP-80.1; Diesel Generator IB Operability Test I
The inspectors reviewed the completed test results for this STP and found that the test was conducted as prescribed and indicated that the D/G was operable.
e.
2-STP-16.5; Containment Spray System Flow Path Verification
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The inspectors verified that each of the containment
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spray valves which are controlled from the main control board were correctly positioned to assure the proper flow path if called upon to function.
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1-STP-22.8; Auxiliary Feedwater Inservice Valve Exercise Test The inspectors observed satisfactory stroke testing (" cycling") of system valves.
Valve operability was determined to be satisfactory.
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0-STP-26.3; Control Room Ventilation Isolation Test f
The inspectors observed satisfactory operability testing (" cycling") of the control room ventilation system damper valves.
The surveillance also tested the radiation monitor "R35A" to
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initiate the automatic closure of the ventilation valves.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the surveillance area indicate that personnel conducted
assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
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6.
Industry Technical Issues - Resident Inspector Inquires 'and FNP Response The licensee was questioned relative to events / problems that have occurred at other nuclear facilities.
a.
Inoperable Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) --
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Problem: At another plant, the ATWS/AMSAC system was found to have been inoperable due to improper troubleshooting software changes.
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Inadequate post-maintenance testing resulted in the errors going
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undetected for six months.
(Information Notice 92-106, Supplement
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FNP Response:
Software modifications to FNP AMSAC systems and installation of changes are controlled by plant administrative procedures.
Periodic validation of the software is performed in i
conjunction with surveillance testing. System actuation setpoints l
are controlled by a plant limitations /setpoints document. Return to service testing following maintenance invokes the performance
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of the system quarterly surveillance test.
Upon review, the inspectors found FNP's response to the issue to be acceptable.
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b.
Reactor Head Instrument Tube Cracks
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Problem: A concern was expressed with reactor head instrument
tubing cracks found in some foreign reactors.
Region II asked for
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any history of a similar condition at FNP.,
t FNP Response:
FNP has not had a problem with instrument tubing
cracks and FNP believes that Region II may have asked for a
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response because of unrelated issue cracks found in Incore Flux Mannino Tubina. These problem occurred approximately four years i
ago.
Further research revealed that Westinghouse is aware of the
problem and is actively working on it. The problem is not with
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the head instrument tubing, but rather with rod control and incore thermocouple vessel head ports. Some foreign reactors have had i
such cracking and Westinghouse is expected to make
recommendations.
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FNP is aware of the concern and stated that FNP is considered to be a low risk plant because the materials used at Farley are different from those used in those particular plants. Upon review, the inspectors found FNP's response to the issue to be acceptable.
c.
Velan Globe Valve Anti-Rotational Key Breakage Problem: At another plant that uses nine 2-inch Velan-type globe valves in various plant safety systems, the licensee identified a failure of one of the valves to fully close due to the anti-rotational key being broken.
i FNP Response: Eight safety-related valves (6 charging pump mini-flow valves and 2 emergency boration valves) were of the same type found at the other plant and could be susceptible to a similar failure. A records search revealed that these valves have not had any broken keys.
FNP plans to inspect and replace, if necessary, such keys. Upon review, the inspectors found FNP's response to the issue to be acceptable.
7.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
Inspectors attended a meeting of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) on June 23. The meeting was chaired by the General Manager -
Nuclear Plant and a quorum was present as required by Technical Specification 6.5.1. The agenda included discussions of licensee event reports, a licensee response to an NRC violation and revisions to site security procedures.
Members were prepared for the discussions, had knowledge of the issues, and discussion among the PORC members was uninhibited and encouraged by the chairman of the committee.
PORC activities were adequate. No violations / deviations were identified.
8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings and Licensee Event Reports (92700 and 92702)
(Closed) Unit 1 NOV 50-348/91-16-01, Operator error which resulted in an unplanned reactor trip. The licensee acknowledged the violation in a letter dated October 1,1991, which also described commitments for corrective action. A reactor trip occurred on August 2, 1991, when an OATC allowed an 50 to cycle an electrical circuit breaker from the
" closed" to the "open" and back to " closed" position. This circuit breaker supplied power to the protection system and when opened it caused a reactor coolant pump breaker "open" signal to be generated.
This personnel error was caused by inadequate labeling of the circuit breaker and inadequate communications between the 50 and the OATC.
Personnel have been counseled, the inspector verified the circuit breaker has a very clear warning on it, and communications have improved between the S0s and the OATCs. This item is close.
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(Closed) Unit 1 LER 348-92-004, Fire door blocked open without fire watch. An individual placed a fire door ajar without a fire watch being posted near the door. The inspectors noted that even though the T.S.
was violated, a roving hourly fire watch was patrolling the general area during the time when the door was left ajar.
Record show that responsible personnel have been reinstructed to question conditions which they observe and to verify that fire watches, etc.., have been
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posted. This condition has occurred a limited number of times in
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previous years and is not indicative of site practices. This item is
closed.
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(Closed) Unit 1, LER 348-92-006, LOSP actuation due to inadvertent contact while installing jumper. On October 28, 1992, while conducting i
an STP on the "B" train "B1G" sequencer, an electrician inadvertently contacted, (with a jumper wire), an incorrect electrical terminal located on the inside of the sequencer panel. The inspectors observed that it was physically very difficult to access the area where the
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" correct" terminal was located. The inspector verified that procedures
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have been upgraded to aid in the reduction of the likelihood of this occurring again. Additional verbal training is being provided for each person involved with the installation of jumper wires in energized electrical circuits. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unit 2, LER 364-92-004, Missed TS actions due to operator
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error. On May 9, 1992, a plant operator, while performing an STP on the PZR pressure channels, left pressure transmitter (PT-455) channel in an inoperable condition. This personnel error was caused by inadequate communications during a shift turnover between plant operators.
Operators have been " coached" on inadequate turnovers and the shift supervisor was " coached" for not providing a more thorough review of completed STPs.
A communications procedure and a control room conduct i
procedure have been developed that could reduce similar communications problems. The inspectors have observed improved communications in the operations department during the past four months. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unit 2, LER 364-92-007, Manual reactor trip following a loss of steam generator feed pump (SGFP). On May 25, 1992, a control room operator manually tripped the reactor upon observation that the "2A"
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SGFP had tripped.
The unit was operating at 100 percent power and would have automatically tripped, probably on low steam generator water level.
Operator intervention and the manual tripping of the reactor, reduced fluctuations on the plant primary and secondary systems. The SGFP tripped due to a degraded lube oil pump. The inspectors observed repairs made to the lube oil pump and noted that plans have been made to modify the pump during the September, 1993 outage. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unit 2, LER 364-92-008, Reactor trip due to de-energization of stationary gripper coils in the rod control cabinet. An electrician mistakenly removed the fuses for 12 rods powered by the "lBD" rod control power cabinet. This event was caused by maintenance personnel error and poor work planning. The inspectors verified that the individuals involved were " coached" and daily planning now coordinates i
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their actions more closely with the applicable maintenance foreman. The licensee's emphasis on self-verification has reduced the possibility for recurrence of this type of error.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unit 2, NOV 50-364/92-19-01, Reactor trip due to personnel i
error and the inadvertent de-energization of the Unit 2 rod control system stationary gripper coils. The licensee's response to the violation dated August 5,1992, was considered acceptable by Region II.
The inspectors evaluated the corrective actions and circumstances associated with this NOV, and those actions taken with the above related LER 92-008. Based on the observations noted while evaluating these LER
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corrective actions, this item is also closed.
(Closed) Unit 2, LER 364-92-010, Manual reactor trip due to low levels in all steam generators. On September 10, 1992, while operating at 65 percent power, an 0ATC manually tripped the reactor.
He performed the trip after observing a loss of condensate pump net positive suction head pressure and the subsequent loss of the SGFP suction pressure. This loss resulted in a significant reduction in feedwater flow to all steam generators. The event was initiated by a personnel error involving the isolation of one of the in-service condenser cooling sections. This caused an increase in hotwell temperature, saturation of the condensate,
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and a subsequent loss of hotwt 1 level. The incorrect isolation of the j
in-service condenser waterbox section was caused by poor " human engineering" concerning both the labeling and placement of the waterbox isolation valve pushbutton controls and inappropriate operation of the local control station by the operator. The inspectors verified that the pushbutton local control station has been re-labeled to reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding which control station is associated with a particular set of waterbox isolation valves.
This item is closed.
j (Closed) Unit 2, LER 364-93-002, Missed TS surveillance on the TDAFWP.
The inspectors evaluated the missed TS surveillances on the Unit 2 TDAFWP and documented the results in Region II inspection report 50-348,364/93-06. A NCV was identified based on the inspectors
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evaluation of the circumstances and conditions listed in the report. No further action is requested, therefore this item is closed.
(Closed) Unit 1, LER 348-92-003; Inadvertent actuation of engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment. On July 28, 1992 while conducting an augmented test on "B1F" electrical sequencer using procedure 0-STP-226.01A and 1-STP-80.3, the 1A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the 1A residual heat removal pumps inadvertently started. These pumps i
l started when an electrical jumper was incorrectly placed, defeating the
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circuitry designed to prevent inadvertent starts during testing.
Additional errors which contributed to the pump starts included i
inadvertent depressing the sequencer test reset pushbutton and depressing the sequencer test pushbutton as part of the testing. The inspectors verified that the operator involved with this test was
" coached" on the importance of self-verification and that the shift supervisor was " coached" on the need to fully investigate abnormal circumstances related to an activity or test prior to continuing the l
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activity. The inspectors observed that the test procedure, 0-STP-
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226.01A had been revised to clarify the required jumper connection points. Procedure guidelines for the use of jumpers have been made to ensure proper guidance prior to installing jumpers.
Electrical and instrumentation maintenance personnel have been instructed to assure that they have proper guidance prior to installing jumpers. This item is closed.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on June 28, 1993, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that
items contained in paragraph 8 were closed.
10.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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s AMSAC -
ATWS Mitigation Actuation Circuitry
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Administrative Procedure ATWS
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Anticipated Transient Without Scram CCW
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Component Cooling Water CS
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Containment Spray System D/G
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Emergency Diesel Generator DRP
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Division of Reactor Prcjects ECCS
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Emergency Core Cooling System EP
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Engineered Safety Features FNP
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Farley Nuclear Plant I&C
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Instrumentation and Controls LC0
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Limiting Condition for Operation LLRT -
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Licensee Event Report LOSP
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Loss of Site Power MOV
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Motcr-Operated Valve MWR
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Maintenance Work Request Non-cited Violation NCV
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NI
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Nuclear Instrumentation NOV
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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0ATC -
Operator at the Controls PORC
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Plant Operations Review Committee PORY -
Power Operated Relief Valve RHR
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Steam Generator Feedwater Pump SO
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Systems Operator SNC
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company SSPS -
Solid State Protection System STP
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Surveillance Test Procedure
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Service Water System SWS
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TDAFWP -
Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Technical Specification TS
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