IR 05000348/1993008
| ML20045E570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E551 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-08, 50-348-93-8, 50-364-93-08, 50-364-93-8, NUDOCS 9307020205 | |
| Download: ML20045E570 (12) | |
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ARR0 UMITED STATES ff k
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON g
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o REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST REET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-348/93-08 and 50-364/93-08 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL. 35201-1295 Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley I and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 16 - May 21, 1993 Inspectors: MM r-
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Ahb GeorgeVHaxwell,[SEiorResidentInspector Date Signed Sh
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Michae'i J g gan, 8es d t Inspector Date Signed Approved by: N
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Floyd S.&Cantrell, Chief
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Date Signed Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects
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S MMARY Scope:
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This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, fire protection, emergency safety system walkdown and self-es;iessment activities. Deep backshifts were performed May 20 and 21.
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Results:
An increase in componertt cooling water radiation activities was identified and the Unit 2 chemical and volume control _ system excess letdown heat exchanger was isolated, paragraph 3.a.
The system operator suffered injuries to his eyes (caustic burns) and face while performing an emergency diesel generator air dryer operability surveillance test procedure on'the "2C" emergency diesel generator, paragraph 3.b.
The electrical maintenance group placed a new
" plant relamping practice" in service, paragraph 4.b.
The fire protection /
prevention-program was evaluated and-found to have-strengthsiand-improvements, paragraph 6.
A walkdown of the accessible portions of the service water intake structure was performed, paragraph 7.
On May 12, a wrong unit emergency diesel generator was removed from service. A violation was issued for this event, paragraph 8.
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No other violations or deviations were identified.
Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel were adequate.
9307020205 930608 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
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REPORT DETAILS
'1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review
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- B. Bell, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
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- C. Buck, Technical Manager
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L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
- J. Haynes, Fire Marshall R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics-and Radwaste
- C Nesbitt, Operations Manager
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J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J. Powell, Unit Supervisor - Plant Operations
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- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations-
- J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- R. Whitehead, Safety Engineer
- Attended the exit interview-Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.
Acronyms and initializations used throughout this-report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
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a.
Unit 1 Status Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of-the:
reporting period,
b.
Unit 2 Status Unit 2 operated at appro>imately 99' percent power for most of:the -
reporting period. Howe)'.r,.on May 5, power was reduced to 35
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percent for containment antry and isolation of the excess. letdown
heat exchanger. On May 6,.the unit'was returned to full power.-
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On May 15, power was. reduced to 80 percent to allow for
replacement of the "2C" condensate pump lower sleeve guide
bearing. On May 17, the unit was.again returned to full power.
c.
NRC/L.icensee Meetings and-Inspections
During the week of-April 26, Region II-Security / Safeguards-personnel conducted a' routine inspection of guard training,....
j physical barriers and access authorization. (Inspection Report 50-i 348,364/93-09).
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During the week of May 10, Region II Emergency Preparedness personnel performed a routine site emergency preparedness inspection. (Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-10).
On May 17-19, Mr. T.A. Reed, Project Manager, NRR, was on-site to follow-up on open items and to observe resident inspector activities.
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d.
Changes in Southern Nuclear Operating Company Management Personnel On May 1, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company board of directors named Mr. R.P. Mcdonald, Chairman of the Board. He will'
also continue to serve as SNC's Chief Executive Officer until his retirement June 1, 1993. Mr. W.G. Hairston, III, formerly SNC's Executive Vice President, was named to replace Mr. Mcdonald as President. He was also tasked as the Chief Operating Officer. Mr.
H.A. Franklin, President and Chief Executive Officer of Southern Company Services, will become SNC's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer following the retirement of Mr. Mcdonald.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements are being met. The inspection tours included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel.
a.
CVCS Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Isolation - Unit 2 On April 26, FNP's chemistry department identified a slight increase in radiation activities in the Unit 2 CCW system. Plant operators and chemistry personnd determined that the CVCS excess letdown heat exchangar had developed a tube leak. Efforts were made to isolate the RCS from the heat exchanger by closure of two RCS inlet air-operated valves, "8153" and "8154".
After closing these valves, some leakage was still present.
On May 5, Unit 2 was ramped down to 35 percent power to allow for a containment entry and closure of the manual isolation valves to the heat exchanger. On May 6, a containment entry was made and the RCS manual inlet isolation valve, "V007", and the manual CCW supply and return valves, "V076" and "V078" were closed.
Prior to the heat exchanger isolation, a 10 CFR 50.59 review was completed-and evaluated-by the PORC.-The-inspectors reviewed the
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evaluation and found it to be acceptable. The staff is currently scheduling the heat exchanger for tube repair.
Repairs are to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage and until that time, the heat exchanger will remain isolated unless needed for emergency service; e.g. loss of normal letdown. Under such conditions, the 50.59 review has provided limitations and conditions under which the heat exchanger can be operated and the inspectors found these proposed actions to be acceptabl b.
System Operator (S0) Injury On May 12, a 50 suffered a caustic burn injury to his eyes and face while performing a D/G air dryer operability STP on the "2C" D/G.
STP-154.3, "2C" D/G Air Dryer Operability Verification, step 5.2.4, required, after blowing down and depressurizing the air dryer, the slow removal of the air dryer cover. The dryer continued to be pressurized while the S0 was removing the cover.
This resulted in tb
"er and dryer desiccant to be blown upward and into the 50's and eyes, even though he was wearing his safety glasses.
.s capable of reaching the D/G work station
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and he called f or assistance.
First aid and flushing was administered by plant personnel until his arrival at a local hospital. At the time of this report, the extent of the S0's injuries was being determined.
The inspectors reviewed the design of the dryers and noted that each dryer has a 1/16 inch vent port manufactured in the housing.
This vent allows for venting of the dryer during cap removal.
Initial investigation into the event revealed that some, but not all, S0s are aware of the presence and purpose of this vent.
It was known, but not yet " common knowledge", that these vents occasionally required " wiring out" for continued venting of the dryer during cover removal. This vent was also found to be plugged with paint / sealant. This continual venting operation is being considered, by management, for inclusion in a revision to the STP. As part of the corrective action, venting wires have been attached to the dryers for clean out and continuous venting during future air dryer desiccant changeouts.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
i The inspectors reviewed various licensee preventative and corrective j
maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements,.
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a.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
m MWR-257858; Install temporary clamp on main turbine EH-system-emergency trip control block A " strong-back"/ bolting system was used to seal-off a small hydraulic oil leak on the end of the EH system control block. This repair was similar to one implemented prior to the 1991 Unit I refueling outage. A leak test was conducted.
Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions in the MWR.
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m MWR-257884;' Replace packing in the fire protection system
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jockey pump
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The original pump' packing had developed a leak, and appeared to be " blown".
Proper replacement packing was obtained, the old packing was removed and. replaced.- Pump operability _ and leak tests were conducted. Work was satisfactory'and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR and pump vendor manual.
m MWR-261226;- Spent fuel pool supply fan flex boot connection has developed an air leak inspect and replace Trouble-shooting efforts were observed. The airLleak was.
q found, a new boot obtained, silicone sealant was applied to..
t connections and the new boot was installed. Work performed.
was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained
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in the MWR.
b.
Improved plant relamping practices - Units 1 and 2 In an attempt to improve lighting in all areas which require repair or observation of operating equipment, the maintenance
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group placed a new " plant relamping practice" in service.
Individuals call the answering system, report which lampsLare out and note the location of the lamps or fixtures in need of repair.
Shop orders / maintenance work requests are no longer needed to
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report relamping needs. _ Inspectors continue to monitor the above.
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to note if relamping practices improve.
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No violations or deviations were identified'in this area. Th'e results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both. operations and l
maintenance personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with
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applicable procedures.
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety -
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related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities
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and licensee technical specification requirements.
t The following-surveillance-activities were-observed:
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a 1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements'
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2-STP-1.0, Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
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1-STP-10.3; Emergency Core Cooling Valve Inservice Test and PORV Block Valve Stoke Test
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Inspectors observed portions of this test. The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
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u 1-STP-22.19; Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Flow Path Verification v
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After scheduled maintenance the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was manually started and functionally eccepted due to flow parameters being met. The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
m 1-STP-33.0A; Solid State Protection System (SSPS)' Operability Test Inspectors observed satisfactory completion of this test which
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assures that the SSPS will function as required. The test was
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l performed in accordance with approved plant procedures.
n 2-STP-33.2A; Reactor Trip Breaker Train "A" Operability Test The inspectors observed tripping of the breakers, voltage checks, bypass breakers checks and testing of the undervoltage trip features. The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
No violations and no deviations were identified in this area. The-results of inspections in this surveillance area indicate that personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with ap. icable procedures.
6.
Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)
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On January.12, 1993, NRR issued amendments to both the Unit 1 and Unit.2 operating licenses which allowed for the removal of the fire protection program from the TS. This amendment allowed the program to be placed into plant procedures and the FSAR.
The inspectors evaluated adequacy of the site fire protection program described in the FSAR and.FNP's procedures, a.
Adequacy and Implementation'of the QA Program for Fire Protection-j An audit of the program was conducted by SAER in March, 1993.
Audit-findings were thorough and provided a good evaluation of; 1).
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fire surveillance procedures and inspections, 2) adequacy of housekeeping cleanliness control procedures, 3) maintenance of fire protection equipment, 4) fire protection pump test results,
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and 5) system pressure gauge calibrations.
The audit identified two non-compliances; 1) fire. protection STPs.
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written by maintenance which did not receive cross-disciplinary-review by the site fire marshall and 2) smoke detecbrs at'the
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6 service water intake structure not receiving sensitivity checks every two years. Corrective actions have been completed for both of these SAER findings.
The inspectors reviewed changes which have been made to the program since fire protection has been removed from the TS.
Changes included,1) redesignating procedural identifiers /
references and 2) recommending revisions to FSAR, Section 98.
b.
Administration / Fire Control Capabilities The inspectors evaluated nine recently completed activities which placed portions of the fire detection or suppression systems in a disarmed or inoperable condition. In each instance, LC0 status sheets / controls were present to assure'that required compensatory measures were in place.
Training / qualification records for two personnel chosen as fire brigade members on May 5, 1993, were evaluated.
FNP Records reflected that they were trained in accordance with the fire
brigade training procedure, TCP-17.21, Fire Brigade Training i
Initial / Retraining Program Administration, Revision 4.
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c.
Fire Risk Maintenance Evolutions On March 9, (during a previous reporting period) the inspectors observed Unit 1 main turbine generator #4 governor valve removal / repair activities. Work included grinding and welding. An open flame permit was issued to authorize work as required by the procedure AP-38, Use of Open Flame, Revision 9.
On May 7, the inspectors observed grinding activities on the east wall of Unit I turbine generator building. A fire watch was present and a records review revealed that work was properly authorized'with an open flame permit issued on April 29.
d.
Records of Surveillance Tests The inspectors evaluated the STP results on yard piping, fire hose stations, CO2 systems, and hydrant hose houses.
These recently completed tests demonstrated that the fire suppression systems were operable and have been tested at the prescribed FSAR and fire procedure frequencies.
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Fire Alarm and Supervisory Signaling Systems The inspectors evaluated-July,1992 STP results authorized by WA-105300 and January, 1993 STP results authorized by WA-104720.
Tests verified operability of fire alarms, annunciation and computer alarm systems for fire protection.
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Plant Tours and Visual Inspection The inspectors toured various plant areas and observed the following; 1) standpipe / hose stations were operable, 2) portable
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extinguishers are in designated areas, 3) access to fire suppression devices was unrestricted, 4) general condition of fire suppression equipment was acceptable, 5) fire dampers and doors were functional, 6) emergency breathing apparatus was operable and available to the control room, and 7) fire watch personnel were knowledgeable of their duties, g.
Reduction of Leaks In Yar'd Loop Piping In the past 12 months, fire protection personnel have demonstrated a heightened awareness concerning the number of leaks in yard loop piping. Manpower and resources have been increased in this area and leaks have been significantly reduced. The largest contributors to leak reduction involved replacement of the jockey pump. The pump was replaced on January 25, 1993, due to reduced capacity and this action restored operating flow rate and pressure to normal. The original design operating parameters reduced the number of motor-driven fire pump starts and operating hours to minimum. Replacement of the jockey pump is an improvement to the system since the pump replacement has reduced stresses on the yard loop piping caused by the frequent starting, stopping, and running of the motor-driven fire pump, h.
Weaknesses in the Program
The inspectors conducted a followup on a weakness identified in RII report 50-348,364/92-29, concerning reluctance to use protective clothing and breathing apparatus during fire drills.
The training department has stressed to fire brigade members, the
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requirement for them to properly dress for drills and for actual fire protection emergencies. The inspectors verified that this message has been provided to each fire brigade member.
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Strengths and Improvements Strengths in this area continues to be compliance with fire
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prevention procedures regarding control of ignition sources and combustible materials.
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Jockey pump replacement has reduced the stresses on the yard loop which was caused by the frequent starts and estended runs of the motor-driven pump.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area and based on this evaluation, the fire protection program is adequate.
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7.
Engineered Safety System Inspection - Units I and 2 (71710)
A detailed walkdown of the accessible portions of the SW intake structure for Units 1 and 2 was conducted. The walkdown included comparing the current system line-up procedure to_the plant SW drawing and Sections 9.2.1 and 9.4.5 of the FSAR. The inspectors looked for -
equipment and structural conditions which could degrade plant or system performance. Specific observations included; correct alignment of SW hangers / supports, housekeeping, general condition of SW valves, SW component and piping labeling, SW instrumentation installation / calibration and positioning of system valves. Operation of the SW system and system line-up was satisfactory. No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability - Wrong Unit Emergency D/G Removed from Service (40500 and 62703)
On May 12, FNP tag-out order 93-462-2 was issued and approved to place the "2B" D/G out of service in order to repair a fuel oil return line cl.ack valve. The tag-out required manipulation of valves and verification that the "2B" D/G output circuit breaker, "DG08-2", was open and " racked-out".
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At 3:45 a.m., an electrician was assigned to complete the electrical portion of the clearance; the " racking out" of breaker "DG08-2".
At 3:56 a.m., a Unit I main control board operator received annunciator alarms associated with a loss of DC power for the "lB" D/G output breaker "DG08-1".
The electrician was paged and, at that point, realized that he had de-energized the DC power for the opposite unit D/G and that he was removing the wrong unit "B" D/G output breaker from service; i.e., the Unit 1 output breaker vice the Unit 2 breaker.
Responsible electrical, operations, and assigned root cause evaluation personnel were interviewed by the inspectors. Unit I control room logs, mandantory LC0 and system drawings were evaluated and it was noted that within one minute following the Unit "1B" D/G annunciator alarm, the
"lB" D/G circuit breaker DC power was re-energized and the circuit breaker was returned to service. The D/G became operable when DC power was restored and when the "1B" D/G output breaker was racked back into place.
The above conditions were documented by the plant staff on incident report IR 1-93-108. On May 13, 1993, a plant work stoppage went into effect.and each-department at the-site was-required to-review with each
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individual, the circumstances involved with the May 12, 1993 wrong unit-tag-out/ clearance event.
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Failure to rack-out and tag-out the circuit breaker which was specified on the " approved for clearance" tag-out sheet is identified as procedure viol ation, - 50-348/93-08-01,. Wrong unit emergency diesel generator output breaker removed from service.
No other violations or deviatio'ns were identified in this area.
9.
Action on Licensee Event Reports (92700)
(Closed) Unit 1 LER-91-007, Revision 1, Reactor trip following actuation of protective relays on the "1B" UAT. A reactor trip occurred on June 29, 1991, following a main turbine generator trip. After extensive and thorough testing the licensee determined that the turbine trip resulted from an insulation breakdown which affected the integrity of a multiple stranded conductor internal to the "1B" UAT. This allowed a-ground to the core frame structure of the transformer, which, per protective design, caused the overcurrent relays for the transformer to actuate the main turbine generator trip.
In March,1993,- the conductor insulation was repaired, satisfactorily tested and the transformer was returned to service.
Long-term.
corrective actions include inspection of each of the site UATs and start-up transformers during the next refueling outages since each of these transformers have similar insulation design. This item is. closed.
(Closed) Unit 2 LER-91-001, Dropped control rod causes reactor trip. On April 1,1991, while conducting an STP for a control rod operability test, a reactor trip occurred. The trip occurred due to a control rod dropping into the core. The rod drop was attributed to defective circuit cards in the rod control system.
Suspect cards were replaced and the "old" cards were sent to the vendor for evaluation.
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91-06, paragraph 2.b.(2). Subsequently, two of the. three cards were determined to be defective. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unit 1, LER-92-02, Missed fire watch due to personnel error.
This LER resulted from inadequate communications between control room operators and the shift foreman concerning the need for a fire watch patrol. Once the need was detected, a watch was promptly assigned.
Personnel were instructed on the importance of proper communications and the event was reviewed with all on-shift operators. Recently, operators drafted procedures for improving operational communications and control room formality. Even though the procedures have not been final reviewed to implement, their intent has been. The inspectors have observed improvements-in-the communications area over the-past-four months. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unit 2, LER 92-012, Power range nuclear instrument (NI-41) OTDT setpoint potentially nonconservative. On September 28, 1992, while conducting a quarterly STP calibration on the Unit 2 power range channels, the I&C technicians d.iscovered that the "as found" condition of the gain potentiometer settings for NI-41 (which inputs into OTDT
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channel TE-412) were different from those values shown in the plant curve book.
After. finding this, the correct values were promptly placed into the circuit by the technicians. A record review revealed that the incorrect values were placed in the circuit on June 26, 1992. Apparently the error was made on June 26 by a technician who read the incorrect value from the curve while obtaining the information for adjusting the potentiometer for NI-41. The "as found" reading indicated that he used the value for NI-42 not NI-41 while conducting the June 26 calibration.
The inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation concerning the incorrect value setting and concluded that the OTDT reactor trip was functional within the safety analysis limit for the expected range of cycle 9 core AFD. The channel did maintain the ability to generate a trip within the limits required by the safety analysis for the period between June 26 and September 28, 1992.
Even though the condition could have been perceived as rendering one of the RPS channels inoperable, there remained two fully operable OTDT channels (TE-422 and TE-432).
Additionally, AFD did not reach'a value high enough to actuate the portion of the circuit that was miscalibrated.
Therefore, the actual OTDT setpoint never exceeded TS tolerances. I&C. completed a thorough evaluation of all plant procedures and have made changes, as appropriate, to those which required I&C personnel to obtain information from other sources as a routine part of calibration / adjustments for STPs which are to be performed. These changes affected 55 procedures. _This item is closed.
10.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on May 24, 1993, with the acting plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection-findings were discussed:in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that items contained in paragraph 9 were closed.
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 50-348/93-08-01 (N0V)
Wrong unit emergency diesel generator output breaker removed from service.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
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AFD Axial Flux Distribution
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Administrative Procedure CCW
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Component Cooling Water Carbon Dioxide C02
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CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System DC
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Direct Current D/G Emergency Diesel Generator
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DRSS -
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Electro-Hydraulic EH
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Farley Nuclear Plant FNP
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report HHSI
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High Head Safety Injection HSP
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Hot Shutdown Panel I&C
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Instrumentation and. Controls LC0
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Limiting Condition for Operation LER
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Licensee Event Report Low Head Safety Injection LHSI
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MWR Maintenance Work Request
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Nuclear Instrumentation NI
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NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR
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NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Over-Temperature Differential Temperature OTDT
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PORC -
Plant.0perations Review Committee RCS
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Reactor Protection System SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review ShC
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company SO
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System Operator Solid State Protection System SSPS
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Surveillance Test Procedure STP
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Service Water. System TS
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Technical Specification UAT
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Unit Auxiliary Transformer WA
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Work Authorization
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