IR 05000348/1993006
| ML20036B166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036B162 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-06, 50-348-93-6, 50-364-93-06, 50-364-93-6, NUDOCS 9305180242 | |
| Download: ML20036B166 (11) | |
Text
l
,
p "" "'%o t
UtBIT ED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON j
,e g
o REGION 11 l
$-
E 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
l
...
C Alt.ANTA GEORGIA 30323
%...../
t
Report Nos.:
50-348/93-06 and 50-364/93-06 l
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
'
Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 22 - April 16,1993 Inspectors:
IdiI NZ
.5!6 d t
George F. Maxwell,"Te,rfior Resident Inspector Date Signed Y
)
.f h 3 i
Michael J. Morgan, Resid nt Inspector Date Signed
Approved by:
Floyd S. Cantrell, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section IB l
Division of Reactor Projects l
SUMMARY
-
Scope:
This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, i
maintenance, surveillance, and licensee self-assessment activities. Deep backshifts were performed March 31, April 6 and April 7, 1993.
Results:
A plant system operator operated the wrong unit motor-driven auxiliary feedwater flow control valve, paragraph 3.a.
The inspectors also noted that
',
Farley is continuing to take steps to reduce problems experienced with the
,
lubrication control program, paragraph 3.b.
On March 23, the inspectors were
'
notified that the tone alert radio system was inoperable, paragraph 3.c.
The inspectors reviewed the status of licensee corrective actions to address sequencer Agastat failures, paragraph 4.c.
Actuation of "B-train" slave relays for the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump had not been verified within 18 months, paragraph S.b.
On April 8, the inspectors attended the scheduled I
meeting of the Nuclear Operations Review Board, paragraph 6.
l 9305180242 930505 PDR ADOCK 05000348
.
O PDR
-.
!
.
-.
=_..
..
..
i
-
.
2
,
t Two non-cited violations were identified.
Results of this inspection indicate l
that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel l
were adequate.
,
, !
!
k i
h i
.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- C. Buck, Technical Manager
- G. Crone, Operations
- L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
- R. Marlow, Technical Supervisor M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste
- C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- J. Powell, Unit Supervisor - Plant Operations
- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- Attended the exit interview Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.
From April 5 to April 8, Region II Inspector / Examiner, R. F. Aiello, assisted the resident inspectors.
Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status a.
Units I and 2 Status
!
Units 1 and 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the reporting period.
b.
NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During the week of March 22 and March 29, Region II Security and Safeguards (DRC) personnel conducted an inspection of the FNP site and the Southern Nuclear Corporate access authorization program.
(Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-05)
During the week of April 5, Region II Radiological Effluents and Chemistry personnel conducted an inspection of FNP's chemistry and
,
radiological waste training, documentation, and handling.
(Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-07)
During the weeks of April 5 and 12, Region II Operator Licensing Branch personnel conducted requalification examinations for FNP operations department personnel.
(Examination Report 50-348,364/
93-301)
f
-
.
E
-
t
!
-
,
c.
Changes in Southern Nuclear Operating Company Management Personnel
,
During the inspection period, Mr. R.P. Mcdonald, President and i
Chief Executive Officer, Southern Nuclear Operating Company announced that he would be retire June 1,1993, t
3.
Operational Safety Verification and Emergency Preparedness (71707 and 82206)
i The inspectors conducted routine plant tours to verify license
requirements are being met. The inspection tours included review of
'
site documentation and interviews with plant personnel.
i a.
Local Control Of Wrong Unit Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-3227B (FNP IR l-93-63 and NRC Inspection Report 50-348/93-04; Paragraph 3.b) (Follow-up) - Units 1 and 2 On March 7, the shared unit systems operator was performing a
service water alignment surveillance test for Unit 2.
While in
'
Unit 2 he was instructed by the Unit 1 plant operator to go to hot l
shutdown panel (HSP) "C", take local control of valve "3227B" and then go the to the "A" HSP and cycle the potentiometer for the
,
valve. The rover wrote the instructions down on the back of his i
logsheet, verbally repeated back instructions given and then told the board operator that he would call him from the HSP. The rover entered the Unit 2 HSP room and noted that the door on one end of
,
the room was painted yellow. Discussions revealed that upon
seeing the yellow door, he assumed that he was in the Unit 1
"C"
!
HSP room. He found the " local-remote" hand switch for Unit 2 valve "3227B" and placed the switch to the " local" position.
After starting toward the Unit 1
"A" HSP room, he noted the green door, through which he had entered the Unit 2 "C" HSP area, and
_
realized that he had operated a Unit 2 switch rather than the Unit l
1 " local-remote" switch. He immediately placed the Unit 2 t
handswitch back to the " remote" position and attempted to call the control room to tell them of his mistake. Before he could make the
'
call, he was informed by the Unit 2 control room operators that they had received an alarm when the " local-remote" switch was
-
changed to the " local" position.
Unit 2 was not placed in an LC0 condition by the incorrect placement of the " local-remote" handswitch. After discussing his
'
error with the shift supervisor and control room personnel, he
satisfactorily completed the assigned task on Unit 1.
A Unit 2 line-up check was immediately performed using STP-73.0, Hot Shutdown Panel Handswitch Position Verification and all auxiliary feedwater components controlled from the HSP were verified in their proper position. A root-cause analysis was i
performed for this event, a complete walkdown of the Unit I and j
Unit 2 auxiliary and turbine building areas was performed to
determine if similar potential problems existed. HSP labeling enhancements were made and the HSP floors for Units 1 and 2 were i
painted with the proper numeric and unit color designators.
i
.
.
This item was identified, as an unresolved item UNR 50-364/
93-04-02, Inappropriate operator action results in manipulation of the wrong unit auxiliary feedwater valve control. This URI is now identified as a non-cited violation NCV 364/93-06-01. This violation will.not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy. This item is closed.
b.
Status of FNP Lubrication Program Enhancements - Units 1 and 2 FNP is continuing to take corrective actions to reduce the number of problems previously experienced with FNP's lubrication control program. Currently, they have improved their methods of purchase, dedication, and issuance of lubricants. Distribution of the lubricants in the facility is presently being addressed.
The inspectors reviewed the results of a lubrication controls meeting that was attended by representatives from operations, maintenance, quality control, systems performance, procurement and chemistry groups. The meeting outlined various methods which could be employed to improve controls of distribution once the lubricant is in the plant.
This item was identified, as a violation NOV 50-348,364/92-35-01, Failure to properly and adequately control site lubrication oil resulting in use of nonconforming lubricant in safety-related equipment. Since the " distribution" corrective actions have not been fully implemented, this item will remain open.
c.
Inoperable Tone Alert Radio System - Units I and 2 On March 23, the tone alert radio system was determined to be inoperable. The inspectors observed that a proper event notification was made to the NRC, that the emergency preparedness (EP) coordinator rapidly dispatched personnel for determination /
correction of the problem and that other meteorological tower equipment was checked and no other failures were found.
The apparent cause of the failure was a lightning strike in the area of the tone radio. A system amplifier card was replaced and the system was returned to an operable status approximately 13 minutes after the initial discovery of the problem.
The insnectors observed that corrective actions taken were proper and in accordance with approved procedures.
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure !
.
,
I
-
!
[
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
,
The inspectors reviewed various licensee preventative and corrective
[
maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements.
a.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
a MWR-262110; "lB" D/G Day tank drain union fittings at valve f
QlR43V564 are loose and leaking - repair (Note:
!
!
Part of scheduled "lB" D/G maintenance)
The day tank was emptied, the valve and associated fittings were replaced, and the drain piping was tightened. A leak
!
"
test was conducted.
The inspectors concluded that work l
.
performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions l
in both the weld package and the MWR.
"
s MWR-253658; "lB" D/G Fuel Pump - #4 Fuel oil pump leaking
.
fuel at the top of the pump and on the fuel line l
- investigate and repair (Note: Part of
scheduled "lB" D/G maintenance)
,
The inspectors observed maintenance department trouble-shooting efforts and repairs. Maintenance personnel i
replaced fuel oil injection piping, the pump "0"-rings, and the upper gasket of the pump.
Pump operability / system leak
-
tests were conducted, and the inspectors concluded that work
!
performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions
!
contained in the MWR.
[
s MWR-261052; Erratic operation of FCV-122 (the charging flow
control valve) when in automatic
The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance department's trouble-shooting efforts. Remote flow
'
measurement equipment was used to determine true flow and valve adjustments were made to establish " desired versus actual flow" conditions. Work performed was satisfactory i
and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR.
m WA00385602.; "lC" D/G #10 Cylinder - Hydrotest leak MWR-253610; and cylinder liner replacement
'
The inspectors observed portions of the work being performed and noted that proper materials and maintenance equipment l
-
were obtained. A new cylinder liner was installed as per MWR-253610. The work performed was satisfactory and in i
accordance with directions contained in both the work authorization and the associated MWR.
b.
Injury of an electrical maintenance apprentice due to improper work practices on an electrical transformer (X-FMR) [ Industrial Safety (OSHA) Item]
,
!
I
.
5 On March 24, an electrical maintenance apprentice was injured when he attempted to disconnected a X-FMR ground wire. The apprentice received on-site medical treatment for burns to his hand and was transported to the Southeast Alabama Medical Center for further treatment / observation. He was returned to work, in a " restricted duty" status, the same day. A similar personnel injury event occurred July 2, 1991, [See Inspection Report 50-348,364/91-14, Paragraph 2.b(3)]. The following actions were taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence of the problem:
a Pocket-type voltmeters are being purchased and visual reminders, (signs, posters, etc...), are being obtained and displayed.
New apprentices will be receiving specific, "one-on-one" n
training on various aspects of electrical safety and more
" pre-job" and "on-the-job" briefings are being held to improve communications and provide specifics of job status.
In addition to the above, the individuals involved, were " coached" on proper electrical safety practices and the need for proper "on-the-job" communications. The inspectors are continuing to evaluate this event and will continue to note if the actions proposed and taken by the licensee are effective.
c.
Update on plant corrective actions to address failures of the D/G sequencers and sequencer Agastats - Units 1 and 2 On July 23, 1992, NRR, Region II, and Southern Nuclear Operating Company personnel, held a meeting, via telephone, to discuss EDSFI observations dealing with repeated failures of plant Agastats and plant sequencers Blf, BIG, B2F and 82G. (See Unit 2 LER 92-009, NRC Inspection Report 50-348,364/92-17 and 50-348,364/92-20.
Subsequent replacements of Agastats and repeat failures of other D/G sequencer Agastats to meet a setpoint acceptance criteria of
"+/- 10 percent or 0.5 second, whichever is greater", prompted FNP management, on July 24,1992 to; 1) reestablish a nominal Agastat relay baseline for all Agastats, 2) reset all Agastats to the tighter baseline and to 3) retest all sequencers.
I The initial, July,1992, time interval selected for performance of the TS surveillance was approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Based on continued acceptable performance, this interval was extended.
Tests were then performed, on each sequencer, at intervals of
approximately 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, and 30 days.
The present interval of 30 days has been in effect since September,1992.
,
'
As an example of the current testing program and present Agastat performance, the following has been noted. The step 3 relay for
loss of site power (LOSP) sequencer "B1G" tested satisfactorily after installation September 2, 1992. This relay again performed well during the second surveillance on September 5, 1992.
However, when tested again on September 14, 1992, the relay exceeded the TS limit on the fourth, fifth and sixth repetition.
A plant incident report was written for this failure and the relay was returned to the vendor to determine why the relay would not meet the vendor advertised accuracy. The vendor tested the relay at their facility and found performance to be acceptable. The behavior of this relay appears to be anomalous based on the significant number of other relays previously tested at FNP.
The present schedule, as of April,1993, calls for additional relay sequencer testing at 30 day intervals. Data collected to date indicate that the surveillance interval is conservative and provides a high level of confidence that installed relays at FNP remain within the TS criteria.
Present trending information indicates that the " Step 1" relay of the sequencers are not prone to inaccuracy; however, " Steps 2 and 3" are the most heavily loaded sequencer steps / relays that can be postulated to converge.
Although FNP and SNC management feels that the Agastat timers are performing adequately, modification of the sequencers has been evaluated. Reduction in manpower demands for relay / sequencer maintenance / testing and minimization of outage times associated with the relatively frequent performance of sequencer surveillance were factors in the decisions of future modifications. After licensee evaluations of a variety of options for replacement of the Agastat E7000 relays, design changes were initiated to install Agastat ETR relays in Unit 1 (PCR 92-1-8266) and Unit 2. These changes are presently scheduled for implementation during the Unit 1 12th RF0 and Unit 2 10th RFO.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both operations and maintenance personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and regulatory and technical specification requirements.
,
a.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
l u
l-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements 2-STP-1.0 Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4
,
i Inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
s 1-STP-16.1; Containment Spray Pump "1A" Quarterly Inservice Test
.
.
+
,
The inspectors observed portions of this test. The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
'
u 1-STP-80.6; Diesel Generator "1B" 24-Hour Load Test t
After scheduled maintenance, the inspectors observed portions of the load test on the D/G.
The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
m 2-STP-80.6; Diesel Generator "2B" 24-Hour Load Test After scheduled maintenance, the inspectors observed portions of the load test on the D/G.
The test was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
b.
Missed Technical Specification Surveillance on the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) - Unit 2 On February 11, the licensee determined that actuation of two "B-train" slave relays for the Unit 2 TDAFWP had not been verified within the last 18 months. These relays initiate TDAFWP start on
'
undervoltage (UV) on two out of three reactor coolant pump buses
,
or on steam generator (SG) low-low water level on two out of three S/Gs.
The verification of this function is part of the required
'
surveillance testing associated with Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.1.2.
The surveillance procedures used only initiated an "A-train" start every 18 months. Other plant procedures have tested the "B-train" initiated start at least once every 36 months.
A PORC meeting was held to evaluate the above and determine appropriate actions to address the incident (See Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-04; Paragraph 6).
Test procedure, FNP-2-STP-33.1, was modified to test the "B-train" initiated start. Testing was satisfactorily completed on February 11. The licensee determined that credit could also be taken for a "B-train" pump start performed on November 28, 1992.
This FNP I&C "B-train" surveillance test was performed in accordance with STP-246.18, TDAFWP Response Time Test".
The licensee reported the event and a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was initiated.
The licensee also documented the specifics of this event in Unit 2 LER 93-002.
The above condition is identified as a non-cited violation NCV 50-364/93-06-02, missed Technical Specification surveillance on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation
,-.
--
_...
._- -_ - -
-
.
..
'
.
!
i I
meets the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy. No other violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability - NORB Meeting (40500)
On April 8, the inspectors attended the regularly scheduled quarterly meeting of the Nuclear Operations Review Board (NORB) which was held at
,
the plant site. The NORB provides an independent review and audit of plant activities in the areas of plant operations, engineering, nuclear
'
safety, and quality assurance. At this meeting a TS quorum, consisting of the Vice President-Nuclear, Chairman, six members, and two
,
alternates, were present.
Items reviewed included:
-
Safety evaluations
-
Meeting minutes of the PORC (Plant Operations Review Committee).
,
'
-
LERs and NRC audit findings.
-
S/G events in other regions.
,
Prior to the meeting, each member was provided with an agenda of the
'
items to be discussed.
Each agenda contained detailed information on
'
every item. The members appeared to be well informed on the agenda items and the meeting was conducted in a professional manner. As
appropriate, members presented differing views and methods of resolution.
The NORB evaluation found no trends indicative of decreasing plant safety. No additional recommendations for improving weak areas were discussed and no additional corrective actions for licensee identified
discrepancies were noted.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The inspectors observed concerted efforts on the part of management to
resolve key issues which required a higher degree of NORB attention.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection findings (92702)
'
(Closed) UNR 50-364/93-04-02, NCV 50-364/93-06-01, Inappropriate i
operator action results in manipulation of the wrong unit auxiliary j
feedwater valve control (See paragraph 3).
(Closed) NCV 50-364/93-06-02, Missed Technical Specification j
surveillance on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (see paragraph 5.b).
8.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on April 19, 1993, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the
,
inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material
.
,-
,
f
-
,
l
reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was l
informed that the items discussed in paragraph 7 were closed.
!
!
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE-l 50-364/93-06-01 (NCV)
In appropriate operator action
!
results in manipulation of the wrong
}
unit auxiliary feedwater valve
!
Control.
50-364/93-06-02 (NCV)
Missed Technical Specification surveillance on the Unit 2 turbine-i driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
i 9.
Acronyms and Abbreviations D/G
-
,
DRSS
-
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards l
EDSFI
-
Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection
-
-
Flow Control Valve i
-
Farley Nuclear Plant HSP
-
Hot Shutdown Panel
,
-
Instrumentation and Controls
!
'
LC0
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
,
LER
-
Licensee Event Report LOSP
-
Loss of Site Power MWR
-
Maintenance Work Request NI
-
Nuclear Instrumentation NORB
-
Nuclear Operations Review Board
,
-
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'
-
Occupational Safety and Health Administration PORC
-
Plant Operations Review Committee RF0
-
Refueling Outage
!
S/G
-
-
Safety Injection SNC
-
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
.
'
-
Surveillance Test Procedure SWS
-
Service Water System TDAFWP
-
Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
,
TI
-
Temporary Instruction
'
TS
-
Technical Specification UNR
-
Unresolved Item
'
WA
-
Work Authorization X-FMR
-
Transformer
>
k
!
t
$
/