IR 05000338/1979031
| ML19249E734 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Kidd M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249E727 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-31, 50-339-79-39, NUDOCS 7910020305 | |
| Download: ML19249E734 (8) | |
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Report Nos. 50-338/79-31 and 50-339/79-39 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and CPPR-78 Inrpection at North Anna it near Mineral, Virginia Inspected by:
f et-6 /7 M. S K'
si hterpect6r D'at Signed
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-ection Chief, RONS Branch Itate /Sig6ed P.
Kel SUMMARY Inspection on June 25 - July 13, 1979.
Unit 1 Areas Inspected
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This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved rinteen (16) hours of previously identified unresolved items, operational on site in the areas staffing, respiratory protection training, IE Bulletins and Circulars, licensee event reports, and plant tours.
Unit 1 Findings No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Unit 2 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved twenty four (24) hours on site in the areas of previously identified unresolved items, operational staffing, preoperational test witnessing, IE Bulletins and Circulars, reports per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21, and plant tours.
Unit 2 Findings No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons contacted Licensee Employees
- W. R. Cartwright, Station Maciger
- S. L. Harvey, Operating Supervisor
- J. D. Kellams, Superintendent of Operations E. J. Lozito, Director of Fuel Resources
- P. A. Slatter, Resident QA Engineer - Construction
- E. R. Smith, Superintendent of Technical Services Other licensee employees contacted included three engineers,three office personnel, two maintenance supervisors, and two members of the station training staff.
Other Organizations R. Whitley, Field Quality Control - Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation N. Walker, FQC - S&W
- Attended one or both exit interviews.
2.
Exit Interviews The inspection scope and finding were summarized on July 6 and 13,1979, for the persons denoted in paragraph 1.
All findings presented in these details were discussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item 338/78-30-03, 339/78-28-02 Inservice Inspection of Service Water Piping Station personnel have formulated a conceptual plan for accomplishing inservice inspection of the service water pond fiberglass piping, supports, and restraints per Regulatory Guide 1.22.
These plans are to be tranrlated into a surveillance procedure which will be reviewed upon licensee approval.
This item remains open.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Operational Staffing - Units 1 and 2 Operating Staff a.
The station organization for two unit operation is given in FSAR Figure 13.1.2-2, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) Figure 6.2-2 and Unit 2 proposed TS Figure 6.2-2 The Unit 1 TS Figure was revised by 10/2 147
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-2-Amendment 11 on June 14, 1979, which brought it into agreement with the FSAR and proposed Unit 2 TS (part of open items 338/79-01-02 and 339/79-01-01).
The actual organization conforms to the referenced Figures.
Requirements for minimum operating shif t crew sizes are given in Unit 2 TS Table 6.2-1.
Review of the station staffing list, shift assignments, and discussions with appropriate supervision revealed that all required positions will be filled contingent upon those operators currently licensed on Unit I receiving licenses for Unit 2.
Requirements for issuance of licenses for Unit 2 will be determined by the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR.
Amendment 11 to the Unit 1 TS changed the oniste management structure and makeup of the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.
These changes required updating of station cdministrative procedures (ADM) 1.0, " Station Organization and Responsibility," and 2.0 " Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee." These procedures were undergoing revision at the conclusion of the inspection period.
Qualification requirements for station personnel are defined by TS 6.3.1 for each Unit by reference to ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." FSAR section 13.1.3.1 also defines these requirements and commits to ANSI N18.1-1971. Supervisors are assigned responsibility to assure that persons appointed to positions within their group are qualified by ADM 1.0, paragraph 2.
Records of education, related training, and work experience were reviewed for key staff personnel and certain other staff members prior to Unit 1 operation. Since then, qualifications of individuals placed in key positions were reviewed as personnel changes were made (see, for example IE Report Nos. 50-338/79-01, 50-338/78-37, and 50-338/78-27).
Amendment 66 to the Units 1 and 2 FSAR;on March 23, 1979 updated the qualifications of station supervisory and technical personnel in section 13.1.3.2. Qualifications for persons in the following positions were not reviewed during the current inspection in that they had been previously reviewed or because the qualifications are given in FSAR section 13.1.3.2:
Station Manager Superintendent of Operations Superintendent of Maintenance Superintendent of Technical Services Operating Supervisor Shif' Supervisors Assistant Shift Supr isors Hechanical Maintenance Supervisor Health Physics Supervisor Chemistry Supervisor Instrument Supervisor Reactor Engineers 10/2 148
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al Qualifications of four individuals recenfly promoted to new positions were reviewed and compared to the provi(ions of ANSI N18.1-1971, with no discrepancies being noted. These were A. L. Hogg, Nuclear Training Supervisor; G. A.
Kann, Engineering Supervisor; J. W. Ogren, Supervisor Administrative Services; and D. E. Thomas, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor. Also reviewed were qualifications for the following with no discrepancies being noted:
Four Assistant Control Room Operator Trainees Two Nuclear Instrument Technician Trainees Two Chemistry Technician / Trainees Three Maintenance Mechanics / Trainees Two Electrician / Trainees For the trainees involved, it was verified that the individuals had the necessary education and related experience to enter the applicable training program. Previous reviews of qualifications of health physics technicians and quality control inspectors were documented in IE Report Nos. 50-338/79-03 and 50-339/79-31, respectively.
b.
Technical Support Corporate technical support for the station is provided by the Production Operations Department, shown in FSAR Figure 13.1.1-2 and Figures b.2-1 of the TS for each unit. The organization appears to function as depicted.
Qualifications of key persons providing management and technical support are given in FSAR section 13.1.1.1.
Welding and Non-Destructive Testing Personnel c.
The qualifications of three NDT technicians were compared to the provisions of SNT-TC-1A, American Society for Nondestructive Testing
" Recommended Practice", with no discrepancies noted. The qualifications required in VEPCO's Nondestructive Test Manual for each NDT technique meet or exceed the recommendations of SNT-TC-1A, Table 6.2.1A.
The personnel folders of two velders were reviewed to determine whether qualifications were documented to demonstrate compliance with VEPC0
' requirements. Based on the review of education, experience, training, welder qualification, and related records, it appeared that the indivi-duals had been appropriately qualified to the provisions of VEPCO's
" Welder Qualification Manual." Additionally, documentation demonstrating continuing qualification to applicable procedures was reviewed.
6.
Respiratory Protection Training On June 28, 1979, the inspector attended a respiratory protection training session given by the station training staff for some sixteen station employees.
The objectives were to receive training in order to qualify for use of protective equipment and to assess the quality of training given. The 1072 149
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vised to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103, Regulatory Guide 8.15, and/section 12.2.5 of the Units i and 2 FSAR. The training session involved use of videotapes produced by Industrial Training Corporation, supplemented by lecture and discussions.
Each participant was fitted with a full face mask and associated apparatus and leak-tightness tested in a smoke filled room. The session appeared to The session cover all key points of RG 8.15 regarding use of the equipment.
also included a general discussion of the procedures for entering and exiting the containment building.
Within the areas observed, no items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
7.
Unit 2 Blackout Test The inspector witnessed periormance of test 2-P0-69, " Station Blackout Test at Shutdown Conditions," on July 5,1979. The test is designed to demonstrate proper functioning of emergency equipment during a loss of normal power with the Unit shut down. It was observed that a current test procedure was in use and that deviations to the procedure had been processed as required Selected by the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual (NPSQAM).
initial conditions were verified to be complete prior to start of the test.
Following loss of normal power, the emergency diesel generators appeared to start, come up to speed and voltage, and supply the emergency buses as required; however, not all components functioned as required. Charging pump "C" did not start automatically, operation of the steam valves for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was questionable, and breaker position recorder traces were not obtained due to loss of the computer.
Results will be reviewed further to observe retest requirements established by the station staff (open item 339/79-39-01).
8.
IE Bulletin 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping Although this Bulletin was addressed to holders of operating licenses, VEPC0 conducted the examinations required by item 1 on Unit 2 the week of June 25, 1979. No indications were found on nozzle welds for two generators, but discontinuities involving slag and porosity were found on the third feedwater line. These were in the weld and were greater than allowed by ASME III, thus being rejectable. Discussions with Stone and Webster and V PC0 NDT personnel revealed that the discontinuities did not appear on the original radiographic films taken after construction because a less sensitive film was used. The original film met requirements of the piping code, USA B31.7. Preparations were being made for repair of the subject weld at the conclusion of the inspection period. A report will be forwarded to NRC by VEPC0 per the IEB.
This matter will be reviewed in more detail at t later date (open item 339/79-39-02).
Unit 1 is scheduled to shut down for refueling in September 1979 at which time the examinations required by the IEB are to be performed.
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IE Circular 79-02, Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies This Circular was reviewed by VEPCO and S&W for applicability to Units 1 and 2.
A letter from R. B. Bradbury of S&W to S. C. Brown, Jr. dated March 1, 1979, documented S&W's finding that although vital bus inverters similar to those described in the IEC are used in Units 1 and 2, they do not utilize time delay circuitry nor have an alternate AC input, thus the problem does not apply. Review of FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1, FSAR Section 8.3.1.2-1, and station logic drawing 11715-LSK-22-7A by the inspector con-firmed the above findings.
Licensee personnel were informed that there were no further questions on this matter.
10.
Quadrant Power Tilts - Unit 1 Unit I licensee event reports 79-076/03L-0 dated June 29, 1979 and 79-079/
03L-0 dated July 9,1979 discuss instances of quadrant power tilt ratios exceeding 1.02, the limit set by Technicical Specification (TS) 3.2.4.
Actions were taken to return the ratios within limits as required by the TS, but no firm reason for the tilts had been determined. As noted in the LER's, licensee personnel felt the cause may have been due to dropped rod cluster control assembly rodlets or fingers. This problem was recently discovered at the Salem 1 facility, which uses similar fuel and control rods. Analyses by VEPC0 and Westinghouse have shown no detrimental effects would be caused by continued operation with a small number of dropped rodlets.
Incore flux map surveillance has been increased and analysis was continuing at the conclusion of the inspection period. This matter will be reviewed further (open item 338/79-31-01).
11. High Energy Line Break Effect on Steam Generator Level Indications On June 21, 1979, VEPC0 notified IE:II that Westinghouse had related a discovery that steam generator level indication may be higher than actual because of reference leg heatup following a high energy line break in containment. Operating personnel were informed b r Standing Order No. 31 on June 25, 1979, of the problem with correction factors to be applied to indicated levels following a line break based on containment temperature.
Evaluation by station personnel revealed that the assumptions of FSAR Table 15.1-2 are still met assuming worst case errer in indicated level feeding the Lo-Lo Level trip circuitry; however, a setpoint change was being consi-dered to raise the trip from five percent to fifteen percent for added conservatism.
This matter was reported on Unit 1 as a prompt LER with written report 79-083/0IT-0 on July 3, 1979 and per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 per letter No. 539 on July 2, 1979 for Unit 2.
This matter will be reviewed further (open items 338/79-31-02 and 339/79-39-03).
12. Unit 2 Pressurizer Supports On June 18, 1979, VEPC0 reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 that the pressurizer support tube assemblies were found to be missing lower jam nuts and bearing lock washers. This could possibly result in loosening of the
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lower spherical nuts, lowering the pressurizer, and causing possible damage.
Unit I was not affected.
A written report was submitted June 27, 1979.
This item will be inspected further following repairs (open item 50-339/
79-39-04).
13. Plant Tours Tours of selected plant areas were conducted on June 26, 1979, and other dates during the inspection period in conjunction with other inspection activities.
During the tours, the following items, as available, were obse rved:
a.
Fire Equipment Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
b.
Housekeeping Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels in systems under or following testing.
c.
Equipment Preservation Maintenance of special preservative measures for installeu equipment as applicable.
d.
Component Tagging Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equip-ment protection.
e.
Communication Effectiveness of public address system in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems turned over for initial operations or preoperational testing.
g.
Foreign Material Exclusion Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened to admit foreign material.
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Security Implementation of security provisions for both units.
Within the above areas, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed when compared to the applicable station programs and procedures.
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