IR 05000338/1979009
| ML19263E459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1979 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Kidd M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263E454 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-09, 50-338-79-9, 50-339-79-14, NUDOCS 7906180355 | |
| Download: ML19263E459 (11) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 o
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101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 4,*****4
Report Nos. 50-338/79-09 and 50-339/79-14
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Virginia Electric and Power Company Licensee:
P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Power Station, Units I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and CPPR-78 Inspection at North Anna Power Station near Mineral, Virginia
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Inspector:
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M. $. Kidd
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Date Signed Approved by:
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F.S.Cantrell,ActingActionChief,RONSBranch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on February 5 - March 2, 1979 peasInspected Unit 1 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved fifteen manhours onsite of previously identified open items, licensee event reports and tours of the facility.
Unit 1 Findings Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas. One apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area (infraction - failure to follow procedures in assuring that corrective action for a licensee event had been completed (paragraph 5.e).
Unit 2 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved twenty-two manhours onsite of previously identified open items, plant status, preoperational test witnessing, plant tours, reports per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and/or 10 CFR 21, and personnel training.
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Unit 2 Findings No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager, 1/2/3 D. M. Hopper, Health Physics Supervisor, 4 J. D. Kellams, Operations Superintendent, 2/4 D. G. McLain, Engineering Supervisor, 2 E. G. Lifrage, Project Engineer P. A. Slatter, Resident QC Engineer, Construction, 3 D. L. Smith, Resident QC Engineer, Operations, 2/4 E. R. Smith, Technical Services Superintendent, 1 Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians, three operators, two foremen, two office personnel, and four test engineers.
Attended exit interview on February 9, 1979
Attended exit interview on February 15, 1979
Attended exit interview on February 23, 1979
Attended exit interview on March 2,1979 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 9, 15, and 23 and March 2, 1979, for those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The infraction involving failure to follow procedures discussed in paragraph 5.e was acknowledged by station management on March 2,1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by an asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective actions had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or license /
Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
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-2-a.
78-120/01T-0* Station Battery Racks Improperly Assembled and Installed As discussed in the LER description of event, seismic tie rods were
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missing from battery rack 1-2 and rail support bolts and a diagonal strut were found missing from battery 1-3.
The inspector observed all four battery rooms on February 26, 1979, and compared rack installations to vendor drawings, with no discrepancies being noted. Rework of the battery racks had been documented via Main-tenance Reports N1-78-11101402, N1-78-11291434 and N1-78-11291437.
The inspector had no further questions on this event.
b.
78-122/01T-0* Spare Pipe Penetrations not capped on Both Ends As noted in the LER, the licensee discovered that the outside end of spare penetrations had not been capped as committed to in the Units 1 and 2 FSAR. Plans have been made to weld caps on the ends of the penetrations and S&W has made plans for obtaining the caps.
No estimated completed data had been identified at the conclusion of the inspection period. It was noted that Unit I containment had successfully undergone leakage rate and structural integrity testing without the second set of caps. Fcllowup of this matter is identified as open item 338/79-09-01. An identical Unit 2 problem was previously identified as open item 339/78-36-02.
c.
78-123/03L-0* Incore Detectors Stuck in the Inserted Position This event consisted of two detectors becoming stuck in their guide tubes.
Station personnel suspect fouling of the tubes due to a foreign substance or perhaps use of too much lubricant on the detector thimbles.
The exact cause will not be known until an inspection and cleaning of the tubes can be accomplished during plant shutdown.
A maintenance request has been initiated to perform this work during a future shutdown. This item will be reinspected at a later date (open item 338/79-09-02).
d.
78-137/03L-0 Spurious Turbine Auto-Stop Oil Channel Trip 78-125/01T-0* Emergency Diesel wnerator Battery Racks Improperly e.
Installed previously discussed in IE Report 50-338/79-01, This event was Details paragraph 10.0 and was assigned an open item (338/79-01-08)
in that the Unit I racks had not been grounded as called for by Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) PS - 5161A-1. A continuing review of this matter revealed that the construction design change package, NAl-FC-78-40, had been signed off as complete on December 6,1978. Subsequent to that date, three field changes 2355 062
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e-3-e (revisions) were initiated for this project as permitted by station administrative procedure (ADM) 104.0, " Implementation of Architect -
Engineer Construction Design Changes After Receipt of Operating License." One of those revisions, number 2, formalized the use of
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E & DCR PS - 516A - 1, which required grounding of the Unit I racks.
Licensee personnel were informed that failure to confirm that all aspects of the design change package were complete prior to signing off the cover sheet to denote completion appeared to be contrary to instructions on page 3 of ADM 104.0, dated November 20, 1978, and thus to section 17.2.5 of the VEPC0 Topical Report for Operations Quality Assurance (VEP - 3A) and Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, both entitled Instructions, Procedures and Drawings.
Page 3 of ADM 104.0 requires that the design change packages be reviewed for completeness and that this review will be indicated by affixing the reviewer's signature and date to the A-E Construction Design Change Review form.
The inspector further stated that open item 338/79-01-08 would be elevated to an Infraction.
Discussions with Quality Control and review of their inspection reports revealed that this group had inspected work activities for all other portions of this design change except for PS - 516A - 1, apparently believing that PS - 516B - I had completely revised the instructions in PS - 5161A - 1.
ADM 104.0 requires the QC audit the completed design change packages. This had not been finalized as of February 27, 1979.
Review of Unit 1 Maintenance Reports N1 - 79 - 01261535 and N1 - 79 -
01261536 revealed that actual grounding of the racks had been accomplished on January 30, 1979.
This aspect was verified complete by Quality Control on February 28, 1979.
f.
79-002/03L-0 Containment Particulate Sample Pump Tripped on Overload This event involved everheating of pump bearings and subsequent seizing. Bearings for this pump were replaced with another make recommended by the vendor and an engineering evaluation was initi-ated to study this problem. This matter will be reinspected to review results of the engineering study and plans for the Unit I standby pump and the similar Unit 2 pumps (open items 338/79-09-03 and 339/79-14-01).
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79-03/03L-0* Failure of a Containment Isolation Valve to Close During Test Cause of the failure of the isolation valve to close could not be determined and a maintenance report has been initiated to accomplish inspection of the valve during a future shutdown. This will be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection (open item 338/79-09-04).
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79-04/03L-0 Failure of Solid State Protection System Test Panel for Steam Generator Level Channel i.
79-05/01T-0* Emergency Diesel Generator Mufflers Not Missle Protected
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Nor Seismically Restrained This event involved discovery that the emergency diesel generator mufflers for Units 1 and 2 had not been missle protected or seismi-cally restrained during construction. This was verbally reported under 10 CFR 50.55(e) on January 31,1979, and 10 CFR 21 on February 5, 1976 (letter number 061). Failure of a muffler could cause back pressure on the diesel exhaust line, causing shutdown of the diesel.
Unit I was in a shutdown condition at the time of this discovery and the shutdown was extended to disconnect the exhaust piping for each of the Unit I diesels at the points where they exit the protected area and to add restraints to them inside the missile shields. A portion of this work, conducted per construction field change NAl-FC-79-01, was observed by the inspector on February 2,1979.
Observation in the plant on February 28, 1979, confirmed that this rework had been completed, eliminating the problem at least on an interim basis. The inspector had no further questions on Unit 1.
Unit 2 reporting was addressed in IE Report 50-339/79-12 (open item 339/79-12-04). Unit 2 repairs will be completed prior to initial fuel loading.
j.
79-06/03L-0 Hydraulic Suppressor Found Inoperable During Functional Test k.
79-07/03L-0 Fire Door S54-5 Found Inoperable This fire door was discussed in IE Report 50-338/79-06, Details paragraph 5.c (unresolved item 338/79-06-03).
1.
79-08/01T-0* Service Water Flow to Charging Pump Coolers Inadequate This prompt report was accompanied by reports per 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on February 7, 1979, (026A) and 10 CFR 21 on January 12, 1979, (026) for Unit 2.
The Unit I report states that under certain system demands with 95 F service water, design flows to the charging /high head safety injection pumps could not be met. The Unit 1 LER also attributes the cause to excessive pressure drops across charging pump skid piping, coolers, and associated valves to be too large, and states that an engineering evaluation was being conducted to determine corrective action to be taken. The final 50.55(e) report states only that the excessive pressure drop was due solely to improperly cleaned pioing and did not reference any corrective action other than cleaning of the piping. Discussions with station and engineering personnel revealed that significant 2355 064
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-5-changes were to be made, including teplacing service water piping to and from the charging pump units with larger bore piping and replacement of inlet and outlet valves with different types of valves. Althcugh there appeared to be some question as to whether the modifications were necessary, the inspector informed licensee
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personnel that the final report per 50.55(e) should be corrected to discuss the equipment changes being planned or justification presented establishing that cleaning of piping and coolers alone was sufficient.
A licensee representative stated that submittal of a corrected report would be considered. This will be carried as open items 338/79-09-05 and 339/79-12-01 (previously identified) and resolution of this problem will be required prior to operation of Unit 2.
6.
Followup on Previously Identified Open Items a.
Residual Heat Removal Relief Valves As discussed in IE Report Nos. 50-338/78-02 and 50-339/78-02, the RHR relief valves had been relocated to the pump suction lines, but FSAR Figure 5.5.4.1 had not been revised to reflect this change.
This Figure was revised as part of Amendment 65 to the Units 1 and 2 FSAR on November 3,1978, to reflect this change. These open items (338/78-02-05 and 339/78-02-05) are considered closed.
b.
Licensee Event Report 78-107 As discussed in IE Report 50-338/79-01, this LER was to be corrected to reflect a more appropriate cause code and subcode. A corrected report was submitted February 16, 1979, thus this item (338/79-01-06)
is considered closed.
c.
Licensee Event Report 79-01 As discussed in IE Report 50-338/79-01, this LER was also to be corrected to discuss program changes required for the plant P-250 computer in that it also did not correct for any detector background readings.
A corrected report was submitted February 14, 1979, thus open item 338/79-01-04 is closed.
In conjunctio a with the above, the final report on this problem for Unit 2 per 10 CFR 50.55(e), dated February 16, 1979, (letter number 024B) was reviewed and discussed.
This final report does not discuss any long term corrective action which might be considered.
In that this is not consistent with the information given in the Unit 1 LER, the inspector stated that a corrected Unit 2 report 2355 065
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d.
Licensee Event Report 78-098 The Unit 1 LER concerning errors within the Axial Power Distribution Monitoring System (APDMS) was discussed in IE Report 50-338/79-01, Details paragraph 10.a.
Review of the Unit 2 final report per 10 CFR 50.55(e) revealed that it did not discuss any long-term corrective actions such as those discussed in the Unit 1 LER.
During discussion on this matter, a licensee representative stated that a supplemental report would be submitted to discuss these long-term actions planned. This is identified as open item 339/79-14-03.
7.
Preoperational Test Witnessing - Unit 2 Portions of the following tests were witnessed during the inspection period. During the tests, the following items were observed for conform-ance to station administrative procedures and provisions of the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual (NPSQAM):
Latest revisions of test procedures available and in use.
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Test prerequsites and initial plant / system conditions met on a
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sampling basis.
Special test equipment calibrated as required and in service.
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Tests performed per approved procedure or procedure changed per
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NPSQAM.
Significant events, unusual conditions, and test discrepancies were
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documented.
Crew actions appeared to be coordinated.
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Procedure reviews and approvals were in conformance with the NPSQAM.
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Drawings in use were verified to be the latest revisions.
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Quality control engineers were present to witness each test, utilizing
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approved checklists.
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.-7-Specific tests witnessed were as follows:
2-PO-36.2 Safety Injection Functional Test Passive System (Accu-a.
mulations)
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Functional testing of the accumulator motor operated discharge valves while dumping the accumulators from near normal levels and pressures was observed on February 26, 1979.
This testing was conducted per section 4.2 of 2-PO-36.2.
Test results appeared satisfactory and there were no questions or comments regarding conduct of this part of the test.
b.
2-P0-36.3 Safety Injection System Functional Test - Pump Performance Verification Functional testing of low head safety injection pump 2-SI-P-1A, conducted per section 4.1 of 2-P0-36.3, was observed on February 27, 1979. Review of the data and calculations, along with head curve plots revealed that the results appeared to be satisfactory. There were no questions on the conduct of this portion of the test.
8.
Unit 2 Status The licensee's estimate of Unit 2 readiness for initial fuel loading remains April 30, 1979. As of February 3,1979, VEPC0 estimated con-struction to be 98.4 percent complete. A total of 93 preoperational (pre-fuel loading) tests have been identified. As of February 27, 1979, some 48 tests had been completed, with the results of 12 of those having final approval. Several other tests were in progress as the conclusion of the inspection period.
On February 28, 1979, the preoperational test program was delayed when radioactive water from Unit I was found in the Unit 2 volue control tank of the chemical and volume control system, the Unit 2 reactor vessel, and containment sump. Some of this water had been pumped offsite before station personnel recognized a problem existed.
Testing was resumed ML :h 2,1979, after all radioactive water in Unit 2 was trans-fered to waste tanks.
Recults of the NRC inspectors review of this event are given in IE Reports 50-338/79-11 and 50-339/79-16.
9.
Plant Tours Tours of selected plant areas were conducted on February 21, 26, 27, and 28, 1979, with emphasis on Unit 2 and the auxiliary building. During the tours the following items, as available, were observed:
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Hot Work Adequacy of fire prevention / protection measures used.
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Fire Equipment Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
c.
Housekeeping Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required clean-liness levels in systems under or following testing.
d.
Equipment Preservation Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as applicable.
e.
Component Tagging Implementatica and observance of equipment tagging for safety or eqt.ip. ;ent protection.
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Instrumentation Adequate protection for installed instrumentation.
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Cable Pulling Adequate measures taken to protect cable from damage while being pulled.
h.
Communication Effectiveness of public address system in all creas toured.
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Equipment Controls Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems turned over for initial operations or pre-operational testing.
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Foreign Material Exclusion Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not re-opened to admit foreign material.
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Security Implementation of security provisions for both Units.
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Logbooks The chronological logs for preoperational tests 2-PO-36.2 and 2-P0-36.3 were reviewed as portions of these tests were being conducted.
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Testing Portions of testing conducted per 2-P0-36.2 and 2-P0-36.3 were observed. Findings are discussed in paragraph 7 of these details.
Within the areas observed, no items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
10.
Engineering Staff Training The inspector attended a training session for the engineering staff and other Units 1 and 2 personnel on centrifugal pump characteristics. The training was conducted by representatives of Ingersoll-Rand and included topics such as net positive suction head, suction specific speed, flow shearing and cavitation.
Typical problems encountered during testing and operation of centrigugal pumps were also discussed. The inspector had no comments on this training.
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