IR 05000338/1979002
| ML19263E245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1979 |
| From: | Brooks E, Andrea Johnson, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263E242 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-02, 50-338-79-2, 50-339-79-04, 50-339-79-4, NUDOCS 7906050382 | |
| Download: ML19263E245 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES Houg
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o,h
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REGION il 101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 s.,...../
Report No.: 50-338/79-02 and 50-339/79-04 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 License Nos: 50-338 and 50-339 Inspection at North Anna, Mineral, Virginia Inspectors:
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L A. H. Johnsan, Reactor dnspector Date Signed
'3 - 9- / - 7 h E. H. Broo
, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
Net T/7/[77 R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date frign(d SLWiARY Inspection on January 9-12, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 64 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of precperational containment integrated leak rate testing (including Type "A", "B" and "C" leakage testing); testing of pipe support and restraint systems; surveillance of pipe support and restraint systems; and preoperational testing procedure review (vibration testing).
Results Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
- D. G. McCain, Engineering Supervisor
- D. C. Woods, Sr. Engineering Tech./NRC Coordinator
- G. A. Kann, Engineer / Test Coordinator
- J. R. Eastwood, Mechanic / Snubbers
- J. D. Kellams, Supt. Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted included Q.C. inspectors, technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations - Stone and Webster M. Pacy, Engineer F. Furman, Engineer
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R. Bone, Engineer G. Gardner, Engineer NRC Resident Inspector M. S. Kidd
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumcarized on January 12, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. At this meeting the inspectors disctissed the areas inspected and summarized this preliminary inspection as discussed in this report.
In the areas inspected the licensee was informed that no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. Subsequent telephone followup was made between licensee and Region II on January 16 and 17, 1979 concerning functional testing of accessible safety related (Tech.
Spec.) snubbers (Unit 1); and thermal expansion and vibration testing (Unit 2)/(see Paragraphs 5 and 6).
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Iteias Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) and Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT)
The following items were discussed:
a.
(1) For those systems that have valves tested in the reverse direction of containment pressure, the licensee must provide a documented evaluation to demonstrate that the results will provide equivalent or more conservative test results.
(2) The licensee agreed to ascertain that all commitments made to the NRC in the Question and Response Section of the FSAR are met by the Leak Rate Test Procedures. Responses to NRC questions address both local and integrated leakage rate testing. The inspector stated that requests for exemptions that were not addressed by NRC is not an approval for those exemptions.
(3) The licensee was made aware that the NRC requires Type A Test (CILRT) instrument calibrations and certification to be trace-able to National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or other recognized standards. This docunentation will be made available to the inspector prior to performance of the test.
(4) The inspector received approved copies and changes to the local leak rate test (LLhf) procedures while onsite.
The licensee stated that containment structural integrity and the containment integrated leak rate test (CILRT) procedure would be available to the inspeccor for review when approved.
(5) The licensee was made aware that the isolation and venting of the pressurization (air compressors) source is required upon reaching test pressure and start of official CILRT test data collection.
(6) The licensee stated that some form of tagging would be used for valve line up of systems for the CILRT test.
(7) The licensee stated that they would use an event log during the CILRT test.
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(8) The licensee stated that local leak rate testing would be performed after completion of the CILRT, on penetrations used to perform the CILRT test (i.e., penetration used to pressurize the containment), if appropriate.
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(9) The licensee stated that, to maintain administrative controls during the CIET, only one copy of the CIMT test procedure would be used and that this copy would be located at the CI MT Test Station.
(10) The licensee stated that the reactor coolant system would be vented during the CIET test.
(11) The licensee stated that applicable station procedures would be used to make changes to the approved leak rate test proce-dures.
b.
The inspector informed the licensee that the following hTC Staff positions would be used while performing the inspection of the licensee's leak rate test program:
(1) Venting and Draining Position The reactor vessel, those systems that are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and could provide direct communication with the containment atmosphere under post-accident conditions, and those systems which are postulated to rupture (i.e., not designed for post-accident function) shall be vented and drained to the extent necessary to assure exposure of the containment isolation valves to the containment air test pressure, such that they will be subjected to the simulated accident differential pressure.
If the venting and draining of any system potentially jeopardizes the maintenance of a safe shutdown condition, then those systems shall not be vented and drained; however, in this event, the local leakage rates (Type C) for the iso)ation valves in these systems shall be added to the upper 95% ccafi-dence limit of the CIET before determining the acceptability of the test.
(2) CIET Correction for Local Leakage P_osition If, during the performance of a Type A test, identifiable loca' leakage occurs to the extent that it could cause failure of the Type A test, e.g., through penetrations or isolation valves, the leak may be isolated and the Type A test continued until completion.
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-4-A containment penetration which is isolated during a Type A test must have a design which will permit local leak testing of all potential leakage paths through the penetrations.
Local leakage rates measured before and after repair must be reported, and the sum of the post-repair leakage rate and the CILRT upper 95% confidence limit must meet the Appendix J allowable leakage rate (0.75 La).
However, the difference in Type B and C test results before and after the repair of local leaks may not be deducted from the Type A test results in order to achieve an acceptable containment integrated leak rate.
Type B and C leak rate testing and repair prior to containment CILRT is also considered to be acceptable.
(3) Inclusion of Instrument Errors Position The uncertainty in the measured leakage rate shall be established by calculating the 95% upper confidence limit (UCL) of the least squares fit of the leakage rate data. The test results will be considered acceptable, if the 95% UCL is less than or equal to 75% La (75% LT for reduced pressure tests).
The accuracy of the measurement of the Type A leakage rate will be verified by the supplemental verification test. The measured difference between the supplemental verification test
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leakage rate and the Type A test leakage rate must be within 0.25 La (0.25 Lt for reduced pressure tests).
c.
The Licensee had the following comments:
(1) The licensee stated that tagging would be used only on valves at the pressure boundries of the containment (Item 5.a.(6)
above).
(2) The licensee stated that station procedure deviation form would be used to make changes to approved procedures used to perform testing Item S.a.(ll) above).
(3) The licensee stated that concerning possible problem of tracing moisture analyzer to NBS, discussed by licensee and inspector, that RTD's would be traceable to NBS (Item 5.a.(3) above).
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-5-(4) The licensee stated that further research would have to be made into the possible diaphram rupture of narrow range containment pressure transmitter when exposed to CILRT test pressure (This diaphram is an isolation boundary for the containment).
This item will be carried as an open item, pending future inspections (50-339/79-04-01).
(5) Licensee stated that there would be a minimum 24-hour hold between the Containment Structural Integrity Test (2P074) and CILRT (2P013). The inspector has no further apparent concern about the outgassing of concrete and insulation because of this 24-hour hold point.
d.
The above items were inspected to ascertain whether requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix "J"; draft tech. specs.; FSAR; Regulatory Guide 1.68; ANSI 45.4; licensee commitments; and NRC positions relative to leak rate testing are being met.
6.
Hydraulic Snubbers Unit I and 2 While performing a random visual inspection of Unit I accessible a.
snubbers, the inspectors observed 3 hydraulic snubbers with outer seal / wiper deterioration; the licensee pulled these three snubbers for functional testing.
The inspectors witnessed the functional testing on 1/* ~ for snubbers 1-W-234 (failed to lockup in one direction / lice. -
agreed that this was a 30-day reportable occur-rence); and 1-FW-233 and 226, both of which failed to meet bleed rate PT-79.1 acceptance criteria.
b.
Resident inspector witnessed Unit I accessible hydraulic snubbers functional testing on 1/17/79 for snubbers 1-WDRD-101,1-FW-215, and 1-55V-108.
These snubbers also failed the above mentioned bleed rate acceptance criteria.
Further investigation by the licensee indicated that approximately 16 accessible and 39 inaccessible (inside containment) hydraulic snubbers on Unit I had been tested by the vendor with a "go" or "no go" type functional test and no documentation of lockup and bleed rates is available (no vendor records or licensee records). This will be carried as an open item, pending further licensee investigation and NRC inspections. Open Item: (50-338/79-02-01)
The random visual hydraulic snubber inspection performed on Unit 2 c.
by the inspectors indicated no apparent problems and the licensee gave assurance that all Unit 2 hydraulic snubbers had been functionally tested on licensee's test machine and had been documented.
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Unit 2 - Thermal Expansion Test (2-PO-48.1), Pipe Rupture Restraint Hot Gap Measurements 2-PO-48.3), Bumper Gap Measurements Hot, Cold and Crossover Legs (2-PO-48.4)
a.
Inspectors reviewed and discussed above procedures during onsite inspection of January 9-12, 1979 and subsequent telephone communi-cation of January 16, 1979 between Region II and Stone & Webster personnel in charge of performing the licensee's tests.
The following are the inspector's findings:
(1) 2-PO-48.1 - Procedure does not include predicted movement for pressurizer spray lines or surge lines; and feedwater lines, or steam lines. The Stone & Webster personnel in charge of this testing, stated that the data table was not complete and would be included. This will be reviewed by the inspectors during a future inspection.
(2) 2-PO-48.3 - The inspectors had no further comments.
(3) 2-PO-48.4 - The inspectors had no further comments.
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