IR 05000338/1979032
| ML19275A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Webster E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19275A379 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-32, 50-339-79-42, NUDOCS 7910040208 | |
| Download: ML19275A380 (8) | |
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.. SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303o3
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Report Nos. 50-358/79-32 and 50-339/79-42 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2 Docket No.
50-338 and 50-339 License Hos. NPF-4 t CPPR-78 r i eral, Virginia Inspection at North Ann, Site, Inspected by.
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Approved by:
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ion Chief, RONS Branch Date Sig6ed SUMMARY Inspected on July ?S - August 2, 1979 Unit 1 Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, IE Bulletins and Circulars, Licensee Event Reports, and previously identified items.
Unit 1 Findings Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fied.
Unit 2 Areas Inspected This routine, unant.ounced inspection involved 2 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of IE Bulletins and Circulars and previously identified items.
Unit 2 Findings of the two areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Emp3 yees W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
- J. D. Kellams, Superintendent - Operations
- E. R. Smith, Jr., Superintendent - Technical Services
- J. W. Ogren, Supervisor - Administrative Services S. L. Harvey, Operating Supervisor J. R. Harper, Instrument Supervisor R. E. Sidle, Maintenance Coordinator - Mechanical
- D. E. Thomas, Maintenance Coordinator - Electrical
- W. R. Madison, NRC Coordinator Other licensee etployees contacted included 3 technicians and 5 operators.
NRC Resident Inspector
- M. S. Kidd
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 2, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Irspection Findings a.
(Closed) Deviation (338/78-32-01):
Failure to log emergency diesel generator air isolation valve position. As diucussed in IE Report 338/79-06 paragraph 3, this item remained open pending completion of the licensee's computerized commitment tracking system. The inspector verified that this tracking system is now in operation, programmed to accept and track commitments made from any source.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved item (336/78-32-04): Licensee to conduct generic review of agastat series 2400 relay contact arms application. This item addressed the apr irent omission of a generic review of a construc-tion deficiency reported in LER 78-51 dated June 28, 1978. Subsequent LER's numbers 78-51 supplement dated January 16, 1979 and 78-11 dated November 3, 1978 reported similar occurrences of non-seismically qualified contact arms being found on series 2400 agastats used to control safety-related components.
A generic review to insure no other series 2400 agastats had non-seismically qualified contact c ms was conducted by Stone and Webster and reported complete in a letter dated November 8, 1978 serial NAS-11, 110. A similar unresolved item (338/79-21-02) concerning generic reviews of all LERS remains open.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Plant Operations Review (Unit 1)
a.
Logs and Records Review The inspector reviewed the following operations narrative and and surveillance logs, maintenance reports and operations related files and records to assure the operations during the present calendar quarter have met the requirements of the license: Technical Specifica-tions, and 10 CFR. Licensee administrative controls to insure this compliance were also checked as listed below:
(1) Shif t Supervisor Narrative Log (1-log-1) for July 1-30, 1979 (2) Control Room Operator Narrative Log (1-Log-2) for July 1-30, 1979 (3) Power History Data She-ts (1-log-3) for July 30 and 31,1979 (4) Control Room Operator's Surveillance Sheets (1-log-4) for July 30 and 31,1979 (5) Station Generation Log (1-log-5) for July 31, 1979 (6) Plant Log Sheets for Ju'j 31, 1979:
(a)
(1-log-6A) ACR0 log (b)
(1-log-6E) Outside Log Status (7) Action Statement Status Log (1-log-li) for all active entries on July 31,1979 (8)
idministrative Pad-lock Log (this is a listing and has no dated entries)
(9) Shift Order Bcok, for July 1-30, 1979 (10) Active Maintenance Report Files, for all safety-related systems (11) Active tagging Report riles, for all safety-related systems (12) Deviation Report Index, for May-July,1979 (13) Secondary water radioactivity sample results and Graph July 15-30, 1979 1099 011
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(14) Administrative Procedures (ADM)
(a) ADM 10.0 Administrative Control of Protection _ Instrument Channels (b) ADM 24.0 Adherence to Technical Specifications (c) ADM 29. series Conduct of Operations (d) ADM 37.0 Control of Work and Special Processes (e) ADM '3.0 Records Management (f) ADM 44.0 Safety Inspections The inspector discussed the findings listed below with licensee opera-tions personnel.
All concerns were answered or corrected prior to completion of this inspection.
(1) Two shift supervisor signatures for review of surveillance lop were missing for the 00-08 shif t on July 31.
(2) Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) pressure has been reading 2 psig consistently, while surveillance log 1-log-4 states normal readings of 3-9 psig. Since the nit rogen pressure control valve is set for 3 psig, the surveillance log statecent is incorrect. Licensee supervisor committed to correct 1-log-4 to indicate the correct band for normal pressure readings on the PRT.
(3) A July 27 entry in the Standing Order Book relates two requirements from IEB 79-06C (dated July 26, 1979). The entry requires two licensed operators be in the control room for one unit operation at all time, and that reactor coolant pumps (RCPs shall be tripped by an operator immediately upon receipt of a low pressure safety injection actuation.
The inspector discussed the former requirement with plant operations supervision and was satisfied that the intent was properly understood:
that two operators be available to handle a casualty on the operating unit and trip RCPs (if necessary) itamediately.
b.
Plant Tour The inspector toured the facility operating spaces to confirm administra-tive controls were adequate to ccntrol maintenance, calibration, housekeeping, manning requirements and fire protection system availability.
Any abnormal system operation was noted and related to operations personnel for correction. The inspector had the following comments:
(1) The door latch on door S54-5, a three hour rated fire door that also serves as a pressure boundary for the control room pressuri-1099 Olmt
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zation system was broken, allowing the door to open from the control room side. Licensee personnel repaired the latch within one day.
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(2) Two chemical fire extinguishers mounted in operating spaces were not marked (on installed inspection cards) to have been inspected in on July 31.
On August 2, the inspector noted that this had been corrected.
Licensee supervisor indicated that July fire extinguisher inspections were late, but had been completed on August 1.
(3) Since the Unit 2 oparating areas have been included in the protected area, it was noted that all Unit I and 2 diesel rooms are nc,w afforded vital area securiti protection.
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(4) Extensive cleanup operations were in progress in the Auxiliary Building on July 31. Cleanliness conditions appeared to be very good.
(5) Two uses of wood, which did aot appear to be marked as fire resistant treated were investigated by the inspector.
In both cases, salaples of the wood would not support combustion Discussions with Stone and Webster and licensee personnel substantiat.ed the wood to be treated and a review of the licensees wood control program indicated adequate controls.
(6) A check of a sampling of three component tagouts indicated adequate controls in this area.
(7) Verification cf locks on a sampling of eight valves indicated adequate controls in this area.
(8) A review of radiological survey rasults in connection with the tour indicated adequate controls of radiation and contamination areas and work in these areas.
6.
Licensee Event Reports (Unit 1)
The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective actions had been taken, no unreviewed safety que.:tions were involved, and violations of regulations or licensee / Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
a.
LER 79-046/03L-0* dated May 3,1979: Three charging pamps inoperable during cooling system modification. As discussed in IE Report 338/79-30 paragraph 6i, Maintenance Operating Procedures (M0Ps) 8.01 and 8.02 establish controls to be used to insure two charging pump operation 1099 013
-5-when removing any one charging pump from service for maintenance. The inspector confirmed that these M0PS had not been used at the time of this event, which was correctly stated in the LER as the ca:.se of the event.
b.
LER 79-058/03L-0* dated May 25, 1979: Valve MOV-1865B failed to open during operation. As discussed in IE Report 338/79-30 par: graph 6p.,
the licensee is conducting an investigation of the failure mechanism involved. The inspector shall followup on this investigation results and corrective action taken by the licensee in future inspections (338/79-32-01)
c.
LFR 79-068/03L-0* dated June 6,1979: Radiation monitors RM-RMS-159 and 160 inoperable due to failure of a common solenoid valve coil. As discussed in IE Report 338/79-30 paragraph 64, the licensee is preparing a design change to correct the circuitry which ca" sed both raditation monitoring channels to fail. The inspector shall followup on completion of this design change, designated number 79-S35, in future inspection (338/79-32-02)
d.
LZR 79-075/03L-0 dated June 27. 1979:
Axial flux dif ference ~(AFD)
outside target band during routin.' control rod test.
e.
LER 79-077/03L-0 dated June 18, 1979: AFD outside target band during power reduction.
f.
LER 79-078/03L-0* dated June 29, 1979: One Casing cooling pump inoper-able due to flange leak. The LER describes the cause of the leak as
"an unevenly cast facing" on the pump 0 ring seating surface. However, discussions with technicians and review of the maintenance report revealed the cause of the leak to be several small cuts on the 0 ring seating surface involved. The inspector discussed clarity of reporting with licensee personnel and had no further questions.
g.
LER 79-080/03L-0 dated June 27, 1979: AFD outside target band during power escalation.
h.
LER 79-081/03L-0* dated June 27, 1979: Two individual rod position indicators (IRPIs) inoperable during operation. The repo:t explains that the two IRP1's were removed from service to remove a jumper wire, previously installed for a test.
The inspector reviewed the test involved with Instrument Control technicians and insured proper reviews for conduct of the test and jumper placement had existed.
The test resulted in correction of an IRPI fault reported earlier (see LERs79-015, and 79-55).
i.
LER 79-08::/23L-0* date July 20, 1979: Auxiliary feedwater pump P-2 inoperable during steam valve maintenance.
Owing to the repetitive failures of seating material on valves TV-MS111A and TV-MS111B, the licensee has initiated an evaluation of the valve seats and seating material. The inspector shall followup on results of this evaluation and any corrective actions taken in future inspections (338/79-32-03).
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LER 79-084/03L-0* dated July 20, 1979:
Pressurizer level channel inoperable due to welding operation near instrument cables. An evalua-tion of this failure was conducted and resulted in a change to Adminis-trative Procedure ADM 8.0 attachruent 1 " Welding and Flame Permit" dated July 20, 1979. This change requires an evaluation of welding area for impact on indrumentation.
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LER 79-086/03L-0 dated July 27, 1979: New surveillance requirement eraergency diesel generators conducted late due to a delay in trail delivery of Amendment 11 to Technical Specifications.
1.
LER 79-088/03L-0* dated August 3, 1979: Emergency diesel 1H tripped during routine testing. The inspector verified the retesting of the diesel and oper:bility test diesel IJ conducted July 2.
The two subsequent run tests within 24 nours of diesel 1H appears to indicate diesel operability.
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IE Bulletins - Units 1 and 2 a.
IE Bulletin 78-14: Asco Solenoids This bulletin was fo; warded for information only as it concerned a Boiling Water Reactor issue. The inspector verified thac ~he licensee received and reviewed IEB 78-14.
b.
IE Bulletin 79-10: Operator Training The inspector verified the licensees response of Mr.y 24, 1979 by reviewing the training records from 1978 and 1979. Records indicated compliance with 10 CFR 55 requirements and completion of remedial training for one operator when he failed the 1978 requalification exara.
c.
IE Bulletin 79-11: Faulty Electric Breaker Trip Device The inspector verified the licensees response of July 13, 1979 concerning the specified Westinghoase circuit breaker installation in Units 1 and 2.
However, in responding to question number 4 the licensee incorrectly indicated existance of an overcurrent time delay test program at North Anna Units 1 and 2.
From discussions with the licensee's electrical maintenance supervisors, the inspector f ound that such a testing program is being developed for Unit 2, but that none exists or was planned for Unit 1.
The inspector told licensee management that a supplemental response, correctiv stating the testing program status is necessary (338/79-32-04 and 3379-42-01) and that an overcurrent time
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delay testing program for all rafety-related circuit breakers needs to be promulgated to comply with tne bulletin (338/79-32-05 and 339/79-42-02).
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8.
IE Circulars-Units 1 and 2 The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability to Units 1 and 2, and appropriate action had been taken or planned:
a.
IEC 79-09: Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Internal correspondence dated July 11, 1979 verified that the specified Scott or Presur-Pak self-contained breathing apparatus are not used at the facility, and that a check of the regulator diaphragms on facility units indicated no failures.
b.
IEC 79-10 Unacceptabe Pipe Fittings The inspector reviewed internal correspondence that confirmed that none of the subject pipe fittings were used in either Unit 1 or 2.
9.
Previously Identified Items - Units 1 and 2 (0 pen) Open item (338/79-06-02)
a.
Licensee provided guidance on Technical Specification 3.7.15 requirements regarding fire doors. The inspector informed the licensee of the NRC interpretation of T.S. 3.7.15 as indicated in J. C. Stone memo dated June 26, 1979. This interpretation specifically included fire doors as a " penetration fire boundary.
Licensee management intends to pursue this definition prior to generating guidance for periodic surveillance of firedoors.
b.
(Closed) Open items (339/79-22-01 and 339/79-22-05)
FSAR figure does not denote vents and drains properly for the safety injection and residual heat removal systems. Both of these items were reviewed and found to indicate FSAR details beyond those required by hPC policy.
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