IR 05000333/1981012
| ML20009C566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009C559 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-12, NUDOCS 8107210231 | |
| Download: ML20009C566 (10) | |
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DCS NUMBERS 50333-810327 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50333-810401 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50333-810409 50333-810410 50333-810414 Region I 50333-810418 81-12 50333-810422 Report No*
50333-810427 50-333 Docket No.
DPR-59 C
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License No.
Priority Category Power Authority of the State of New York Licensee:
P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Jarres A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Scriba, New York
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Inspection conducted: May 1-31, 1981 Inspectors:
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l g.7C.LinviTie,ResdentInspector date signed
<>2 (o 3/f(/
f L. T. Doerflei, Resident Inspector date signed
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d te signed h 2.7 [F /
Approved by:
l Fl. B.' KisYer, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed
Section 1C l
Inspection Summary:
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l Inspection on May 1, 1981 May 31, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours
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i by tne Resident Inspector (93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; review of Licensee Event Reports; licensee action on IE Bulletins and
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Circulars; control room observations; plant tours; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; verification of core spray system operability; t
radioactive material shipment preparation observation; quality control audit
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observation; training observation, and security training observation.
i Results: Of twelve areas inspected no items of noncompliance were observed in
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10 areas and two items of noncompliance were observed in two areas.
(Failure to
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I barricade High Radiation Area, paragraph 6; Failure to perfonn surveillance test
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within required frequency, paraaraph 7).
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i Region I Form 12 8107210251 didE06
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PDR ADOCK 05000333 M --
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- B. Diest, Manager-Nuclear Operations
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- R. Liseno, Assistant to Operations Superintendent
- A. McKeen, Assistant to Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
- R. Pasternak, Resident Manager D. E. Tall, Training Coordinator The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operators, Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance and Contractor perscnnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
, Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-06-01):
The inspector reviewed the licensee as-built documents and work requests associated with each of the deficient pipe supports to determine that the deficiencies had been corrected.
In addition, the inspector observed that the base plates for supports H10-38 and H10-40 had been grouted.
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-06-02): The inspector reviewed the work requests and the as-built documents to determine that the discrepancies had been corrected.
In addition, he observed that pipe supports H18-42 and H18-42A remain in the as-built condition they were left in after the repairs were completed in 1979. There was no indication that they had been subjected to damaging dynamic transients.
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-09-12): The inspector reviewed the work requests and the as-built documents to determine that the discrepancies had been corrected.
In addition, he observed that the clearance between the base plate and the sliding pad on support H46-282 had been corrected.
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(Closed)
INFRACTION (333/80-15-09): The inspector has observed during plant tours that most step off pads now in use are the plastic ones comitted to in the licensee's response.
(Closed) DEVIATION (333/80-17-05): The inspector has obsorved during plant tours that control of combustibles has improved markedly since the new fire protection supervisor initiated his inspection program.
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/80-15-03): The inspector determined by reviewing training records that the licensee has sent several electricians and instrument and control technicians to a vendor training course on the LPCI MOV inverters. This training has improved considerably the ability of the licensee to maintain this equipment. The licensee demonstrated this by quickly repairing the A inverter after a failure on May 15, 1981.
(0 pen) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/80-01-05): The inspector reviewed modification package F1-80-22 which provides an alternate sample point at a lower elevation of tne stack. The licensee stated that the hardware is installed and that favorable comparative data has been collected.
However, the modification is not complete because some changes in the installation are necessary. This item will remain open pending completion of the modification.
3.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector detennined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
LER's 81-028*, 81-029*,81-030, 81-031, 81-032*,81-033, 81-034*,81-035, 81-036*, 81-037* were reviewed.
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- Report selected for onsite followup.
Information about followup on LER's81-028, 81-029,81-034 and 81-036 was documented in inspection report 50-333/81-09.
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LER 81-31 reported that investigation continues into the reason that indicated core flow was higher than expected during single loop operation.
This item is unresolved pending submittal of a report of the results of this investigation (333/81-12-01).
LER 81-036 reported the failure of a containment isolation valve to close due to a valve operator motor failure. The licensee revised the LER to indicate that the motor 'ailure was caused by a procedural inadequacy as reported in inspection report 50-333/81-09,(333/81-12-02). The inspector will review this procedure change during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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- 4.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and Circulars The inspector verified that for the IE Bulletins listed below the licensee's written response was provided within the time period stated in the Bulletin, included the information required to be reported, included adequate corrective action comitinents based on information presented in the Bulletin and was accurate. The inspector further verified that any corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the response. The following IE Bulletin was c1csed:
IEB 81-02, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against
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Differential Pressure The following IE Bulletin remains open for the reasons indicated below:
IEd 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems:
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7.n the most recent update of his response to IEB 79-14 dated October 7, 1980 the licensee indicated that a final in depth review of the program was underway. This review which is almost complete has led to several additional pipe support modifications. The licenses also indicated in his response that a new evaluatior. of the CRD piping was being n'ade as a result of IE Bulletin 80-17 coasideratione. The licensee has since detennined that a seismic analysis C. :he CRD piping was completed by RCI. This Bulletin will remain open pending completion of the verification of the seismic analysis for the CRD piping, implementation of any required modifications, and a final report by the licensee. The licensee expects to complete this work
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The following IE Circular is closed:
IEC 81-02, Performance of NRC Licensed Individuals While on Duty
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5.
Control Room Observations
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l a.
Using a plant specific checklist, the inspector verified selected l
plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with the limiting conditions of operations of the plant Technical
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Specifications.
Items checked included:
Power distribution limits
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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite emergency
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tower sources Meactor Control panel indications
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Primary Containment temperature and pressure
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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure
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Standby Liquid Control Tank Level and concentration
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Stack monitor recorder traces
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b.
The inspector directly observed portions of the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Shutdown
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Outage activities
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Startup
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Routine power operations
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency Foms
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Surveillance Tests
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c.
Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
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Shift Logs and Operating Records (1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain infomation on plant problems and operations
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Detect changes and trends in perfomance
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Detect possible conflictr with Technical Specifications
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or regulatory requirements Detemine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required Assess the effectiveness of the comunications provided
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by the logs (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor Log
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Nuclear Control Operator Log
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Night Orders
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Shift Turnover Check Sheet
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Daily Instrument Checks
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Daily Core Surveillance Checks
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Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
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Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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STA Log
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Plant Tours
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and
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conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room i
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Reactor Building
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Turbii.e Building
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumpheuse - Screenwell
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Standby Gas Treatment Building
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Drywell
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Radwaste Building
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Crescent Rooms
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Cable Tunnels
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Torus Room
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Range
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Protected Area Perimeter
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b.
During the plant tours the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for
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i leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor
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operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
Other items verified during the plant tours included:
Proper completion and use of selected radiation work pemits
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Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
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Proper personnel monitoring practices
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Proper control of ignition sources and flamable material I
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l Equipment tag outs in confomance with controls for removal of
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equipment from service Nomal security practices are being followed
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices are in confomance
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with approved licensee programs c.
During a tour of the Radwaste Building at abou',11:05 a.m. on May 18, 1981 the inspector observed gate number RW 272/12 was open.
This gate provided access to portions of the 252 foot and 272 foot elevations of the Radwaste Building in which concentrated waste was in the process of being prepared for shipment. At the time there was
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a high area radiation monitor alam (ARM) for the 252' elevation of l
the Radwaste Building reading approximately 100 millirem per hour.
l Licensee survey number 38055 dated May 18, 1981 showed that the l
general area dose rate in a portion of the area made accessible by this open gate was up to 200 millirem per hour.
Licensee Survey No. 38054 also dated May 10,1981 shows a general area dose rate in another portion of the area made accessible by this gate was 100 millirem per hour. Technical Specification 6.11(A)
High Radiation Area states in part, "In lieu of the ' control device' or ' alarm signal'
required by paragraph 2.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20 each High Radiation Area (i.e., > 100 mrem /hr.) in which the intensity of radiation is 1000 mrem /hr. or less shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be contrclled by
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requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Pemit (RWP)..."
Failure to barricade this area by leaving gate no. RW 272/12 open is an item of noncompliance. Upon notification that the gate was open licensee personnel immediately checked the area for unauthorized personnel and closed and locked the gate (333/81-12-03).
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On several occasions the inspector has observed severai marginal radiological control practices. These practices were in the areas of self monitoring, control of protective clothing and adherence to RWP requirements. The licensee has agreed to take action to prevent recurrence of these problems. The inspector will monitor progress in this area during subsequent inspections (333/81-12-06).
7.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the redundant system or component was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the work was performed by qualified personnel.
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F-ISP-45, Main Steam Line High Temperature Instrumer.t Functional
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Test / Calibration, Revision 3, dated January 1979, performed on May 13, 1981 F-ISP-22-1, RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm High Pressure Instrument
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Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 7, dated May 1981 perfomed on May 20, 1981 During this test the inspector observed that the capability to isolate the RCIC main steam line is inoperable because the breakers for both the inside and outside containment isolation valves are racked out with the valves left in the open position. This is not consistent with Technical Specification 3.7.D.2 which requires that whenever an isolation valve becomes inoperable at least one valve in the line is in the isolated condition.
This item is unresolved pending a detemination of the NRC i
position on this requirement during surveillance testing (333/81-12-04).
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F-ST-9B, EDG Full Load Test, Revision 7, dated June 11,1980-
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perfomed on May 22, 1981 During the observation of this test, the inspector reviewed previous data for the test. As a result of this review the inspector detemined that the portions associated with the air compressors and the fuel oil transfer system had not been performed from January 9, 1981 to February 22, 1981,
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a period of 43 days. Technical Specification 4.9.B.2 requires that,
"Once per month the diesel starting air compressors shall be checked for proper operation and their ability to recharge air receivers."
Technical Specification 4.9 C.2 states, "During the monthly diesel generator testing, the diesel fuel oil transfer system shall be checked i
for proper operation." This failure to perform these portions of the test was apparently caused by taking credit for completion of the entire test on January 21, 1981 when only the diesel generator operation portion was completed. The licensee issued an occurrence report when infomed
of this oversight. This is an item of noncompliance (333/81-12-05).
8.
Maintenance Observations
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The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the redundant train was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the work was performed by qualified j
personnel.
WR 03-2559 Replacement of Control Rod 38-27 perfomed on May 4
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and 5, 1981 i
The licensee told the inspector that what appeared to be crack indications
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were observed on the collet housing at a location further down the housing than that associated with the collet housing cracking problem referred to in Technical Specifications.
In addition, the licensee stated that the cause of the failure of the control rod to move appeared to be excessive corrosion and dirt in the seals rather than the collet housing cracks.
i The licensee has requested that General Electric review this matter and provide recomendations based on the results of the review regarding a course of action during the 1981 refueling outage. The inspector will
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review this matter further prior to the refueling outage (333/81-12-07).
LPRM calibration perfomed in accordance with RAP 7.3.4 LPRM
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Calibration, Revision 3, dated August 1, 1980 and F-IMP-7.6, Neutron Monitoring system LPRM and APRM Instrument Calibration, Revision 6, dated October 31, 1979, performed on May 12, 1981.
WR 71-10082, A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), Motor Operated
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Valve (MOV) Inverter Repair performed on May 15, 1981 The inspector verified by document review and direct observation that this piece of equipment was properly removed from and restored to service. The licensee stated that the reliability of this equipment has improved considerably since the personnel who maintain it have received vendor training. This has been evidenced by a reduction in the number of failures and the frequency of failure of the equipment. However, the inspector noted that one of the spare parts which the licensee attempted to use to repair the inverter and which had been previously returned to the vendor as l
defective again was found defective. The vendor had apparently been unable to find anything wrong with the part. The licensee is investigating the cause of this problem. The inspector will review this matter farther during a subsequent inspection (333/81-12-08).
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WR 13-i1821 Rebuild Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Trap
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performed on May 29, 1981
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Verification of Core Spray System Operability The inspector performed a complete valve lineup check of accessible valves
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in the Core !cray System using the checklist in licensee operating
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procedure F-0P-14.
Prior to conducting the valve lineup check the inspector checked the list against the drawing in the procedure figure
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OP-14-1, Revision 4, and FM-23A-13 which was marked to indicate that a revision with control no. 9-119 was in process. This revision accounted for soveral valve position discrepancies between the Op drawinc and the
FM. However, the 'nspector also determined during the valve lineup check
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that several vent and drain valves which are shown on the OP drawing and i
lineup checklist and which exist in the condition shown do not appear on
the FM drawing. They are valves numbered CSP 429A&B, CSP 781 A&B, CSP 789A&B, CSP 790A&B and CSP 791 A&B. The licensee stated that a work
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i request would be initiated to revise FM-23A-13 to reflect the as-built conditions.
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l During the valve lineup check the inspector also identified four valves
which were improperly positioned. Two of these exceptions were noted on the most recent licensee valve lineup of the system conducted in August
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1980. The other two, CSP 71A and CSP 74A, were not. These normally l
open valves which provide isolation for a makeup pressure control valve which is not in service were found closed'. The licensee immediately
placed these valves in the proper position.
Finally, the inspector also l
determined that CSP 25B, the system high point drain valve, which is normally locked, closed, and capped was not locked. The licensee immediately locked the valve when notified of its condition.
10. Radioactive Material Shipment Preparation Observation The inspector observed portions of the preparations for shipment of solidified concentrated radioactive waste no. 05-81-146-L on May 13,1981.
The inspector reviewed the following areas:
The shipping paper documentation
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The loading of the package on the vehicle l
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The package marking l
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The package labelling
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The control of contaminatica and radiation levels
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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11. Quality control Audit Observation The inspector observed portions of audit no. SR694 dated March 19, 1981 performed by Mr. J. Scott on PSP-5, Revision 1, Radioa:tive Airborne Sampling, Analysis and Equipment Calibration. The inspector verified that:
Audit personnel were qualified and independent of the organization
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being audited.
An audit report was made to management.
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The audit was made in accordance with the required frequency.
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No items of noncompliance were observed.
12. Training Observation The inspector observed licensed operator requalification training in the area of mitigation of core damage on May 27, 1981. The training was conducted as required by ITP5, Licensed Operator Requalification, Revision 4, dated August 7,1981 and the 1981 Annual Requalification Schedule. Subiects covered included Recognizing Core Damage / Critical Plant Parameters, Hydrogen Hazards During Severe Accidents, and BWR TMI Lessons Learned.
No items of noncompliance were observed.
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Security Training Ooservation
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On May 27, 1981 the inspector observed the range instruction for security personnel during backshift hours. This instruction was given in lieu of weapons qualification which had been scheduled but was postponed because of the safety hazard posed by contractor personnel working in the barge slip area near the range.
No items of noncompliance were observed.
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Unresolved Items I
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, i
or deviations. The unresolved items identified during this inspection are l
discussed in paragraphs 3 and 7.
15.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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On June 5,1981, the inspector met with licensee representatives (Denoted in paragraph 1) and sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report. During the meeting the unresolved items were discussed.
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