IR 05000333/1981002
| ML20009B210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1981 |
| From: | Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B207 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-02, 50-333-81-2, NUDOCS 8107150059 | |
| Download: ML20009B210 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF~ INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report N'. 81-02 DCS 50-333-810117 o'
DCS 50-333-810121 Docket No. 50-333 License No.DPR-59 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: January 1,1981 - January 31, 1981 Inspectors:
Of
/ N 3[5 f/
gC[f.invill Resident Irspector date s'igned date signed d te signed N 0/ /
Approved by:
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H'. B. Kistbr, Chief, Reactor Projects
'date signeo '
Section No. 4 Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 1, 1981 - January 31, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-02)
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Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the residant inspector of:
licensee action on previous inspection findings; Control Room Observations; Plant Tours; Log and Record Review; Observation of Physical Security; Witnessing of Surveillance Tests; Observation of Maintenance Activities; Review of a Plant Trip; followup on Licensee response to.IE Bulletins, and NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.4, Containment Isolation Provisions. The inspection involved 84 inspection hours by the resident inspector.
I Results:
Of the ten areas inspected no items of noncompliance were noted in
.eight areas. One item of noncompliance was identified with three examples in l
two areas (Failure to Follow Procedures)
Region I~ Form 12-(Rev. April 77)
8107150059 810318
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PDR ADOCK 05000333
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DETAILS 1.-
Persons Coitacted
.R. Baker,' Superintendent of Power-N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Corverse, Operations Superintendent W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent
- C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
- R. Pasternak, Resident Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this
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inspection-including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operations, Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, and Contractor Personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Inspector followup item 77-31-01: The new NRC Region I SALP Program calls for a management meeting annually to review the results of the SALP Board evaluation.
PASNY management had requested that these meetings be held more frequently than every three years as
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required by the earlier inspection program.
(Closed) Unresolved item 79-02-03: The licensee su: itted a proposed Amendment to Technical Specifications to correct rema ning provisions for the LPCI loop select logic which has been deleted on January 6,1981.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletin The inspector reviewed the licensee responses to the IE Bulletins listed below to determine that the response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the response includes the information required to
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be reported, that the response includes adequate corrective action commitments based on the infomation presented in the Bulletin, that the information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
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. IEB-80-17, Supplement' 4, Failure of Control Rods to Insert During
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a Scram at a BWR IEBL80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Contaimaent
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During the review of IEB 80-24.the inspector identified the following areas of concern. The. reactor building closed loop cooling water (RBCLC) sustem makeup rate.is approximately 17,000 gallons per week, the RBCLC outside containment manual isolation valves for components located inside the
'drywell were-not properly labeled which could lead to operator error if component isolation were necessary, and the drywell floor-sump annunciator'
was on continuously due to improper setpoint adjustnent which could mask
. actual conditions. The licensee has corrected the labeling and annunciator problems and is making efforts to isolate the system leakaoe. The inspector will evaluate this activity further in a future inspection.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations (1) Using a plant specific c'mcklist, the inspector verified plant parameters and equipmen< availability to ensure compliance with the limiting conditions for operations of the plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
Switch and valve positions
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Alarm conditions
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Meter indications and recorder values
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Status lights and power available lights Computer printouts
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Comparise'. of redundant readings
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(2) The inspector directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency Forms
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'(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
The inspector had discussions with the licensee on reducing the numbr.r of lit annunciators in the control room. On a day to day basis, there are approximately twenty-five lit annunciators in the control room.
Some of these alarms are normal for the existing plant conditions ard therefore, provide little information or have no mearing. The inspector will continue to review and evaluate the licensee's efforts in this area during future inspections.
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4-(4)' Shift turnovers were observed to-ensure proper control room
.and shift manning on both day and back shifts. Shift turnover checklists;and log' review by the oncoming and offgoing. shifts were also observed by the inspector.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
.b.
Shift logs and Operating Records-(1)
Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain information on_ plant problems and operations
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Detect changes and trends in performance
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Detect possible conflicts with TechnicalLSpecifi'.ations
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or regulatory requirements Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required Assess the. effectiveness of the communications provided
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by the logs (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor Log
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Nuclear Control Operator Log
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Night Orders
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Shift Turnover Check Sheet
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper / Bypass Log
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Daily Instrument Checks
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Daily Core Surveillance Checks
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Auxiliary Operator Log
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Plant Tours (1)
During the inspection,.riod, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room
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Reactor Building
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Turbine Building
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumphouse --Screenwell
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Standby Gas Treatment Building
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Battery Rooms
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Site Perimeter
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Radwaste Building
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-(2) j The following. determinations were made:
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Yy General Plant Housekeeping: ' Observations relative to
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plant housekeeping identified no items of nuncompliance.
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--: Fluid Leaks: No significant fluid leaks were observed.
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Piping Vibrations: No excessive piping vibrations were.
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observed and no adverse conditions were noted.
Monitoring Instrumentation: The insp:: tor verified-that
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selected. instruments were functional and indicated parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
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Fire Protection: ihe inspector verified that selected
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fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire stations were unobstructed, and that e
adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards
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was maintained.
Radiation Prctection Controls: The inspector verified that
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the licensee's radiation protection policies and procedures e
were. adhered to.
Specific observations included:
(1)
Access control including barriers, tagging, posting, and maintenance of. step-off pads.
(2)
Verification that requirements of RWP's in effect
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are appropriate and are being followed.
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(3).
Verification that radiation protection instruments in use are being calibrated as required.
(3)
On January 15, 1980, the inspector observed nitrogen vapor
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issuing from the CAD system nitrogen storage area while a
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truck was' delivering liquid nitrogen.
Upon investigation the inspector determined that the auxiliary operator filling the
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nitrogen tank had permitted tank pressure to rise to the relief j
valve setpoint daring filling operations because he was not familiar with the procedure for topping off a partially filled i
nitrogen storage tank contained ir step D.3 of procedure F-0P-37,
Nitrogen Ventilation and Purge, Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD), Containment Vacuum Relief and Containment Differential Pressure Systems,' Revision 4, dated October 28, 1980. While he c
was generally aware ~of the procedure he did not follow step D.3.a which requires that the vent valve be opened to reduce pressure
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to approximately 150 psig and then close the vent valve, and
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step D.3.b which requires that the pressure building coil be isolated. He further stated that he did not know that a' written procedure for the evolution existed and that his only training in the procedure had been by observation of an experienced-operator performing the evolution. _This is an item of noncompliance in that Technical Specification 6.8 requires-that written procedures
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D be established and implemented, and Operations Department Standing
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Order No.'2, Operating Principles and Philosophy, Revision'1, dated November 30,1979, step 6.1.1 which states that " Procedure Compliance is mandatory (333/81-02-01).
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Physical Security The inspector made observations and verified during regular and off-shift hours,-that selected aspects of the plant's physical security systems and organization were in accordance with regulatory. requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
(1)
. Physical Security Organization Observations indicated that a full time member of the
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security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
All security members observed appeared to be capable of
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performing their assigned tasks.
(2)
Physical Barriers
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Physical barriers in the protected and vital areas were
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frequently observed to assure that they were intact and randomly checked by patrolling guards.
Isolation zones were observed to be free of obstructions
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and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
(3)
Access Control The inspector observed, on frequent occasions, that
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explosive and metal detectors were operable and used as required.
On many occasions persons and packages were observed to
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be properly searched prior to entry into the protected area.
Vehicles were observed to be properly searched and escorted
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or controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo
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identification badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring escorts were
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properly escorted.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Plant Trips -SafetyLSystem Challenges At approximately 8:40 AM on January 17, 1981 the plant tripped from near j-full power as a result of a transient caused by a loss of the.uninterruptible
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power supply ~(UPS) bus.
Because the plant computer, most control room recorders and many control room instruments failed when the UPS bus was
- de-energized inadvertently for.approximately four minutes, it was difficult i.o determine the exact sequence of events.
Based upon a review of a licensee report prepared in response to IE Bulletin 79-27, t.oss of
.-Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation and' discussions'with operators on shift at the time of the event, it appears
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A maintenance electriciaa was working in the cabinet housing the controls for UPS motor generator-(MG) set. The MG set was tagged out.of service for replacement of brushes on the DC drive motor. The UPS bus was being fed from its alternate power supply transformer. The electrician was surprised to find live electrical power in the control cabinet. When he did, he noticed that the alternate power supply switch was closed and opened it-de-energizing the UPS bus. This act is an item of noncompliance in that it violates Technical Specification 6.8 which requires-that " Written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented,"
and Work Activity Control Procedure No. 10.1.2, Equipment and Personnel Protective Tagging', Revision 3, dated December 18, 1980, step 7.1.2 which states in part, " Additional protection may be added to the original clearance at any time after issue with permission of the tag holder and concurrence of the controller." The maintenance electrician who was the tag holder failed to get the concurrence of the controller, the operators, prior to adding protection (333/81-02-02).
It appears that when the UPS bus was de-energized the feedwater pump motor gear unit controllers failed as is at near full feedwater flow while failures in the 3 element feedwater control system led to a reduced demand for feedwater.
Consequently, reactor vessel level rose to +58 inches at which point the feedwater pump turbines and the main generator turbine tripped. This led to a shrink in reactor vessel level since the turbine
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bypass' valves openec and there was no source of feedwater. Approximately forty five seccnds into the transient, at +12 inches, the reactor scramed
.an low water level, and at -38 inches the main steam isolation valves (MSIV's)
closed,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem(HPCI),andthereactor core isolation cooling systems (RCIC) initiated automatically.
However, the HPCI turbine failed to come up to speed until it was placed in the test mode by the operators because the controller failed.
In addition, operators manually lifted 2 safety r' lief valves (SRV's) to control reactor pressure.
G 59V which is one of the automatic depressurization systems (ADS) SRV's failed to open in response to a manual signal. This failure is discussed further in paragraph 7.
Operators restered reactor vee v1 level with the
'HPCI system, reopened the MSIV's and ccamenced a normal reactor cooldown within about an hour after the transient started.
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Although the operators realized the cause of the transient early because the UPS MG-set was tagged out.for maintenance, most of them were confused by it-because they did not appreciate the consequences.
During the-approximately four minutes that the UPS bus was de-energized most control room recorders were failed as is, the process computer failed, many control room instruments failed including all on scale reactor vessel level instruments except the emergency Yarway level indicator which was low because it is calibrated cold and at atmospheric pressure, and the Gaitronics communication system used to broadcast instructions throughout
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the' plant failed. Most of this equipment was restored after about four minutes but the process computer was not restored until about an hour after the event started.
The shift supervisor was entering the control room at the beginning of the event. He said he heard the scram contactors open and realized that tne UPS bus was de-energized because the nuclear control operator was trying to pass information over the Gaitronics PA system without any success. The shift supervisor said he then proceeded to the 300 foot elevation of the reactor building to check reactor vescel level because he knew he had no reliable level indication in the control *oom.
He left two licensed reactor operators and the shift technical advisor in N
the control room to handle events ^until his return. This is an item of K nonccmpliance in that Technical Specification 6.8 states in part, " Written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented,"
and Operations Department Standing Order No. 1, Operating Staff Responsibilities and Authorities, Revision 3, dated December 21, 1979, step 5.1.9 states in part, "When accident or potential accident conditions are encountered, the s.,ift supervisor shall immediately return to the control room and direct operator activities. He shall remain there until the plant is stable or he is relieved and such relief is recorded in the plant log..."
(333/81-02-03).
The precise point to which reactor vessel level dropped during the transient is not known, however, it is known that it was somewhere between the double
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low level setpoint, -38 inches on the accident Yarway. level indicator (control room repeaters failed low on loss of UPS bus) which initiates HPCI and RCIC and closes MSIV's and +50 inches above the top of the active fuel recorded on the emergency Yarway level recorder.
This is a range of approximately l'5 inches.
The operators also observed that only two of four channels on the scram discharge volume (SDV)' continuous monitoring system (CMS) installed as-required by IE Bulletin 80-17 alarmed as a result of the scram.
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Prior to restart the licensee replaced and~ tested the HPCI system-
-controller, inspected, cleaned and tested the solenoids for all eleven'SRV's, replaced G SRV, and replaced and tested the SDV CMS.
In addition, the licensee is in the process of improving training of operators with regara to loss of control power. transients, investigating a modification.to place the two accident Yarway level indicator repeaters in the control room on different power supplies, and labeling all control room instruments as to power supply. The licensee management also suspended the maintenance electrician who
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initiated the-event for three days without pay for failure to follow procedures. Although the licensee recognized this transient as the worst case in the exhaustive study done in response to IE Bulletin 79-27 and made the study'available to control rooc operators, the licensee apparently did not respond adequately because he did not develop any new procedures and he did not provide any training to prepare the operators for this. type of event.
No other items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation The inspector observed the surveillance tests listed below during a startup on January 26 and 27,1981 following a one week outage which resulte'd from a plant trin.
During the recovery from the trip the riigi: Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the G Safety Relief Valve (SRV) failed to operate properly. The inspector observed that procedures were followed,-testing was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and system restoration was correctly accomplished.
F-ST-4A, HPCI Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 4,
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dated February 18, 1977 F-ST-4B, HPCI Flow Rate Test (ISI), Revision 6, dated December 1,1980
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F-ST-22B, AD5 Manual Relief Valve Operation, Revision 5,
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dated March 20, 1979 RAP 7.3.10, Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation, Revision 3,
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dated August 13, 1980 During the SRV testing the inspector observed that the acoustic monitor for the D SRV gave no indication that the valve was lifting.
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-it did meet the acceptance criteria of the surveillance test indicated by the change -in bypass valve steam flow and reactor vessel level.
The 1icensee discovered upon investigation that the cables for the acoustic monitors for D SRV had been accidentially cut during the outage.
After repairs the valve was retested and the acoustic monitor perfonned satisfactorily according to the licensee, e
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During control rod scram' time testing the inspector observed local flow indication in the scram discharge volume (SDV) continuous monitoring system (CMS) for several rods and occasional alarms.
It appeared that the signal processing equipment installed by the licensee in place of the General Electric package to satisfy.
IE.Bulletin 80-17 is functioning properly.
No items of noncompliance were' identified.
7.
Maintenance Observation The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below to ensure that required administrative and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were being u',ed, the procedures were adequate to control the activity, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were properly implemented, and QC provided independent.orification of specific points.
SRV solenoids
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After G SRV failed to open in response to a manual open signal during recovery from a scram on January 17, 1981, the licensee inspected the solenoid actuator internals and discovered that Loc-tite 620 deposits between the solenoid plunger and cylinder had prevented sufficient travel to actuate the SRV.
It appeared that excessive Loc-tite 620 had been used in securing the plunger on the stem with the locHng nut and that it had not been given adequate curing time prior to final assembly and sealing.
Consequently, it dripped from the assembly onto
'he cylinder and cured between the cylinder and plunger. After this discovery the licensee called in Target Rock vendor representatives te open, inspect, clean, and reassemble the solenoids for all eleven SRV's.
This work was accomplished in accordance with Target Rock Technical Manual No. 7567F, dated October 1980, Report No. 2025, dated October 6,1977.
At the licensee's request one change was made to the procedure to permit the use of neolube as a lubricant for reassembly instead of castor oil.
The licensee felt that the castor oil which appeared to have become somes".at " gummy" in service may have contributed to the problem.
Target Rock believed that the change was unnecessary but agreed to
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substitute the neolube for the castor oil.
Of the remaining ten solenoid assemblies, only one, A, appeared to have excessive Loc-tite 620 deposit similar tc that found on the G assembly.
It should be noted that A was challenged during the transient and did open.
In addition, G had been tested satisfactorily after installation ir about August 1980 and had functioned properly when challenged following a scram in October 1980 according to the licensee.
Inspection of H SRV solenoid assembly revealed rust deposits apparently from corrosion of the locking nut caused by water intrusion through the pneumatic supply system.
After reassembly all eleven SRV's were tested satisfactorily.
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In accordance with the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-25 the licensee
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replaced the' entire G SRV and sent the' valve which failed to the vendor for testing.
The newly installed G SRV appears to be leaking some steam based upon audible output from the_ acoustic monitor.
However, it did test satisfactorily as indicated above.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.4, Containment Isolation Provisions In Inspection Report 80-21, the inspector stated that it appeared that the licensee met their comitment and the Category A requirements of NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.4 regarding containment isolation provisions.
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following up on IE Bulletin 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Leal 3e Inside Containment, the inspector realized that there was evidence contrary to this earlier finding. The return lines from components inside containment cooled by the nonessential Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC) system have normally open manual isolation valves.
This does not meet the licensee's commitment to full compliance nor the requirement that all nonessential systems be automatically 1solated by the containment isolation signal. When the inspector questioned the licensee on_this subject, the licensee provided-the inspector with a report by the licensee's architect engineer prepared in response to NUREG-0578, Item 2.1.4.
This report war not given to the inspector during his previcus inspection.
Rather material prepared by licensee personnel in response to a similar requirement of :E Bulletin 79-08 was made available. The architect engineer's report identified the RBCLC system as a nonessential system not requiring automatic isolation because it was closed inside containment.
When the licensee realized that this error of omission had been made, they notified the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and initiated a reevaluation. They have also identified two other outside containment
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isolation valves which will open automatically upon reset of a containment;,
isolation signal if their control switches are not in the closed position.
These valves are on the drywell floor and equipment drain sump lines.
The licensee has implemented temporary procedure changes to require that the switches for these valves be placed in the closed position prior to reset of a containment isolation signal.
This item is unresolved pending licensee further revision to their response to the Category A requirement of NUREG 0578,-Item 2.1.4 (333/81-02-04).
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 8.
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j-10.' Exit Interview-At periodic interva'.s-during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On January 30, 1981, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the. scope and
' findings-of the-inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting the unresolved item was discussed.
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