IR 05000333/1981009
| ML20004F440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004F433 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-333-81-09, 50-333-81-9, NUDOCS 8106180346 | |
| Download: ML20004F440 (10) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS Numbers 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50333-810323
50333-810324 Region I 50333-810326 50333-810327 i
81-09 50333-810401 l
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Report No.
50-333 Occket No.
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License No. OPR-59 Priority Category
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I Power Authority of the State of New York Licensee:
P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. Fit:: Patrick Nuclear Power Station
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Inspection at: Scriba, New York
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Inspection conducted:
ril 1, 1981 - April 30, 1981 Inspectors:
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' dent Inspector dat signed
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S. Lfrt'v'ille,
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dhte figned
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L. Ocerflein, Resident Inspector
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date igned M
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Approved by:
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H: B. KisterMhief, Reactor Projects da'te signed Section No. 1C
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 1,1981 - Acril 30,1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-09)
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Areas Insoected: Routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors (112 hours0.0013 days <br />0.0311 hours <br />1.851852e-4 weeks <br />4.2616e-5 months <br />) of l
licensee action on previous inspection items; review of Licensee Event Reports; licensee action on TNI Task Action Plan items; licensee action on IE Bulletins
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and Circulars; control room inspections; plant tours; witnessing surveillance tests;
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observation of maintenance activities; followup on licensee event, and review of scram t
control air header dump modification.
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Results: Of the ten areas inspected no items of noncompliance were noted.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
i 81061803%
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DETAILS j
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1.
Persons Contacted j
- J. Bayne, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation f
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- B. Diest, Manager - Nuclear Operations
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power
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N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
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R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power i
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
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- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent i
M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer j
W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent l
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H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent (
C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor i
- R. Pasternak, Resident Manager j
D. E. Tall, Training Coordinator
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this
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inspection including Shift Suoervisors, Administrative, Operators,
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i Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance and
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- Contractor personnel.
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- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
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t 2.
Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
INFRACTION (333/80-17-04): The inspector has observed during l
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plant tours that fire doors have been labeled and that the licensee's
effcets to keep them positioned as required have been effective.
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(Closed)
INFRACTION (333/79-09-02): The licensee's efforts to assure that i
high radiation areas within the plant are properly posted and barricaded i
appear to have been effective since the inspector has not observed any
further items of noncompliance in this ares.
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(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION (SUPPLEMENT I) (333/80-21-02): The j
inspector has observed that the licensee's efforts i;o maintain this and
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other fire doors closed by checking them oncc per shift has been effective.
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(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (SUPPLEMENT I) (333/81-02-02): The inspector has cbserved that the licensee's disciplinary action in this case for violation of the protective tagging procedure has led to improved supervision and more strict adherence to the procedure.
I (C'icsed) SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION (SUPPLEMENT I) (333/80-21-01): The r
inspector reviewed licensee survey number 34831 dated October 31, 1980 which
was conducted at the time the violation occurred.
It indicated that no spread i
I of contamination was involved. Since there has been no observed recurrence,
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the licensee's action to improve comunications between operations and radiation protection personnel appears to have been effective.
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(Closed) UNRESOLCD ITEM (333/80-23-01): The inspector reviewed the
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calculation done by the licensee's architect engineer to justify operation of the CAD system with the pressure buildup coil isolated.
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INFRACTION (333/80-15-11): Although the licensee has changed some of his actions to prevent recurrence from those to which he comitted in his response, his actions appear to have been effective since the inspector has observed no recurrence of open unguarded vital area doors for i
several months.
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(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-09-05): The licensee has indicated that f
all instrument and instrument root valves have been tagged. Rather than revise ISP-73 the licensee cancelled it and incorporated the instrument and j
i instrument root valve lineups in ST-40H, Revision 0, dated September 18 j
1979. The inspector reviewed the most recent data sheets of the lineup i
conducted after the refueling outage on August 16,1980. During the review
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he observed that many temporary changes were necessary to correct errors.
- The procedure has since been revised several times. The inspector has not observed any untagged instrument valves during his tours of the plant.
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i (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-06-01): The inspector advised the licensee j
i that it is the NRC's position that any failure of HPCI to actuate when called
upon during an event is r@ortable as a Prompt Notificatio,n as required by I
l Technical Specifications. Other problems found with HPCI not related to l
response of the system to an event should be reported as a 30 Day Report.
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The licensee agreed to comply with this position in the future.
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(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-06-04): The licensee quickly l
replaced 16-1-A0V-102A when he realized that failure of the computer with j
16-1-A0V-102A closed places him in a six hour action statement contained in note 2 of Table 3.2.6 of the Technical Specifications. This will be the subject of a later LER.
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(0 pen) DEVIATION (333/80-17-05): The inspector reviewed WCAP 10.1.10, l
Control of Combustibles and Flamable Material, Revision 1, dated March 16, l
1981 and detennintd that it meets the requirements of the NRC guidelines, j
However, the inspector questioned the effectiveness of the program because i
i he observed an accumulation of combustible materials in two vital equipment areas subsequent to his review of the procedure. The licensee imediately
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removed the combustible materials from these areas. He further stated that i
the newly hired fire protection supervisor would be responsible for completing l
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the priodic inspections for the accumulation of combustibles as soon as he becomes self monitor qualified. The inspector will detennine the
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effectiveness of the program during a subsequent inspection.
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(Closed) DEFICIENCY (333/80-12-02): The inspector reviewed the results of I
the quarterly reviews conducted by the Operations Department Superintendent j
or his designee during the last two quarters. This program appears to be
both effective and necessary since either the working copy or the master copy
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of several control room surveillance procedures, in particular, are j
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occasionally misplaced.
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3.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)_
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector detennined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
LER's 81-24*, 81-25, 81-26, and 81-27 were reviewed.
- Report selected for onsite followup.
LER 81-24 reported the failure of B drywell equipment drain sump pump.
This event was similar to that reported in LER 80-77 and would have required a plaat shutdown in 30 days if the plant had not been shutdown earlier for other reasons. Since the drywell leakage monitoring system was still in service with the A pump operable,the requirements of Technical Specification paragraph 3.6.0.2.b appear to be unnecessarily restrictive. The licensee has submitted a proposed change to the Technical Specification to correct this problem.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Licensee Action On TMI Task Action plan Items Item I.A.2.1.4 Imediate Vograding of R0 and SRO Training.and Qualification On April 21, 1981, the licensee implemented a training program for mitigation of accidents involving a severely damaged core. The licensee is using a
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generic BWR program developed by General Physics Corporation which appears to cover the subject areas specified in Mr. Denton's letter of March 28, 1980.
Item II.B.4.2.A Training For Mitigating Core Damage As noted in the paragraph above the licensee implemented a generic BWR program which correlates well with the requirements of H. R. Denton's letter of March 28, 1980. Although the April 21,1981 implementation date was past the April 1,1981 requirement, it was consistent with the licensee's comitment dated March 13, 1981. The licensee plans to give this program to all licensed personnel, all auxiliary operators, all STA's, all on-call supervisory personnel, the Superintendent of Power, and the Resident Manager.
It is further planned i
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to have management personnel who have received this training to subsequently i
give appropriate selected portions to Instrumentation and Control and Health Physics technicians. The licensed operator requalification schedule for 1981
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indicates that the traf::ing in this area will be complete by the 'end of June
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1981. The inspector will followup on the completion etatus at the and of
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June 1981.
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5.
Licensee Action On IE Bulletins l
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The inspector verified that for the IE Bulletins listed below the
licensee's written response was provided within the time period i
stated in the Bulletin, included the infomation required to be
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reported, included adequate corrective action comitments based on
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infonnation presented in the Bulletin and was accurate. The insoector i
r further verified that any corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the response. The following IE Bulletins were closed:
IEB 79-26, Baron Loss From BWR Control Blades i
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IEB 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping i
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IEB 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete
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Expansion Anchor Bolts l
IEB 80-10, Contanination of Ncnradioactive Systems
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I 1.
In the response to the Bulletin, the licensee identified
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four nonradioactive systems that could become contaminated.
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They include the Auxiliary Boiler System, the Demineralized
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Water System, the Plant Air System, and the Sanitary Waste i
System. His assessment appears to be adequate. Since the blowdown from the Auxiliary Boiler System is not routed to
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the storm drain system.as a result of an earlier modification
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which routed it to radwaste, the stonn drain system need not l
ordinarily be monitored. The floor and equipment drain systems j
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,are consid6 red radioactive and are routed to radwaste.
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2.
As the licensee indicated in the response, monitoring l
requirements for all nonradioactive systems which could.
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become contaminated, except the sanitary waste system, l
have been in place since before the Bulletin was issued.
The inspector verified this by reviewing the proc 2dures and the sample results. After the Bulletin was issued the licensa issued ESP-8, " Sanitary Sewage Effluent Sampling
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and Analisis," Revision 0, dated June 1980 to require gross j
Beta sampling of this system.
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Shortly after the licensee submitted his responses dated l
July 7,1980 the Auxiliary Boiler became contaminated as a
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result of tube leakage in the radwaste concentrators. On
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July 15, 1980 the licensee perfonned a nuclear safety i
evaluation and concluded that contamination of the Auxiliary i
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Boiler provided no potential for violation of applicable
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requirements. Specifically, the analysis demonstrated that
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the release rate limits of the technical specifications would
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not be exceeded even if all the water in the bailer was
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f exhausted through the ventilation systems due to Auxiliary Boiler tube leakage. However, the inspector pointed out that l
t the requirement that all releases be monitored and recorded found in paragraph 2.3.B.7 of Environmental Technical
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Specifications would be violated if the steam was contaminated l
because of the leaking relief valve in the radwaste building.
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The licensee produced sample results of the steam taken on July 19, 1980 which showed that the steam was not contaminated.
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A review of the licensee's sample results for the Auxiliary
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Boilers indicated that there has been detectable activity in them during all periods of operation since July 1980.
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The following IE Bulletin was not closed for the reason indicated below:
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IEB 80-11, Masonary Wall Design
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Although the licensee comitted to complete the re-evaluation of the l
86 walls in question by April 15,1981,16 wall sections still have not l
passed the re-evaluation criteria. Rather than delay the re-evaluation
further while these wall sections are subjected to more detailed analyses, l
the licensee has decided to proceed with modifications which would pennit
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these walls to pass the re-evaluation with the less detailed analyses f
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currentTy in use. The licensee will perfonn a safety evaluation to assure that the operability of safety systems is not jeopardized while i
these modifications are in progress. The licensee expects to complete
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the modifications and re-evaluation by June 30, 1981.
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6.
Control Room Observations l
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Using a plant specific checklist, the inspetors verified selected t
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plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with
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the limiting conditions of operations of the plant Technical Specifica-l tiens. Items checked, included:
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Power distribucion limits
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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and o1Isite emergency l
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power sources Reactor Control panel indications l
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Primary Containment temperature and pressure
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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure Standby Liquid Control Tank t.evel and concentration
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Stack monitor recorder traces
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b.
The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations to
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ensure adherence to approved procedures:
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Outage activities
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Routine power operations
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency Fonns
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Surveillance Tests i
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Maintenance Acttvities
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Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to
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verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, t
if required, was being taken.
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Shift Logs and Operating Records l
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(1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operations
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Detect changes-and trends in performance l
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Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications
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or regulatory requirements
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Detennine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required
Assess the effect.tveness of the comunications provided c
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by the logs
(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
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Shift Supervisor Log
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Nuclear Control Operator Log
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Night Orders
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Shift Turnover Check Sheet
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Daily Instrument Checks
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Daily Core Surveillance Checks
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Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
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Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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Ouring a review of the Jumper Log the inspector noted that jumper 80-017 had not been cleared although the piece of equipment for which it t.ad been issued had been restored to service for
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approximately cne week. Further investigation indicated that the jumper had been cleared without returning the tag to the control
room and clearing the jumper log sheet as required by WCAP 10.1.3, Placement of Jumpers / Blocks Or Lifted Leads, Revision 2, dated Cecember 21,1979. This appears to have been caused by the loss of the tag from the jumper while it was in place. The licensee stated that he would conduct training for the electricians on this
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procedure. The inspector will review the content of this training and its affect during a subsequent inspection (333/81-09-01).
I No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Plant Tours
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During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and
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conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
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t.ontrol Room
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Relay Room
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Reactor Buildir-
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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t Pumphouse - Screenwell
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Standby Gus Treatment Building
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Battery Rooms
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Radwaste Building
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Crescent Rooms
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Cable Tunnels
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During the plant tours the inspector conducted a visuat inspection of
selected piping between containment and tne isolation valves for j
leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual
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valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor
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l operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
l Other items verified during the plant tours included:
l Proper completion and use of selected radia*. ion work permits
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Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
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Proper personnel monitoring practices
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Proper control of ignition sources and flamable material i
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Equipment tv.g outs in conformance with controls for removal of l
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equipment from service
Nomal security practices are being followed
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness pfactices are in confomance j
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with approved licensee programs l
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Surveillance Observations
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The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below l
to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the
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redundant system or component was available for service, approved procedures I
were used, and the work was perfomed by qualified personnel.
F-ISP-6, Pump Discharge Pressure Interlock (RHR, LPCI) Instrument
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Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 6, dated March 1981, conducted April 15,1981 F-ISP-6-1, Pump Discharge Pressure Interlock (Core Spray) Instrument
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Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 4, dated March 1981, conducted April 15,1981 F-ST-35A, Containment Cooling Subsystem Logic System Functional Test,
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Revision 2, dated April 6,1976, conducted April 22, 1981
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Maintenance Observations l
The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the redundant train was available for service, approved (
procedures were used, and the work was perfomed by qualified personnel.
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WR 07-12347, Repaf r of C SRM performed on Ar. il 3,1981
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g WR 17-9401&2, Repair of Refuel Floor Exhaust Monitors on April 14,1981 l
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WR 10-9589&9591, Replacement of 10 MOV 25A Outside Containment LPCI j
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Infection Valve Operator on April 23,1981 j
The MOV 25A equipment failure was caused by a procedural inadequacy in F-ST-2H, LPCI Subsystem Logic System Functional Test, Revision 4, dated l
April 23,1980 in that it did not require the operator to pressurize
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between 10 MOV 25A ad 10 MOV 27A prior to opening 10 MOV 25A. This is j
necessary because 10 MOV 25A is subjected to reactor pressure because of leakage by check valve 10 A0V 68A. The licensee stated that he will correct
this procedural inadequacy.
10. Followup On Licensee Event At about 11:20 a.m. on April 1,1981, the licensee informed the 'ispectors
that it appeared that the second seal on A Reactor Recirculation Furp had j
failed because of increased drywell leakage, annunciation of alams i
associated with the seal, and indication of decreasing differential
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pressure across the seals. Licensee operating personnel imediately l
reduced reactor power by manually lowering recirculation pump speed. By l
tripping A recirculation ? ump MG set and isolating A recirculation pump,
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they were able to return drywell unidentified leakage to within technical specification limits of 5 gpm.
It reached a maximum of approximately l
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10 gpm during the transient. Since technical specifications only pennit j
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operation on one reactor recirculation loop for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the licensee j
imediately began _ a controlled shutdown of the plant to enable him to r
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f effect repairs to the recirculation pump seal.
I Because drywell unidentified leakage exceeded the 5 gpm technical l
specification, the licensee classified the event as an unusual event as required by the Emergency Plan which was implemented on the day of the event, April 1,1981. The licensee made the notifications required by l
his Emergency Plan.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
11. Scram Control Air Header Dump Modification
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l The inspector reviewed modification package F1-81-01 to ensure that the j
licensee complied with the requirements of the Order for Modification of
BWR Scram Discharge Systems dated January 9,1981.
The modification at FitzPatrick is designed to initiate a Reactor Protection
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System (RPS) scram when the scram control air header pressure reaches 48 to
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50 psig. This is accomplished by wiring four pressure switches in series i
with the existing Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) level switches I
which give a one-out-of-two-taken-twic.e logic scram signal on high SDIV l
level. The modification appears to meet all but one of the design criteria
in the order. Since the pressure switches which are Barkesdale Model j
DlH-A8055 and the Tenninal Blocks which are GE Type EB-25 are not qualified
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s Class lE, and since the licensee has taken two exceptions to the General
Electric (GE) RPS design criteria, it is not certain that the licensee's i
i design does not degrade the~ existing RPS design. The exceptions to the
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RPS design criceria are:
1.
Each RPS trip system shall have at least two independent trip channel
sensors, and associated equipment for each measured variable. By i
wiring the pressure switches in series with the SDIV level switches, the licensee has established an independent trip channel for two
measured variables. The licensee considers this exception acceptable l
because the additional sensor in series with the SDIV level switches
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will not affect it electrically.
2.
All trip channel sensor trips of a specific type shall initiate a i
single annunciator of the variable causing the trip. By wiring the
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t pressure switch in series with the SDIV level switch, there are now two sensor trips which can initiate a single annunciator. The licensee l
considers this to be an allowable exception because there are other annunciators associated with each of the sensors which would aid the operator in positively identifying the sensor which caused the scram.
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In addition, although the pressure switches and junction boxes are not qualified in IEB 79-018 they are identical to those used in other
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safety-related applications at the FitzPatrick plant. The licensee plans
to replace them with fully qualified switches as soon as they become i
available fran GE.
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Discussions between the licensee and NRR representatives and between the
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resident inspector and IE management have indicated that the licensee's modification is acceptable on an interim basis.
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No items of noncompliance wers identified.
I 12. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
On April 21, 1981, and May 6, 1981, tt inspectors met with licensee t
representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and sunnarized the scope and i
findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
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