IR 05000333/1981019
| ML20033B693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B680 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-19, NUDOCS 8112010646 | |
| Download: ML20033B693 (3) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
81-19 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 C
Priority Category
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Scriba, New York Inspection corducted: August 21-28, 1981 Inspectors h
9 _2X
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s n x, Resident Inspector
'a' signed
. C. Linville date c
L. T. Doerfl ein, Resident Inspector
'date' signed date signed Approved by: k[
9!2.Th/
w l1. B. Kist'er, Chief, Reactor Projects
~date signed Section 1C
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Inspect On Summary:
l Inspection on August 21, 1981 to August 28,1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-19)
Areas Inspected:
Special inspection by the Resident Inspectors (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)
of Oper.'tional Safety Verification.
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Results: One item of noncompliance was noted (Failure to satisfy the Action Statement with less than the required number of operable reactor coolant leakage detection systems).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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8112010646 81111 PDR ADOCK 05000 G
P
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent 01 Power
- R. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer R. Liseno, Assistant.to Operations Superintendent
- J. Leonard, Resident Manager E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent R. Pasternak, Resident Manager
- T. Teifke, Security / Safety Superintendent
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
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Operational Safety Veri _fication Durirg a tour of the relay room at about 10:40 a.m., on August 21, 1981, the inspector noted that the Drywell Radiation Monitor isolation valves, 27-SOV-135A and 27-S0V-135B, were shut as indicated by the valve position indicating lights on the Primary Containment Purge Panel. These valves are tae primary containment isolation valves on the sample line for the Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Monitoring systems. Although there are two Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Monitoring systems, each containing monitors for gaseous, particulate and iodine radioactivity, they share a common sample line. With 27-50V-135A and 27-S0V-135B shut, both Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Monitoring systems were rendered inoperable.
Tne inspector notified the shift supervisor that 27-S0V-135A and 27-S0V-135B were shut. The shift supervisor imediately reopened both valves.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the two valves were apparently shut the morning of August 20, 1981, during the perfomance of surveillance test F-ST-34A, Reactor Building Ventilation, Drywell Isolation Valve, Atmosphere Control Valve, Drywell Sump Valve, and TIP Withdrawal Logic Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 5, dated May 13, 1981. During this surveillance test, valves 27-S0V-135A and 27-S0V-135B receive a signal to shut. These valves,
however, were not included on the valve lists in the procedure which are used to verify that the valves do go shut or to reopen them during the restoration lineup. The surveillance test, F-ST-34A was completed at 12:00 a.m., August 20, 1981. Thus, valves 27-S0V-135A and 27-S0V-135B were shut for a period of approximately twenty-two hours. The Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate Radioactivity Monitors are used in addition to the Drywell Sump Monitoring System to detect abnormal leakage that could occur from the reactor coolant system.
During this twenty-two hour period, the operating staff was not aware that the Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate radio-activity Monitors were inoperable. However, the Drywell Sump Monitoring System remained operable during this period and gave no indication of an abnormal increase in a reactor coolant leakage. Technical Specification
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3.6.D.2 states, "The folicwing reactor coolant leakage detection systems shall be operable during reactor power operation:
a.
Drywell sump.nonitoring system b.
Drywell Continuous Atmosphere (Particulate) Radioactivity Monitoring System, and c.
Drywell Continuous Atmosphere (Gaseous) Radioactivity Monitoring System."
Technical Specification 3.6.D.3 allows continued operation for 30 days with only two of the reactor coolant leakage detection systems operable,... otherwise, be in at least hot shutdown with the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />... Operation at power continued for approximately twenty-two hours with only one operable reactor coolant leakage detection system, the Drywell Sump Monitoring system. The Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Particulate and Gaseous Radioactivity Monitoring systems were inoperable due to the shut isolation valves in their sample line. This is an item of noncompliance.
(333/81-19-01)
This was the first time the surveillance test, F-ST-34A, had been performed since it was significantly revised and approved by the Plant operations Review Committee. Revision 4 of F-ST-34A, dated April 2, 1981, combined four surveillance procedures into one. The following procedures were used in developing F-ST-34A, Revision 4:
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F-ST-31 A, Drywell Isolation Valves, Atmosphere Control Valves, Sump Drain Valves and TIP Withdrawal Simulated Automatic Isolation Test, Original, dated October 3, 1975.
F-ST-31B, Drywell Isolation Valves, Atmosphere Control Valves,
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Sump Drain Valves and TIP Withdrawal Logic System Functional Test, Revision 2, dated September 21, 1976.
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F-ST-34A, Reactor Building Isolation Logic System Functional Test, Revision 2, dated Septe.nber 21, 1976.
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F-ST-34C, Reactor Building Isolation from Primary Containment Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Original, dated February 27, 1976.
Of these four surveillance tests only F-ST-31 A and F-ST-31B actually cycled valves on the Primary Containment Purge Panel. Of these two surveillance tests, it was noted that F-ST-318 also failed to include valves 27-S0V-135A and 27-S0V-135B. This error was apparently carried over into F-ST-34A, Revision 4.
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Exit Interview Periodically during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
On August 31, 1981, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the findings of the inspection.
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