IR 05000333/1981018
| ML20011A405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011A406 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-18, NUDOCS 8110090400 | |
| Download: ML20011A405 (9) | |
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DCS NUMBERS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORi COMMISSION j
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50333-810810 Region I 50333-810821 81-18 Report No.
50-333 Docket No.
DPR-59 C
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License No.
Priority Category Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
Au ust 1 31,1981 Inspectors:
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. LirWille, Res t Inspector
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f/v3/g/
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&T Doerflein, Resident Inspector date ' signed
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date signed Approved by: fb D,
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H. B. Kist'er, Chief: Reactor date signed
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Projects Section 1C
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 1,1981 to August 31, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspectior, during day and backshift hours by the Resident Inspectors (67.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; review of Licensee Event Reports; Control Room Observations; Plant Tours; Surveillance Observations; Maintenance Observations; PORC Meeting Observation and Security Training Observation.
Results: Of eight areas inspected no items of noncompliance were observed in six areas.
One item of noncompliance was noted in one area (Failure to follow procedures while troubleshooting instrumentation, paragraph 4). Two items of noncompliance were observed in another area (Failure to barricade high radiation area, paragraph 5 and Failure to follow Radiation Protection Operating Procedures, paragraph 5).
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8110090400 910924 DR ADOCK 05000
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Co_ntacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power N. Brosee, Mair' nance Superintendent
- R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- J. D. Leonard, Resident Manager
- E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor R. Pasternak, Resident Manager D. E. Tall, Training coordinator
- T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operators, Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance and Contractor Personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspect.*on Findings (Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (333/81-02-01):
Since most of the licensee's auxiliary operators have a very low experience level, the inspector has observed improved supervision of them by licensed operators.
In addition, the licensee stated that a fomal 4 week BWR technology training course was given to the current generation of auxiliary operators for the first time.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (333/81-06-06): Since the licensee is no longer storing concentrated waste liners in the tempo-rary radioactive material storage area located in the northeast corner
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of the protected area, it is no longer required to be covered or posted as a High Radiation Area.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (333/81-06-07):
Since the licensee is no longer storing concentrated waste liners in the tempo-I rary radioactive material storage area in the northeast corner of the protected area, it is no longer required to be covered or posted as a Radiation Materials Storage Area.
3.
Review Of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting
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requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the fom was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
LER's 81-5E", 81-59*, 81-60*, and 81-61* were reviewed.
- Report selected for onsite followup.
LER 81-61 reported that the inspector observed that the sample line isolation valves for the drywell atmospheric monitoring systems were improperly positioned. The details of this event are described in NRC IE Inspection Report No. 50-333/81-19. The inspector also noted that the bases for Technical Specification 3.6.D states in part, "The drywell continuous atmospheric monitoring system utilizes a three-channel monitor to provide infomation on particulate, iodine and noble gas activities in the drywell atmosphere. Two independent and redundant systems are provided to perfom this function." The Safety Evaluation for Amendment 28 which incorporated the above Technical Specification bases also states that there are currently two redundant, three-channel monitors. The inspector observed that there is a single sample line and a single return line for both of the drywell monitors. This means that a single active component failure such as a failure of a containment isolation valves in the closed position could render both of these independent and redundant drywell continuous atmcspheric monitoring systems inoperable. The licensee agreed to evaluate further this apparent inconsistency between the Technical Specification bases and (333/81-18-01)pector will review this evaluation at a the system design.
The ins later date.
4.
Control Room Observations a.
Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operations of the plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
Power distribution limits
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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite emergency power sources Reactor Control panel indications
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Primary Containment temperature and pressure
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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure
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Standby Liquid Centrol Tank Level and concentration
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Stack monitor recorder traces
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b.
The inspectors directly observed portions of the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency foms
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-Surveillance Tests
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' Reactor Shutdown
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Outage Activities
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At about 8:30 a.m. on July 31, 1981, while the reactor was operating at about 95 percent power, the inspector observed that the annunciators for the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Isolation Signal and the HPCI valve or pump motor overload or control power loss were energized. He further observed that the valve position indication-lights for 23M0V15 and 23MOV60, the HPCI system turbine steam line containment inside and outside bypass isolation valves were de-energized.
When the inspector questioned the licensed Nuclear Control Operator (NCO)
about this condition, the NC0 stated that the breakers for 23MOV15 and 23MOV60 had been racked out so that an Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician could troubleshoot a problem with a temperature sensor. The Shift Supervisor was unaware that the condition existed when he was questioned by the inspector. When be became aware that this condition existed, the Shift Supervisor immediately reset the isolation signal indicating that the breakers for 23MOV15 and 23M0V60 were open.
Upon further investigation the inspector determined that the I&C Technician was preparing to trouleshoot a problem with temperature element 23-TE-92A, a dual elemer t temperature detector. One element provides area temperatu e indication in the control room for the area in the vicinity of the HPCI turbine steam line.
He had approved work request numbe.r 12/12822 which permitted him to trr"bleshoot a problem with the selector switch for the indicator in his possession. He had discussed with his supervisor the need for an additional safety-related work request since the problem appeared to be in the sensor, the other temperature element of which was connected to a temperature switch which provides a HPCI system steam line isolation signal on high area temperature. They were concerned that an inadvertant isolation could occur while troubleshooting the e.ement which provides indication. The I&C technician was also concerned because of the external physical appearance of the sensor that the second element of the sensor, which provides the HPCI steam line isolation signal, may have been damaged. He decided to lift the leads for the temperature switch in the control room to ensure that a HPCI steam line isolation signal would be produced. He discussed this matter with the licensed Senior Nuclear Operator who agreed to rack out the breakers for 23 MOV15 and 23MOV60 in order to prevent an actual isolation of the HPCI turbine steam supply. Neither the I&C de-
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partment supervisor nor the Shift Supervisor were aware that this test was to be conducted. Technical Specification 6.8(A) states
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in part, " Written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented...". Operations Department Standing Order No.1, Operating Staff Responsibilities and Authorities, Revision 6, dated February 2, 1981 states in paragraph 5.2.9 under
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SN0 Pesponsibilities, "He shall operate in accordance with approved procedures unless immediate and unforseen action is required to ensure the safety of the reactor plant or personnel." When he racked out the breakers by 23M0V15 and 23MOV60 and permitted the I&C Technician to generate a HPCI turbine steam line area high temperature isolation signal, he was not. using an approved pro-cedure. This is an item of noncompliance.
(333/81-18-02)
In addition, WACP No.10.1.1, Procedure For Control of Maintenance, R'. vision 3, dated March 16, 1981, paragraph 7.1.1 states in part,
"Trie k,.i Request / Event / Deficiency (WRED) fann shall be utilized as a minimum for the following:
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Reporting any deficiencies on safety related systems or components requiring work (maintenance, calibration. etc.)
Worv Tracking Form (paragraph 7.2.1 states in parc, "The to correct..." and figure 8.4), a three page form, shall be used for the following:
7.2.1.1 To properly pre-plan, track, control and document corrective maintenance (normally initiated on a WRED form)
for Category 1, Safety Related or QC inspection required work." Failure of the I&C Technician to obtain an approved WRED and Work Tracking Fonn prior to troubleshootina a suspected problem with the safety related HPCI system steam line isolation high area temperature circuit is contrary to WACP 10.1.1 and is a second example of a failure to properly (A).
implement procedures required by Technical Specification 6.8 (333/81-18-03)
c.
Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken, d.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
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Obtain information on plant problems and operations Detect changes and trends in performance
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Detect possible conflicts with technical specifications
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or regulatory requiremcats
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Detennine that records are being maintained and reviewed as rr : aired
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Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
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Shift Supervisor Log Nuclear Control Operator Log
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y Night Orders
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SSift Turnover Check Sheet
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-Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Daily Instrument Checks
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Ddly Core Surveillance Checks
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Liquid Radwa e Discharge Log
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Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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e.
On August 16, 1981, during a piant startup and heatup, the reactor coolant heatup rate, as indicated by four consecutive fifteen minute l
readings of computer point C047 was 106.810F. Technical Specifi-l cation 3.6.A.1 states that the average rate of reactor cooloc.t L
temperature change during normal heatup or cooldown shall not exceed l
1000F/ hour when averaged over a one hour period. The heatup rate was reduced and the following fifteen minute reading of computer i
point C047 indicated a slight cooldcwn rate.
Computer point C047, l-which is nomally used to monitor the rate of change of reactor l
water temperature, is an average of Recirculation loops A and B temperatures, Reactor Water Cleanup System inlet temperature and l
the saturation temperature detennined frcm the reactor pressure.
The excessive heatup rate was caused, in part, by minimizing use of the mechanical vacuum pumps and the delay in drawing vacuum in i
the main condenser. Without vacuum, the condenser was not available j
as a heat sink. The control rods were used in an attempt to reduce i
the heatup rate, however, this method was slow and did not prevent j
the heatu; rate from being exceeded.
I During the exit interview the licensee stated that he will perfonn
a evaluation to determine the effects of the out of limit heatup rate on the Reactor coolant system. This item is unresolved pending completion of the evaluation and subsequent NRC review.
(333/81-18-04)
5.
Plant Tours
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a.
Dtring the inspection period, the inspectors made observations and ccnducted tours of plant areas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay RNm
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Reactor Building
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Turbine Building
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i Steam Tunnel
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l Heater Bays
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Tcrus Room j
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Crescent Room
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Radwaste Building
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b.
During the plant tours the inspectors conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
Other items verified during the plant tours included:
Proper completion and use of selected radiation work permits
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Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
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Proper personnel monitoring practices Proper control of ignition sources and flammable material
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Equipment tag' outs in conformance with controls for removal
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of equipment from service Nonnal security practices are being followed
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices are in conformance
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with approved licensee programs c.
During a tour of the Radwaste Building at about 2:15 p.m. on August 7, 1981, the inspector observed gate number RW 272/12 was propped open with welding cables running through it and no one in sight. This gate provided access to portions of the 252 foot and j
272 foot elevations of the Radwaste Building. Licensee survey l
number 39194 dated August 7, 1981, showed that the general area
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dose rate in a area made accessible by this open gate was up te l
300 millirem per hour. Technical Specification 6.11(A), High l
Radiation Area states in part, "In lieu of the ' control device'
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or 'alanr signal' required by paragraph 2.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20 each High Radiation Area (i.e., > 100 mrem /hr.) in which the intensity of radiation is 1000 mrem /hr. or less shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance
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thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Pennit (RWP)..." Failure to barricade this area by leaving gate no. RW 272/12 open is an item of noncompliance. Upon notifi-cation that the gate was open licensee personnel immediately checked i
the area for unauthorized personnel, removed the welding cables and closed and locked the gate. The above example is identical or similar to the item of noncompliance (Violation A) brought to the attention of the licensee in a letter dated July 6,1981.
(333/81-18-05)
i d.
At about 1:00 p.m., on August 14, 1981, the inspector observed a
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worker don protective clothing over his personal outer clothing, sign in on a Radiation Work Pennit (RWP), and enter the West
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Crescent Area. Upon reviewing the RWP for the work in the West Crescent Area (RWP No. 3489), the inspector noted the RWP contained l
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I No personal outer clothing
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l Tape gloves - cotton boots to coveralls
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The inspector also observed that the same worker had not taped his l
gloves and cotton boots to the coveralls. Technical Specification
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6.11 states in part, " Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared and adhered to for all plant operations."
Radiation Protection Operating Procedure II.B.6, Control of Radiation Work Permits, Section 5.2.4, dated December 26, 1979, states in part, "... a leadman... is responsible for personnel working on the RWP and ensures that they obey its instructions."
Failure to follow the instructions on the RWP is considered an item of noncompliance.
(333/81-18-06)
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At about 2:40 p.m., on August 18, 1931, the inspector observed a worker in protective clothing working in the area over the east side Drywell equipment hatch. The inspector reviewed the RWP (No. 3544) for the ongoing work and noted that no one was signed in on the RWP for work in the area. A discussion with the leadman revealed that the worker was listed on the RWP and that he het entered the work area at about 1:00 p.m.
Technical Specificetion 6.11 states in part, " Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared and adhered to for all plant operations."
Radiation Protection Operating Procedure II.B.7, Obtaining and Using a Radiation Work Pemit (RWP), Section 7.6.1.8, dated December 26, 1979, states in part, "The RWP is kept on the ' clean'
side of the step-off-pad and personnel entering the work area sign in on the Sign-In/ Sign-Out sheet (back of RWP) writang in their entry time and dosimeter reading." Failure to enter the time and dosimeter reading on the RWP when entering the work area is considered an item of noncompliance.
(333/81-18-07)
6.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the redundant system or component was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the wcrk was perfomed by qualified personnel.
F-ISP-71, IRM Instrument Trip Functional / Calibration Test, Revision
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7, dated April 1981, perfomed on August 4,1981.
F-ST-26J, Heatup and Cooldown Temperature Checks, Revision 2,
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dated December 1,1980, perfomed on August 5,1981.
7.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the redundant train was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the work was performed by qualified personnel.
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WR 05/13025, Group 3 Solenoid Power Cable Repairs perfonned on August 5,1981.
WR 02/13523, L SRV repair performed on August 14, iPdl.
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=9 WR 27/13490 Drywell Continuous Airborne Monitor /Gaseoud Meter
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repairs. performed on August 28, 1981.
8.
PORC Meeting Observation The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Meeting 81-070 held =at 11:30 a.m. on August 4,1981 to review a situation caused by Namage to Reactor Protection System Cabling. As a result of the meeting, PORC detemined that the plant should be shutdown to repair the damaged cable.
The inspector verified that the membership and meeting frequency met Technical Specification Requirements and that the plant was in fact
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shutdown to repair the damaged cable as discussed in the meeting and the minutes.
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Security Training Observation r
I On August 18, 1981, the inspector attended a security training lecture on Control Alam Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)
Operations to verify that the lesson plan objectives and the-lecture i
schedule were met. Based on the lecture and interviews conducted with two of the trainees, after the lecture, it appears that the objectives of the lesson were adequately covered. No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. Unresolved Items
. Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required i
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item identified during
this inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.
11.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings
were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On August 31, 1981, the inspector met with licensee representatives (deroted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and i
findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report. During l
the meeting the unresolved items were discussed.
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