IR 05000333/1981024
| ML20038B580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038B563 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-333-81-24, IEB-80-03, IEB-80-07, IEB-80-3, IEB-80-7, NUDOCS 8112080413 | |
| Download: ML20038B580 (12) | |
Text
DCS NUMBERS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50333-810915 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50333-811010 Region I Report No.
81-24 Docket No.
50-333 DPR-59 C
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License No.
Priority Category Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41
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Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: 0 ober 1, 1981 Inspectors:
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C.Minville, sident Inspector date' signed Il ft 0
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S'l cem L. T. Doerflei n, Resident Inspector da'te signed date signed Approved by:
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d ll 13 ff l H $. Kiste date signed S Jc ien 1C y Chief, Rsctor Projects j
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 1-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-24)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by two Resident Inspectors (134 hours0.00155 days <br />0.0372 hours <br />2.215608e-4 weeks <br />5.0987e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event repor-t review; licensee action on IE Bulletins; licensee action on TMI Task Action Plan items; operational safety verification; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; emergency preparedness drill, licensee event followup and refueling preparations.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were observed in the ten areas inspected.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power
- N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, Site nuality Assurance Engineer W. Fernar.dez, Technical Services Superintendent
- H. Keit's, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- J. D. Ieonard, Resident Manager
- R. A. Lucy, Shift Supervisar
- E. Mulcabey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor D. E. Tall, Training Coordinator T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operators, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-12-06): Additional followup on the effectiveness of the licensee Health Physics program will be done to close out the items of noncompliance identified in the area of RWP enforcement and High Radiation Area gate control in Inspection Report 50-333/81-18.
(Closed) DEFICIENCY (333/78-28-04):
Revision 2 of Radiation Protection Operating Procedures made the practice of using a rope or closed gate to barricade High Radiation Areas ( < 1000 mrem /hr.) consistent with the procedure in paragraph II.A.l.3.3.a.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-12-07):
Since GE considers the collet retainer tube cracking observed in control rod device (CRD)
38-27 to be the type previously identified by GE SIL 139, GE recommended no additional corrective action. The licensee has decided to delay this routine GE recommended maintenance on ten percent of the CRD's until the first short outage after the refueling outage to facilitate refueling outage scheduling.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION (333/81-01-03): The inspector reviewed licensee Standard Audit (SA) 69, dated August 17, 1981 of ITP 5, Licensed Operator Requalification, Revision 4.
The license identified no nonconformance during this audit but observed that individual training records are updated slowl (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-04-06): The inspector determined through a review of WR 03/3606, a review of purchase orders 12278-78 and 18403-801, a review of issue records, and discussions with licensee personnel that replacement of Buna N components in the ASCO solenoid valves used as scram pilot valves was completed during the 1980 refueling outage.
In addition, the inspector reviewed MP 3.8, Maintenance of ASCO Pilot Head Assemblies, Revision 0, dated May 18, 1979 and determined that the licensee is using a manual system to ensure the Buna N parts for one third of these valves are replaced during each refueling outage.
(0 pen) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-21-05): The inspector determined that the reroute of the condensate receiver tank discharge to the waste collector via the equipment drain system was accomplished under work request 87/3677 on November 1,1979. This work request which was identified as a minor modification remains open. The stated purpose of the modification on the work request was to prevent contaminated high conductivity water from entering the reactor water.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins The inspector verified the following for the IE Bulletins listed below:
The licensee provided the response within the time period stated
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in the Bulletin.
The response included the required information.
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The response provided adequate corrective action comitments.
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The response was accurate.
The licensee took the corrective action described in the response.
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IEB 81-03, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components By Corbicula sp. (Asiatic Clam) and Mytilus sp. (Mussel).
IEB 80-07, BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure The inspector noted that the licensee did not report completion of the required inspection until about sixteen months after it was required by the Bulletin.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Licensee Action on TMI Task Action Plan Item II.B.4.2.B Training For tiitigating Core Damage The inspector reviewed licensee training reports to ensure that all shift technical advisors and all operating personnel from the plant manager through the operations chain to the licensed operators had received the 32 hour3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> training for mitigating core damage program. The inspector noted that the current Resident Manager and one shift supervisor had not completed the training program. The licensee stated that the new Resident Manager would be scheduled for the training after his arrival on site.
The licensee stated that the shift supervisor who did not attend the training program passed the exam based on self study of the course material.
The inspector reviewed the shift supervisor's exam.
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In addition, the inspector reviewed the 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> training program given to Radiological and Environmental Services Department technicians. The inspector further noted the licensee did no training for mitigating core damage for instrument and control technicians. The licensee agreed to provide appropriate training for I&C technicians. This item remains open pending training of the new Resident Manager and the I&C technicians.
5.
Review Licensee Event Report (LER)
The inspector reviewed LER's tc verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
The inspector reviewed LER's 81-70, 81-71 and 81-72.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Operation Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations (1) Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical ;pecifications.
Items checked included:
-- Power distribution limits
-- Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems
-- Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite emergency power sources
-- Reactor control panel indications
-- Primary containment temperature and pressure
-- Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure
-- Standby Liquid Control Tank level and concentration
-- Stack monitor recorder traces (2) The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
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-- Routine power operations
-- Issuance of RWP's and Work Request /Evat/ Deficiency forms (3) Selected lit annunciators were discu'
with control room operators to verify that the rease.., oc them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take.
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(4) Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning. Shift turnover checklists and log review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by the inspectors.
(5) No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
-- Obtain information on plant problems and operations
-- Detect changes and trends in perfomance
-- Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements
-- Detemine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required
-- Assess the effectiveness of the comunications provided by the logs (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
-- Shift Supervisor Log
-- Nuclear Control Operator Log
-- Night Orders
-- Shift Turnover Check Sheet
-- Protective Tag Record Log
-- Jumper log
-- Daily Core Surveillance Checks-
-- Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
-- Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
-- Weekly Chemistry Status Log (3) No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Plant Tours (1) During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
-- Control Room
-- Relay Room
-- Reactor Building
-- Turbine Building
-- Diesel Generator Rooms
-- Electric Bays
-- Pumphouse-Screenwell
-- Standby Gas Treatment Building
-- Radwaste Building
-- Crescent Rooms
-- Cable Tunnels
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-- Torus Room
-- Protected Area Perinieter (2) During the plant tours the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked. Other items verified during
the plant tours included:
-- General plant / equipment conditions
-- Operability of selected personnel monitors, area radiation monitors and air monitors
-- Proper completion and use of selected radiation work permits
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-- Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
-- Proper personnel monitoring practices
-- Proper control of ignition sources and flamable material
-- Equipment tag outs in conformance with controls for removal of equipment from service
-- Normal security practices
-- Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices d.
Physical Security The inspectors made observations and verified during regular and off-shift hours that selected aspects of the plant's physical security systems and organization were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan and approved procedures.
(1) Physical Security Organization
-- Observations indicated that the security organi7ation was properly manned.
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-- All security personnel observed appeared to be capable of l
perfonning their assigned tasks.
(2)
Physical Barriers
-- Physical barriers in the protected and vital areas were frequently observed to assure that they were intact and randomly checked by patrolling guards.
-- Isolation zones were observed to be free of obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
-- The inspector observed that compensatory measures were employed when required by security equipment failure or impaimen __._ __
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(3) Access Control
-- The inspector frequently observed that explosive and metal detectors were operable and used as required.
-- Often persons and packages were observed to be properly searched prior to entry into the protected area.
-- Vehicles were observed to be properly searched and escorted or controlled within the protected area.
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-- Persons within the protected area displayed photo identification badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized and persons requiring escorts were properly escorted.
(4) No items of noncompliance were identified.
e.
Emergency System Operability The inspectors verified operability of the Reactor Core Isolation
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Cooling, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start and Reactor Protection Systems. The following items were included in the system verification:
Confimation that each accessible valve in the primary flow
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path was in the correct position.
Confimation that power supplies and breakers are properly
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aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal.
Visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other
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conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.
The inspectors also verified the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System by perfoming a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system. The following were included in the SBGT system verification:
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Confimation that the licensee's system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
Verification that valves are in the proper position, have power
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available, and are locked (sealed) as required.
Verification that system instrumentation is properly valved in.
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Verification that there are no obvious deficiencies which might
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degrade system perfomance such as inoperable hangers or supports.
During the SBGT system verification, the inspector noted that the deminster drain valve SGT 701 A and SGT 701B, respectively, on each filter train was shut. The plant drawings indicate these valves
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should be open and they were documented open on the latest valve lineup for the SBGT system. When notified that the demister drain valves were shut, the licensee opened both valves. Although the demister drain valves were in the wrong position, it did not affect the operability of the SBGT system.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
f.
Radioactive Waste Systems Controls (1) The inspector witnessed selected portions of a liquid radioactive release to verify the following:
-- The required release approvals are obtained.
-- The required samples are taken and analyzed.
-- The release control instrumentation was operable and in use during the release.
-- The radioactive waste system is operated in accordance with approved procedures.
On October 14, 1981, the inspector observed the release of batch 3379 of Waste Sample Tank A.
(2) On October 19, 1981, the inspector observed selected portions of dewatering a resin cask to verify:
that procedures were being followed; that the procedures were adequate; and that the system lineup was proper. The inspector also observed the radiation surveys of the cask, prior to its departure from the site, to verify that the radiation levels were below the transportation limits.
(3) No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
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F-ISP-75, Condensate Storage Tank Low Water Level (HPCI), Revision 3, dated April 1981, performed October 7,1981.
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F-ST-4C, HPCI Pump Operability Test (ISI), Revision 8, dated March 1981, performed October 9,1981.
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F-ST-4E, HPCI Subsystem Logic System Functional Test, Revision 11, dated May 1981, performed October 9, 1981.
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F-ST-7B, Standby Gas Treatment Logic System Functional Test, Revision 4, dated December 1980, performed October 9,198.
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F-ST-lD, MSIV's, Main Steam Line Drain Valves and Reactor Water
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Sample Valves Logic Functional Test, Revision 5, dated May 1981, perfomed October 23, 1981.
Tte inspector also witnessed all aspects of F-ISP-3-4, Reactor Level Instrument Calibration, Revision 7, dated September 1981, performed October 2,1981. Observations were made to verify that:
The surveillance procedure conforms to technical specification
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requirements and had been properly approved.
Test instrumentation was calibrated.
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Limiting conditions for operations for removing equipment from
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service were met.
Testing was perfomed by qualified personnel.
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The surveillance schedule was met.
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Test results met technical specification requirements.
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Appropriate corrective action was initiated, if necessary.
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Equipment was properly restored to service following the test.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety related maintenance activities. Through direct observation and review of records, they detennined that:
Redundant components were operable.
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These activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation.-
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Required administrative approvals and tag outs were obtained prior to initiating the work.
Approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills
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of the trade".
Appropriate radiological controls were-properly implemented.
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Ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented.
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Equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 23/12637, Condensate Storage Tank Level Switch repair perfomed on
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October 7, 1981.
Following the repairs on the Condensate Storage Tank Level Switch, the inspector independently verified that the level switch was correctly returned to service by observing F-ISP-75, " Condensate Storage Tank Low Water Level (HPCI)", Revision 3, dated April 1981, performed satisfactorily October 7, 1981.
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WR 03/8824, Install CRD Piping Support PFSK 3024, performed on
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October 7-9, 1981 The inspectors were concerned that the installation of this pipe support on the scram discharge volume (SDV) near the ultrasonic sensors for the SDV continuous monitoring system (CMS) could degrade the performance of the SDV CMS due to movement of the SDV during pipe support installation. The licensee acknowledged this concern and implemented twice daily performance of IMP 3.10, Weekly Operability Verification of Scram Discharge Volume Header Water Level Monitoring During Reactor Operation, Revision 0, dated February 2,1981 while the work was completed.
WR 17/13781, "B" Turbine Building Exhaust Monitor Troubleshooting
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performed October 15, 1981.
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WR 76/13434, Motor Driven Fire Pump Check Valve Repair performed October 22, 1981.
During the repair of the Motor Driven Fire Pump Check Valve, the inspector independently verified the adequacy of protective tag out
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WR 93/16050, Troubleshooting Failure of Emergency Service Water Pump Auto Start performed October 28-29, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Licensee Event Followup According to the shift supervisor's log, the reactor water conductivity exceeded the 5 micromhos per cm. permitted by Technical Specification 3.6.C from approximately 7:05 p.m. October 10, 1981 until about 1:20 a.m.
October 11, 1981. The licensee made the appropriate ENS notification to NRC headquarters, initiated Occurrence Report number 81-202, reduced generator power to 450 MWe, and initiated demineralized water makeup to the reactor through the control rod drives (CRD's).
Based on the subsequent discovery of amines in the condensate storage tanks (CST's),
the licensee concluded that resins in the liquid radioactive waste system waste filter and waste demineralizer had been overheated by hot water from the condensate receiver vents and drains via the waste collector and waste sample tanks. This overheated resin was not detected by conductivity monitors in the liquid radioactive waste system because it remained in a colloidal form until additional heating in the reactor transformed it to ionic form.
In order to restore CST chemistry to normal the licensee continued to makeup demineralized water to the CRD's and processed CST water for discharge to the lake.
The underlying cause of the event appears to have been the additional heat added to the waste collector tank by the vents from the condensate receiver tank. This heat was sufficient to raise the waste collection
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tank temperature above 140cF at which resin damage begins to occur according to a licensee consultant. The condensate receiver tank vents had recently been rerouted to the waste collector tank as a result of a spill which occurred in September 1981. To reduce the heat input to the waste collector tank the licensee shifted the condensate receiver tank drains from the waste collector tank to the main condenser via the auxiliary boiler system.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. Emergency Preparedness Drill On October 23, 1981, the licensee conducted a emergency response drill which involved a contaminated injured man who required hospitalization.
The objective of the drill was to test the ability of the plant staff to effectively respond to a medical emergency in conjunction with the Oswego Hospital. The inspector reviewed the drill scenario and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EAP-2, " Personnel Injury," prior to the drill and observed the onsite portion of the drill.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11. Refueling Preparation On October 14, 1981 the inspector observed the placement of several new fuel bundles in the spent fuel pool in preparation for refueling. The inspector observed that all fuel bundles with enrichment greater than 3.0 weight percent were placed in the old General Electric analyzed spent fuel racks. This was necessary because the new spent fuel pcol racks had not yet been analyzed for fuel enrichment in excess of 3.0 weight percent U-235.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the new fuel receipt inspection reports. The inspector noted that bundle LJX900 was not accepted because the rod to simulated channel clearance was less than.114 inches and the rod to rod clearance was less than.109 inches between the fifth and sixth spacers. On October 30, 1981 the inspector determined by report review that rod DP 25161 in uundle LJX900 had been replaced by rod DP36383 in accordance with procedure P/PQP 8:2, Bundle Rework at Site, and that the bundle was accepted by the licensee QC inspectors after reinspection following this repair and torquing of the channel fastener on October 23, 1981. However, the licensee reactor analyst still had several areas of concern requiring resolution by General Electric. These areas include:
1.
The method of establishing the coordinates to locate the defective pin.
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Verification of the pin number for repair coordinates.
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Verification of the method for sending the correct replacement pi __
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In addition, the reactor analyst requires onsite verification that the proper pin was replaced. The inspector will review the resolution to these concerns later.
(333/81-24-01)
12.
Exit Interview
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At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, the inspectors met with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On October 30, 1981, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
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