IR 05000333/1981016
| ML20030C051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030C044 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-16, NUDOCS 8108250350 | |
| Download: ML20030C051 (10) | |
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DCS NUMBERS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50333-810601 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50333-810602 50333-810603 Regior I 50333-810604 50333-810608 81-16 50333-810612 Report No.
50333-810625 50-333 50333-810701 Docket No.
DPR-59 C
License No.
Priority Category
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: July 1 - 31 1981 het[
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Inspectors:
! Linville!4fe ident p6ctor dyte~/igned
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8 !T fB l L. T. Doerflein, Resident Inspector da'te signed date signed 7/7/P/
Approved by:
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B. Kisteh-Chief, Reactor Projects dite ' signed Section 1C Inspection Summary:
l Inspection on July 1, 1981 to July 31, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-16)
l Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours
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l by the Resident Inspectors (124 hours0.00144 days <br />0.0344 hours <br />2.050265e-4 weeks <br />4.7182e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; review of Licensee Event Reports; licensee action on IE Circulars; control I
room observations; plant tours; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; verification of control room emergency ventilation system operability; emergency plan training observation; refueling preparations; fire brigade leader; PORC meeting
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l observation and spent fuel storage rack modifications.
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Results:
Of thirteen areas inspected no items of noncompliance were observed.
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(R Apr 7)
8108250350 810811 PDR ADOCK 05000333 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power ti. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- R. Liseno, Assistant to Operations Superintendent A. McKeen, Assistant to Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor R. Pasternak, Resident Manager D. E. Tall, Training Coordinator The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operators, Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance and Contractor personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-14-04): The inspector reviewed the followup report to related LER 79-24 which indicated that the vendor overhauled the RHR service water pump and modified the impeller to increase pump discharge head.
In addition, the followup report indicated that the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-15 were taken into consideration when this work was performed.
3.
Review Of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspectors determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the 'orm was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
LER's 81-44, 81-45, 81-46, 81-47, 81-48*, 81-49, 81-50, 81-51, 81-52*,
81-53*, 81-54, 81-55, 81-56 and 81-57 were reviewed.
- Report selected for onsite followup.
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LER 81-52 reported that fire protection spray nozzles for Standby Gas Treatment Train A were found plugged with rust during a surveillance test.
It further states that cleaning the nozzles corrected the problem and that no further corrective action was required. The inspector took exception to this statement ~ because of the 18 month frequency of this test. The licensee stated that additional action will be taken to prevent recurrence. The inspector will review this action further during a future inspection.
(333/81-16-01)
LER 81-48 reported failure of B drywell equipment drain sump pump.
Because of similar failures in the past the licensee had previously
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requested a Technical Specification change to clarify pump and system i
operability requirements. The resubmitted Technical Specification l
change was approved by NRR. The inspector noted that paragraph
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3.6.D.2.a of the revised Technical Specification states that, "Drywell sump monitoring) system (equipment drain sump monitoring or floor drain
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sump monitoring," shall be operable during reactor power operations.
The inspector pointed out to NRR that both the equipment drain sump
l monitoring and the floor drain sump monitoring must be operable to i
determine the unidentified and total leakage into the primary l
containment required by Technical Specification 3.6.D.1.
NRR agreed to review this matter further and issue a subsequent change to the Technical Specification, if necessary.
(333/81-16-02)
LER 81-53 reported that the Electric and Diesel Fire pump flow and pressure tests required by Technical Specifiestion 4.12.A.1.3.3 m re not conducted within the required time period because they had not been placed on the computer schedule. The licensee further stated that the reason for this oversight was that the fire insurance inspector normally witnesses these tests on a more restrictive frequency for the insurer. The licensee stated that these tests would be included on the computer schedule to prevent future oversights. The inspector will review the computer schedule during a subsequent inspection to ensure this is accomplished.
(333/81-16-03)
Occurrence Report 81-063 fomally reported that replacement of G safety relief valve in January 1981 with a valve of a different setpoint constituted a Technical Specification Violation. During PORC meeting 81-046 on April 30, 1981, the licensee r,oncluded that an LER was not necessary since the plant will receive an item of noncompliance concerning the relief valve replacement. The inspectors informed the licensee that the means of identification of a reportable event has no bearing on the necessity for formally reporting the event on an LER fom. The licensee stated that he would submit an LER (333/81-16-06)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Followup On IE Circulars For the IE Circular listed below, the inspectors verified that the Circular was received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed and that appropriate corrective actions were taken. The following IE Circular is closed:
IEC 80-18, 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive
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Waste Treatment Systems The licensee incorporated the requirements for 10CFR50.59 evaluations of changes to radioactive waste systems contained in the Circular in the latest revision to WACP 10.1.6, Control of Modifications, Component Changes, and Safety and Environmental Impact Evaluation Reports, Revision 5, dated June 2, 1981. This completes the licensee's action on this Circular.
5.
Control Room Observations Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified selected a.
plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for oparations of the plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
Power distribution limits
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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite
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emergency power sources Reactor Control panel indications
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Primary Containment temperature and pressure
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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure
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Standby Liquid Control Tank Level and concentration
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Stack monitor recorder traces
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The inspectors directly observed portions of the following plant
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l operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency Fonns
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Surveillance Tests
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Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective i
action, if required, was being taken.
d.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operations
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Detect changes and trends in performance
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Detect possible conflicts with technical specifications
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or regulatory requirements
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Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required Assess the effectiveness of the comunications provided
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by the logs (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor Log
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Nuclear Control Operator Log
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I Night Orders
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Shift Turnover Check Sheet l
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Daily Instrument Checks
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Daily Core Surveillance Checks
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Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
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Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations a.
and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room
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Reactor Building l
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Turbine Building I
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumphouse - Screenwell
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Standby Gas Treatment Building
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Radwaste Building
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Cable Tunnels
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Protected Area Perimeter
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b.
During the plant tours the inspectors conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
Other items verified during the plant tours included:
Proper completion and use of selected radiation work permits
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Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
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Proper personnel monitoring practices
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Proper control of ignition sources and flamable material
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Equipment tag outs in confomance with controls for removal of
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equipment from service
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Nomal security practices are being followed
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices are in
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conformance with approved licensee programs No itenis of noncompliance were identified.
The inspectors observed that steam leakage in the steam tunnel has c.
increased to the point that coupled with high ambient temperatures it has led to main steam line high temperature isolation half trips on July 9, 16, 17, and 22. The switch with the lowest setpoint of 1680F has been the source of the problem. The setpoints of the
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other 15 switches range up to 1980F The required setpoint for the switches is less than ambient whir.h is nominally 1600F plus 400F. The wide range of setpoints is due to the switch design and the test equipment arrangement for adjusting the setpoints.
The licensee planned to replace the existing switches which have been a recurring source of this type problem during wam sumer months with new solid state trip units which are on site. However, the new units are not qualified to the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-01B. The licensee has rigged portable blowers in the entrances to the steam tunnel to provide added ventilation cooling. The inspectors will monitor this situation further during subsequent inspections.
(333/81-16-04)
7.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the redundant system or component was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the work was perfomed by qualified personnel.
F-ISP-72, Source Range Instrument Trip Function Calibration,
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Revision 6, dated March 1981, perfomed on July 2,1981.
F-ISP-71, Intemediate Range Instrument Trip Function Calibration,
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Revision 7, dated April 1981, perfomed on July 2,1981.
l F-ST-5B, Average Power Range Monitor Instrument Functional Test,
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Revision 6, dated ArrP 1981, performed on July 20, 1981.
F-ISP-64-1, Main Steam Radiation Monitor Instrument Calibration,
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Revision 7, dated March 1981, performed on July 23, 1981.
F-ST-2G, RHR Isolation Valve Control Logic System Functional Test, l
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Revision 3, dated May 13, 1981, perfomed on July 30, 1981.
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No items of noncompliance were observed.
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Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the redundant train was available for service, approved procedures were used, and the work was performed by qualified personnel.
WR 02-3-9094, Gain Adjustment on Jet Pump Reverse Flow Proportional
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Amplifier perfomed on July 8,1981.
WR 17-12835 Repair A Radwaste Monitor which failed upscale on
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July 16,1981.
WR 07-12847, Perfomance of F-IMP 7.6, Neutron Monitoring System
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LPRM and APRM Instrument Maintenance, Revision 6, dated October 1979 on B APRM, perfomed on July 20, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Verification Of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Operability Using the checklist in F-0P-55B, Control Ventilation and Cooling, Revision 2, dated March 26, 1980, and drawing FB-35C, Equipment Room Heating, Vent and Air Conditioning Plan El 300'-0" the inspector verified the operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System by observing switch positions, breaker positions and damper positions. During this review the inspector observed that the switch for control room exhaust fan 70-FN-4A was in the pull-to-lock position.
The licensee stated that this fan was not required to be operable by Technical Specifications. Upon further review of the quality assurance department equipment list and the FSAR Section 9.9.3.11, the inspector determined that 70-FN-4A is safety grade equipment and that either 70-FN-4A or 70-FN-4B should be running in the recirculation mode during post accident conditions. The licensee agreed tV t the system may not be able to perform its intended function in the
' ended manner during post accident conditions if fan 70-FN-4B failed with 70-FN-4A switch
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in the pull-to-lock position.
Since fan 70-FN-4A was fully operable the licensee restored its control switch to the nomal position.
10. Emergency Plan Training Observation On July 13-15, 1981 the inspector attended an Oswego County Radiological Emergency Response Plan Training Session for County Coordinators and New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness Perscnnel at the Fulton County Building, County Emergency Operations Center. As many as 18 county and state officials attended portions of the training session.
The principal instructor for this training session was an employee of EDS Nuclear which had been contracted by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation and the licensee to conduct the training.
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The inspector attended this training session to verify that the session was conducted as scheduled, the appropriate offsite agencies were represented, the training satisfied the perceived needs of the agencies and the training covered the proposed subjects.
Based on discussions with most attendees and direct observations of the entire session, the inspector detennined that the instructor was unable to meet the perceived needs of the attendees because he lacked famil-iarity with the site and state plans, with the details of facility operation, with the probable hazards associated with potential accidents, and with the organization and authority of state and local governments in New York State.
While the instructor did cover the Oswego County Emergency Response Plan by reading most of it to the attendees and he did provide some fashion of radiation protection training which he appeared to be reading for the first time, he did not appear to meet the training requirements of Table SAP-1; Emergency Plan Training of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure No. SAP-1, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, Revision 0, datad March 9, 1981. The table requires that state, county, and local suppart service direci. ors and coordinators be given training in coordination of individual response plans with the site emergency plan.
To correct this deficiency the licensee's site emergency plan coordinator gave a presentation prior to the conclusion of the session on coordination
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of the site emergency plan with the county emergency plan. The licensee stated that a similar presentation on coordination of the state emergency
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response plan with the site emergency plan was not necessary because of recently passed state legislation giving Oswego and the adjacent counties authority to implement radiological emergency response plans without state participation.
In addition, the licensee stated that a new instructor with t, stronger background would be provided for future training sessions with offsite agencies, that site training personnel would participate by presenting portions of these sessions, and that the one day session for county department heads and coordinators would be held at the site.
11. Refueling Preparations Prior to receipt of new fuel by the licensee the inspector reviewed RAP 7.1.1, Receiving and Handling of Unirradiated Fuel, Revision 1, dated January 22, 1980 for technical adequacy. On July 16 and 17,1981 the inspector observed receipt, unloading, unpackaging, and transfer to
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the refuel floor of a shipment of new fuel.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the following approved procedures for technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of ANSI N18.7 and the facility Technical Specifications:
RAP 7.1.2, Inspecting and Channeling Unirradiated Fuel, Revision 2,
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l dated January 24, 1980.
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1 RAP 7.1.3, Refueling Procedure, Revision 6, dated May 27, 1980.
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RAP 7.1.14. Neutron Instrumentation Monitoring During In Core Fuel
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Handling, Revision 1, dated November 1,1978.
RAP 7.1.21, Reactor Building Elevation 369' Work / Tool Control,
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Revision 1, dated May 20, 1980.
RAP 7.3.9, Shutdown Margin Check, Revision 3, dated August 13, 1980.
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RAP 7.2.4, Reactor Core Fuel Verification, Revision 2, dated
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June 30, 1980.
RAP 7.2.4 provides three methods for performing verification of fuel assembly location and orientation in the core. Two of these methods cannot be effectively utilized because the existing licensee undervater television camera does not provide adequate resolution to both read the fuel assembly serial number and ascertain correct orientation of the fuel assembly on a single scan of the core. The third method which is routinely used requires separate scans to read the serial numbers and determine the orientation. The licensee stated that the other two methods were written into the procedure in anticipation of procurement of new equipment with better resolution.
No items of noncompliance were observed.
12. Fire Brigade Leader While reviewing the licensee's new Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures issued April 1, 1981 the inspector noted that the Shift Supervisor is still assigned as the fire brigade leader. Since this
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is not consistent with current NRC policy contained in Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, paragraph H, the inspectors asked for the licensee's position on this issue. After discussions between the licensee and NRR, NRR issued a letter dated July 13, 1981 requesting that the licensee reconsider the use of the SRO in this dual role and implement a change by July 1, 1982.
13. PORC Meeting Observation i
On July 24, 1981 the inspector attended PORC meeting no.81-067. The inspector verified that the Technical Specification membership and frequency requirements were met. The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the members of the PORC to assure that they meet the requirements of ANSI 18.1, 1971. The inspector reviewed the minutes of the meeting and confimed that they accurately reflect the decisions and recomendations made by the PORC members.
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During the PORC meeting, one member informed the committee of two potential conflicts with the Safety Evaluation of Amendment 55 to the Operating License. This amendment allows use of high density spent fuel racks to increase the spent fuel storage capability.
One conflict deals with the criticality analyses.
In order to prevent the keff in the fuel pool from exceeding the 0.95 limit, the safety evaluation states, in part, "... it is necessary, pending an NRC review, to prohibit the use of these high density storage racks for fuel assemblies that contain more than 14.8 grams of uranium-235, or equivalent, per axial centimeter of fuel assembly."
The new fuel, which will be added to the core during the next refueling, has an equivalent lattice enrichment of 3.19 weight percent of uranium-235. This corresponds to approximately 15.55 grams of uranium-235 per axial centimeter. The second conflict deals with the spent fuel pool cooling capacity.
In calculating heat loads in the spent fuel pool, the safety evaluation assumes an annual refueling cycle with one hundred forty fuel assemblies replaced each refueling. The licensee intends to go to an eighteen month refueling cycle with approximately two hundred fuel assemblies replaced each refueling. The PORC chairman stated that these concerns would be forwarded to the Corporate Office for review. The inspector will review the followup action taken by the licensee in a subsequent inspection.
(333/81-16-05)
14. Spent Fuel Storage Racks Modifications The inspector reviewed the vendor purchase documents, the design specifications and drawings to assure they contained the specific technical requirements and comitments contained in the Technical Snecifications FSAR and NRR Safety Evaluation Report. The inspector verified that critical dimensions were specified and that materials, such as structural, welding, and neutron absorbing were specified.
Potential conflicts with the NRR Safety Evaluation are discussed in paragraph 13.
No items of noncompliance were observed.
15.. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)pectors met with licensee and findings. On July 31, 1981, the ins and sumarized the scope and I
findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
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