IR 05000327/2020001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000327/2020001 and 05000328/2020001

ML20128J214
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/05/2020
From:	Tom Stephen NRC/RGN-II
To:	Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR 2020001
Download: ML20128J214 (18)

Text

May 5, 2020

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2020001 AND 05000328/2020001

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2. On April 22, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Matt Rasmussen and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Thomas A. Stephen, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000327 and 05000328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000327 and 05000328 License Numbers: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Report Numbers: 05000327/2020001 and 05000328/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0055 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Facility: Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2 Location: Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Inspection Dates: January 01, 2020 to March 31, 2020 Inspectors: N. Childs, Resident Inspector D. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Thomas A. Stephen, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Properly Classify the Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves as Critical Results in Age-Related Failure and Unit 2 Transient Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71111.12 FIN 05000328/2020001-01 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to properly classify the heater drain tank (HDT) bypass valves and controls as critical components in accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-09.18.2, Equipment Reliability Classification. The omission led to age-related degradation and failure of the positioner for 2-LCV-6-105A (#3 HDT bypass valve) and subsequent Unit 2 turbine runback to 74% on October 24, 2019.

Failure to Properly Perform Procedure Causes Inoperability of the Unit 1 Containment Vacuum Relief Lines for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.1] - 71111.15 NCV 05000327/2020001-02 Resources Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to properly perform 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0, Containment Building Ventilation Isolation. The error caused inoperability of the Unit 1 containment vacuum relief lines for longer than allowed by technical specifications.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000327/2020-001-01 LER 2020-001-001 for 71153 Closed Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,

Unit 1, Containment Vacuum Relief Lines Found Isolated LER 05000328/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for 71153 Closed Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,

Unit 2, Loss of Heater Drain Tank Flow Causes Turbine Runback and Manual Reactor Trip

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On January 23, operators reduced power to 23 percent RTP and took the main turbine offline to preform maintenance on the turbine control system. Operators returned the unit to RTP on January 26 and the unit operated at or near RTP for the remainder of inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at RTP. On March 18, the unit began to reduce power due to end of life coastdown conditions. The unit was at 87 percent RTP on March

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a tornado watch and warning on January 11, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Vital Battery V alignment to Battery Board I during Vital Battery I surveillance testing on January 8, 2020.

(2) Unit 1 and 2 offsite power while A Common Station Service Transformer was out of service for corrective maintenance on February 12, 2020.

(3) Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps while the turbine driven AFW pump was out of service for surveillance testing on March 3, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Auxiliary Building El. 734 (U-X) on January 8, 2020

(2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 vital battery rooms 1-4 on February 10, 2020

(3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms on February 13, 2020

(4) Diesel Generator Building, Elevation 722, on February 26, 2020

(5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, Elevation 714 on March 9, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) 161kv and 500kv cable tunnels on February 11, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) The inspectors observed 1A1 component cooling system heat exchanger inspection and state of cleanliness on March 17, 2020.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room following a leak in the control air system on January 14, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator training scenario on February 24, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Heater drain tank #3 condenser bypass valve inadvertently throttling open on October 24, 2019.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

(1) Unit 1 and 2, week of January 5 - January 11, 2020, including protected equipment status reviews for scheduled maintenance on Vital Battery 1 and K-A ERCW pump.

(2) Unit 1 and 2, week of January 19 - January 25, 2020, including protected equipment status reviews for scheduled maintenance on K-A ERCW pump and removal of unit 1 turbine from service to repair the turbine control system.

(3) Unit 1 and 2, week of February 23 - February 29, 2020 including protected equipment status reviews for scheduled maintenance on L-B ERCW pump and the A Common Station Service Transformer.

(4) Unit 1 and 2, week of March 8 - March 14, 2020, including protected equipment status reviews for scheduled maintenance on Unit 2 steam driven AFW train and the Unit 1 blender station.

(5) Unit 1 and 2, week of March 15 - March 21, 2020, including protected equipment status reviews for scheduled maintenance on Unit 2 steam driven AFW train and the 1A1 component cooling system heat exchanger.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1 pipe chase cooler 1B-B essential raw cooling water (ERCW) supply pipe leak, on January 13, 2020

(2) 1A 690 Penetration Room cooler TCV gagged where it could not be fully opened on January 16, 2020 (CR 1579523)

(3) Containment pressure limit exceeded during 2A containment purge operation on January 21, 2020 (CR 1580434)

(4) Unit 1 vacuum relief valves closed and loss of safety function on January 22, 2020 (CR 1580587)

(5) Control Room Emergency Ventilation System failed flow test on February 29, 2020 (CR 1591012)

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Design Equivalent Change Package SQN-19-808, Relocation of EDG 2A-A Common Start Relay Circuit Fuses.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) 2-SO-62-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, after centrifugal charging pump 2B-B load shed TDR calibration, on January 28, 2020

(2) 0-SI-SXI-000-201.0, ASME Section XI Inservice Pressure Test, after repair of Unit 1 pipe chase cooler 1B-B ERCW supply pipe leak on January 29, 2020

(3) WO 119863402, Perform periodic inspection and preventative maintenance on 1-FCV-70-153B, on February 13, 2020

(4) WO 118146376, Refurbish the K-A ERCW pump motor, on February 18, 2020

(5) WO 119998411, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1A1 Clam and MIC inspection on March 19, 2020

(6) WO 1137211283, 2-MVOP-003-136B-A, ERCW Header A Isolation, Replace Actuator on March 18, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) 2-SI-MIN-061-108.0, Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Door Weekly Inspection, on January 29, 2020

(2) 0-SI-SFT-031-144.B, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Test Train B, on March 2, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) 0-SI-SXP-067-201.R, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump R-A Performance Test, on February 20, 2020

(2) O-SI-SXP-003-202.S, TDAFW Pump 2A-S Comprehensive Test, on March 27, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Emergency preparedness drill conducted on March 11,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) ===

(1) Unit 1 RCS Activity (January 2019 - December 2019)

(2) Unit 2 RCS Activity (January 2019 - December 2019)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 RCS Leakage (January 2019 - December 2019)

(2) Unit 2 RCS Leakage (January 2019 - December 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) 1-FCV-67-0350, 1A 690 Penetration Room Cooler ERCW Supply Valve found gagged closed (CR 1579523)

(2) Letdown Isolation and uncontrolled boration (CR 1577772)

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000328/2019-002-00, Loss of Heater Drain Tank Flow Causes Turbine Runback and Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS accession: ML20038A107). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred.

(2) LER 05000327/2020-001-001, Containment Vacuum Relief Lines Found Isolated (ADAMS accession: ML20083F591). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section for IP

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Properly Classify the Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves as Critical Results in Age-Related Failure and Unit 2 Transient Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71111.12 FIN 05000328/2020001-01 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to properly classify the heater drain tank (HDT) bypass valves and controls as critical components in accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-09.18.2, Equipment Reliability Classification. The omission led to age-related degradation and failure of the positioner for 2-LCV-6-105A (#3 HDT bypass valve) and subsequent Unit 2 turbine runback to 74% on October 24, 2019.

Description:

On October 24, 2019, with Unit 2 at 100% rated thermal power (RTP), operators noticed the #3 HDT bypassing to the condenser along with an alarm indicating that 2-LCV-6-105A was open. This condition caused lowering #3 HDT level and partial loss of HDT pump flow. Operators manually reduced main turbine load due to rising reactor power, stabilizing the unit at 95% RTP. Shortly thereafter, Unit 2 experienced a main turbine runback and plant power was stabilized at 74% RTP.

Investigation revealed that that the positioner for 2-LCV-6-105A was malfunctioning due to age-related degradation and was not capable of throttling the valve to the closed position. The heater drain tank valves and controls were originally classified as non-critical components in the licensees equipment reliability program. The licensee failed to consider that spurious operation of the HDT #3 bypass valve could result in a greater than 20% power reduction, which is a qualifying characteristic of a critical component per NPG-SPP-09.18.2. TVAs fleet PM program for critical air operated valves (AOVs) specifies positioner replacements on a 12-year frequency. If 2-LCV-6-105A had been properly classified as critical, failure of the 22-year old positioner would have been prevented.

Corrective Actions: At the time of failure, the positioner model was obsolete and there were no replacements available. Unit 1 was in refueling outage, so the Unit 1 positioner of same model and similar age was installed on 2-LCV-6-105A until a replacement could be obtained. Additional corrective actions included the reclassification of 2-LCV-6-105A as a critical component, creation of a PM activity to periodically replace the valve positioner, and an action to review other non-critical secondary AOVs for appropriate classification and generate PM activities as necessary.

It should be noted that 2-LCV-6-105A failed open again on December 12, 2019, resulting in total loss of #3 HDT level followed by a turbine runback and manual reactor trip. However, the cause of this second failure was due to a loosened fine adjusting screw that was not attributed to component aging or installation error. There were no performance deficiencies associated with the December failure. The positioner for 2-LCV-6-105A was subsequently replaced with a newer model.

Corrective Action References: CR 1559894

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to properly classify the HDT bypass valves and controls as critical components in accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-09.18.2, Equipment Reliability Classification, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, failure of these components could result in a plant transient or scram as proven by the Unit 2 main turbine runback on October 24, 2019 and the Unit 2 main turbine runback/reactor trip on December 12, 2019 following failure of 2-LCV-6-105A. If properly classified as a critical component, periodic AOV positioner replacement per TVAs fleet PM program would have prevented age-related failure.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding screened to Green because the finding did not result in a reactor trip along with a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Failure to Properly Perform Procedure Causes Inoperability of the Unit 1 Containment Vacuum Relief Lines for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.1] - 71111.15 NCV 05000327/2020001-02 Resources Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to properly perform 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0, Containment Building Ventilation Isolation. The error caused inoperability of the Unit 1 containment vacuum relief lines for longer than allowed by technical specifications.

Description:

On January 21, 2020, while performing surveillance instruction 1-SI-SXV-000-201.0 Attachment 1, "Stroke Vacuum Relief Isolation Valves," the licensee discovered that all three Unit 1 containment vacuum relief isolation valves were in the closed position. The vacuum relief system has three vacuum relief lines located on the containment dome, with each line containing a vacuum relief valve in series with a vacuum relief isolation valve. The vacuum relief lines protect the containment vessel during transients that cause excessive external forces on the vessel. Technical Specification 3.6.9, "Vacuum Relief Valves,"

requires all three vacuum relief lines to be operable in Modes 1 through 4 (i.e., available to open during a design basis transient); therefore, all three vacuum relief lines were considered inoperable upon discovering the closed vacuum relief isolation valves.

The vacuum relief isolation valves had been previously manipulated on November 13, 2019 via surveillance procedure 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0, Containment Building Ventilation Isolation, during the U1R23 refueling outage (Mode 5). It should be noted that, in Modes 5 and 6, operability of the relief lines is not required due to the reduced probability of a design basis transient in those modes. Steps 6.3.10 through 6.3.12 of 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0 stated in part to check that, in each relief line, either the vacuum relief valve or vacuum relief isolation valve were in the closed position. "Check" as defined in licensee procedures, does not allow the repositioning of a component. The operator performing the procedure incorrectly interpreted these steps to be action steps and manually closed the relief isolation valve in each line. Additionally, the procedure did not contain instructions to re-open the relief isolation valves upon completion and the relief isolation valves remained in the closed position until discovered on January 21, 2020. The vacuum relief lines were considered inoperable from November 24, 2019, when Unit 1 entered the modes of applicability, until the valves were re-opened on January 21, 2020 (58 days).

Corrective Actions: Operability was restored on January 21, 2020 at 10:23 pm when the isolation valves were placed in the open position. CR 1580587 includes several corrective actions to ensure proper alignment of the vacuum relief system as required.

This NCV closes LER 05000327/2020-001-00.

Corrective Action References: CR 1580587

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to properly perform procedure steps 6.3.10, 6.3.11, and 6.3.12 of 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, all three Unit 1 containment vacuum relief isolation valves were manually closed when the procedure steps were intended to be a verification of valve position.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. It adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (i.e., containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," the inspectors determined that the finding screened to Green because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

Licensee procedures did not contain adequate guidance to ensure that the vacuum relief system was aligned correctly during all modes of applicability.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4 requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, which includes procedures that operate the containment ventilation system. Contrary to the above, on November 13, 2019 with Unit 1 in Mode 5, the licensee failed to properly perform procedure steps 6.3.10, 6.3.11, and 6.3.12 of 1-SI-OPS-088-006.0 by manually placing the relief isolation valves in the closed position, resulting in inoperability of the Unit 1 containment vacuum relief lines from November 24, 2019 through January 21, 2020 (58 days).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Matt Rasmussen and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Procedures AOP-N.02 Tornado Watch/Warning Revision 41

71111.04 Procedures 0-SI-OPS-082- AC Electrical Power Sources Operability Verification Revision 45

007W

0-SO-250-1 125 Volt DC Vital Power System Revision 81

1-SO-3-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Revision 59

71111.05 Corrective Action CR 1582488 Fire Header Leak in turbine building 01/28/2020

Documents CR 1582488 FPIP FOR200031 needs extension 02/12/2020

Corrective Action CR 1589572 Fire Protection Report Section 14.5 Bases for Fire Hose 02/25/2020

Documents Station needs to be revised to clarify contingency measures

Resulting from CR 1591726 Evaluate use of Tarps as Battery FME Cover 03/03/2020

Inspection CR 1593452 Cable in tray OV has broken Flammastic 03/09/2020

Fire Plans AUX-0-734-03 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building El. 734 (U-X) Revision 8

AUX-0-749-01 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building El. 749 Unit 1 Side Revision 11

AUX-0-749-02 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building El. 749 Unit 2 Side Revision 12

CON-0-706-00 Pre-Fire Plan - Control Building Elevation 706 Revision 8

Procedures AUX-0-714-01 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building El. 714 (Col A1-15, Q-U) Revision 9

71111.06 Corrective Action CR 1584752 500kV switchyard cable tunnel pump not working 02/05/2020

Documents CR 1584927 Cable Tunnel Sump Pumps installed are not capable of 02/06/2020

keeping up with amount of water coming in

71111.07A Work Orders WO 119998411 CCS 1A1 Hx Clam Inspection and Cleaning 3/15/2020

71111.11Q Corrective Action CR 1578892 Control Air Valve 0-32-1080 broken off at Tee Connection 01/14/2020

Documents

Miscellaneous SEG Simulator Exercise Guide - Shutdown LOCA Revision 0

OPL273S2001

Procedures AOP-M.02 Loss of Control Air Revision 25

AOP-R.02 Shutdown LOCA Revision 29

71111.12 Corrective Action Condition Reports 1572649; 1572651; 1572767

Documents (CRs)

Miscellaneous Prompt Investigation Report for CR 1559882 10/24/2019

Equipment Failure Investigation Checklist for CR 1559894 11/26/2019

Troubleshooting Plan for 2-LCV-006-0105A (WO 10/24/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

20865680)

CDE #3087 #3 Heater Drain Tank Valve Bypassing to Condenser 10/24/2019

CDE #3091 #3 heater drain tank valve failed open 12/12/2019

Work Orders 120973949; 120974765; 121044543

71111.13 Procedures 0-GO-16 System Operability Checklist Revision 25

NPG-SPP-07.3.4 Protected Equipment Revision 6

71111.15 Calculations N2-67-A-013A Through Wall Leak Evaluation for CR 1578600 Revision 5

Corrective Action CR 1591999 CREVS Margin Management Optimization 03/03/2020

Documents CR 1594964 Critical Thinking for CREVS CRE Boundary CR #1591012 03/05/2020

Miscellaneous Prompt Investigation Report for CR 150587 01/23/2020

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case N-513-3 01/26/2009

DS-C1.2.8 Civil Design Standard - Structural Evaluation of Raw Water Revision 7

Corrosion Degradation in Piping

Operability Prompt Determination of Operability for CR 1578600 01/14/2020

Evaluations Past Operability Evaluation for CR 1580434 02/03/2020

Past Operability Evaluation for CR 1580587 02/20/2020

CAR 1579523- Past Operability Evaluation for 1-FCV-67-350 found blocked 01/31/2020

001 from opening

Procedures 0-PI-DXI-000- ASME Section XI ISI/NDE Program Unit 1 and Unit 2 Revision 2

114.4

NEDP-27 Past Operability Evaluations Revision 5

OPDP-8 Operability Determination Process and Limiting Conditions Revision 25

for Operability Tracking

Work Orders WO 121057294 Measure stroke with gag installed 01/22/2020

71111.18 Engineering SQN-19-808 Relocation of EDG 2A-A Common Start Relay Fuses Revision 0

Changes

71111.19 Corrective Action CR 1586702 Deficiencies discovered while performing MMTP-141 02/13/2020

Documents CR 1595652 Stem factor exceeds criteria but adequate margin exists to 03/18/2020

accept as is

Procedures 0-SI-SXP-067- Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump K-A Performance Test Revision 27

201.K

0-SI-SXV-000- Testing of Category A and B Valves after Work Activities, Revision 7

206.0 upon Release from a Hold Order, or when Transferred form

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Other Documents

0-SI-SXV-070- ASME Code Valve Testing Revision 25

266.0

MMTP-141 Routine Inspection and Maintenance of Limitorque Motor Revision 1

Actuators

Work Orders 120198501 Calibrate CPP 2B-B load shed TDR CPBY 01/28/2020

21041767 Replace Leaking ERCW Piping Section U1 669 Penetration Revision 1

Room

WO 119397542 2-MVOP-003-136B-A MOVATS 03/18/2020

71111.22 Corrective Action CR 1591012 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test Failed 2/29/2020

Documents CR 1597803 SDAFW pump comprehensive test suspended at step 10 of 03/26/2020

section 6.9 due to inability to maintain test parameters

Procedures 0-SI-SFT-031- Control Room Emergency Ventilation Test Train B Revision 23

144B

0-TI-SXI-000- Inservice Testing Program Revision 4

200.0

TI-50 Air Flow Measurement and Balancing Methods Revision 20

71151 Procedures 0-SI-CEM-000- Chemistry Surveillance Requirements Revision 3

877.0

0-SI-OPS-068- Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Revision 41

137.0

0-TI-SXX-068- RCS Leakage Monitoring and Action Plans Revision 5

001.0

71152 Corrective Action CR 1578122 Evaluate response of charging flow controller 1-HIC-62-93 01/10/2020

Documents CR 1578124 Operator 4.0 Critique for letdown isolation 01/09/2020

CR 1579625 Prompt HU and Equipment Investigation Report for 1-FCV- 01/16/2020

67-350 being found gagged closed

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