IR 05000328/1981003
| ML19350D259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1981 |
| From: | Herdt A, Zajac L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350D255 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-328-81-03, 50-328-81-3, NUDOCS 8104150026 | |
| Download: ML19350D259 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
'T NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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e, 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 j
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FE B 2 01981 Report No. 50-328/81-03 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Docket No. 50-328 License No. CPPR-73 Inspection at Sequ si e,near Chattanooga, TN Inspector:
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M L. D. Zaja f/
Dat'e Sfgned Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 26-28, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 24 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of containment penetrations - review of implementing procedures, observa-tion of penetration protection, review of Quality Assurance records; preservice inspection - observation of liquid penetrant examination.
Results Of the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in one area, one violation was identified in one area (Violation - Scaffold placed on Stainless Steel Pipe paragraph 7).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. G. Stack, Project Manager
- T. B. Northern, Jr., Construction Engineer
- 0. W. Mack, Assistant Construction Engineer
"D. W. Kelley, Construction Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included four construction craftsmen, ar.d two technicians.
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 28, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Un"esolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5b and 8.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
The inspector observed liquid penetrant examination of safety related piping socket welds listed below to ascertain if they were examined in j
accordance with applicable procedures.
l Weld Ident.
pipe Size & Mat'l System 2SE19086CX1 1/2" stainless steel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system 2SE19086S 1/2" stainless stnel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system 2SE19086R 1/2" stainless steel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system
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Weld Ident.
Pipe Size & Mat'l System (Continued)
2SE19087CX1 1/2" stainless steel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system 2SE19087M 1/2" stainless steel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system 2SE19087N 1/2" stainless steel Instrumentation sensing lines for RC system No violations or deviations were noted.
b.
The inspector sighted numerous flange connections for the safety injection pumps, the charging water centrifugal pumps and the positive displacement pump to ascertain if they had the correct fasteners. The following apparent discrepancies were noted:
(1) Flanges adjacent to safety injection pump case vent valve 2-63-517 are held together with four bolts in lieu of four studs with nuts.
The licensee's instruction II-1 Rev. 15 states that bolting material for all mechanical flanged joints shall be verified as ASTM-A-193 studs, Grade 87 and heavy duty nuts, unless otherwise specified by the responsible engineer on the data card.
The applicable records were reviewed which indicated that studs had been installed. The Construction personnel stated that the pumps had been turned over to Nuclear Power personnel who may have replaced the studs with bolts during repair work.
The inspector was also advised that the subject pump had been returned to the manufacturer for repair work and that the manufacturer may have replaced the studs with bolts.
The licensee is reviewing this situation to determine whether the subject flange joint can be connected with bolts in lieu of studs.
(2)
Five studs and nuts were not fully engaged (in that the end of the stud was less than flush with the face of the nut) on four dif-ferent flange connections associated with the two safety injection pumps. Instruction II-1 specifies that all bolts (studs) shall be engaged so that there is visible evidence of complete threading through the nut. The licensee is reviewing to determine if the above described condition meets the criteria for engagement in their instruction.
This item is carried as Unresolved Item 328/81-03-04, "Incor-rect / inadequate fasteners used in flange connections on safety injection pumps."
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6.
Containment Penetrations - Review of Implementing Procedures The inspector reviewed the written procedures listed below to ascertain whether they were appropriate and adequate for containment penetrations.
a.
Identification requirements b.
Shipping, storage and handling requirements c.
Protection of penetration essemblies i
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Installation / erection including positioning and alignment e.
Welding requirements f.
Nondestructive examination requirements
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g.
Quality assurance audit requirements relative to containment penetra-tions No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Containment Penetrations - Observation of Work and Work Activities i
a.
It should be noted that all penetrations have been installed and inspected, thus observation of installation, welding and nondestructive examination cannot be performed. However, radiographic examination of
several penetration welds was reviewed by the inspector during a pre-vious inspection.
See report 328/80-22.
Leak testing has not been
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i completed, but none was being performed during this inspection. The inspector did sight several penetrations to ascertain if they vare adequately protected from damage and discovered some were not.
Penetration X-32 is fabricated with bellows (convolutions) which can be easily damaged if not protected with shield covers.
The fabricated cover for this penetration had been removed leaving the bellows section exposed to potential damage. Also, the bellow's cover for penetration X-22, had been dislodged and the cover itself was resting on top of the
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bellows section which could cause damage, and the bellow's cover for penetration X-15 was partially dislodged.
These items were brought to the attention of the licensee's construc-
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tion personnel, who in turn advised the inspector that the penetrations had been turned over to the Nuclear Power Division who is now respon-sible for the penetrations. The inspector advised that regardless of
the division of responsibility, the licensee needs to take action to protect the bellows from damage. It should be noted that some bellows
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(for penetration X-13c) had already been damaged and were in the
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process of being repaired. This item is carried as Inspector Followup Item 328/81-03-01, " Inadequate protection for penetration bellows".
b.
During the sighting of the penetrations, the inspector noted that one end of an aluminum scaffold was resting upon penetration X-90 and on the adjacent 1 1/2 inch stainless steel pipe. There was no pad between the bottom of the scaffold and the stainless steel pipe.
This is in violation with the licensee's procedure SNP-CP No. P-12, which
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specifies that scaffolding shall not be placed on pipe sizes less than 3-inch diameter and that a pad shall be placed between metal scaf-folding and stainless steel pipe.
This item was brought to the attention of the licensee's Construction personnel.
However, cor-rective action was not taken within the two days before departure of the inspector. This discrepancy is in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and is Violation Number 328/81-03-02, " Scaffold placed on 11/2 inch stainless steel pipe".
No violations or deviations were noted er. cept for the violation identified above.
8.
Containment penetrations - Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed the records for the containment penetrations listed below to ascertain whether:
a.
Nondestructive examinations were performed as required b.
Welding was performed in accordance with approved procedure c.
Inspections were performed to verify correct positioning and alignment Penetrations Reviewed:
X-43A X-48A 123E X-77 X-39 120E X-93 X-20A X-108 X-40B X-208 X-32 During this review it was disclosed that the records for several penetra-tions containing bellows were missing. These records titled " Verification and Installation of Penetration Assembly" are used to verify alignment of the bellows section wherein the compression of the bellows section is measured before and after installation and the results recorded.
This record also verifies other installation work.
The licensee is reviewing this discrepancy to establish whether or not these records are pertinent to the safety aspects of the penetrations and as a result of this review will initiate action accordingly. This is carried as Unresolved Item 328/81-03-03, " Missing records for penetrations containing bellows".
No violations or deviations were noted.
9.
Preservice Inspection - Observation of Liquid Penetrant Examination i
The inspector observed liquid penetrant (PT) examination of 3 inch stainless steel branch connection weld W-4 of the safety injection system. Although the PT was performed correctly, the PT examiner (when questioned by the inspector) did not know specifically how much of the base metal adjacent to the weld was required to be examined. He stated that the requirement was to PT the weld and the heat affected zone, thus he always PT'd a band beside l
the weld which was intended to include the heat affected zone. The
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inspector advised that the heat affected zone is an arbitrary distance from the weld since it can vary in width depending on several factors.
The inspector also advised that the Code (Section III, NB 5000) specifi.es h-inch of the base metal to be PT'd and 1 inch of the base metal is to be cleaned prior to the PT.
A review of the applicable PT procedure, N-PT-1 Rev. 2, disclosed that the amount of base metal to be examined was not specified.
The licensee should ensure all PT examiners are instructed on the require-ments for base metal examination and ensure that the penetrant procedure specifies the required amount. This is Inspector Followup Item 328/81-03-05, " Amount of base metal to be penetrant examined is not specified in the PT procedure".
No violations or deviations were noted.
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