IR 05000317/2011010
| ML11350A236 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/2011 |
| From: | Glenn Dentel Reactor Projects Branch 1 |
| To: | George Gellrich Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, Calvert Cliffs |
| Dentel G | |
| References | |
| IR-11-010 | |
| Download: ML11350A236 (20) | |
Text
aEcut4b^ UNITED STATES s** NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W;
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
+***i December 16,2011 George H. Gellrich, Vice President Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 -47 02 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 0500031 7 12011 01 0 AND 0500031 81201 1010 Dear Mr.
On November 18, 2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results discussed with Mr. Chris Costanzo, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that Constellation was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Calvert Cliffs personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold.
Calvert Cliffs personnel, in general, prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
G. Gellrich 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any)will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.sov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-317,50-318 License Nos.: DPR-53, DPR-69
Enclosure:
lnspection Report 0500031 7 1201101 0 and 0500031 812011010 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I Docket Nos.: 50-317,50-318 License Nos.: DPR.53, DPR-69 Report No.: 0500031 7 /201 1 01 0 and 0500031 81201 1 010 Licensee: Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Facility: Qalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Lusby, MD Dates: October 24,2011 through November 18,2011 Team Leader; Thomas C. Setzer, PE, Senior Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Inspectors: K, Dunham, Reactor Engineer, DRP C. Newport, Operations Engineer, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
L. Scholl, Senior Reactor lnspector, DRS Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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lR 0500031712011010 and 0500031 812011010; 1012412011 1111812011; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), Units 1 and 2; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem ldentification and Resolution,
This NRC team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
No findings were identified during this inspection.
Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that Constellation was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems, Constellation personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and in general, prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. In most cases, Constellation appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Constellation typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.
The inspectors concluded that, in general, Constellation adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Calvert Cliffs operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Constellation's self-assessments and audits were thorough.
Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnelwere unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.
REPORT DETAILS
4. orHER ACTTVTflES (OA)
40.A2 Problem ldentification and Resolution (7 11528)
This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152. Alldocuments reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Proqram Effectivenegs
lnspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Constellation's corrective action program at Calvert Cliffs. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVl, "Corrective Action," and Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective Action Program." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Plan-of-the-Day meetings, Condition Report screening meetings, and Management Review Committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, the Maintenance Rule program, the boric acid corrosion control program, and oversight programs.
- (1) Effectiveness of Problem ldentification ln addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, operator logs, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems and areas on site, such as the emergency diesel generators, emergency core cooling pump rooms, auxiliary feedwater pump room, intake structure, turbine building, control room, centralalarm station, secondary alarm station, armory, and switchgear rooms. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Constellation entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.
- (2) Effectiveness of Prioritjzation and Evaluation of lssues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC biennial Problem ldentification and Resolution inspection completed in November 2009. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance (Category 3 and 4) that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.
- (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed Constellation's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Constellation's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings to verify that Constellation personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. ln addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Constellation's actions related to the boric acid corrosion control program (BACCP).
b.
Assessnlent
- (1) Effecliveness of Problem ldentification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Constellation, in general, identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Constetlation staff at Calvert Cliffs initiated approximately 21,500 condition reports between December 2009 and October 2011. The inspectors observed supervisors at the Plan-of-the-Day meetings, Condition Report screening meetings, and Management Review Committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Constellation trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through these reviews were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnelwere identifying trends at low levels.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 service water pump room, and identified an issue that had not been previously entered into the corrective action program. This included a ladder, fan, and a section of floor grating that were not properly stored or seismically restrained in accordance with Constellation procedures. In response to the team's discovery of the issue, Constellation removed the materials from the room, and performed an operability screening to determine if the items would have caused the Unit 2 service water system to become inoperable during a seismic event.
Constellation determined that the items did not present a concern for operability. The failure to properly store or seismically restrain the items in the Unit 2 service water pump room was determined to be a performance deficiency because Constellation failed to follow procedural requirements for storing or seismically restraining the items. The inspectors evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with NRC inspection manual chapter (lMC) 0612, Appendix B, "lssue Screening," and IMC 0612, Appendix E,
'Examples of Minor lssues." Since the items did not adversely affect the operability of the safety-related equipment in the Unit 2 service water pump room, this performance deficiency was determined to be minor and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Constellation personnel promptly initiated condition reports and took immediate action to address the issues previously described (CR 201 1 -01 0689, 0107 1 4).
- (2) Effectiveneqs of Prioritization and Evalglltion of lssues The inspectors determined that, in general, Constellation appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem.
Constellation screened condition reports for operability and reportability, prioritized the condition reports by significance (Category 1 - most significant, through Category 4 -
least significant), and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, applicability of relevant operating experience, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.
Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causalanalyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the inspectors did note some observations in Constellation's prioritization and evaluation of the following issues.
Cateoory 3 Condiiion Report Closure Docum,entation During the review of corrective action closure documentation contained in condition reports, the inspectors identified that there were numerous Category 3 condition report evaluations which lacked sufficient detail to determine the full scope of actions taken by Constellation. This required Constellation staff to research and retrieve the additional information needed to fully describe the actions taken. A weakness in closure documentation had been previously identified by the Constellation Quality Assurance (OPA) department in December 2010 (OPA Assessment Report 2010-103)for Category 2 condition reports; in that, corrective actions were noted to be absent of objective evidence of the actions performed, and that the traceability and auditing of the completed actions could not be easily accomplished. Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective Action Program," requires that Category 3 condition reports will be evaluated to the extent required at the discretion of the supervisor; however, for the examples reviewed by the inspectors, the extent of closure documentation was not adequate to fully understand the corrective actions taken, and impeded the traceability and auditing of corrective actions, The inspectors determined that this issue did not represent a violation of NRC requirements, Constellation entered this issue in the corrective action program (CR 2011-010801).
Annunciator Card Failures Not Evaluated Within th-e Maintenance Rule The team reviewed condition reports pertaining to Constellation's Maintenance Rule program which described numerous control room annunciator card failures that occurred in 2008 and 2009. Annunciator cards are scoped within the Constellation Maintenance Rule program and their performance is classified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 paragraph (aX2). Failures of the annunciator cards are required to be evaluated as potential Maintenance Rule Functional Failures (MRFFs) or Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures (MPFFs) to determine if continued classification in 10 CFR 50.65 paragraph (aX2) is appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations contained within the condition reports and were unable to find any documented evidence of Maintenance Rule failure screening evaluations. Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective Action Program," requires every condition report to be reviewed by the Maintenance Rule coordinator so that the performance of a Maintenance Rule evaluation may be completed for components which are scoped in the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors determined that the failure to document the Maintenance Rule evaluation of the annunciator card failures in 2008 and 2009 did not meet the requirements of Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000. A subsequent review and evaluation performed by Constellation revealed that all of the 2008 and 2009 failures were appropriately classified and did not represent any additional MPFFs or MRFFs which would have required Constellation to have classified the system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 paragraph (aX1). Since classification in 10 CFR 50.65 paragraph (aX2) was appropriate and there were no unaccounted MRFFs or MPFFS, the inspectors determined this issue was of minor significance and therefore not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Constellation entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 2011-01 1385)
CR 2010-001378. Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for Letdown Restoratign (Cateqorv 3)
The vast majority of condition reports reviewed by the team were adequately categorized for evaluation. Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective Action Program," Attachment 3, "Condition Report Categorization Criteria," defines each condition report category in terms of how acceptable or unacceptable occurrence of the degraded condition should be. The following definitions are listed in the procedure:
o Category 1 - "Recurrence is unacceptable" o Category 2Tier l - "Rare occurrence is undesirable" r Category 2Tier ll - "Rare occurrence may be acceptable" r Category 3 - "Occasional occurrence is acceptable" o Category 4 - "Trend Only" The procedure also provides typical examples for each category, and further states that the list is not all inclusive and as such, a higher or lower category may be appropriate.
This guidance provides the condition report screener flexibility to either increase or decrease the condition report category level. The inspectors determined that the staff's use of the flexibility allowed by the procedure could lead to a lower than appropriate category being assigned. The inspectors identified the following example where a lower than appropriate category level was chosen for a degraded condition.
On February 18, 2010, a phase to ground over-current fault on the 128 reactor coolant pump switchgear resulted in an automatic reactor trip on Unit 1. As a result, protective relaying isolated the letdown portion of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS).
Operators worked to stabilize pressurizer level, which approached and later exceeded plant emergency operation procedure (EOP) high level limits. Operators were unable to immediately restore letdown because of a closed excess flow check valve. Due to inadequate procedural guidance, letdown was not reestablished until approximately five hours after event initiation. A Category 3 condition report was written by Constellation, which later established procedural guidance relating to letdown restoration following closure of the excess flow check valve.
The inspectors determined that the operator challenges in controlling pressurizer level, which eventually led to the EOP high level limit being exceeded, and the inadequate procedural guidance which prevented operators from re-opening the excess flow check valve represented a condition that was not suitable to be categorized as "occasional occurrence is acceptable" (Category 3). Discussions with Constellation revealed that the Category 3 categorization was deemed appropriate and allowed by procedure through the guidance describing that a higher or lower category may be selected for any condition report. The inspectors determined that a Category 2 apparent cause evaluation would have been the appropriate category level to adequately investigate and explore the extent of condition, extent of cause, and generic issues surrounding the event.
The inspectors evaluated the example of inappropriate categorization noted above for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, "lssue Screening," and Appendix E, "Examples of Minor lssues." While the inspectors concluded the condition report was not categorized appropriately, the issues were resolved adequately by Constellation staff. Furthermore, the vast majority of condition reports reviewed by the team throughout the inspection were categorized properly.
Specifically, the team did not identify any Category 1 or 2 condition reports that had been prioritized inappropriately, and all Category 3 condition reports reviewed with the exception of the example above were prioritized appropriately. The inspectors concluded that the above example did not represent a programmatic weakness in Constellation's ability to properly categorize condition reports. Therefore, the inspectors determined this issue was of minor significance and therefore not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The technical aspects of this issue pertaining to the failure to establish adequate procedures for the restoration of CVCS letdown flow was previously documented as an NCV in NRC Special Inspection Report 050003 1 7 &31 81 2010006 (ADAMS accession num ber ML101650723).
Constellation entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 2011-011375).
- (3) Effectivqngss of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Constellation identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs and findings since the last Problem ldentification and Resolution inspection were timely and effective. However, the inspectors identified the following examples in which a corrective action was not fully effective in addressing a potential degraded condition.
CR 2010-006331 . Pos.sible Corrosion of Uncoated Carbon Steel Pipino Under lnsulation Constellation staff reviewed operating experience (OE) item OE30955, which identified a condition in which a leak developed in insulated, uncoated carbon steel piping exposed to outdoor elements at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. Constellation screened this OE item and concluded that the condition was applicable to Calvert Cliffs, specifically to piping residing in the tank farm (condensate storage tanks). The evaluator recommended that the details of this OE item be provided to system managers who would determine if any issues exist within their system's piping, and that corrective actions be assigned to perform any necessary coating and repairs. CR 2010-006331 was written with one corrective action to review and revise piping specifications. This corrective action was closed with no work performed. No corrective actions were assigned to system managers to evaluate their system's piping for the issue described in the OE item. The inspectors questioned the closure of this condition report and determined that there was no other condition report written to carry out the recommendations described by the OE item evaluator. As a result of the inspectors' issue, Constellation staff wrote condition reports to have the condition evaluated by engineering to determine if insulated, uncoated carbon steel piping exposed to outdoor elements at Calvert Cliffs had any degraded issues or needed to be coated to prevent degradation.
Although the corrective action as originally assigned was not fully effective in exploring a potential degraded condition, there have been no adverse impacts to component operability or safety as a result of the issue. Therefore, the inspectors considered this issue to be of minor significance, and, as a result, it is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Constellation entered this issue into the corrective action program (CR 2011-010851, 010820).
CR 2011-005200. Review of Outside Radioactive Material Storaqe Areas The inspectors reviewed CR 2011-005200 which required a review of outside radioactive storage areas against design criteria because Constellation had identified several potential discrepancies between the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of the areas and the actual practices and conditions. The radioactive storage areas are used for storage of radioactive spent resins and filters, and in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analysis the storage of these items is limited to a specific timeframe of five years.
Constellation created corrective action CA-2A11-000614 to review both the Lake Davies interim storage area and the West Road Cage storage areafor compliance with the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The inspectors reviewed this corrective action and determined the review was completed for only the Lake Davies interim storage area. The inspectors determined the failure to review the West Road Cage storage area was of minor significance because a subsequent review of the operation of the West Road Cage storage area was found to remain in compliance with the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and NRC regulations. Therefore, the inspectors consider this issue to be of minor significance, and, as a result, it is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Constellation entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 201 1-01 1397).
Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment ofJhe Use of Operatinq Experience
lnspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with the review of industry operating experience to determine whether Constellation appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Calvert Cliffs and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Constellation adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infreq uently performed activities.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings, Condition Report screening meetings, and in maintenance work orders.
The inspectors identified one issue in which the corrective action assigned to address the issues identified in an OE item was closed with no work performed. The evaluation by Constellation resulted in a corrective action that was not fully effective in addressing a potential degraded condition. The details of this issue are described in the assessment section for the Effectiveness of Corrective Actions, Section 4OA2.1b(3) above.
c. Findinos No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
lnspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if Constellation entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether Constellation initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.
Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Constellation assessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Constellation personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Constellation completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.
The inspectors identified one instance in which guidance for performing self-assessments for the boric acid corrosion control program was deficient. Specifically, Constellation procedure MN-3-123,"Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program," step 5.98, requires Engineering Programs to perform periodic self-assessments of the boric acid corrosion control program. The guidance does not define the periodicity or the type of self-assessment (i.e. snapshot, focused) to be completed. The inspectors determined that this was a minor procedure deficiency issue since snapshot self'assessments had been completed by Calvert Cliffs personnel once every three years, and not a violation of NRC requirements. Constellation entered this issue into the corrective action program (cR 2011-0113e8).
c. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.4 Assessqent of Safetv Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at Calvert Cliffs. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program (ECP) coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees are aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that Constellation entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate. The inspectors performed a follow-up of ECP items identified during the last Problem ldentification and Resolution inspection in November 2009 to determine if Constellation adequately addressed the issues. Finally, the inspectors reviewed the results of the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessments conducted in 2009 and 2011 to gain insights into the SCWE at Calvert Cliffs b. Assessment During interviews, Calvert Cliffs staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
40A6 Meetinos. Includins Exit On November 18, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Chris Costanzo, Plant Manager, and other members of the Calvert Cliffs staff, The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SU PPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- P. Amos, Performance lmprovement Unit Director
- D. Bartnik, Security Director
- J. Beasley, Engineering Supervisor
- K. Bodine, Engineering Programs Supervisor
- C. Costanzo, Plant Manager
- J. Etzweiler, Principal Engineer
- J. Gaffey, Design Engineer
- R. Gines, System Engineer
- R. Jones, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Manager
- C. Jackson, System Engineer
- M. Jones, System Engineer
- S. Kirkpatrick, l&C Supervisor
- G. Knull, Work Management
- J. Klecha, Work Management
- S. Kowaluk, Engineering Programs
- D. Lauver, Licensing Director
- M. Major, Engineering Programs
- C. Neyman, Senior Engineering Analysl
S. Sanders. GS-Asset Manager
- J. Schoolcraft, Performance lmprovement
- A. Simpson, Licensing Supervisor
- W. Tippett, Senior Program Analyst
- P. Tolliver, l&C Supervisor
- K. Umphrey, Shift Operations Manager
- T. Unkle, Licensing Engineering Analyst
- L. Williams, System Engineer
- J. Wilson, System Engineering Supervisor
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
None