IR 05000313/1996027

Insp Repts 50-313/96-27 & 50-368/96-27 on 961022-29,1121 & 25.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20138J380
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	02/03/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138J368	List: IR 05000313/1996027 ML20138J365 ML20138J377
References
50-313-96-27, 50-368-96-27, NUDOCS 9702070149
Download: ML20138J380 (45)

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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket .Nos.: 50-313 50-368 License Nos.: DPR-51 NPF-6 Report No.: 50-313/96-27 50-368/96-27 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: Junction of Hwy. 64W and Hwy.333 South Russellville, Arkansas Dates: October 22-29 and November 21 and 25,1996 Inspectors: Philip Qualls, Reactor Inspector James Melfi, Resident inspector Approved By: Chris A. Vandenburgh, Chief, Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information Attachment 2: Transcript of Telephonic Notifications

i 9702070149 970203 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G PDR

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.e l SUMMARY

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Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-313/96-27,50-368/96-27

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This specialinspection reviewed the circumstances surrounding a fire in the Unit 1 reactor I building on October 17,1996. The fire originated in oil-soaked insulation in contact with Steam Generator B. The uncontrolled leakage of lube oil which wetted the insulation came from a cracked weld in the lube oil piping of Reactor Coolant Pump Motor B. The 1 inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, and plant support.

a Operations f ,

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. * The containment fire was caused by the ignition of oil that had accumulated in fibrous insulation on Steam Generator B. The oil originated from previous

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uncontrolled leakage from a crack in the discharge piping of the high pressure lift oil I

pump of the lube oil system for the reactor coolant pump. The oilignited below its normal auto-ignition temperature due to the " wicking effect" in fibrous insulation (Section 01.1).

* The inspectors determined that the lube oil collection systems for the Reactor

} Coolant Pump B in Units 1 and all the reactor coolant pumps in Unit 2 had not been

- designed to collect oil leakage from all pressurized and unpressurized locations. The

- Unit 1 A, C, and D reactor coolant pump lube oil collection systems were not  ;

maintained to collect oil from unpressurized locations. This is an apparent violation j of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (Section O2.1, O2.2).

} * The licensee determined the appropriate emergency classification of the fire event and notified the NRC headquarters operations officer of the event; however, the licensee failed to specifically notify the NRC that'an unusual event had been declared. The f ailure to inform the NRC of this emergency classification within

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is a violation (Section 04.1).

I j * The licensee made a documentation error by writing an Alert Classification on the

! Unusual Event Form (Section 04.1).

Maintenance

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• Following the containment fire, modifications made to add a shroud and enlarge the drip trays of the lube oil collection system for the reactor coolant pump motors in Unit 1 and 2 were adequato to correct the fire protection deficiencies (Section M1.1).

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• Prior to the containment fire, the licensee repaired a cracked weld on the reactor i coolant pump motor lube oil discharge pipe, but f ailed to initiate a condition report j to thoroughly investigate for oilleakage accumulation. This was the first example l

of an apparent violation involving the failure to identify and take corrective action for a significant condition adverse to quality (Section M7.1).

Plant Support

• The licensee failed to investigate a report of oil soaked insulation, smoking excessively, on the morning of the fire, during the plant heatup. This is the second example of an apparent violation involving the failure to identify and correct a j significant condition adverse to quality (Section F1.1).

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• The fire brigade responded well to the event and promptly extinguished the fire (Section F4.1). ,

• The licensee replaced the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor B in March 199 I However, the fire protection review of this plant modification did not identify the need for shrouds to collect pressurized lube oil (Section F7.1).

• The licensee modified the lube oil piping to add remote filllines for Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps and did not incorporate a collection system for leakage from the fill lines (Section F7.1).

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• The licensee performed a thorough investigation and evaluation of the cause of the fire and the resulting damage (Section F8.1).  ;

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• The licensee did not document and evaluate oil found in the reactor building during the f all 1996 outage. This is the third example of an apparent violation involving l the failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality l (Section F8.1). l l

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Report Details l

1. Oparations l

01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Fire in Reactor Buildina Due to Reactor Coolant Pumo Lube Oil Leakaoe (71707, i

93702)

l l Inspection Scoce (93702)

l The inspectors ob' served the control room operator's response to the fire and

reviewed the events surrounding the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building on October 17,1996.

1 Observations and Findinas On October 17,1996, at 4:07 p.m., with the plant heating up to hot standby conditions following an outage, the licensee noticed a fire on Steam Generator B near Reactor Coolant Pump B. Two fire brigade qualified operators were in the !

reactor building at the time of the fire and responded to the fire (see Section F4.1). !

The licensee declared an Unusual Event since the fire lasted longer than 10 minutes :

(see Section 04.1). The inspectors observed some of the actions of the operators during the unusual event and noted that the actions of the operators were professional and showed good command and contro After the reactor building was purged of smoke and the plant cooled down, the licensee and the inspectors walked down the affected area and inspected the other reactor coolant pumps. An oil film was noticeable on the side of Steam Generator B and on the side of the Reactor Coolant Pump B, below the high pressure lube oil pipin The licensee determined that the fire was caused by oil on the insulation on the Steam Generator B. The oil had accumulated on the insulation due to a previous I leak from the lube oil piping. During a preventive maintenance pump run on the l High Pressure Lube Oil Pump P-80B, the licensee had noted a cracked weld on the '

discharge line. The licensee repaired the cracked line but failed to identify the oil saturated insulation which had resulted from the leak (see Section M7.1).

Subsequent to the fire, the licensee determined that the pump discharge line had cracked before the preventive maintenance activity. Since the high pressure lube oil pump operates only during reactor coolant pump starts or stops, the licensee concluded that the oil was sprayed on the insulation when Reactor Coolant Pump B was stopped at the beginning of Refueling Outage 1R13. During the refueling

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shutdown, Reactor Coolant Pump B was operated for an extended period until the j reactor coolant system was relatively cool (approximately 250 F). The high l

pressure lube oil pumps were normally operated only briefly to assure that the

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reactor coolant pump motor bearings were not damaged. However, due to

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problems at that time with reactor coolant pump speed sensor relays that gave spurious signals to start the tube oil pumps, tne high pressure lube oil pumps operated for approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />, j l

The licensee estimated that a total of 7 gallons of oil sprayed out of the lube oil pipe !

during that period of extended operation. The licensee determined this amount from l

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the difference in oil level indications observed following a May 19,1996, reactor trip and a September 12,1996, reactor trip. The licensee had not identified the cause of the apparently excessive oil consumption at that time. The oil consumption was not identified as excessive and a condition report was not writte The reactor coolant pump lube oil had a flashpoint of approximately 400 F and an auto-ignition point of approximately 700 F. Although the normal metal temperature on the Steam Generator B at the time of the fire was approximately 430* F, the licensee concluded that the lube oil ignited at a temperature below the auto-ignition point due to a " wicking effect" of the insulation. This phenomenon was described by the licensee as the high temperature breakdown of the lube oil into more volatile hydrocarbons due to the increased surface area of the oil when absorbed in fibrous material. Due to this phenomenon, sustained heating of oil soaked insulation can reduce the auto-ignition temperature of the oil to a value approaching the flashpoint temperatur Conclusions The observed operator's response to the Unusual Event was good. The fire was caused by the ignition of oil that had accumulated in fibrous insulation on Steam Generator B. The oil originated from previous uncontrolled leakage from a crack in the discharge piping of the high pressure lift oil pump. The oilignited below its j normal auto-ignition temperature due to a wicking effect of fibrous insulatio O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Una 1 - Walkdowns of Reactor Coolant Pumos Motor Oil Collection Systems  ;

inspection Scope (71707. 64704)  :

Following the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building, the inspectors walked down the Unit 1 reactor coolant pump motors to assess the as-found condition of the !

equipment affected by the fire and the licensee's actions to resolve the proble Observations and Findinas The inspectors wn the Unit 1 reactor coolan pump motors several times folio t e fire in the reactor building. The first to of the reactor building ccurred approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the fir The inspectors observed that the Unit 1 motor assemblies for Reactor Coolant Pumps A, C, and D were the original motors manufactured by Allis Chalmers. All of l

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lube oil piping was located within a shroud. A drip pan underneath the piping could remove any leakage to an oil collection tank. The inspectors noted that a level gauge and level transmitter were located outside this shroud to monitor level in the upper reservoir, in addition, there were no means to collect any potential leakage from a remote fillline (tygon tube) connected to the top of the moto The inspectors observed that the Unit 1 motor assembly for Reactor Coolant Pump B was a replacement motor manuf actured by Jeaumont (discussed further in Section M1.1). The replacement motor differed in some design features from the i original motor. Unlike the Allis Chambers motor assembly, most of the high i pressure piping was not enclosed in a shroud, in addition, the drip pan did not !

extend under the reservoir fill connection or the remote fill lines (tygon tube), which j was connected to the fill connectio .

The inspectors noticed an oil film on the insulation, the emergency and main feedwater feedrings of Steam Generator B, and on the side of the Reactor Coolant Pump B motor. This area was adjacent to and below the location of a weld repair previously performed on the lube oil piping (see Section M7.1). Subsequent walkdowns by the inspectors and the licensee found other problems with the Reactor Coolant Pump B and the other reactor coolant pumps (discussed in NRC inspection Report 50-313:368/96-07). These walkdowns identified the following observation * The inspectors found that the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump B upper reservoir fill connection was not protected by a collection syste * The inspectors found that the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump B lube oil cooler did not have drains under the welded connections to the coole * The licensee found that the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump A upper reservoir level glass indication extended beyond the oil collection drip tra * The licensee found that Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pumps C and D upper reservoir level glass indications were near the edge of the oil collection drip tra :

As immediate corrective actions, the licensee installed a shroud on Reactor Coolant Pump Motor B and extended drip trays on all of the reactor coolant pump motors ;

(further discussed in Section M1.1). Due to questions regarding the Reactor Coolant Pump B motor lube oil pump piping, the licensee implemented several additional administrative actions. The lube oil pump motors were tagged out for the next operating cycle. The vendor provided an evaluation that the lift pumps were not needed during an emergency shutdown or trip of the Reactor Coolant Pump B motor. Further, during controlled starts or stops of the reactor coolant pump motor, the licensee established administrative controls to station personnelin the vicinity of the lube oil pumps to observe any oilleakag i

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02.2 Unit 2 - Walkdown of Reactor Coolant Pumo Motors Insnection Scope (71707,64704)

Due to the deficiencies found on the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps, the inspectors reviewed the configuration of the lube oil collection systern on a spare Unit 2 reactor coolant pump motor, since the reactor coolant pumps installed on Unit 2 were not accessible during power operations. Following the unscheduled shutdown of Unit 2, the inspectors observed the oil collection system insta!!ed on reactor coolant pump motors for Unit 2 to determine compliance with Appendix Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the spare motor assembly configuration was similar to that of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor B. Specifically, the drip tray did not extend under the lower oil reservoir level indicator, and some tube oil pump piping, and spray deflectors were not installed over the high pressure lube oil pipin Therefore, the spare reactor coolant pump motor did not appear to meet Appendix R requirements. The Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report stated that the motors have systems to prevent lube oilleakage from spreading. Based on these observations, the inspectors questioned if the reactor coolant motors installed in Unit 2 met the Appendix R fire protection requirement Based on these observations of the spare motor, the licensee reviewed drawings and training materials, but could not determine the actualinstalled configuratio The licensee determined with Continued Safe Operations 2-96-0284-01 that continued operation was acceptable since there was not any fibrous insulation that !

could be affected by the lube oil, the lube oil levels were monitored, and the potential amount of uncollected lube oil would be minimal. Since the field configuration of the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps were not accessible at power, this item was identified as an unresolved item during the November 7,1996, exit meeting until a walkdown of the reactor coolant pump lube oil system was performed in Unit 2. Subsequently, during an unrelated shutdown of Unit 2, on November 21 and 25,1996, the inspectors observed the installed condition of the tube oil system of the reactor coolant pump motor The inspectors walked down the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps lobe oil collection systems to verify compliance with Appendix R. During the walkdown, the inspector noted that each Unit 2 reactor coolant pump motor assembly had lube oil collection features similar to the motor assemblies installed in Unit 1. However, the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump lube oil system included 700 psi discharge pressure tube oil pumps rather than the 2000 psilube oil pumps installed in Unit 1. The high pressure lube oil pipes did not have shrouds around them and would allow leakage to not enter a drip tray. The inspectors noted that the lower reservoir had a level

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gauge and transmitter that could have leakage that would not enter a drip tray. The lower reservoir also had a level transmitter and a remote fillline. The inspectors also noted that the remote fill lines (stainless steel pipes) did not have a means to collect any leakage and was connected to the fill connection. No uncontrolled leakage was observed at the time of the walkdown The inspectors observed the following common design features of the lube oil systems installed on all of the reactor coolant pump motors in Unit 2 which appeared to conflict with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Criterion li * The existing drip pan installed in the lube oil collection system did not extend adequately to collect leaks from the flanged connections of the lower oil reservoir level indication transmitter.

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• The collection system did not provide for spray deflection and leak collection from the flanged connections of the high pressure lube oil pump pipin CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section 111.0, states, in part, ". . . collection systems

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shall be capable of collecting oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems." Appendix R, Section lll.0, also defines the leakage points to ". . . include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oillines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps."

The inspectors concluded that the tube oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps in Unit 2 could not collect oil from all pressurized and unpressurized locations. This was similar to the condition which also existed in Unit 1. This is an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Il (50-313:368/9627-01).

As corrective action, the licensee modified the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump's lube oil collection system to address these Appendix R concerns with Plant Change 96-3478P201. The inspector verified that this modification properly addressed the Appendix R aeficiencies. The walkdown of the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps is also discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-313;368/96-0 During the walkdown in Unit 2, the inspectors identified several additional configuration deficiencies:

• A drain pipe for the lower oil collection tray of Reactor Coolant Pump Motor D was supported by two nylon tie wraps. The upper reservoir drain to a funnel was not aligned over the funnel allowing oil to spill when the upper reservoir was drained. Some oil accumulation was observed below the funnel on top of the metal reflective insulation around the reactor coolant pump bow j i

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A drain pipe from the lower oil reservoir of the Reactor Coolant Pump Motor A was not aligned over the funne *

The insulated electrical power leads for the Reactor Coolant Pump A motor were touching the metal edge of the motor terminal box. These edges were typically protected by rubber gasketing to prevent abrasion of the wire. The inspectors did not observe any damage to the motor leads. The licensee initiated action to install an appropriate protective grommet in the motor bo * Valves 2RCP40, "2T110 Drain Valve," and 2RCP38, "2T110 Drain isolation," associated with the lube oil drainage system had damaged handles. In response to the inspectors' observation, the licensee initiated Job Requests 921939 and 921762, respectively, to fix these valve * The inspector noted two drawing discrepancies between the as-built configuration and the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram M-2233,

" Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System," Sheet 1, Revision Specifically, the drain valves below the tube oil pump cabinet did not have identification tags and were not identified on the drawing. In response to the inspectors' observation, the licensee removed these valves as part of Plant Change 96-3478P201. The drawing identified that the end cap on the drain

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line from Tank 2T110 was located inside a berm area underneath the tan However, the inspectors observed that the drain line went through the berm and the end cap was actually located outside of the berm area. In response to the inspectors' observation, the licensee initiated action to revise Piping and Instrumentation Diagram M-2233 to reflect the actualinstallatio *

The inspectors also reviewed sections of the Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report describing the reactor coolant pump lube oil system. Section 5.5.1.2

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stated, "Two 10 HP AC oil lift pumps are used to support the pump-motor shaft assembly during startup and shutdown of the pumps." The inspectors nnted that the two oil lift pumps for each reactor coolant pump motor shaft assembly were both actually driven by a 3-HP electric motor, in response to the inspectors' observations, the licensee initiated action to revise the description in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This discrepancy is a minor violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), as such it will be treated as a noncited violation (50-368/9627-02).

c. Conclusions

The Unit 1 and 2 lube oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pump motors had not been designed to collect leakage from all pressurized and unpressurized locations. As such, the as-built configuration of the lube oli collection system did not meet the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirement This is an apparent violatio .

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The licensee took adequate corrective action to resolve several minor discrepancies identified on the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps, in addition, the licensee modified and improved the lube oil collection systems and implemented several administrative controls on the use of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump B motor lube oil pump The inspectors concluded that these actions were appropriat Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Notification of Unusual Event Inspection Scope (93702)

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's emergency response to the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building, including the emergency classification of the event and the notifications made to the NRC Headquarters Operation Office Observations and Findinas On October 17,1996, the licensee declared an Unusual Event at 4:17 p.m. for a fire in the Unit 1 reactor building. In the licensee's Emergency Plan, Emergency Action Level 7.5, required a declaration of an Unusual Event if a fire anywhere on site lasted longer than 10 minutes. The inspectors found that the licensee's classification of the event was consistent with its emergency pla In reviewing the J .cumer tation for this event, the inspector and the licensee noted that Emergency Action Level 7.6 was written on the unusual event form used by j the licensee during the event. Emergency Action Level 7.6 required the declaration J of an alert if the fire could damage safety-related equipment. The inspectors ,

verified that there was no safety-related equipment that could have been damaged l by the fire and that an alert classification was not required by the licensee's Emergency Plan. The inspectors considered that the minor error was an example of j a lack of attention-to-detail in the license's documentation of its emergency response actions during the even The licensee notified state and local agencies of the fire. The following was the sequence of events and notifications made by the licensee during the fir TIME EVENT i i

4:07 Fire in reactor building reported to the control room. Fire brigade dispatche l 4:10 Fire water supply aligned into the reactor buildin j 4:17 Unusual Event declared due to fire in reactor building lasting more than 10 minute .

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4:18 Attempted to extinguish fire initially with a CO2 extinguisher, followed by a light spray of water onto fire. Reactor building evacuation announce :21 Fire under control with small flames remainin :22 Notified State of Arkansas of Unusual Even :23 Fire extinguished. Reflash watch establishe l

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4:35 Plant cooldown/depressurization initiate :45 NRC resident contacted and informed of unusual event (aoproximate).

4:50 NRC headquarters notified of fire in reactor buildin :35 Unusual Event terminated when piping temperature was below lube oil flashpoin l 6:00 NRC headquarters notified of Unusual Event termination (approximate).

Although the licensee promptly contacted the NRC to report the fire, the licensee did not inform the NRC Headquarters Operation Center that an emergency classification of an Unusual Event had been declared. The licensee later contacted the NRC to report the termination of the Unusual Event. Region IV NRC staff members were advised of the declaration of an Unusual Event by the resident f inspector The inspectors reviewed the licensee's documentation and audio recording of the telephonic notifications of the unusual event. The inspectors concluded that the a licensee had informed the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of the details of the l fire, but failed to inform the headquarters operations officer that an emergency ;

classification of an Unusual Event had been declared in accordance with their emergency plan. A transcript of the actual notification is included as Attachment I 10 CFR 50.72 (a)(1)(i) states, in part, that

"Each nuclear power reactor licensee . . . shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of the declaration of any of the Emergency Classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan." The licensee's emergency plan required a declaration of an unusual event for

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any fire within the protected area that lasts longer than l 10 minutes. Further,10 CFR 50.72 (a)(3) states that "The I licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of I the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than l

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the time the licensee declares one of the .

Emergency Classes."

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)' The failure to notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the declaration of an unusual event is

, a violation (50 313/9627-03). Conclusions '

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The licensee made the appropriate determination of the emergency classification of i

the event. A minor documentation error was identified in that the wrong emergency action level was written on the licensee's unusual event form. The licensee satisfactorily informed other offsite agencies of its declaration of an Unusual Event, l

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but failed to inform the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of this decleratio l

i 11. Maintenance

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d Conduct of Maintenance

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, M1.1 Installation of Shrouds on Reactor Coolant Pumo B Oil System

' 1 Insoection Scoce (62707)

i As immediate corrective action for the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building on '

( October 17,1996, the licensee installed shrouds on the Reactor Coolant Pump B to i control pressurized tube oilleakage and enlarged the drip trays or all the reactor

coolant pumps. The inspectors reviewed Plant Change 963478P101,which

installed the modification and observed the as-built equipment condition following j

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< l Observations and Findinos l J

The inspectors noted that the licensee's design review of the modification was thorough. The new shroud and enlarged drip trays were constructed of sheet

, metal. The licensee determined that since the added weight of the modification was less than 200 pounds, the seismic analysis was not adversely affected. The licensee determined that the metal shroud would allow air to cool the reactor

coolant pump lube oil pump motors. The metal shroud was designed to assure that i j it would not be in electrical contact with the motor i

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The inspectors walked down all four reactor coolant pumps in Unit 1 and verified ]

that the lube oil lines were adequately protected (also described in NRC Inspection i Report 50-313:368/96-06).

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At the conclusion of the inspection, the licensee was continuing to evaluate the adequacy of the modification as a long term corrective actio Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the installation of shrouds on the Reactor Coolant Pump B and addition of drip pan extensions on the other Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps brought the reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system into compliance with Appendix R.~ The licensee was continuing to evaluate the adequacy of the modification as a long-term corrective actio M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M 7.1 Rpoair of Cracked Weld on Reactor Coolant Pumo B Lube Pioe Insoection Scope (92902)

Because the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building resulted from undetected oil accumulations from earlier leakage from a cracked piping weld, the inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the identification and repair of the cracked piping weld. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's quality classification of the reactor coolant pump motor lube oil system to determine if it met the licensee's Quality Assurance Manua Observations and Findinas On October 9,1996, during a routine preventive maintenance activity on Pump P-80B (Reactor Coolant Pump B lube oil system pump), licensee electricians observed oil accumulate on the anti-contamination clothing of one of the workers when the pump was operating. The electricians noted a fine mist of oil coming out of a crack in the pump discharge piping and had the control room immediately shutdown the pump. The licensee estimated that the pump was operated for approximately 15 to 30 seconds during the maintenance activit The maintenance workers cleaned up the immediate area, but did not do a more extensive cleanup since the quantity of oil was limited. The electrician informed his supervisor, and the supervisor initiated Corrective Maintenance Job Order 00955265to fix the weld. However, the licensee did not initiate a condition report to identify the oilleakage which was observed to have accumulated on the personnel and in the immediate are During troubleshooting for the leakage, the licensee found a crack in a pipe weld in a removable 4-inch spool piece which connected the pump discharge to the lube oil piping. The licensee removed the spool piece, repaired the weld, and reinstalled the spool piece. The electrical supervisor did not initiate a condition report since this piping system was not cor <idered classified as safety-related, nor required to have any quality assurance co',: al _ _ ._ _ . _ _ _ . . . -.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _

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The inspectors reviewed Job Order 00955265 which described the as-found condition of the pipe and repaired the pipe weld. The through-wall crack was located at the center of a pipe weld and extended approximately 2/3 to 3/4 around the circumference of the pipe. The welders determined that, due to improper weld j q preparation, the weld did not have adequate weld material penetration. The '

licensee ground out the weld, rewelded the pieces, reinstalled the spool piece onto ' l

, the pump and verified that the weld did not leak when subjected to system

pressure. The licensee considered the defective weld to have been a manufacturing l defect in the original equipment supplied, j

, According to the licensee's Quality Assurance Manual, all structures, systems, or

, components at ANO were classified as either Q, F, S, or N. Plant equipment was

] classified using Procedure 6010.002,"QACAT and ENVQ Component

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Classification," as defined below:

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i O- Safety-related components that are required to ensure (1) the integrity of the

RCS pressure boundary, or (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and (3) the capability to prevent or

mitigate the consequences of potential offsite exposures from a potential

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{ F- Components that are part of control room halon suppression system, certain i

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fire dampers separating fire are boundaries, certain fire suppression systems, and certain fire detection system S- Components that are not either F or Q, but which have quality assurance )

j program requirements imposed on them. These are imposed by the NRC or l committed to by the licensee. The licensee can also impose a

] Classification S for sound business reasons.

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j N- Nonsafety-related components that do not impose quality assurance program d

requirement The inspectors noted that, according to the licensee's quality assurance program, j the lube oil system would not be classified as Q or F. To determine if the lube oil system should have been classified as S, the inspectors reviewed correspondence

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related to the reactor coolant pump lube oil system. The inspectors did not identify

any commitments made by the licensee to impose quality assurance requirements on the reactor coolant pump motor lube oil systems.

At the conclusion of this inspection, the licensee was considering, as a corrective ;

i action from the reactor coolant pump oil fire, implementing quality assurance '

! program requirements on the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems by designating those components under a Classification CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria 16, requires that significant conditions adverse to i quality be identified, corrective action documented, and corrective action reported

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The inspectors considered that the failure to identify the minor leakage I accumulation within the corrective action system was a missed opportunity to more I thoroughly investigate and identify the larger oil accumulations, which had occurred in other areas from the uncontrolled leakage. In addition, the lack of formal problem identification precluded review of the adequacy of the collection system in light of the instances of uncontrolled leakage accumulations. As such, this is the first example of an apparent violation involving the f ailure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. The additional examples are discussed in Sections F1.1 and F8.1 (50-313;/9627-04).

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l c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee appropriately identified the fixed the cracked weld. However, the licensee did not initiate a condition report since the system was classified as nonsafety-related. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program did not require the implementation of quality assurance program requirements on the reactor coolant pump motor lube oil system. Nevertheless, the inspectors concluded that the failure to identify and correct the tube oilleakage was a significant condition adverse to quality is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. As part of the licensee's corrective actions following the fire, the licensee is evaluating placing these lube oil pumps and piping under a quality assurance Category IV. Plant Support F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.1 Early Reports of Fire in the Reactor Buildino Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to early reports of indications of a fire in the Unit 1 reactor building. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel who were in the reactor building on October 17,1996, prior to the fire.

1 Observations and Findinas Several personnelinterviewed by the inspectors indicated that they had noticed a haze inside of the containment, but stated that the haze was normal for a reactor heatup after an outage. An electrical supervisor and an electrician were working in the vicinity of the location of the fire between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. They stated that they had observed oil-soaked insulation, which was smoking excessively at that time. The supervisor called a senior member of the electrical shop and reported this observation and stated his opinion that the insulation needed replacemen According to the supervisor, he was told that an engineer would be sent to look at the insulation. The electrical supervisor did not initiate a condition report for his observatio .

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The licensee determined that the electrical tapervisor's report of the smoking insulation did not reach the outage desk in this detail. The outage manager called the fire protection supervisor and requested information regarding the auto-ignition temperature of lobe oil. No report of excessive smoke or oil soaked insulation was given to the fire protection supervisor. The fire protection supervisor advised the outage manager that the auto-ignition temperature of lube oil was approximately 700 F. Since the normal metal temperature on the exterior of the steam generator at the time was approximately 430 F, the outage manager concluded that no fire hara d existed. No further followup was conducted. The fire in the insolatbn subsequently occurred at 4:07 p.m., approximately six hours after the mitial report of excessive smoking. The inspectors considered the failure to identify the observation of oil-soaked insulation and excessive smoking was a missed opportunity to take prcmpt corrective actions to prevent the fire. As such, this is the second example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" (50-313:368/9627-04), Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee missed an opportunity on the morning of the fire to identify and correct the condition. However, the licensee failed to identify and correct the condition, which resulted in the reactor building fire and failed to take corrective action. This is an apparent violatio F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2.1 Fire Protection Eauipment Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the performance of the fire protection equipment used to suppress the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building. The inspectors interviewed fire brigade personnel and visually inspected the fire protection equipment inside of the reactor building, Observations and Findinas Licensee personnel initially attempted to suppress the fire with one CO2 fire extinguisher. After the extinguisher was depleted, the fire re-ignited. The fire was subsequently extinguished using a water mist from a fire hose. All fire protection equipment functioned as designed. The inspectors observed that fire protection equipment appeared to be well maintained and in good condition. However, the inspectors noted that there were no fire detectors installed in the vicinity of the fire and that no fire detectors alarmed during the fir Conclusions Fire protection equipment functioned as required during the even l l

.+, .na, mm.,. .-.~~..w.-u a .+ w . m.a m u., n n e.w w .n a m+ - --- . --.. w w w.s a a m u m_ - ~ w ., n a u- n + w.,

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F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F Fire Briaade Response l

' Inspection Scope i-

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The inspectors evaluated fire brigade response and activities during the fire. The j inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, operating logs, and the licensee's post- fire report.

i Observations and Findinas l

i 4 The fire protection supervisor identified the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building and i remained at the scene. Two fire brigade members responded to the fire when the i alarm sounded. The fire brigade members climbed thirty feet up an installed ladder

! to fight the fire carrying a 40-pound CO2 fire extinguisher. The fire protection

} supervisor had an air sampler and told the fire brigade members that SCBAs were l not needed. The fire brigade initially tried to extinguish the fire with the fire j extinguisher, but without lasting effect. The fire brigade finally extinguished the fire

, using water from a fire hose.

i

} The inspectors noted that carrying the fire extinguisher up the ladder was a very i hazardous activity for the personnelinvolved. In addition, the fire extinguisher I could be a potential missile hazard if it had been dropped. The use of the installed j ladder was needed to reach the location of the fire inside the D ring. The inspectors i were concerned that, if the fire had gotten suddenly worse and rapidly spread, fire l brigade personnel could easily have been trapped with no easy way out. The

! license acknowledged the inspectors concern and, at the conclusion of the

inspection, was reviewing its preferred method of fighting fires inside the D ring.

!

! Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the fire brigade promptly suppressed the fire using the proper extinguishing agen F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities F Fire Protection Review of Modifications Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed several plant - ications related to equipment involved in the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building to destermine if the changes incorporated an adequate fire protection review. The inspectors reviewed the Design Change

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Package 92-1013-B, dated January 1,1995, for the reactor coolant pump changeout, Plant Change Requests 89-7026, dated December 11,1989, and 89-1684, dated December 9,1989, for the Units 1 and 2 fill line installations, respectively, and Limited Change Package 92-5005, dated March 21,1992 for the insulation changeou Backaround Each reactor coolant pump motor assembly incorporated an integral tube oil system with two high pressure " lift" oil pumps and separate oil reservoirs for its upper and lower bearings. During continuous reactor coolant pump operation, the upper reservoir bathed the thrust bearing and a upper radial bearing, while the lower

reservoir bathed the lower radial bearing. During startup and shutdown of the reactor coolant pump motor, the lift pumps were operated to inject oil into the thrust bearing to provide an oil jet to lift and lubricate the thrust bearing surface This oil jet reduced thrust bearing wear and enabled the reactor coolant pump motor to start with less curren The reactor coolant pump lube oil system had local, external level gauges and level instruments for remote indication of oil level in the oil reservoirs; fill and drain connections to replace or remove oil in the reservoirs; and lube oil coolers to cool the oil. The licensee had also installed remote fill lines into the upper reservoirs to fill the reservoirs during power operatio To control tube oil leakage and prevent a fire hazard, the system design included a lube oil collection system, which included drip pans to remove oil leakage from pressurized and unpressurized sources in the lube oil system. Shrouds were installed to direct oil spray from pressurized leakage sources into the drip pan Separate pans were provided for the upper and lower reservoirs. The drip pans drained accumulated oil to a remote tan b. Observations and findinas The licenseo had previously procured a spare reactor coolant pump motor manufactured by Jeaumont Industries. This motor was installed in Reactor Coolant Pump B in Unit 1 in March 1995 under Design Change Package 92-1013-B to replace the original motor that was manufactured by Allis Chambers. The replacement motor differed in some design features from the original motor. Unlike the Allis Chambers motor assembly, most of the high pressure piping was not enclosed in a shroud. In addition, the drip pan did not extend under the reservoir fill connection or the remote filllines (tygon tubes) which were connected to the fill connectio The inspectors noted that the design of the oil collection system for Jeaumont reactor coolant pump motor had not been identified as an unrevicwed safety question nor reviewed by the NRC as part of the design change. The oil collection systems were described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The design change did not identify the difference in the lube oil shrouding even though most of the f 15

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pressurized oil piping was outside of the shroud. Although, the design change was reviewed by the licensee's fire protection str.ff, the information provided to the fire protection engineer erroneously stated that the new motor had no external piping and eliminated the need for a shroud. This error in the description of the design change for the reactor coolant pump changeout resulted in an inadequate fire protection review and a missed opportunity to identify deficiencies in the implementation of Appendix R Section 11 The inspector noted that inadequacies in the oil collection systems of reactor coolant pump motor assemblies had been identified in Information Notice 94-58, which had been issued August 14,1994. However, the licensee did not recognize the applicability of this information to their facilit The inspectors also noted that Plant Changes 89-7026 and 89-1684, which modified the system to add remote fill lines (i.e., a Tygon tube on Unit 1 and stainless steel piping on Unit 2), did not consider the fire protection requirements for this modification to the reactor coolant pump lube oil collection syste The inspectors also reviewed Limited Change Package 92-5005, which changed the type of insulation from mirror to bat insulation. This design change appeared to have been appropriately conducted, in that the insulation was evaluated for combustibility concerns. The licensee also noted that at the time of this change, they believed that the shroud protected all of the lube oil piping. However, the

" wicking" effect of tube oilin the bat insulation was not well understood at the time and, therefore, was not considere Conclusions The design change documentation for the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump B changeout did not properly identify the full scope of the design change; therefore, the unreviewed safety question and fire protection evaluation were not properly performed. In addition, the design change for the addition of the remote fill lines did not properly address the Appendix R fire protection requirements. These failures appear tr .e the root causes of the apparent violations discussed in Section 02. of this repor F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Activities F8.1 Fire Damaae Evaluation Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the damage caused by the fire

{ in the Unit 1 reactor building. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel,

! observed fire damage, observed photographs, and reviewed engineering analysis to l evaluate the licensee's post fire evaluations.

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The inspectors reviewed prior events which may have allowed earlier identification of the condition which resulted in the fire.

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b. Observations end findinas

The inspectors observed that the fire damage was limited to the oil soaked 4 insulation on the steam generator adjacent and below Reactor Coolant Pump B. The licensee concluded that the fire did not damage the metal structure of the steam generator. The licensee promptly removed and replaced the fire damaged

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insulation.

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The inspectors reviewed the fire reoort for two fires in 1993 in the turbine building involving oil accumulations on insulation. The condition report concluded that the l

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fire was caused by the paper backed insulation insttilled in the turbine building. The '

insoectors did not consider that the lessons-learned from the 1993 turbine building

fires could have prevented the 1996 fire in the Unit I reactor buildin However, during personnel interviews, the inspectors; identified a missed j opportunity to identify the tube oilleakage and the inadequate collection system.

! The licensee personnelindicated that lube oil had been found on the floor of the i i

Unit 1 reactor building at various times throughout the recent outage by radiation protection personnel. They had attempted to find the leakage source, but faile No condition report was written or other formal problem identification was initiated

, based on the observations of the personnel at that time. Without adequate problem identification, more thorough investigation and corrective actions were not taken to identify the source of the oil leak inside of the reactor building. This is the third i example of an apparent violation involving the f ailure to identify and correct a

. significant condition adverse to quality (50-313:368/S)627-04). Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee took apprcpriate action to identify and i

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repair damage caused by the fire in the Unit 1 reactor building. The inspectors concluded that previous turbine building fires did not appear to be precursor events to the October 17 fire in the reactor building. The failure to identify and take prompt corrective action for repeated oilleakage observed by radiation protection

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personnel during the outage was another example of a missed opportunity to prevent the containment fir V. Manaaement Meetinas J

X1 Exit Meeting Summary A

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5,19tl6, and during a conference call conducted December 11,1996. The finalinspecticn results were also discussed with Mr. Dwight Mims on February 3,1997. The licensee acknowledged

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I acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not identify as proprietary

any of the information presented to the inspectors during the inspection.

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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

+ D. Bauman, Supervisor, Minor Mods

• C. Anderson, Unit 2 Plant Manager

• + M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist

+ B. Day, Manager, Engineering Support

"R. Edington, General Manager

• R. Fuller, Unit 1 Operations Manager

+ B. Gordon, Supervisor, System Engineering

• B. Greeson, Unit 1 Systems Engineering Supervisor

• M. Harris, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager

• + R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering

+ C. Little, Design Engineering, Unit 2 Coordinator

• + D. Lomax, Manager, Engineering Programs

• J. McWilliams, Modification Manager

• + D. Mims, Licensing Director

+ T. Mitchell, Unit 2 System Engineering Manager

• + R. Rispoli, Senior Lead Fire Protection Engineer

+ T. Robinson, Fire Protection Engineer

+ M. Smith, Supervisor, Licensing

+ C. Turk, Manager, Mechanical, Civil, and Structural

+ C. Tyrone, Design Engineering, Unit 1 Coordinator

• D. Wagner, Quality Assurance Supervisor

+ G. Worner, Supervisor, Design Engineering

• C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Plant Manager NRC

• K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector

• C. Vandenburg, Engineering Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Safety

• Exit meeting, November 5,1996

+ Exit meeting (via telephone), December 11,1996, discussing findings on unit 2 RCP LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors IP 64704 Fire Protection Program IP 62707 Maintenance IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance

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'I LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-313:368/9627-01 APV Inadequate tube oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps in Unit 1 and 2 (Section 02.1).

50-368/9627-02 NCV Minor descrepancy in FSAR concerning the size of the oil lift pump electric resitor (O2.2).

50-313/9627-02 VIO Failure to notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the declaration of an unusual event (Section 04.1).

50-313/9627-03 APV Three examples of the failure to identify and take prompt corrective action for lube oil leakage (Section F1.1).

Closed 50-368/9627-02 NCV Minor descrepancy in FSAR concerning the size of the oil lift pump electric resitor (O2.2).

4 ATTACHMENT 2 l l

Transcript of Teleahonic Notifications REPORT OF EVENT STEVE BONNER (ANO UNIT 1 FIRE)

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i ATTACHMENT 2 l Transcriot of Telechonic Notifications I

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REPORT OF EVENT I STEVE BONNER (ANO UNIT 1 FIRE)

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l~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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Title

REPORT OF E\(ENT l

! STEVE BONNER sai !

j (ANO UNIT 1 FIRE) [niR1uiU2 :

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Docket Number: EVENT NO. (31,173)

Location: RUSSELLVILLE, lA

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Date: OCTOBER 17,1996 Work Order No.: NRC-907 Pages 1-16

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NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., IN Court Reporters and Transcribers 1313 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20005

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(202) 234-4433

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA l

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l REPORT OF EVENT -l Event No.

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l STEVE BONNER l l l l

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(ANO UNIT 1 FIRE) l I

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Thursday l'

October 17, 1996

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Via Telephone Cal)

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The above-entitled interview was conducted at

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49 BEFORE:

JOHN MACKINNON

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NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

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! 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 5:49 MR. MACKINNON: -- NRC (inaudible)~ John l

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4 Mackinnon speaking.

, 5 MR. BONNER: Ye This is Steve Bonner at

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l 6 Arkansas Nuclear Could I have your name again?

7 MR. MACKINNON: Just hang o I just got

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! 8 another event her MR. BONNER: Oka MR. MACKINNON: One from Nine Mile, and one 11 from Texas A& Oka Which unit is this for?

13 MR. BONNER: Arkansas Nuclear 1, Unit MR. MACKINNON: Your name again, pleas MR. BONNER: Steve Bonne B-O-N-N-E- MR. MACKINNON: What time did the event occur?

17 MR. BONNER: Pardon?

18 MR. MACKINNON: What time did the event occur?

19 MR. BONNER: 160 MR. MACKINNON: Central daylight time?

21 MR. BONNER: Central daylight savings tim (es, si MR. MACKINNON: Today's date is?

24 MR. BONNER: 10-17.

I 25 MR. MACKINNON: What power were you at before (

I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS .

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1 and after? J l 2 MR. BONNER: Pardon? '

3 MR. MACKINNON: What power before and after? l

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4 MR. BONNER: What power level were we at when j 5 (inaudible)

6 Start-up.

l 7 MR. MACKINNON: Start-u Like one percent l

l 8 power or --

9 MR. BONNER: Less than one percen MR. MACKINNON: You were critica Right?

11 MR. BONNER: Critical? No, we weren't i

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12 critica ,

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._... 13 MR. MACKINNON: Oka Start-u Not critica ~

14 Oka What is it, four or one hour call?

i 15 MR. BONNER: One hour reportabl I 16 MR. MACKINNON: Under which paragraph number,

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17 please? '

18 MR. BONNER: Oka It is going to be 10 CFR i

19 50.72 (b) (1) (4) .

20 MR. MACKINNON: (b)1 --

21 MR. BONNER: Excuse m (b) (1) (6) .

22 MR. MACKINNON: Outside notification?

23 MR. BONNER: We had an outside notification to 24 ;he Arkansas Department of Health, and we're under one hour

! 25 report because we've had a fire inside our containment NEAL R. GROSS COURT 74EPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C, 20005 (202) 234-4433 I

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i 2 MR. MACKINNON: You said it was one hour call?

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+ MR. BONNER: Yes, sir.

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l 4 And sir, what is your name again?

F 5 MR. MACKINNON: Mackinnon spelled M-A-C -- l i

l 6 MR. BONNER: M-A-C --

l l 7 MR. MACKINNON: K-I-N-N-0-N.

I 8 MR. BONNER: N-N-O- And your first name, 9 sir?

10 MR. MACKINNON: Joh MR. BONNER: Don?

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12 MR. MACKINNON: Ye You want to give me an i

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13 event description, please.

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14 MR. BONNER: Event descriptio At 1607 our l

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15 time we had a fire reported in our containment buildin MR. MACKINNON: Fire reported.

l l 17 MR. BONNER: It was some insulation had caught

18 fir MR. MACKINNON: Containment buildin And i 20 shere is the insulation located in the containment 21 ouilding?

l 22 MR. BONNER: It is within our D ring near our 23 aravo reactor coolant pump.

I 24 MR. MACKINNON: D ring near the B reactor

[ 25 coolant pum What caused it to catch on fire?

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1 MR. BONNER: Cause of fire, there was oil on 2 insulatio MR. MACKINNON: Oil on insulatio MR. BONNER: We had oil on the insulation and 5 it ignite MR. MACKINNON: Oil on insulatio MR. BONNER: We were warming up and it ignite MR. MACKINNON: You were warming up reactor 9 coolant pump Right?

10 MR. BONNER: Ye The bravo reactor coolant 11 pump was runnin MR. MACKINNON: Oka Now, okay, go ahea MR. BONNER: Fire has been containe MR. MACKINNON: How long did that fire burn?

15 MR. BONNER: Well, when did we put the fire 16 out? Hang on a secon It was approximately 15 minutes, 17 out we'll get you an exact time here in just a momen was when the fire was ou MR. MACKINNON: Fire burned approximately --

20 MR. BONNER: 1607 to 162 MR. MACKINNON: Fire was extinguished at 162 Oka And it started at 160 Oka What did you use to 23 aut it out with? Did you use CO2 or haylon (phonetic sp.)

24 or what?

25 MR. BONNER: Fire extinguisher Did we ever NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

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1 run fire water on it? Yes, si We used fire l.

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2 extinguishers, CO 2 fire extinguishers, and then we put a

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3 small amount, a misting amount of fire water on the fir i 4 MR. MACKINNON: So far they're oka Did it 5 cause any chlorine problems at all?

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6 MR. BONNER: No, si MR. MACKINNON: -- lagging?

8 MR. BONNER: N No chlorine problems from the 9 lagging.

l 10 MR. MACKINNON: Did you have to evacuate people 11 from containment?

12 MR. BONNER: We did evacuate containment l

L .. 13 except, of course, for the fire brigad ~

14 MR. MACKINNON: Now, except the fire brigad l 15 All right?

16 MR. BONNER: Yes, si MR. MACKINNON: Anybody hurt or injured?

18 MR. BONNER: No injurie MR. MACKINNON: No injurie Oka Anybody 20 avercome by smoke or flame?

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21 MR. BONNER: No, si N We had people l 22 ceport, sent in the fire brigade, they contained the fire, I l 23 To injuries, nobody was overcome with smoke or flame.

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24 MR. MACKINNON: And you said this was how close

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25 to the -- did it do any damage to the reactor coolant pump

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1 or anything like that or any damage? Did the fire cause l

2 any damage at all?

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l 3 MR. BONNER: No damage to the reactor coolant  !

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4 pum It was in the D ring with the reactor coolant pump l 5 but did no damage to the reactor coolant pump or anythin MR. MACKINNON: I'm taking on another cal Just hang o MR. BONNER: Oka MR. MACKINNON: USNRC (inaudib,le) John 10 Mackinnon speakin ~MR . CHAFEY: Hi, Joh It's Al Chafey 12 (phonetic sp.) I'm leaving for the da MR. MACKINNON: Oka j i

14 MR. CHAFEY: So I'll see you guys some time 15 tomorro MR. MACKINNON: I just got notifie I'm 17 balking to A&O (phonetic sp.) right no They had a fire 18 in containmen MR. CHAFEY: Oh, really?

20 MR. MACKINNON: It lasted from 1607 to 1623 21 near the D ring of reactor coolant pump brav I'm talking 22 to him right now about i Nobody injured, nobody hur They put the fire out using CO2 and a little bit of misting 24 ' eate They said there'll be no chlorine affected from the 25 ' eater and that's as far as it's gone so far talking to him.

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l 8 1 MR. CHAFEY: Were they at power when it

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j 2 happened?

3 MR. MACKINNON: No, no, no, n They weren't

. 1 4 critica They were just st a ,ing up, but they were not l 5 critica MR. CHAFEY: Did they declare UE (phonetic

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8 MR. MACKINNON: N It's a one hour

I 9 nonreportabl MR. CHAFEY: Oka MR. MACKINNON: All righ I just wanted you 12 to know about it.

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I 13 MR. CHAFEY: Oka Thank I appreciate i MR. MACKINNON: By MR. CHAFEY: By MR. MACKINNON: Sorry for the hold ther MR. BONNER: No proble MR. MACKINNON: No damage to reactor coolant 19 pump brav Right?

20 MR. BONNER: No, si No damage to the B 21 ceactor coolant pump or any other equipment other than 22 lagging insulation burnin MR. MACKINNON: When you say you were starting 24 'ap, were you at --

25 MR. BONNER: We were in a refueling outage i

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N j WASHINGTON, O C. 20005 (202) 2344433 !

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1 coming out of a refueling outag MR. MACKINNON: You were at NOP NOT?

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3 MR. BONNER: We're not quite up to normal l

4 pres ure and normal temperatur Right?

. 5 We're not at NOP or NO Presently we're at l 6 433' and 972 psi.

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l 7 MR. MACKINNON: What's the NOT for your plant?

8 MR. BONNER: NOT is about what? Five? Five .

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9 seventy nine is NO I j 10 MR. MACKINNON: Oka MR. BONNER: I'm the communicator from the 4 12 other uni l

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13 MR. MACKINNON: You said just some lagging is 14 burn MR. BONNER: Ye MR. MACKINNON: How large an area are we 17 talking about? Several square feet of lagging?

18 MR. BONNER: Approximately 8' of pip MR. MACKINNON: What type of piping are we 20 talking about? 30" piping?

21 MR. BONNER: Hang on, si I'm getting that 22 information right no Haven't really -- 8" is what we're estimatin 'iaven't got the line class actually nailed down at this 25 :nomen .

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d 1 MR. MACKINNON: Approximately an 8" diameter 2 pipin MR. BONNER: Yes, si MR. MACKINNON: And about 8" of this lagging 5 burnt?

6 MR. BONNER: Yes, si MR. MACKINNON: Oka Evacuate Oka What i 8 state agencies did you have to notify?

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9 MR. BONNER: We notified the Arkansas 10 Department of Healt MR. MACKINNON: Arkansas Department -- l 12 MR. BONNER: And our surrounding countie MR. MACKINNON: Surrounding countie Oka .

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14 All righ l 15 MR. BONNER: And so far that's been all we've

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16 contacte MR. MACKINNON: What does D ring mean? What 18 are you talking about?

19 MR. BONNER: D ring is like it's the 20 environmental, you know, we're a PWR and they have a 21 :oncrete cavity where the pumps -- the steam generators are  !

22 ceactor coolant pumps are located inside the cavities.

23 MR. MACKINNON

Oka MR. BONNER: They're in a D shape and then we

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4 1 MR. MACKINNON: Oka So this is a concrete

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2 cavity surrounding the reactor coolant pum MR. BONNER: That's correct, si It was 4 within that cavit MR. MACKINNON: Concrete cavity surrounding )

6 reactor coolant pump brav Oka It was on the other 7 side of it or the inside of it?

i 8 MR. BONNER: The fire was inside the D rin MR. MACKINNON: Oka Insid Oka And 10 there's no oil from this reactor coolant pump or anything i I

l 11 like that on the ground that could also catch on fire.

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l 12 Right?

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13 MR. BONNER: No, si ),

14 MR. MACKINNON: Do you have a fire watch there l 15 now?

16 MR. BONNER: Yes, si We're rotating fire 17 aatches no Looking for reflash and we'll be removing  ;

18 insulation as soon as it cools down a little bi MR. MACKINNON: Do you know where this oil came 20 from?  ;

21 MR. BONNER: Do we have a clue on what the 22 source of the oil was?

23 The theory so far is that it is oil spilled 24 <iuring maintenance during outag We can't be sur We

. 25 ilon't know at this tim We just started our I -.

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1 investigation.

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Oil spilled during maintenance, e

3 MR. BONNER: That's our first guess.

l 4 MR. MACKINNON: Do you know where you -- before 5 -- I worked at power plant Before we started up stuff, l 6 we do a complete walk down of containment to make sure that i

i 7 there is no oil or trash and stuff like this on the floor,

8 lagging, stuff like thi Do you do a walk through?

9 MR. BONNER: Oh, yes, si We had a

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j 10 (inaudible) performance, several walk downs.

j 11 MR. MACKINNON: Walk down of containment had

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l 12 been performed before heat u Right?

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13 MR. BONNER: That's correc What our present 14 plan is is we are going to cold shut down for reactor

t 15 building ventilation, clear the air, and to remove the i

l 16 logging that was burne MR. MACKINNON: Going to cold shut down, then

[ 18 going to ventilate containmen Right?

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19 MR. BONNER

Yes, sir.

I 20 MR. MACKINNON: Are you doing that now, I

] 21 assume?

22 MR. BONNER: WE're in the process of going to 23 ::old shut down at this time.

l 24 MR. MACKINNON: And then after you've reached 25 :old shut down, you're going to ventilat NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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e 1 MR. BONNER: That's correc MR. MACKINNON: And then repair laggin Right?

4 MR. BONNER: Yes, si MR. MACKINNON: Any news media?

6 MR. BONNER: N We haven't contacted any news 7. media ye MR. MACKINNON: There's no news media interest 9 right no Right?

10 MR. BONNER: None that I'm aware o Of 11 course, there'll probably get some interest later on after 12 the ADH talks to somebody, I'm sur But, you know --

13 MR. MACKINNON: Oka I understan MR. BONNER: The guys at the plant are not 15 calling the news right no MR. MACKINNON: Oka Anything else unusual 17 occur besides what you just told me?

18 MR. BONNER: No, si No, si The 19 significant event is that we had a fire on some insulation 20 in our containment building which we contained within 15 21 ninute MR. MACKINNON: Do you know how high the flames 23 got at all? The reason I ask these questions, people are 24 going to ask me when I call u So that's the only reason 25 ['m askin . . -

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, 1 MR. BONNER: Did we have any reports on high

2 the flames were?

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3 The reports that we got from the people who

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4 were on site was the height of the flame was only like 24" t

i 5 or so.

i f 6 MR. MACKINNON: The highest was about 24".

7 MR. BONNER: Yes, sir.

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8 MR. MACKINNON

And resident, has he been j

l 9 notified?-

! 10 MR. BONNER: Have we talked to the resident?

l 11 We've beeped them and we've left voice mail on

.12 their answering machine, but we haven't talked to them yet, i

13 MR. MACKINNON: So you notified Arkansas 14 Department of Health. MR. BONNER: Yes, sir.

i" i 16 MR. MACKINNON: -- count Any other

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17 government agencies?

f i 18 MR. BONNER: Any other government agencies?

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19 3nly yo ;

20 MR. MACKINNON

Oka And news media mayb !

21 MR. BONNER: N We have not contacted the i

22 nedi I i

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23 MR. MACKINNON: I know but probably will I

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24 eventuall l

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j 25 MR. BONNER: Ye I'm sure Arkansas Department

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1 of Health will probably handle that for us.

4 2 MR. MACKINNON: Oka Did everything else 3 function as required at your plant?

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4 MR. BONNER: Yes, sir.

1 5 MR. MACKINNON: Everything is workin So all 6 your other emergency systems, everything else working fine, 7 no wires burned, nothing like tha MR. BONNER: That's correc No other damage 9 to any other equipmen MR. MACKINNON: And when you get the lagging 11 off, you're going to look at the piping real carefull MR. BONNER: Yes, si MR. MACKINNON: Oka I've (inaudible) call 14 at 1749 eastern tim The event number that will be 15 assigned to this will be 31,17 That's three one one 16 seven thre MR. BONNER: Three one one seven thre MR. MACKINNON: Righ MR. BONNER: What time did you have me calling?

20 MR. MACKINNON: 1749 eastern tim MR. BONNER: Oka MR. MACKINNON: Anything else, Steve?

23 MR. BONNER: No, si Nothing to repor MR. MACKINNON: All righ Good luck and get 25 everything fixe I'm glad nobody was injured or hurt by l

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o 1 thi l 2 MR. BONNER: Thank you, Do l

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3 MR. MACKINNON: By (End of report)

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CERTIFICATE

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This is to certify that the attached i

proceedings before the United States Nuclear 1 il l Regulatory Commission in the matter of: I l

l

Name of Proceeding: REPORT OF EVENT STEVE BONNER f-l (ANO UNIT 1 FIRE)

I I

[1

Docket Number: EVENT NO. (31,173)

(

Q j Place of Proceeding: VIA TELEPHONE CALL i

i ,

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original l

transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear

'

Regulatory Commission transcribed by me from recorded tapes i i a  :

provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and that the 1

l transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing i

j proceedings to the best of my belief and ability.

i bl/ 0 /

f

$DYH[iber Transcr LEY #

[

Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc.

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i NEAL R. GROSS couRr REPORTERS AND TRANSCNBERS

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