IR 05000285/2006002
| ML061350446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/2006 |
| From: | Graves D NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Ridenoure R Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| IR-06-002 | |
| Download: ML061350446 (18) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FORT CALHOUN STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000285/2006002
Dear Mr. Ridenoure:
On March 31, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Fort Calhoun Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 6, 2006, with Mr. David Bannister, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David N. Graves, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects
Omaha Public Power District -2-Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2006002 w/attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40 Report: 05000285/2006002 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 399, Highway 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2006 Inspectors: J. Hanna, Senior Resident Inspector L. Willoughby, Resident Inspector J. Kirkland, Project Engineer, Project Branch E Approved By: David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000285/2006002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; Fort Calhoun Station, Routine Integrated
Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a project engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified
Licensee-Identified Violations
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The unit began this inspection period in Mode 1 at full rated thermal power and operated at 100 percent until the end of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignments
1. Partial Equipment Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns (three inspection samples) of the following trains of equipment during outages, operation, or testing of redundant trains. The inspectors verified that the following systems were properly aligned in accordance with system piping and instrumentation drawings and plant procedures:
- Diesel Generator 2 Fuel Oil system while Diesel Generator 1 was out of service
- Diesel Generator 1 Starting Air system while Diesel Generator 2 was out of service
- Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater train while the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was out of service
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Complete Equipment Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the containment spray system (one inspection sample). The inspectors reviewed open work orders and condition reports (CR) associated with the system. The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the system. During the walkdown, inspectors verified that the system was properly aligned in accordance with piping and instrumentation Drawing E-23866-210-130, Safety Injection & Containment Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 85 and Procedure OI-CS-1, Containment Spray Normal Operation," Revision 22.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Routine Fire Inspection Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed routine fire inspection tours (six inspection samples) and reviewed relevant records for plant areas important to reactor safety. The inspectors observed the material condition of plant fire protection equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the operational status of barriers. The inspectors compared in-plant observations with commitments in the licensees Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Report. The following fire areas were inspected:
- Fire Area 6.5 - Shut-down Heat Exchanger Area II (Room 15)
- Fire Area 6.6 - Shut-down Heat Exchanger Area II (Room 14)
- Fire Area 20.1 - Personnel Air Lock Door Area (Room 58)
- Fire Area 31 - Intake Structure
- Fire Areas 37 and 38 - Battery Rooms (Rooms 54 and 55)
- Fire Area 36A - East Switchgear Room (Room 56E)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Summary Notebook for internal flooding events. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the AC-4B shut-down cooling heat exchanger to verify that equipment was not subject to damage as a result of internal flooding (one inspection sample). The inspectors reviewed the internal flooding analysis that demonstrated safety-related equipment in other rooms were not vulnerable to this internal flooding.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the performance of Shut-down Cooling Water Heat Exchangers (one inspection sample). Test acceptance criteria and results were reviewed to ensure differences between testing conditions and design conditions were correctly addressed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the test results against the pre-established engineered acceptance criteria in licensee procedure PED-SEI-16, Evaluation of Heat Exchanger Performance, Revision 8.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed one quarterly licensed operator requalification observation.
On March 17, 2006, the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification training activities, including the licensed operators performance and the evaluators critique (one inspection sample). The inspectors compared performance in the simulator with performance observed in the control room during this inspection period. The focus of the inspection was on high-risk licensed operator actions, operator activities associated with the emergency plan, and previous lessons-learned items. These items were evaluated to ensure that operator performance was consistent with protection of the reactor core during postulated accidents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) to verify that they had conducted appropriate evaluations of equipment functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, the unplanned capacity loss factor, and system unavailability. The inspectors discussed the evaluations with the licensee personnel. The following maintenance rule items (two inspection samples) were reviewed:
- Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-54
- Scoping of the Potable Water System into the Maintenance Rule
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed risk assessments by the licensee (four inspection samples) for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensees effectiveness in assessing risk for these activities. The inspectors compared the licensees risk assessment and risk management activities against requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). The inspectors discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. The inspectors verified that plant personnel were aware of the appropriate licensee-established risk category, according to the risk assessment results and licensee program procedures. The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of risk assessment and risk management for the following activities:
- On February 1, Diesel Generator 2 out-of-service for monthly run, clean and inspect CW-6A Bearing Water Cooler, clean and inspect FW-3 Condensate Cooler, repair steam leak on Main Feedwater Pump FW-4B, Low Pressure Safety Injection system inoperable due to void alarm, and Installation of the Low Pressure Safety Injection Jockey Pump SI-18
- On February 15, Diesel Generator 1 Damper YCV-871E inspection, Diesel Generator 1 out-of-service for monthly run, Boric Acid Pump to Charging Pump Isolation Valve HCV-268 stem inspection, Hydrogen Analyzer VA-81A quarterly calibration, Screen Wash Strainer CW-7A replacement, and "E" Traveling Screen repair
- On March 1, Diesel Generator 2 out-of-service for monthly run, repair of FW-4A Feedwater Pump, replace AC-6 Spent Fuel Pool Filter
- On March 9 Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump out-of-service for suction strainer inspection, inspection of CA-1C Air Compressor
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
.1 Routine Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations (three inspection samples) to verify that the evaluations provided adequate justification that the affected equipment could still meet its Technical Specification (TS), Updated Safety Analysis Report, and design bases requirements. The inspectors also discussed the evaluations with cognizant licensee personnel. The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations and cause assessments for the following:
- Containment Spray Pump SI-3B Bearing Cooler CCW Outlet Flow Controller, flow switch sticking after re-establishing component cooling water flow (CRs 200600994 and 200601001)
- Potential water hammer events on Low Pressure Safety Injection System in excess of analyzed stresses during design basis accidents (CR 200600860)
- Effects of loose parts within the Component Cooling Water system (CR 200600304)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Inoperable Backup Instrument Air (IA) to Condensate Makeup Control Valve
a. Inspection Scope
Introduction.
The inspectors reviewed an Unresolved Item (URI 05000285/2005004-01)associated with the unintended unavailability of the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump (FW-54) due to the backup source of IA to the main condenser makeup Valve LCV-1190 being nonfunctional. This issue was determined to be a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance.
Description.
On May 14, 2005, while the plant was shut-down during a refueling outage, the licensee identified that the four nitrogen cylinders that provided a backup source of IA to the main condenser makeup Valve LCV-1190 were depressurized. These cylinders ensured that Valve LCV-1190, which fails open on a loss of instrument air (LOIA), would remain closed for up to four hours to prevent the condensate storage tank from draining to the condenser hotwell. This would provide operators time to manually isolate Valve LCV-1190 during a LOIA and ensure the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump FW-54 has a source of water. Pump FW-54 is a non-safety related component that has no associated TS but is risk-important because it provides a redundant supply of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators. In addition, Pump FW-54 can also provide makeup water to the emergency feedwater storage tank from the
condensate storage tank. The licensee had credited the pump in their plant risk model and considered the pump to have a high-risk significance function per 10 CFR 50.65.
Work Request 82847 was written on May 14 noting that the cylinders were depressurized. On May 27, the cylinders were again noted to be empty and Work Request 83298 was written to address the issue. On June 5, 12, 19, and 26, equipment operators documented, in the turbine building logs, that the cylinders were reading zero psig. The minimum acceptable pressure noted on the log sheet was 1025 psig.
Although, following the June 5 log reading, the equipment operator referenced that a work request had been initiated on May 14, no actions were taken to ensure that the cylinders were replaced until a shift manager recognized the potential significance of the depressurized cylinders on June 28 and initiated CR 200503231.
The licensee performed a root cause analysis and determined that during the Spring 2005 refueling outage the four nitrogen cylinders had become depressurized during a planned replacement of the main condenser tubes. Prior to June 28, 2005, equipment operators had noted (on June 5, 12, 19, and 26), in the turbine-building Log FC-78, that the nitrogen cylinder pressure was indicating zero psig with a minimum acceptable pressure of 1025 psig. However, following each of those instances of logging zero psig, the equipment operator failed to write a CR to document the equipment deficiency. Additionally, the shift manager reviewed and failed to act on the deficient condition noted in the logs recorded on June 5, 12, 19, and 26, 2005. The failure to identify the issue during these reviews indicated that the log review process, which was designed to identify degraded equipment conditions and adverse trends, was not properly implemented in this case.
Standing Order SO-R-2, Condition Reporting and Corrective Action, Revision 30, 7.1 Guidelines for Identification of Conditions to be Reported, provided that equipment, material, or components available for operation in the plant that are determined to be, or may potentially be, nonconforming should be reported via the condition reporting system. The licensees failure to document in the corrective action system, or properly evaluate the significance of the as-found depressurized condition of the nitrogen cylinders is considered to be a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensees ability to identify and prevent from occurring. The inspectors considered the finding to be greater than minor because the condition impacted the reliability and availability of Pump FW-54 to mitigate the consequences of a loss of IA and loss of offsite power events.
Analysis.
The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Phase 1 of the significance determination process, the inspectors determined that the finding represented an actual loss of safety function during a loss of IA or loss of offsite power of one or more of the non-technical specification trains or equipment designated as risk-significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Consequently, a Phase 2 evaluation was required.
The inspectors used the Fort Calhoun site-specific worksheets and Phase 2 of the significance determination process and evaluated the risk-significance of the finding as
potentially greater than Green. As a result, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by Regional Senior Risk Analysts, which concluded that the risk-significance was very low (Green). The best estimate change in core damage frequency was 6 x 10-7 representing the risk related to internal initiators and internal fires. The change in risk related to other external events as well as the change in large-early release frequency were determined to provide only negligible increase in risk.
Enforcement.
The inspectors determined that Valve LCV-1190 and Pump FW-54 were not safety-related and were not required per TS. Therefore, no violation of regulatory requirements (e.g., TSs or failure to identify a Condition Adverse to Quality) was identified. Additionally, the issue was identified, documented, and corrected by the licensee. However, the licensees failure to follow their procedures for reporting and correcting conditions was determined to be a performance deficiency. This issue was originally documented as Unresolved Item 05000285/2005004-01, Inoperable Backup Instrument Air to Condensate Makeup Control Valve and is being closed as a licensee-identified finding, which will not be included in the Plant Issues Matrix per NRC policy.
This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 200503231.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change 36972 and the associated 10 CFR Part 50.59 screen and safety evaluation that installed the Low Pressure Safety Injection Jockey Pump (one inspection sample). The inspectors performed a walkdown of the installed equipment. The inspectors discussed the modification with operations and engineering. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the following postmaintenance tests to verify that the test procedures adequately demonstrated system operability (five inspection samples). The inspectors also verified that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work performed and that the acceptance criteria were clear and consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The following activities were included in the scope of this inspection:
- Work Order 00215469 - Clean and Inspect FW-57, Startup Aux Feedwater Pump Suction Strainer
- Work Order 00232732-01 - Replace the XSS Control Switch for CA-1C, Air Compressor C
- Work Order 00228218-01 - Inspect Cylinder Internals and Clean Filter/Strainer on CA-1C, Air Compressor C
- Work Order 220530 - Replacement of Valve HCV-2851
- Work Order 209388 - Repair of Component IA-DPT-1039-B1
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the performance and documentation for the following surveillance tests (five inspection samples) to verify that the structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their intended safety functions and to assess operational readiness:
- OP-ST-ESF-0009, Channel A Safety Injection, Containment Spray and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test, Revision 45
- OP-ST-SI-3022, Room 22 Safety Injection/Containment Spray Pumps and Valve Exercise In Service Test, Revision 3
- OP-ST-CCW-3001A, Component Cooling Category B Valve Exercise Test, Revision 8
- IC-CP-01-0381, Calibration of Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) Level, Loop L-381, Revision 7
- OP-ST-DG-0001, Diesel Generator 1 Check, Revision 50
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification EC 38046 for installing a voltage recorder in the control room operating panels to monitor letdown flow oscillations and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening (one inspection sample). The inspectors
verified the modification had no effect on system operability or availability. The inspectors reviewed the postinstallation test results to confirm that the test was satisfactory and that there was no adverse impact of the temporary modification on the permanent system.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On March 7, 2006, the inspectors observed aspects of the emergency preparedness drill from the simulator and the technical support center (one inspection sample). The purpose of the observation was to evaluate operator performance, licensee event classification, notification of state and local authorities, and the adequacy of protective action recommendations. The inspectors attended the licensees post-drill critiques and discussed the observations with licensee management.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
The inspectors sampled submittals for the performance indicators listed below for the period January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2005. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear Engineering Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revisions 3, were used to verify the licensees basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period.
- IE1 Unplanned Scrams
- IE2 Scrams With a Loss of Normal Heat Removal
- IE3 Unplanned Power Changes
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors chose one issue (one inspection sample) for a more in-depth review to verify that the licensee personnel had taken corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue. On March 6, 2006, concentrated boric acid Tank A level registered an incorrect elevated condition (CR 200600921). The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with this condition. When evaluating the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions, the following attributes were considered:
- Complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its significance and ease of discovery
- Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- Consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- Classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with its safety significance
- Identification of corrective actions which are appropriately focused to correct the problem
- Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 6, 2005, the resident inspectors presented the results of the quarterly inspection effort to Mr. D. Bannister, Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was examined during the inspection period.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
A licensee-identified violation is discussed in Section 1R15.2.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Bannister, Plant Manager
- M. Core, Manager System Engineering
- P. DeAngelis, Radiation Protection
- T. Dukarski, Chemistry
- H. Faulhaber, Division Manager, Nuclear Engineering
S. Gerbers Corporate Health Physicis
- D. Guinn, Licensing Engineering
- D. Lakin, Corrective Action Group Management
- J. McManis, Manager Licensing
- T. Nellenbach, Operations
- D. Spires, Work Management
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000285/2005004-01 URI Inoperable Backup Instrument Air to Condensate Makeup Control Valve. (Section 1R15.2)