IR 05000285/2006017
| ML062410221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/2006 |
| From: | Spitzberg D NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/FCDB |
| To: | Ridenoure R Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| IR-06-003, IR-06-017 | |
| Download: ML062410221 (23) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C O M M I S S I O N ust 28, 2006
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION REPORT 050-00285/06-017~072-00054/06-003
Dear Mr. Ridenoure:
An NRC inspection was conducted at your Fort Calhoun Station on July 23-29, 2006. The purpose of the inspection was to verify your first dry fuel storage loading campaign was performed safely and within the requirements of the Transnuclear Certificate of Compliance and the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities granted by the NRC.
The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection, which were discussed with members of your staff during the exit meeting held on July 29, 2006. The inspection found that your first dry fuel storage loading campaign was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Transnuclear Certificate of Compliance, the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities, and NRC regulations. No violations were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at (817) 860-8191 or Mr. Scott Atwater at (817) 860-8286.
SincereIy ,
D. Blair Spitzbe;g, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Docket Nos.: 50-285 72-054 License No.: DPR-40
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 050-00285/06-017~072-00054/06-003
Omaha Public Power District -2-
REGION IV==
Docket Nos.: 050-00285; 072-00054 License: DPR-40 Report No: 050-00285/06-017~072-00054/06-003 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Dates: July 23-29, 2006 Inspectors: S. P Atwater, Health Physicist, Region IVIDNMS J. D. Hanna, Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station L. M. Willoughby, Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station Approved By: D.B. Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Attachments: 1. Supplemental Information 2. Technical Specification Compliance Matrix 3. Inspector Notes
-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 050-00285/06-017; 072-00054/06-003 Inspections conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the Fort Calhoun Station dry fuel storage project over the past 7 months provided a comprehensive evaluation of the licensees compliance with the requirements contained in the Transnuclear Certificate of Compliance, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities, and 10 CFR Part 72.
The licensee met the requirements for loading and operating an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) by integrating the ISFSI programmatic requirements into the Fort Calhoun Station 10 CFR Part 50 programs, incorporating the technical specifications into the ISFSI operating and maintenance procedures and by conducting extensive pre-operational testing of the ISFSI equipment and systems. A summary of the Technical Specifications contained in the Transnuclear Certificate of Compliance and the NRC inspection report documenting licensee compliance with them is provided in Attachment 2 to this report.
On July 23-29, 2006, the NRC observed Fort Calhouns first loading of spent fuel into dry storage. Risk significant activities such as fuel movement, remote handling of heavy loads, and initial radiation surveys were observed. The following provides a summary of the inspection results: (Details of the inspection are provided in Attachment 3 to this report.)
The licensee selected spent fuel assemblies meeting the criteria of the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities. The identity of each spent fuel assembly was confirmed prior to insertion into the canister. Each fuel assembly was loaded under an approved loading plan and was verified to be in the correct location following loading (Attachment 3, Fuel SelectionNerification).
The licensee completed and approved a 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation report that documented compliance with the conditions established in the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities (Attachment 3, General License).
The licensee verified the minimum boron concentration had been established in the spent fuel pool prior to fuel loading, as required by Technical Specifications (Attachment 3, Loading Operations).
The licensee started the vacuum drying time clock when the initial 750 gallons had been pumped out of the canister, as required by the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities (Attachment 3, Loading Operations).
The licensee had inspected and formally accepted the Horizontal Storage Modules in accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station Quality Assurance Program requirements (Attachment 3, Quality Assurance).
-3-
- The licensee performed remote handling of the transfer cask in accordance with ALARA objectives. The collective exposure resulting from remote handling of the first loaded minimally shielded transfer cask was consistent with other Region IV sites using fully shielded transfer casks and direct handling methods.
e The Horizontal Storage Module and Transfer Cask dose rates were confirmed to be within Technical Specification limits following loading (Attachment 3, Radiation Protection).
The licensee was performing Horizontal Storage Module daily and startup thermal monitoring in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. The temperatures observed were consistent with the design calculations (Attachment 3, Storage Operations).
The welding materials used for canister closure met the requirements of the NUHOMS Final Safety Analysis Report and the ASME code (Attachment 3, Welding).
Attachment 1 Supplemental Information PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel S. Andersen - Project Engineer G. Cavanaugh - Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance D. Guinn - Licensing Engineer D. Hecksel - Quality Control Inspector L. Hoegen - Radiation Protection Technician F. Klauser - Operations Shift Manager T. Maine - ALARA Coordinator R. Paradies - Project Engineer M. Pohl - Principal Reactor Engineer M. Pope - Radiation Protection Technician R. Ruhge - Supervisor, Quality Control T. Steckleberg - Radiation Protection Technician B. Van Sant - Manager, Nuclear Projects J. Willett - Principal Reactor Engineer TriVis Personnel J. Antill - Quality Control Inspector R. Barefoot - Fuel Loading Technician R. Brown - Welder J. Byrd - Welder J. Crowson - Fuel Loading Technician P. Dugan - Loading Supervisor J. Feagan - Welder D. Henley - Fuel Loading Technician J. Kelley - Loading Superintendent L. Wood - Loading Supervisor Transnuclear Personnel J. Axline - Project Manager J. Chapman - Fuel Loading Communicator
-2-INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 60855 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 60855.1 Operation of an ISFSI At Operating Plants LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None.
Closed None.
Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AWS Automated Welding System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COC Certificate of Compliance FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report Gwd/MTU Gigawatt Days per Metric Ton Uranium HSM Horizontal Storage Module ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation kW Kilowatt mrem miltirem MTU Metric Ton Uranium OPPD Omaha Public Power District QA Quality Assurance SER Safety Evaluation Report wt. % Weight Percent
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Attachment 3 FORT CALHOUN FIRST LOADING Inspector Notes Category: Fuel Selection/Verification Topic: Allowable Fuel For Storage Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.1 Exemption Requirement The Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities limited fuel assembly parameters to those identified in Table 1 of the exemption request. These included: 1) a maximum total canister decay heat load of 11.0 kW: 2 ) a maximum individual assembly decay heat load of 0.500 kW; 3) a maximum assembly average burnup of 42.049 Gwd/MTU; 4) a maximum initial assembly enrichment of 4.500 weight percent (wt.%);
and 5) a maximum initial assembly uranium content of 0.377 MTU. The exemption further required a minimum cooling time of 16.2 years for each assembly.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. The loading campaign consisted of four canisters containing 32 spent fuel assemblies each. The characteristics of the spent fuel assemblies selected for the first canister were reviewed to ensure the conditions required by the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities were met.
1) The first canister loaded contained a total decay heat value of 9.876 kW, as documented in Attachment 8.1 of Procedure RE-AD-0005.
2) The decay heat values for the fuel assemblies selected for the first canister ranged between 0.068 and 0.419 kW, as documented in Attachment 3 of Procedure RE-ST-DFS-000 1.
3) The maximum assembly average burnup values for the fuel assemblies selected for the first canister ranged between 8.310 and 39.580 Gwd/MTU, as documented in Attachment 3 of Procedure RE-ST-DFS-0001.
4) The maximum initial assembly enrichment values for the fuel assemblies selected for the first canister ranged between 1.390 and 3.51 1 wt.%, as documented in Attachment 3 of Procedure RE-ST-DFS-000 1.
5) The maximum initial assembly uranium dioxide content for the fuel assemblies selected for loading into the first canister ranged between 0.354 and 0.375 MTU, as documented in Attachment 3 of Procedure RE-ST-DFS-000 1.
6) The cooling times for the fuel assemblies selected for the first canister ranged between 18.8 and 30.9 years, as documented in Attachment 3 of Procedure RE-ST-DFS-000 I.
Documents Exemption from 10 CFR 72.48, 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 for Dry Fuel Storage Reviewed: Activities - Fort Calhoun (TAC No. L23984) dated July 19, 2006 Omaha Public Power District Exemption Request LIC-06-056, dated June 9, 2006 Safety Evaluation Report - Exemption for Fort Calhoun Station Independent Spent Fuel Page 1 o f 9
Storage Installation - Docket No. 72-54, dated July 19, 2006 Procedure RE-AD-0005, Fuel Selection and DSC Planning for Dry Cask Storage.
Revision 0 Procedure RE-ST-DFS-000 1, Fuel Selection Verification for Placement in Dry Fuel Storage, Revision 4 Category: Fuel SelectiodVerification Topic: Fuel Assembly Identification Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.1 Requirement Prior to loading of a spent fuel assembly into a canister. the identity of each fuel assembly shall be independently verified and documented.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. The Fort Calhoun spent fuel pool map had been verified approximately 3 months prior to the first loading campaign. Each rack location and spent fuel assembly identification number had been identified and documented.
Procedure NMA-3, Step 4.2.4 required that all spent fuel movements between the spent fuel pool racks and the dry fuel storage canister be made using the Fuel Handling Checklist. Prior to grappling each fuel assembly, the fuel handler and spotter independently verified the spent fuel pool rack location matched the Fuel Handling Checklist .
Documents Procedure NMA-3, Special Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Revision 13 Reviewed: Form F-2, Fuel Handling Checklist, Revision 4 Category: Fuel Selection/Verification Topic: Loading Plan Reference: FSAR 1004, Section M.8.1.2.5 Requirement A cask loading plan shall be developed to meet the loading configuration specified in the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities. The loading plan shall be independently verified and approved before the fuel load. A fuel movement schedule shall be written, verified and approved based on the loading plan. All fuel movements from any rack location shall be performed under strict compliance with the fuel movement schedule.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. The Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities linuted individual fuel assembly decay heat load to 0.500 kW and total canister decay heat load to 11.0 kW.
The 32 fuel assemblies selected for loading into the first canister were identified in Attachment 8.1 of Procedure RE-AD-0005. Each fuel assembly decay heat load was verified to be within the limit for each cell and loading zone, as specified in the exemption. The total heat load for the first canister was calculated and verified to be 9.876 kW.
Procedure NMA-3, Step 4.2.4 required that all spent fuel movements between the spent fuel pool racks and the dry fuel storage canister be made by Operations personnel or designated fuel handlers using Form F-2, Fuel Handling Checklist. The Fuel Handling Checklist for the canister provided the sequence for moving each fuel assembly, its from and to locations, and its required orientation in the canister. The checklist was Page 2 of 9
reviewed and approved by the Principal Reactor Engineer, as documented on Form F-1.
Documents Exemption from 10 CFR 72.48, 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 for Diy Fuel Storage Reviewed: Activities - Fort Calhoun (TAC No. L23984) dated July 19, 2006 Safety Evaluation Report - Exemption for Fort Calhoun Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Docket No. 72-54, dated July 19, 2006 Procedure RE-AD-0005, Fuel Selection and DSC Planning For Dry Cask Storage, Revision 0 Procedure NMA-3, Special Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Revision 13 Form F-1 ,Fuel Handling Checklist Coversheet, Revision 0 Fonn F-2, Fuel Handling Checklist, Revision 4 Category: Fuel SelectioidVerification Topic: Post Loadilia Verification Reference: FSAR 1004, Section M.8.1.2.7 Requirement After the canister has been fully loaded, check and record the identity and location of each spent fuel assembly.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0002, Step 7.1.2 required fuel verification to be complete prior to installing the fuel spacers. The post loading verification was performed by two Reactor Engineers using high resolution underwater cameras and video displays. The underwater survey results showed that each spent fuel assembly identification number matched the canister cell location specified in the Fuel Handling Checklist.
Documents Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0002, Dry Shielded Canister Sealing Operations, Revision 3 Reviewed: Form F-2, Fuel Handling Checklist, Revision 4 Category: General License Topic: Certificate of Compliance Conditions Reference: 10 CFR 72.2 12(b)(2)(i)(A)
Requirement A general licensee shall perfonn written evaluations, prior to use, that establish that the conditions set forth i n the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities have been met.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Compliance with the general license conditions set forth in the Certificate of Compliance, prior to issue of the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities, was veiified during the Programs Inspection on April 10-13, 2006 and documented in Inspection Report 050-00285/06-13; 072-00054/06-02 (ML062000421).
Compliance with the general license conditions that were modified by the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities was verified during this inspection. The exemption conditions were incorporated into the 72.2 12 Evaluation Report as follows:
Attachment A of the 72.212 Evaluation Report, Technical Specification 1.2.1 bases.
documented NRC approval of a maximum canister decay heat load of 11.O kW and removed the wording concerning transfer cask surface dose rates.
Attachment A of the 72.212 Evaluation Report documented NRC approval of new Page 3 of 9
transfer cask dose rate limits for Technical Specification 1.2.11. The new limits were 170 mredhour three feet above the centerline of the Automated Welding System integral shielding, and 110 mreidhour on the outside surface of tlie supplemental shielding sleeve.
Attachment A of the 72.212 Evaluation Report documented NRC approval to start the Technical Specification 1.2.17a vacuum drying clock when the first 750 gallons of water was pumped out of the canister. This ensured the spent fuel assembly cladding temperature did not exceed 752 degrees F and the thermal cycling did not exceed 117 degrees F.
Documents 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report, Revision 0 Exemption from 10 CFR 72.48, 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 for Dry Fuel Storage Activities - Fort Calhoun (TAC No. L23984) dated July 19, 2006 Category: Loading Operation s Topic: Control of Combustible Materials Reference: FSAR 1004. Section M.4.6.3 Requirement The postulated worst case fire accident is a 300 gallon diesel fuel fire engulfing the transfer cask for 15 minutes at a temperature of 1475 degrees F. Combustible materials in proximity to a loaded transfer cask should be controlled such that a fire involving all of the combustible materials will not exceed the bounding fire conditions.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Several pallets of combustible radwaste had been temporarily stored on the east end of ISFSI pad at the time of the heavy loads demonstration. These pallets had been removed prior to the first loading campaign.
Two portable light masts and one JLG man lift were introduced to the ISFSI pad during the first HSM loading. Their diesel fuel capacities were added to the existing diesel fuel quantities and tlie total was verified to be less than 300 gallons.
Documents None.
Reviewed:
Category: Loading Operations Topic: Spent Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration Reference: COC 1004, TS 1.2.1 (Table 1-lg); TS 1.2.15a Requirement When loading tlie 32PT canister the canister cavity shall be filled with water borated to the minimum concentration specified in Technical Specification 1.2.1, Table 1-lg. Two samples shall be taken and chemically analyzed by two individuals within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loading spent fuel assemblies into the canister and at intervals not to exceed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> while the loaded canister is in the spent fuel pool.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0001, Step 7.4 directed Chemistry to obtain two samples of spent fuel pool water and to analyses them independently for- boron concentration. Technical Specification 1.2.1, Table I-lg required a minimum boron concentration of 2,100 ppin for the first loading campaign.
Technical Specification 12.1% required the boron concentration to be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of fuel loading. Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0001, Step 10.2 required the Loading Supervisor to verify compliance with Technical Specification 1.2.15.a prior to fuel Page 4 of 9
loading. Two boron samples were taken at 0120 on July 24, 2006 and spent fuel loading commenced at 0505. One sample indicated 2,308 ppin and the other 2,3 15 ppm.
The loaded canister was removed from the spent fuel pool prior to reaching the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> sampling requirement.
Documents Procedure RE-RR-DFS-000 1, DSC/TC Prep For Fuel Loading Operations, Revision 1 Reviewed:
Category: Loading Operations Topic: Synthetic Roundsling Inspection Reference: ASME B30.9, Sect 9-6 Requirement A synthetic roundsling shall be removed from service if any of the following conditions are present: a) missing or illegible sling identification; b) acid or caustic bums; c) evidence of heat damage; d) holes, tears, cuts or snags that expose core yarns; e) broken or damaged core yams; f) weld splatter that exposes core yams; g) roundslings that are knotted; h) discoloration and brittle or stiff areas which may mean chemical or ultraviolet/sunlight damage; and i) fittings that are pitted, corroded, cracked, bent, twisted, gouged or broken.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Section 5.6.3 was added to Standing Order SO-G-6 1 under Condition Report #200601474 to provide the inspection requirements for synthetic roundslings. The criteria for removing them froin service was consistent with ASME Code B30.9. The criteria also included loss of fiber optic integrity and tell-tale visibility, not cui-rently required by the ASME code.
Documents Condition Report #20060 1474 Reviewed: Standing Order SO-G-6 I, Rigging Inspection Program at Fort Calhoun Station, Revision 28 Category: Loading Operations Topic: Vacuum Drying Time Clock Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.17a Exemption Requirement The vacuum drying time clock shall start when the initial 750 gallons have been pumped out of the canister. Helium shall be used for canister bacldill diiring canister pump out.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0002, Step 7.1.33 maintained a positive helium overpressure during canister pump out. Step 7.1.35 started the vacuum drying time clock when the initial 750 gallons had been pumped out, as specified in the Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities.
Documents Exemption froin 10 CFR 72.48, 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 for Diy Fuel Storage Reviewed: Activities - Fort Calhoun (TAC No. L23984) dated July 19, 2006 Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0002, Dry Shielded Canister Sealing Operations, Revision 3 Category: Quality Assurance Topic: Procurement Controls Reference: 10 CFR 72.154(a)l(b)l(c)
Requirement The licensee shall establish measures to ensure that purchased material, equipment, and services conform to procurement documents. These measures must include provisions for source evaluation and selection, objective evidence of quality furnished by the Page 5 of 9
contractor/subcontractor, inspection at the contractor/subcontractor source and examination of product on delivery.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure NPD-GL 25.0, Section 25.3.3 required ISFSI project personnel to perform receipt inspections of dry fuel storage components.
The receipt inspection checklists for the canisters were reviewed during the team inspection and found to be acceptable. However, the Horizontal Storage Modules (HSMs) had not been accepted by the licensee at that time and the receipt inspection checklists were not available for review. The receipt inspection checklists for the HSMs were reviewed during this inspection.
The inspection checklists were provided in Attachment GL-25-03 of Procedure NPD-GL 25.0. Each HSM consisted of four subassemblies; a base unit, shield door, roof section, and an outlet vent section. Two shield walls, comprised of four sections each, were installed at the east and west end of the ten HSM double array configuration.
Each subassembly was inspected for packaging integrity, shipping damage and proper documentation prior to unloading. Once unloaded, the concrete was inspected for cracks, bugholes, popouts, voids, spalls, and rebar nicks. All ten HSMs were formally accepted by the licensee following receipt inspection.
DOCuments Procedure NPD-GL 25.0, Materials Control Management And Receipt At Site Of Reviewed: District Furnished Equipment And Material, Revision 3 Category: Radiation Protection Topic: KARA Reference: 10 CFR 72.104(b)
Requirement Operational restrictions must be established to meet As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) objectives for radioactive materials in effluents and direct radiation levels associated with ISFSI operations.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Due to the expected high dose rates, movements of the loaded transfer cask between the spent fuel pool, decontamination area and transfer trailer were perfonned remotely using cameras. lasers and laser targets. The cameras provided displays on two screens at the crane remote operating station. The video equipment worked as designed and without failure. Remote operation of the crane was trouble-free.
The areas through which the loaded transfer cask traveled were instrumented with 13 remote reading area monitors. The monitors indicated that a person standing on the work platfoim would have been exposed to a radiation field of 88 mredhour as the transfer cask was removed from the spent fuel pool, increasing to 1,041 mredhour as the transfer cask was inserted into the shielding sleeve. A person working near the crane cab would have been exposed to a radiation field of 142 mrem/hoiir when the transfer cask was at its closest lift point. The first canister contained a total decay heat load of 9.9 kW, rather than the 24 kW decay heat load authorized in the Transnuclear Certificate of Compliance.
Fort Calhoun ISFSI personnel received a collective radiation exposure of 0.5 15 person-rem during the first cask loading evolution, as estimated from the Electronic Page 6 of 9
Alarming Dosimeter (EAD) data. Region IV loading campaigns have historically resulted in collective exposures of 0.250 person-rem to 0.970 person-rem per cask.
Remote handling of a minimally shielded transfer cask at Fort Calhoun resulted in a collective radiation exposure consistent with other Region N sites using fully shielded transfer casks and direct handling methods.
Documents Computer Monitoring Station (CMS) printouts dated J U ~25, Y 2006 Reviewed:
Category: Radiation Protection Topic: Horizontal Storage Module Dose Rates R e f e m ~ e : CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.7.a Requirement When loaded with a 32PT canister, the Horizontal Storage Module dose rates are limited to 800 inredhour on the front surface, 200 trendhour on the door centerline and 8 mretdhour on the end shield wall exterior.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Following shield door installation, Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0004, Step 7.7.30 required a dose rate survey of the loaded HSM front surface, HSM door centerline and end shield wall exterior. The dose rate limits specified in the procedure were consistent with Technical Specification 1.2.7.a.
The first spent fuel canister was loaded into its Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) on JLIIY29, 2006. Following shield door installation, tlie HSM dose rates were less than 1 mredhour on the front surface, door centerline and end shield wall exterior. A reading of 12 inredhour was taken on contact with h e inlet air vent.
Documents Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0004, DSC From TC To HSM Transfer Operations, Revision 2 Reviewed: Survey Log 06-0306, dated July 29, 2006 Category: Radiation Protection Topic: Transfer Cask Dose Rates Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.11 Exemption Requirement The Fort Calhoun Exemption for Dry Fuel Storage Activities changed Technical Specification 1.2.11. When containing a loaded 32PT canister, the transfer cask dose rates are limited to 170 rm-edhour axially and 110 tnrem/hour radially. Tlie dose rates are measured with the transfer cask inside the shielding sleeve and shielding bell, with the top shield plug, inner top cover plate and Automated Welding System (AWS)
integral shield in place. Tlie axial measurement is taken in tlie centerline of the canister at three feet above the AWS integral shield. The radial measurement is taken on contact with the shielding sleeve.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure RPI-16, Step 7.17.3 required a dose rate survey of the loaded transfer cask while inside the shielding sleeve and shielding bell, and in the configuration specified in the exemption.
Procedure RPI-16, Step 7.17.3 required ganima and neutron dose rate measurements at three feet from the AWS integral shield. The sitin of the gamma and neutron dose rates was limited to 170 inredhour. The axial dose rates measured during the first canister loading were 5 mreidhour total, with 4 mredhour gainma and 1 mredhour neutron.
Procedure RPI-16, Step 7.17.4 required ganima and neutron dose rate measurements on Page 7 of 9
contact with the shielding sleeve. The sum of the gamma and neutron dose rates was limited to 110 mredhour. The radial dose rates measured during the first canister loading were 5 mredhour total, with 2 mreidhour neutron and 3 mi-edhour g a m a .
The survey results for both axial and radial dose rate measurements were documented on Survey Form FC-RP-202-194 dated July 25,2006.
Documents Exemption from 10 CFR 72.48, 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 for Dry Fuel Storage Reviewed: Activities - Fort Calhoun (TAC No. L23984) dated July 19, 2006 Omaha Public Power District Exemption Request LIC-06-056, dated June 9, 2006 Safety Evaluation Report - Exemption for Fort Calhoun Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Docket No. 72-54, dated July 19, 2006 Procedure RPI-16, Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage, Revision 2 Survey Form FC-RP-202-194, Revision 4 Category: Storage Operations Topic: HSM Dailv Temperature Monitoring Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.3.2 Requirement Evaluate the thermal performance of each HSM on a daily basis. Direct concrete temperatures, direct canister temperatures, air inlet and outlet differential temperatures, or other means may be used to identify off-normal theimal conditions that could lead to exceeding the concrete and fuel clad temperature criteria. If air temperatures are used, they must reflect the thermal performance of the individual module and not the combined performance of adjacent modules.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Each horizontal storage module was equipped with two thermocouples imbedded in the concrete directly above the stored canister.
Procedure OP-ST-SHIFT-0001 recorded both concrete temperature readings on each loaded storage module once per day.
Documents Procedure OP-ST-SHIFT-0001, Operations Technical Specification Required Shift Reviewed: Surveillance, Revision 96 Category: Storage Operations Topic: HSM Startup Thermal Monitoring Reference: CoC 1004, Tech Spec 1.2.8 Requirement The temperature rise across the HSM shall be recorded at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following loading and daily thereafter until thermal equilibrium is reached. The maximum temperature rise across an HSM containing a 32PT canister with a decay heat load of 24 kW is 100 degrees F. For an HSM containing a canister with a heat load less than 24 kW, the maximum allowable temperature rise must be calculated. If the maximum temperature rise at equilibrium is within limits, no further startup thermal monitoring is required.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0004, Step 7.8 and Attachment 9 were used to measure and document the temperature rise across each Horizontal Storage Module. Attachment 10 was used to calculate the expected exhaust air temperature for a range of air inlet temperatures. The temperature rise was measured at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following loading and daily thereafter until thermal equilibrium was reached.
The first HSM was loaded with a canister containing a decay heat load of 9.9 kW. For this decay heat load and the ambient temperatures existing at the time, the expected Page S of 9
HSM temperature rise was calculated to be 32.5 to 34 degrees F. The actual temperature rise at equilibrium was approximately 16.5 degrees F.
Documents Procedure RE-RR-DFS-0004, DSC Froin TC To HSM Transfer Operations, Revision 2 Reviewed:
Category: Welding Topic: Materials - Code Year Reference: FSAR 1004, Sections M.9.1.2; M.3.1.2.1 Requirement The NUHOMS 32PT canister confinement welds are fabricated in accordance with ASME Code Section 111, Subsection NEJ (1998 edition with 2000 addenda), with exceptions provided under alternate ASME Code Case N-595-2. The top inner cover plate, vent and siphon port covers and the vent and siphon port block define the primary confinement welds at the top end of the 32PT canister.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. The Weldstar Company provided the weld wire spools under Purchase Order #00088364 and the weld wire cut lengths under Purchase Order #00092700. The two Weldstar Certificates of Compliance documented the spool wire and cut lengths met the requirements of ASME Code Section 111, Subsection Nl3 2400,2001 edition with no addenda.
D ~ ~ u m e n t sWeldstar Certificates of Compliance Reviewed:
Category: Welding Topic: Materials - Minimum Delta Ferrite Content Reference: ASME Section 111, Article NB-2433; Reg Guide 1.31 Requirement A delta ferrite determination must be made for A-No.8 consumable inserts, bare electrode, rod, or wire filler metal. Exceptions: 1) A-No.8 metal used for weld metal cladding; 2) SFA-5.4 and SFA-5.9 metal; 3) Type 16-8-2 metal. The minimum acceptable delta ferrite content is 5 FN and it must be stated i n the certification records.
Finding: This requirement was implemented. The Weldstar Company provided the weld wire spools to OPPD under Purchase Order #00088364. The Weldstar Certificate of Compliance for the spool wire documented a delta ferrite number of 9 FN.
The Weldstar Company provided the weld wire cut lengths to OPPD under Purchase Order #00092700. The Weldstar Certificate of Compliance for the cut lengths documented a delta ferrite number of 8 FN.
Documents Weldstar Certificates of Compliance Reviewed:
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