IR 05000280/1988018
| ML18152B077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1988 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Nicholason L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152B076 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-18, 50-281-88-18, NUDOCS 8808170081 | |
| Download: ML18152B077 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/88-18 and 50-281/88-18 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conducted:
May 1 through June 4, 1988 Inspectors:
~ ~ ~
~
W. r~* ~Ri;;lnspector L. E. Nicholson, Resident nsp Approved by:F. ~ef Division of Reactor Proje*cts SUMMARY Date Si~~
1~~7-o()
Date Signed 7~e?fi!nfa Scope:
This routine _resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report review, and meetings with local official Results:
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor The following new items were identified in this inspection repor One unresolved item (paragraph 5) was identified with regards to additional review of procedures for configuration control of piping blanks (280,281/88-18-01).
One unresolved item (paragraph 7) was identified with regards to the control over installation of flow orifices (280,281/
88-18-02).
One inspector followup item (paragraph 5) was identified for followup on implementation of procedure upgrade program (280,281/88-18-03).
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Benson, Station Manager
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
$. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics
- Attended exit meeting Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne The NRC Region II Section Chief, F. Cantrell, visited the Surry Power Station on May 11 and 1 Mr. Cantrell 1s tour included the Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment during this visi *
The NRC Headquarters NRR Project Manager for Surry, C. Patel visited the Surry Power Station from May 23 through May 2 Mr. Patel was involved in routine day to day inspection activities with the resident staf.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period on day 24 of a maintenance/refueling outag During this period fuel was removed fiom the vessel to the spent fuel pool, and the fuel assemblies were inspected using ultrasonic testing (UT).
The UT process identified one leaking fuel assembl Another assembly was substituted, and the appropriate fuel assemblies were reloaded into the vesse The vessel was reassembled and at the end of the inspection period, the unit remained in cold shutdown while maintenance activities were baing complete Unit 2
.
Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power until May 16, when at 0324 hours0.00375 days <br />0.09 hours <br />5.357143e-4 weeks <br />1.23282e-4 months <br /> the unit automatically tripped from full power on a steam generator low-low level conditio Approximately one minute after the trip, the operators manually initiated safety injec-tion in accordance with procedure, when pressurizer level approached 13 percen *
- .** *.. *.... -**.
The trip was due to an undetermined failure of the Electro-Hydraulic-Contro l (EHC) system which caused the main turbine governors to close resulting in low steam generator levels. Safety committee review of the cause of the trip was closely monitored by the inspector The committee decided to connect monitoring equipment to instrumentation during unit restart and operation in order to evaluate system operation. Also, the auxiliary feedwater fl ow to the II A" steam generator indicated 1 ower than expecte This condition is further discussed in paragraph Repairs were made and the unit left cold shutdown the morning of June However, after reaching approximately 245 degrees F, the 11A 11 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor breaker tripped on overcurren The unit was returned to cold shutdown during the afternoon of June At the end of the inspection period, Unit 2 remained in cold shutdown with preparations being made to repair 11A 11 reactor coolant pump moto * Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) (Open) Unresolved Item 280; 281/88-04-03, Review of Licensee Clarification of the Requirements of ASME,Section XI, IWV-3417 for Valves Failing to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Testin The subject item was identified in Inspection Report 280,281/88-0 In that report the inspectors requested that the 1 i censee review their position that two successive successful stroke tests would be acceptable in verification of operability of a valve which failed to properly operate on deman Since identifica-tion of the issue, the licensee has reviewed the requirement with their code personne 1 and provided the inspector with a memorandum from R. H. Blount to SNSOC dated April 12, 198 In the memo, the licensee stated that in certain situations during the conduct of testing, if an initial test failure of a valve cannot be duplicated in two consecutive tests which are satisfactory, then the valve should be considered operable as required by Technical Specification In addition the memo states, as required by the code, corrective measures must be accomplished within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the valve would be declared inoperabl The memorandum was approved by the station safety committee on May 17, 198 The 1 i censee response to this issue was forwarded to NRC Region II tech-ni ca 1 personnel and management for revie This item will remain open until regional review has been complete Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptab 1 e or may i nvo 1 ve via 1 at ions or deviation Two new unresolved items are identified in this inspection repor One of the unresolved items (paragraph 5) involved additional review of procedures for configuration control of piping blank Also, one unresolved item- (paragraph 7) was identified with regards to the control over installation of flow orifice *
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3 Pl ant Ope rat i ans Operational Safety.Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; review of control room operator logs; operating orders, plant deviation reports, tago~t logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors conducted weekly inspect ions in the fa 11 owing areas:
verification of operability of selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours which included observation of general plant/equipment condi-tions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevente The inspectors conducted biweekly inspect ions in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem i dent if i cat ion system; veri fi cat ion of se 1 ected port ions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on May 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 19, 21, 24, 27, *and 2 Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, Units 1 and 2 containments, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage faciliity, low level intake structure, and the safe-guards valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently calcu-lated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; padge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post On May 5, 1988, the inspector learned that two of the three steam supply check valves in the three separate main steam lines which supply the steam for operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP)
had been opened for inspection on. Unit The inspection revealed that one of the check valve discs was properly fastened to its hinge; however, the other check valve was missing the nut and washer that connect the disc to the hing This is a similar situation which was discovered at the North Anna Station in April 198 The licensee determined that this problem may be generic to Unit 2, which was operating at full powe An emergency work request was processed to inspect the Unit 2 check valve The unit entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.F at 1356 hours0.0157 days <br />0.377 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.15958e-4 months <br /> on May 5, when the TDAFP became inoperable due to initiation of the isolation required to open and inspect the steam check valve After initial attempts to isolate the maintenance area were unsuccessful, the licensee decided to radiograph (RT) the check valves in order to determine if the i nterna 1 configuration was prope The RT
. indicated that one of the three check valves (2-MS-176) appeared to be properly assembled; however, the other two steam check valves (2-MS-178 and 182) appeared to be missing the nuts that connect the disc to the rocker assembl The licensee was able to establish the isolation required for maintenance on the valves in the afternoon of May 6, and the work area was released for inspection and repair The licensee opened check valves 2-MS-178 and 182 that evening and determined that the disc nut pin, disc nut, and disc washer were missing in both of the valve Additional inspection of the system was conducted downstream of the check valves in order to try to locate the missing part The inspection determined that one disc washer and a pin were located at the strainer screen in the trip and throttle valv The screen was not damage A comp 1 ete inspect ion was done of the system fl owpath from the steam check valves to the trip and throttle valve and no other loose parts were foun A safety committee meeting was held on the morning of May 7, and it ~as decided that the disassembled components in the system would be reassembled and the TDAFP would be tested in preparation for a final safety committee meeting to evaluate operabilit The check valve repairs included welding of the disc nut and disc nut pin in order to preclude similar problems in the futur The licensee then reassembled the system and conducted an operational test of the TDAF After safety committee review of all the.
above information and an engineering evaluation (EWR 88-153) which provided a summary of the inspections and all corrective actions, the licensee*
concluded that operation of the system without welding of the disc nut on 2-MS-176 would not effect operability of the TDAFP until the refueling outage scheduled for September 198 The pump was returned to service and declared operable at 0923 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.512015e-4 months <br /> on May 8, 198 The inspector reviewed
licensee actions from the time the issue was identified until the pump was returned to service, including witnessing system isolation activity, reviewing the RT film, observing the internal condition of the check va 1 ves, and being present at appropriate management/p 1 anni ng meetings during this timefram The inspector concluded that licensee actions were adequate; however, after the Unit 2 trip and forced outage which began on May 16, the licensee replaced 2-MS-176 with a new check valve which had been modified to insure that the disc nut would not become loose during system operatio The inspector considers that this additional action was appropriat On May 16, after the Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection, the oper-ators observed that the* auxiliary feedwater (AFW) fl ow to the 11A' 1 steam generator appeared low (approximately 240 GPM) when compared to the 118
and 11C 11 steam generators auxiliary feedwater flow (over 330 GPM).
Additional testing of the AFW flow to the 11A 11 steam generator indicated that a partial blockage existed in the flowpat This condition was similar to the AFW flow problem that occurred on March 27, 1988 (see Inspection Reports 280, 281/88-09 and 88-14).
The 1 i censee conducted additional testing of the AFW flowpath to the 11A 11 steam generator in order to help identify the cause of the reduced flo This testing included determination of check valve positions using both RT and ultrasonic test (UT) method During the testing, the blockage condition self-correcte The unit was placed in cold shutdown and the AFW piping upstream of the the venturi fl ow 1 imiter (FW-201A) for the 11A 11 steam generator was cut for inspectio The inspection inside the pipe downstream of the cut discovered a metal foreign object lar,ing in the pip The object was approximately 1 1/2 11 by 5/8 11 by 3/16 1 thic The licensee removed the foreign object and continued with their troubleshootin Engineering evaluation of the foreign object concluded that it may be part of one of the AFW pump internal component Since Unit 2 AFW pumps 2-FW-P-2 and 2-FW-P-3A had been overhauled during the last refueling outage (Fall 1986),
the licensee decided to disassemble AFW pump 2-FW-P-38 and inspect for any damaged i nterna 1 parts (normally one pump is scheduled for preventive overhaul each refueling cycle).
After the pump was disassembled, the licensee determined that the last stage diffuser plate was missing parts from three of the vane During pump disassembly, the licensee also found another foreign object in the 11C 11 steam generator AFW line upstream of the flow orifice (FW-200C).
The licensee continued with inspections of the AFW flowpaths using fiber optic equipment and making video tapes of the piping inspecte Three additional small non-magnetic metal pieces were found in valve 2-FW-141 during this inspection, but no conclusive answer to their origin could be determine After evaluating the inspection data, the licensee decided to modify the AFW piping configuration to each of the three steam generator feed lines by installing a strainer assembly in each line so that any future foreign objects would be stopped by the strainer before they could reach the venturi flow limiters and possibly reduce flow in the syste In addition, all three AFW pumps in Unit 2 were disassembled and inspected visually
with liquid penetrant to determine if any further degradation has occurred in the diffuser vane The results of this extensive inspection revealed that although no additional pieces were found missing from the other vanes, cracks were found that amplify the need for 1 i quid penetrant inspection of these vanes on a periodic basi Also, the licensee installed new check valves.in place of existing check valves AFW-27, 58, and 8 This work was done in order to correct another problem of backleakage of hot feedwater into the AFW system during normal plant operatio The licensee then conducted operational testing of the AFW system repairs by verifying correct fl ow from each AFW pump to each steam generato The inspector monitored the 1 i censee' s eva 1 uat ion and troubles hooting of the blockage problem and reviewed a 11 maintenance work orders and test documentation (see paragraph 6).
No discrepancies were note On May 24, the 1 i censee dee 1 a red an unusua 1 event in accordance with their emergency plan due to a fire in the Unit 2 containment which was immediately extinguished by the fire brigade after their arrival at the scen The fire was a flame approximately 2 inches high at the exit of a pipe nipple attached to a flange cover plate which was connected to a vent line normally used to vent open systems during reactor coolant system maintenanc The vent line also provides for a flowpath from the pres-surizer relief tank (PRT) to the vent and drains system in the auxiliary buildin However, system configuration at the time of the event had the manual isolation valve (2-RC-144) between the PRT and the pipe nipple location shu After the event, the licensee determined that the fire was attributed to hydrogen gas leaking from the PRT, past valve 2-RC-144 and out the pipe nippl The gas was apparently ignited by a spark from grinding operations being performed on the auxiliary feedwater system in the vicinity of the pipe nippl This event was properly reported to the NRC in accordance with requirement However, further review of the event by the residents concluded that the source of the flammable gas was a connection point to a vent system which should have been blanked by a flang Instead, the connection point had a flange with a nipple installed that allowed a portion of the vent system to be open to the containment environmen Add it i anal i nvesti gat ion revealed that the connection point had been used in the past during maintenance activities to allow for connection of tubing in order to vent the reactor vessel hea The inspector discussed his concern with station management and requested that they provide information with regard to the program which maintains configuration control over temporary connections of this typ Additional discussions with operations personnel identified several procedures which require review in order to determine the significance of this issue; however, the inspection period ended prior to this review being accomplishe This item is unresolved (280,281/88-18-0l) pending completion of additional review of procedures by the inspector in order to determine significance of this item with regards to configuration control of piping blank **
On May 27, 1988, the 1 i censee determined that a Westinghouse contract employee received a total quarterly occupational dose that exceeded the allowable 3 rems while performing the final cleaning and inspection of the Unit 1 rector vessel flang The individual that was performing the majority of work received 2.527 rem to the head by extending his head past the vessel flange toward the internals and into an estimated 7 rem fiel This individual had a previous quarterly dose of 0. 752 rem that when added to the exposure for this job gave a total of 3.279 re The other two contract individuals that were supporting this work received 1.99 and 1.65 rem to the head for total quarterly exposures of 1.99 and 2.389 rem, respectivel The licensee health physics technician involved in the job received considerably less dos On May 29, 1988, the resident inspector reported to the site and monitored suqsequent work in the reactor head are The licensee performed a second head lift to inspect for debris that may have entered the seal ring area during cavity deconnin The inspector attended all planning and prejob briefings, as well as entering containment to witness the actual head lift and flange inspectio No discrepancies were noted during this evolutio A region-based inspector arrived on site and will document the results of his investigation of the overexposure event in Inspection Report 280,281/
88-2 During this inspection period, the inspectors monitored refuelfng evolu-tions to insure that they were properly controlled and that all required techni ca 1 speci fi cat ions were being me The inspector noted that refueling evolutions were contra 11 ed by Operating Procedure, OP-4.1, Contra 11 i ng Procedure for Refue 1 i n The 1 i censee kept this procedure in the control room during all evolutions starting with preparations for reactor disassembly through reactor reassembly after refuelin The inspector noted that the procedure was being properly updated and was used by the licensed operators in the control room to monitor activities and control evolutions. No discrepancies in performance of refueling opera-tions were observed; however, during review.by the inspector, it was noted that the initial conditions section of the procedure contained several verification steps that were not considered as being initial condition Also, the inspector noted several action steps_in the body of the procedure being listed as notes with ho verification requirements when these notes were accomplishe The inspector discussed these items with the licensee management and was informed that the procedure upgrade program which was in the formulation stages would address such issue The inspector then discussed the new procedures program with site personne The following information was provide The new procedures upgrade program was being instituted by the licensee at both of their nuclear stations with control of the program being maintained at the corporate leve A new Nuclear Operations Department Standard is being prepared by the corporate office to define po 1 icy and requirements for implementation of the programs at each statio This standard is scheduled to be issued in August 198 The new program will require the use of a procedure writer's guide for procedure preparation and revisio This guide is scheduled to be available in November 198 The new procedure group at Surry will commence the procedure upgrade process in December 1988, and estimates 5 to 7 years to complete initial upgrade.
. The inspectors consider that the procedures upgrade program will be a major improvement over current requirements, but are concerned about the length of ti me to comp 1 ete the progra They wi 11 continue to review implementation of this progra This item is identified as an inspector followup item (280,281/88-18-03), followup on implementation of procedure upgrade progra Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the residual heat removal system for Unit 1 and the auxiliary feedwater system for Unit This verifi-cation also included the following: confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant config-uration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection/prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated, and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures and other regulatory requirement During this inspection period, the residents continued wtth their inspection of the following maintenance items for Unit 1 which were identified in last month's report for monitoring during the maintenance/refueling outage:
Auxiliary Feedwater System Repairs This area included overhaul/repair of auxiliary feedwater motor operated valves and other work associated with the syste The area also included overhaul of the Terry turbine which is the prime mover for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pum On May 3, the -inspector witnessed maintenance activities associated with rerouting of each auxiliary feedwater pump's lube oil cooler water piping to the condensate storgage tan The work was being accomplished in accordance with engineering work request (EWR)
- 88-20 and authorized by work order (WO) 380006401 The inspector reviewed the work package at the jobsite, and also questioned mechanics with regards to the scope of work in progres After completion of the work, the in~pector reviewed the official completed work package including the EWR, the unreviewed safety question evaluation, the installation procedure, and the post maintenance testing requirements/results~
No discrepancies were identifie During this period, the inspector witnessed maintenance activities and reviewed the work package for overhaul of turbine 1-FW-T-2 which is the prime mover for one of the auxiliary feedwater pump This review included all procedures and paperwork associated with work order 3800058211 and maintenance procedure MMP-C-FW-209, 11Disassembly, Inspection and Reassembly of Terry Turbine 11 which was the primary procedure used to perform the wor The review verified that work was properly documented in the package and that adequate post main-tenance testing was prescribe No discrepancies were note During this period, the inspector monitored maintenance activities associated with the motor operated valves which are used to control flow of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators during system operatio These valves (MOV-151A," 8, C, D, E, and F) were disassembled and the seats were renewe The inspector monitored the progress of work that was accomplished on these valves during his tours in containmen No discrepancies were note Design Change 85-32-01, Vital Bus Expansion/Surry/Unit 1 This area included replacement of the Unit 1 DC vital power supply for the 11A 11 bus including a new battery and solid state battery charger/inverter packag During this inspection period, the inspector routinely visited the modification area in the emergency switchgear room and monitored construct ion activitie The new solid state inverter/battery charger packages were positioned i'n the room and tied into their power supplie Al so, the new lA battery was installed, charged, and teste After completion of the modi fi cat ion and re 1 ease of the work to ope rat ions, the inspector reviewed the completed work packag This review included veri fi cat ion that appropriate engineering reviews, safety ana 1 ys is, and testing were documented as require No discrepancies were note Design Change 87-22, Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Replacement This area includes replacement of_ the four Unit 1 recirculation spray heat exchangers which are 1 ocated in containment with new heat exchanger The replacements were required due to degradation of the heat exchanger tubes (90/10 copper/nickel).
The new heat exchangers have tubes made of a more corrosion resistant material (titanium)
which should provide for a longer service life. During this inspec-tion period, the new heat exchangers were installed into the proper
- locations in containmen The inspector monitored the installation*
process and also discussed the installation of the upper restraint support. plates with the licensee and other NRC inspector No discrepancies were identifie Overhaul of the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
The inspectors monitored the repair of the Unit 1 pressurizer PORVs PCV-1455C and PCV-1456 fo 11 owing their failure to open on demand during a planned shutdown evolution (discussed in Inspection Report 280, 281/88-14).
This event was reported to the NRC vi a Licensee Event Report CLER) 280/88-011, dated May 11, 1988. The licensee issued an engineering work request to investigate the selector switches, air supply to the valves, and the actual valve Dissassembly and inspection of the solenoid operated valves (SOV)
that admit air to the PORVs revealed no abnormalities that would contribute to a failure to ope The PORVs were dissassembled and inspected for a common cause failure mechanism, in addition to inspecting the selector switch and wiring on the main control boar The only possible problem found so far was some inadequate insulation between the selector switch lug and the indication light box on the main contra 1 boar The licensee i dent i fi ed this condition on Station Deviation Report Sl-88-340 and issued a work order to repair the insulatio Station engineering is continuing thefr investigation and will issue a revision to the original EWR with the results, as well as issue a supplemental report to the LE The inspector will perform a final review of the issue in conjunction with closing the supplemental LER respons The inspectors continued their inspection from last month (Report N,281/88-14) of the problems associated with the weighted swing check valves used as containment isolation valves in the containment spray and recirculation spray syste While attempting to perform a local leak rate test of penetration number 70 in Unit 1 to establish an as-found condition of the penetration, the licensee discovered that check valve l-RS-11 (discharge check valve from the outside recirculation spray pump l-RS-P-28) was stuck in the open position. This check valve is used for passive containment isolation as defined in the Technical Specification As stated in last month 1s inspection report, this check valve is a 10-inch, 150 lb weighted check valve manufactured by Schutte and Koertering per drawing 68-XC-17 The weighted arm that is designed to hold the valve closed was found to be approximately eight degrees beyond top dead center, resulting in the valve being held in the full open positio *
The licensee evaluated and corrected the problem-in accordance with EWR 88-119, Evaluate Operability of RS Check Valve (1-RS-11).
An externai-inspection of the valve revealed motion (approximately 5 degrees) between the lever arm and hinge pin keyed connectio Subsequent internal inspec-tion indicated additional movement between the disc and hinge pi The
- key ways on the hinge pin and counterweight arm were loose, but indicated no damage from motion of the counterweight ar The above manufacturing drawing states to set the angle of the counterweight arm to 30 degrees above horizontal, with a total valve movement of 55 degree This would place the lever at 85 degrees with the valve full open and no movement between the part Corrective actions included repositioning the counter weight arm to a zero degrees horizontal starting positio This would result in a full open angle of 55 degrees and would more than compensate for manufactured and wear tolerance Normal access to the area of this valve is by ladder or scaffoldin Scaffolding had been install~d early during the outage to facilitate planned maintenanc It was concluded that the most likely cause of the valve being found open would be by someone manually lifting the counter weights for work access to other equipmen The cause appears to be a combination of poor original design and failures of licensee to understand the importance of the angle of the weighted ar These valves are 11stroked 11 during refueling and type 11C 11 testing, and will be added to the check valve test program that is being develope In addition, an air leak test on the portion of line from the suction motor operated valve, through the pump to the entrance to the associated recirculation spray heat exchanger showed a leak rate of 18 SCF This leakage rate added to measured leakage during the previous refueling outages, and known increases in leakage, gives a total leaking-of 141 SCF The allowable leakage is 180 SCFH (0.6 La).
In an accident situation this recirculation spray pump would start and this line would have a water seal. Only one of the two trains is needed in the accident analysis to return the containment pressure to subatmospheric within one hou Based on the licensee's identification of the open valve and the safety significance, as it could not be determined when this condition originated, the licensee reported via LER-280/88-012 that a condition existed violating containment integrity as defined by Technical Specification 1. 0. H. Enforcement actions pertaining to this situation is discussed in paragraph
_ 8 of this repor The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and corrective actions taken and consider both adequat Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to -assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel_ involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
Emergenc~ Diesel Generator Testing The inspector witnessed testing of emergency diesel generator number 3 (EOG) in accordance with PT-22.6C, Emergency Diesel Generator #3 Starting Sequence Tes This test verified the correct starting sequence following final adjustment of the start circuit relays in accordance with EWR 87-38 All work performed appeared to be in accordance with approved procedures; however, a problem did occur with the start failure alarm illuminating each time the EOG was started. This alarm is actuated by any of the following:
Failure of either fast start relay to pick up within 1 second after a start signal is received, Failure of the engine to achieve 40 rpm within 3 seconds after receiving the start signal, or Engine achieves 40 rpm within 3 seconds, but fails to achieve 125 rpm within 4 seconds after the start signal is receive This problem has occurred before and documented in Inspection Report 280,281/87-3 The corrective actions at that time was to adjust the relays and the start failure alarm was cleare The licensee performed extensive testing during the current outage and determined that the alarm was a valid annunciator due to sluggish roll-up of the engine when a start attempt was performed from the preferred start circui The air start motors were replaced but that did not correct the prob 1 e Fina 1 reso 1 ut ion was accomp 1 i shed by rep 1 acing the three-way air valve in the start circuitr This valve admits air initially to force the start motor pinion gear forward and engage with the engine ring gear, which is coupled to the engine crankshaf This process is repeated for the other start motor in that circuit and then air is returned to the valve, causing it to open and admit full air flow to the starting motors to begin cranking the engin The inspector witnessed the retest of this EOG on June 1, 1988, and noted that no start f~ilure alarm was received. A problem was noted in that the diesel could only be loaded to approximately 2.6 m The acceptance criteria stated in the Technical Specification requires the assumption of a load up to 2. 75 M The licensee performed troubleshooting and determined that the problem involved the megawatt meter only, which was subsequently repaired and the EOG was returned to servic *
8.
0
Chemistry Control On June 1, 1988, the inspector witnessed portions of the below test procedures that verify proper chemistry is being maintained in the primary coolant system and boric acid storage tanks during the Unit 1 refueling outage:
1-PT-38.1, Primary Coolant Chemistry 1-PT-38.8, Boric Acid Storage Tanks 1-PT-38.50, Condensate Storage Tank 1-CN-TK-2 The inspector reviewed the results of the above tests and compared them to the requirements of the Technical Specification No discrepancies were note Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Testing On May 29, 1988, the inspector witnessed flow testing of the Unit 2 AFW system in accordance with Special Test ST-21 This procedure used the motor-driven pump 2-FW-P-3A to separately flow each line to each steam generator and verify adequate flow can be achieve The results of this test were as follows:
Steam Generator "A" Steam Generator 118
Steam Generator 11C
294 gpm 336 gpm 304 gpm The licensee considers a minimum flow of 325 gpm is required to satisfy the system desig Corrective action following this test included venting the flow transmitters and reperforming the test with similar results obtaine Further inspection by the licensee revealed the 11A"1and 11C 11 flow orifices to be reinstalled backwards following their disassembly for pipe blockage inspectio The orifice plates were reversed, and, in conjunction with manually isolating the other AFW pumps to prevent backleakage, the test was repeated and acceptable flow results were obtaine A similar event occurred earlier this year when two AFW flow orifices were also determined to be installed backward The inspector was reviewing the contro 1 s and procedures regarding the installation of orifices that allowed this discrepancy to occur when the inspection period ende This issue is identified as an unresolved item pending further review by the inspector (URI 280,281/88-18-02).
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspector reviewed the LE Rs 1 i sted be 1 ow to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector 1s review also included
followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action(s) were complet LERs that identify violation(s) of regulation(s) and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V may be identified as Licensee Identified Violations (LIVs) in the following closeout para-graph LIVs are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria for exemption from issuance of a Notice of Violatio These items are identified to allow for proper evaluation of corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the futur (Closed) LER 280/88-12, lnoperable Containment Isolation Valve Due To Personne 1 Erro_ This report i nvo 1 ved the discovery of a weighted containment isolation check valve being found in a held open positio The cause of the valve_ to remain in the open posit ion was determined to be. a design prob 1 em with the valve and corrected as discussed in paragraph The only operational event that could have resulted in this particular valve opening would have also resulted in spraying containment; therefore, it was surmised that the valve was opened during an outage by a worker performing maintenance in the vicinit There is no way to determine when this condition originate The safety signifi-cance of this valve being in the open position is that it constituted a violation of containment integrity as defined in technical specification, unless this situation occurred during the current outage in a period when containment integrity was not require It should be noted that this situation was identified and corrected prior to any refueling operations that require containment integrit The inspectors reviewed the licensee act ions, as discussed previously, and consider them adequat Based on the licensee's identification of the open valve and the safety signifi-cance as disccussed here and* in paragraph 8, this item is identified as a LIV (280/88-18-04) for violation of containment integrity for an unspecified period of tim This LER is close (Open) LER 280/88-011, Inoperable Power Operated Relief Valve This LER discussed the event that occurred on April 15, 1988, when during a normal depressurization evolution, both Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
PCV-1455C and PCV-1456 failed to manually open when the respective three position switches were placed in the open position from the auto positio Both PORVs were later opened when the selector switches were placed in the open position from the closed positio The inspector monitored the licensee activities to troubleshoot and correct the problem as discussed in paragraph A supplemental report to this LER is expected pending final evaluation and conclusions from the station engineering staff. This LER remains open awaiting the results of this evaluatio.
Information Meetings with Local Officials (94600)
On May 11, 1988, the senior resident inspector, accompanied by the Section Chief from the Region II office, conducted a meeting with the new Surry County Administrator, Mr. Terry D. Lewi The purpose of the meeting was to provide a brief description of the present NRC organization, provide
appropriate business telephone numbers and points of contact, and to introduce the resident inspector The meeting was constructive and no major concerns were identifie The inspector also left a standing invitation for additional meetings with interested parties or officials to discuss matters of mutual interes.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 6, 1988, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One unresolved item (paragraph 5) was identified with regards to additional review of procedures for configuration control of piping blanks, (280,281/
88-18-01).
One unresolved item (paragraph 7) was identified with regards to the control over installation of flow orifices, (280,281/88-18-02).
One inspector followup item (paragraph 5) was identified for followup on implementation of procedure upgrade program, (280,281/88-18-03).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comments.* The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.